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^^yuhnn India achieved indap«nd«no«| Uere vag no organised 
Socialist part/ of auch significance* Though the Congress 
Party represented the soc ia l i s t ide&s. It did not stick to 
any stereo type brand of socialism* Soon after the CoHBunist 
Party and the Congress Socialist Party emerged, as an opposi-
tion to the Congress, professing and projecting social ist 
ideas In the country* In 1946 the Congress Socialist Party 
was changed to ^ocinlist party and finally to Praja Socialist 
Party in 1962, as a result of the merger of Klsan Mssdoor 
Praja Party and ^ c l a i i s t Party* Then in 1966 a large seetio^i 
of thfc PSF spl i t avay and fozaed a Socialist Party* In 1964, 
th« merger of the two brought about the Samyukta Socialist 
Party* Ih«n on August 9, 1971, once again a l l these parties 
formed into one Socialist Party* A spl i t also occured In the 
Communist Party of India in 1964, i^ieh resulted In the fonia. 
tion of tiie two parties, the CPI and the Manist Communist 
Party of India* 
The present study is an attempt at analysing and 
assessing crit ically the attitude and programme of the Cooiailst 
Parties of India with reference to Indians foreign policy* The 
parties selected for this study arc the CPT "Leftf and "Right", 
the P^ P and the FHp. An these parties, barring the CPI (M), 
agree in principle to Oovemment pursuing a policy of peace, 
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noiwftlignaitnt, anti^ooXoaiftllMi and an^l^raelalim* !1ov«f er» 
th«y •xpr«s8«d th^lr dit . iat l t fact ion vit^ th« Banner of Its 
lapXoiBontation. Ih« CPI (N) looks upon th« foreign poliey 
of ths Qovornatntt as a fdro«| a falXura and a davlatlen froa 
tlis basic principles laid dovn during ^ a prciadcp«idcncc 
and po8t»indep«nd«icc period and is tuned to suit the Interest 
of the Indian ruling class* 
All these parties have been continuously trying to 
give s new look and soeia l l s t ic orientation to India*s foreign 
poliey* As regards their ideology each differs froa the other 
and has Its ovn solution to offer with regard to ^brld proUeas* 
The hyper-sensItlvlty of these parties often led thea to take 
Initiative in foreign policy debates* The CPI advocates endlni 
of a l l exploitation of India's resources tqr foreign aonopoltfl<£l 
and a aore positive role In the struggle for peace against 
colonialisa and iaperlallsa* It advocates the policy of peacct 
non^alignaent and antUcolonlalisa* Hovevert It does not 
refrain froa crit icis ing the Qovemaent for i t s vacillations* 
Ihe CPl Oi) favours an independent foreign policy based on 
opposition to laperiailsai ooloaialisn« neo*colonlalisB and 
support to a l l freedoa struggles* It asserts that India's 
increasing reliance on v^stem aonopoly ald^ etc* oojectlvely 
faci l i tates the U*B« designs of neo»colonialisa and isolate 
Indl& froa the powerful currents of p«ace| deaocracy, freedsa 
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and a o e l a l l n . Contrary to this , tho CPI balitved that tha 
foralgn policy of India la In tdia aala a poXley of paaao, non. 
allgnaant and antLcolonlaliaa* It la aoaatlaaa vltlatad by 
lapaaa and eoaproBlaaa, bat on tha «hola« the aala oharaetar 
of tha policy haa baan preaarvad* Both tha partlaa h^fa 
ooapalgnad for cloaar tlaa with tha Soclallat eountrlaa. 
The praj« Soclallat Party bellaved In a dynaala and 
lndap«ndant foreign polley that upholda the peace and freadon 
of a l l natlona* It v&a oppoaed to a l l types of a l l l ta iy 
alllancea and deplored the policy of Indian GovarmeBt i^lah 
aubacrlbed to systems of big powers* A Vbrld aoclety baaed 
on the principle of freedoa and equality of a l l natlonS| and 
voluntary co-oparatlon between fsea people*a was the mala 
goal of the party* The eaayukta Socialist Party hardly differ) 
with PSP In foreign policy mattara* HoweYari In place of n»n. 
alignment It talked much of noiwpreferanea between powerful 
oountrlea l ike the U*S*A* and the U*f*S*R* and enphaalaed t>*e 
need for a vorld Ooverament* It has a firm belief that the 
Indian foreign policy haa been a weak-kneed policy* Both the 
parties emphasised the t l lrd force approach In International 
affairs* 
The preaent woxk highlighta the part played by these 
parties Inside and outside the Parliament and examine their 
influence on Indian public opinion and on detemlnents of 
foreign policy* 
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The attitude adopted 1^ the Socialist partieti ••«•» 
to b« aalnly confused vith India's stand on thc: basis issues 
of non-aiignataty antl^coloniaiisa and anti*raelalls% d l s . 
armaasnty £sian solidarity» India's con timed aenbeitbip In 
t^ .e Comaonvealtfa and India's sole in the Ulf. This stodj 
exaaines the attitude of these parties on these issues* They 
reacted on these issues articulately and did not refrftia 
froa crit ioisinc the Governaent day In and day out* They found 
the position of the Qoverment auch aore imlnerable in fore''" 
policy aatters than on doaostio affairs. 
Oener3lly» the study covers the issues vhieh cropped 
up between 19i2mto7, Ihe araed conflict with China and wars 
with Pakistan gave new dlaensions to India's forei^i policy* 
There arose a controversy among the social is t parties on 
laportant foreign policy issues such as non-allgnaeat and 
co*exlstence. During this period a l l these parties eaerged 
as a vociferous opposition to the Indian Goveraaeat* 
An extensive use of Lok Sabha and Hajya rabha DsbateSy 
related Cocuaents, Besolutions, Manifestoes, P&apMets, Books, 
Journals and periodicals of the parties has been aade* The 
off ic ial organs of the parties ewih as ISJOLjJULt Psftpi^** 
DaMrtogftoVy Janata and MatAirui h&ve a l so been usdd* 
The thesis has been divided into six chapters* The 
f izst chapter traces the beginning of the socia l i s t tradition 
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In Indlai i t s lapaot on Indian {Hiiallle opinion, on parties of 
dlffsrsnt polit ieai coaplszions and also on ths Qovsinasiit. 
Xh« basic issuss and prlnciplas of Indian forslgn polls/ havs 
btan dlsoussed in th« sscond ehaptsr. The third chapter 
deals vlth the Left and Eight CPI and Its emergence ag a 
great opposition to the ruling party. The party's function, 
ideology, stmcture and programae relating to the basic issues 
of India's foreign policy have been elaboratory discussed* 
The fourth chapter brings to l ight the attitude of the 
FSP and the CP tovards the essenti'^l ingredients of India's 
foreign policy, such as noa.allgnBent, antLcolonialisa^ sntl« 
raciallsa, aemDership of the Connsomrealth of Nations, dis« 
armament and the UNO* The fifth chapter highlights tiie rea«» 
tion ofthe Socialist parties to India's relation wit^ big 
powers-the U.r.A, and the U*C*S«ft« the controversial questl< 
of foreign aid is also discussed* 
The sixth chapter Is devoted to the study of India's 
relations vith }«r immediate neighbours particularly China 
and Pakistan, The events of 19&2, 1966 and ifl72, \^ich very 
much affected their relations, have been thoroughly examined* 
The present study tries to discuss thorou^ly tile 
attitude, reaction and contribution of these parties vith 
reg&td to the specific issues discussed in the earlier chattel 
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It also analy*«d th« hanging pha»« of th«st ptrtltt in 
Ui« oourio of tlao* It It gon«rall/ found that tht approach 
of theaa |>arti«s la aloganlth and eond«Bnatory ra^or than 
logical and constructiv*. often tlaas It appcaia t^at 
they oppose In order to play to the gallery and stsbUlae 
their petition In doai«ttlc pol l t le t . They thlft their 
petition time and again to tult t^clr ovn purpose* Foreign 
policy Batters are bated on delicate ittues vhieh ou^t 
to be thoroughly studied before hurling abuses on the 
governsent or questioning Its bona^fides or eapa^liity* 
P R K y A C E 
Th« present 8tu4y Is an atteopt to assess and review 
crit leal ly t^e attitude and prograome of the Socialist Parties 
of India with reference to India^s foreign policy. Till ^947 
India vas not an Independent state and hence could not clalii 
a foreign policy of her ovn. Mth the dam of Independence 
India inherited conpllcated probleas in Internal and external 
matters. India could not reoaln In^different to the pover« 
polit ics of rival groups and Military alliances* The choice 
of non-alignment h^ as actually a device to secure Indians 
national Interest at that time and to ensure ^ r l d peace* l^ur 
vlth China In 1962, the death of Janeh^rlal ffehxu, In 19d4^ 
the armed conflict vlth Pakistan In 1966 and the liberation 
of Bengla Desh, provided a different anvil for evaluation and 
assessment of India's foreign policy declarations* But India's 
faith In peace and non-alignment could not be shaken* The vay, 
India has faced these challenges to freedom and non-alignment 
Is Indeed a glaring example of sincere devotion to the cause 
of freedom and peaceful co-existence* 
The Socialist parties of India, It might be said, have 
been continuously trying to demand a social ist orientation to 
India's foreign policy* The parties selected for this study 
are the CPI *'LefV and "Right", the PSP and the SSP* In 
principle, a l l of them, barring the CPI (M), agree tb Oovem-
nent pursuing a policy of peace, non-alignment, antl-colonla-
llsm and anti-raclallsm* novever, they expressed their 
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dltsatUfaction vlth tht manner of i ts laplcDtntatlon* In 
their Ideology oaeh differs froa tSie other and has Ita own 
solution to offer vlth regard to ^orld probleas. The hyper. 
s e n i l i t y of these parties often led then to take Initiative 
In foieign policy debetes. They hlf^llghted eertaln forelffi 
polloy Issues for active and serious consideration by the 
Govemnent* ^ their propaganda they soaetlaes bvougfit pressure 
on the Qovemaent to follov a particular action* They a l l 
tried to bring to l ight the failures and %feaknesses of the 
Qovemment of India from tine to tine. They found the Qovem. 
•ent*s position mach nore vulnerable In foreign policy than 
on domestic affairs* 
The present wDsk h lgh l l^ts the role of th«se parties 
Inside and outside the Parliament and assess their impact on 
Indian public opinion and on detexalnenta of IndiaU forel^i 
policy. 
This study throve l lg^t on thoae Issues vhldi cropped 
up betveen 19bS.19d7. 2he aned conflict vlth China 196S and 
vars vlth Pakistan gave nev dimensions to India's forelffi 
policy* Controversy arose among the f^oclallst parties on 
Important foreign policy Issues sudi as non-allgnstnt and 
co-existence* Dtiring this period a l l the Socialist parties 
to 
smerged as a vociferous opposltlon/the Qovemment and some 
extent Influencing it* 
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The attltud* of th« Socialist parti** tovardt India's 
foreign polley i t oonftts«d« Ihay crl t le ise India*! stand on 
th« Issutts of noruaiigDBsnt^ hsr fight against raeialisa and 
oolonialisa, disaniamsntt Asian solidarit/t India's xola in 
th« Unit«d Nations and India's oontinnsd mcab^rship in th« 
CoMMmrsaith of Nations* This study strives to cxsHia* ths 
attitude and the reaetlon of the soeiaXist parties towards thea. 
All these parties articulately reacted on these issues and 
did not desist froa crit icising the Goverosient for i t s weak* 
nesses and vacillations* The CPI (M) adopted« throu^ut , a 
yry cr i t ical and sometlces hostile attitude tov<ards the 
Goverment* Its vievs on a l l the isportant issues vere more 
or less agitational* 
*n extensive use of Lok Sataha and Bajya Sabha Debates, 
related OocuaentSy BookS| JoumalS| Periodicals^ Paaphlets, 
Resolutions and Election Manifestoes of the parties has been 
Bade* Ihe of f ic ia l organs of the parties such as JblLAgftt 
p^ftpia'e riMiiftfirfiflTi fanafeny Mttniritut^  havc also been consulted* 
tti9 thesis contains s ix chapters* Ihe f irs t chapter 
traces the begiiming of the social is t tradition in fodia, Its 
iapaet on Indian public opinion, on parties of differ«it 
polit ical coBplexions and also on the Qovemnent* The second 
chapter deals vith the basic principles and Issues of ^ e 
Indian foreign policy* The third chapter deals with the Left 
and Right CoBninltt Par^r of India and ita aaarganea as a graat 
oppoaition to the Congreas Qovamiant* Tha funetion, idoolog/ 
and prograama of both tha Coanunist partiaa relating t» Indians 
foreign policy principlea and iaauaa haira been elaboratory 
dlaousaad* The fourth chapter highlights the attitude of the 
PGP and the nnp tovarda eaaential ingredients of India's foreign 
poUc/t such as non-aligmenty anti^oolonialisa, anti-raeiallsa, 
disaraaMenti aeciberahlp of tha Coaaonvealth and the United 
Nations* The fifth chapter deals vith the Socialist parties 
reaction to Indians relations vith big povers • • • the U.fi.A, 
and the U*&,£«B» The controversial question of foreign sid 
is also dealt with. 
The laat chapter is devoted to India is relations with 
her Inmediate neighbours such as China and Pakistan. The events 
of 9^t>29 igtd and 1972, lAiioh ver/ mch affected these rela* 
tions, have been thoroughly exaained. In ^ e end a brief 
oobelusiony suamarlsing the aain points of the thesis, has 
been given. 
I an deeply indebted to Professor R.^.H.Haqqi, Head of 
the Department of Political Science for his valuable suggestions, 
I aa grateful to ay teacher and supervisory Professor n.Naslr 
/ l i i vhose constant help and inspiring i^idance created <»>nfi. 
dence In ae and enabled ae to finalise the thesis. I aia also 
greatful to Dr* Shan Mohaaasd, Er* Zafar Ail Khan Hatai, 
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Pr* Xanflq Ahaad Iflsaai and Dr. Shah Abdol Qa/yiia for thair 
ayapath/ and aupport* I ala^ acknovledga vltti thanks th« 
asslstanoa axtandad to • • by fallov research seholars and 
frlands* I also wish to adcnovladga the help and assistance 
I received fzon the Library rtaff of Maulana Asad Librsr/| 
eapru House Library and tdie National Library of Calcutta* 
My thanks also due to these writers vhosc woxks and 
opinions 1 have referred to In these psges. Even though I 
have drawn upon the aaterial included in ^.e vorirs of these 
writers profusely, the opinions expressed and conclusion 
reached are sgr ovn for which I own ful l responsibility* 
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Ihfi social is t movtaent la Ir.dis ttartttd as 8 r«ftetion 
against capltallinti feudalism and Vhe British eolonlai doBi* 
nation. It vas alnvd at establishing a society iasssd on 
equity and justice. '*t present stage of Indian politics^ 
soclallsB has taken the for* of a positive Ideology or Idso* 
logies vlth many parties adhering to i t s vax'ylng forms vlth. 
out l>elng able to give i t a concrete meaning* ^hen the 
object Is not cl&ar consistent efforts to acV l^eve It become 
an Impossibility* 
•"oclallsm Is seen differently t^roug^ different eyes, 
fome consider It as a positive virtue and an unmixed blessing^ 
vMle others regard i t as vicious end s t i l l others as ""• 
mysterious p}i«UMBenon which eludes the grasp of si student* 
vriters on socialism are not agreed on current definitions 
of socialism as i t connotes different politico*economic 
programmes and raurse of action ^ i o h are oftui vldely 
divergent* It involves fundamental c^^nges in the social 
structure^ polit ical culture, in VAJB of thinking and living* 
It has important social and cultural aspects deposited hy 
U^ « flov of history* It embraces a l l regions of the l i f e 
of an individual as vei l as the community* 
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Coclallsa Is an attitude ot mind and a direction of 
approach to th« vox id probleoit* the ideal of a tociallat i t 
to rcBove traditional povert/y customary prlvlleget» ramp&at 
crlmei a l l pervading curruptlon and other social evils of the 
society by esta iailshing a new social and econoBle ordmr 
vhere there v l l l be no tmequailty^ no exploitation and no 
serfdom* 
Xhe lArd *sooialism* has come to us from the vest. 
For the f i r s t time the texm 'socialism^ in i t s modsrn senssf 
vas used in 18£7 in the :>wanlta Ciw>n>Mtl%> KafKlif to 
1 
denote tendencies opposed to tiie liberal individualism. 
Sir Thomas More Ct478»1696) had been the f i r s t iirlter \flu> 
depicted an ideal society vlth sociai ist ie institutions in 
his book "Utopia", £!y 1830 socialism vas applied both la 
England and France to describe the social t ideals of Ibbert 
Owen, Charles Fourier^ Louis Blanoy st^Slmon^ Proudhan and 
others* Hobsrt Oven sought to reform capitalism through state 
supported trade unionism^ the cooperative movement and education 
Charles Fourier vas in favour of spontaneous cooperative 
associations vlth capital furnished by the state* St* Simon 
sought to subordinate private enterprise to councils of 
system 
•xperts to eradicate many of th^ maladies of the capitalist / 
1* C3iaraaa, a*K*, Indian a>flUlJliit Hr^t ^gra Univsrslty, 
1966, p* 29* 
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and Proudhan ves Is £wtmr o£ eoMeafitsmtlon of owiwnltip 
2 
o£ all oapitaX in oooparativo bardsa* AXl of thaa triad to 
rapXaea e^ltal las by soaa foia or voricar'a oimarahiip or 
eoQtrol of inctustry* Tbasa vritara \t9T9 kaowa aa Utopian 
i^ooialiata beocmae thoir idoas wera attraotiva tmt war* 
oonaidarad iapraoticabla* 
With the adirant oT ManciaB aooialiai antarad an 
altogathor jmf phaaa* Dialaetioe^ matariallMf on vhioh vaa 
based tha % o^la socialist thimdng of MaxXf enablad Karstiat 
to ragard their Idaology as historically oriantad* Soclalin 
in this raspact boeaao seiantifie aa iq;q)osad to aarly sooia^ 
3 
lissif vhidh Is e&llod Utopian* 
SoeialiaB i s day by day gaining atrangth and praatiga 
and has baoaraa the watchword of ovary political laadar of 
almost evary ooontry* i t doainataa Uia nodam spirit and 
axprasaaa tha thcnghts and faalings of an* It has beeata a 
a nov slogan to attract ^r ^befoop tha aaasas and for achiavlag 
political povar arid autho.'ity* 
in India aocialian nanlfastad itaalf in tha atruggla 
for fraadon freei foreign colonial mla aa wall aa in tha 
Part It flaw Delhi, riehiu Manorial Muaai» And Liberary. 
19701 p*46* 
3* Ibid^ y p. 46, 
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•truggl* for social Justice against th« cxploltstlvs faudal 
and capitalist sleaents vho oooparatad vlth the British 
liBpttrialirts with ths object of perpetuating their strong 
behold oirer India. The interests of the local bourgeoisie 
and the British rulers verit identical and hence they encoura. 
ged each others doaination* 
Before th« First ^ o^rld ^»r there vas no soelalisn in the 
country either in the fom of ideolog/i political parties, 
groups or in t^e shape of individual socialist thinkers* Hovevor 
Sone / l l India Organisations sprang up, such as *MahaJan r^ abha* 
in Madras and * Indian Association* in Bsngsl in leTS. In 1678 
started the famous Journal Thm HinAt in Hadras, vhich played 
4 
an important part in ^ e developnent of Indian nationalisa* 
Out ultimately in 1866, the Ijidlan Ifatlonal Congress cane into 
existence in Ibmbay, ^ e^ople vho were eager for such an 
6 
organization Joined It ultlnately* It started as a platfon 
for the liberal intelligentsia of the country* 
4. For details see, "teaMidar, A.C*, fodlin Nitlanil BTQltttafln 
A Ri.ii.f Eurnav af tha Origin And Pragraae at tha Indian 
waiHr^ nai Cangraae^ 2nd ed*, Hsdrss, Hatesan, 1917, pp. 
1.46* 
bm Ghosh, r«M«, "Congress and Dtaoeratlo f^ociaiisa**, J ^ 
Hitairada (Wagpur), January £, 1967* 
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/OX through tha X9tli oent^ry and tbd bagiiinlxig of 
SOtti i'ar rdtiohlng oh^jigos vera taklztg plaeo in soeialf 
ecoooBley polit ical and IntaXidctu&l fidlds ^ i o h sonrtd to 
praparo the ground Tor tha «Mrgenoe of oerteln itess nhidn 
aaaok9d of eooialim* 
Miong tha groat lnt«lloot»al8 end rofomors ^ o had 
oomo ifito cootaet with the soolali^ta at Oroat Britain and 
the i^ oropoun eoaiitri«>8 vare Doda i^d £iaorojly Lala Lujpat 
i^aif bal Gangadhar liXak oto* Dada Bhai had ooae into 
oontaet vith sooi&Iist thought through UyndiMKi who was his 
groat rriend« Hyxtdman r^g^dod him as boing too aodorate 
in his politios* liada Lhai v ^ hittorly aoeosod by th» 
Inuiana for tho ''daniiorcxis podiay** o£ soeurisig the support 
of sooialists* But to hia there was nothing vrong in seeking 
the help and support oi GXI men of good faith whether thegr 
vrere soeialistGy l i t era l s or eonservatlve^- He also baeaao 
ao<|aalnted with the intornatlor.al soeiolists* In August 
19079 he attended the International Socialist Congress at 
AastdrdflB as a delegate of British India* ihere Dada liiai 
called upon the working aen for help and s^ n&pathy in Indiar^ 
6 
national struegle* 
6« i;''or a detailed uooount aedf Xmas. ^^ afary "%e hise of 
Soviet FvusBia .nd f^ooialisa 1017»19S9**| in Handa. B.B^edl., 
fioaiaiiitm |n Tnr^ ffti, riew Delhi, V i^kas >^blioatioc8y 1972. 
• 6 » 
ijy tlws9 oofitaets th<is« polltleians eqold not ooiiQ«rn 
tb«as«lv«8 with sooiallsa or vith my doetriiM preaofaiog a 
radioed progrnsie* lh«gr valued nationallBB abova avarythix^ 
and thought i t to bo above all olass intoMsts* Xha and o£ 
toT9i$n rula was thair prlsary oonoarfu 
Tha introduotion and spraad of iastani oduoation 
oo&trlbutod much to tha davalopaant of tha idaology o£ 
natlofMa fraadcn* Aetong tha foetors ^ ieh turnad Indian 
aiod against tha British niia vev\?its aconanio oonsa^panoaa* 
.\8 Byailiford roaarkadi 
"Tha aeonomio raXatiom^ip (batwaan India and Britain) 
rapeatad ttiat vhi^ had drivan tha Aaariean eoloniaa into 
ravolt* India vas regardod as a graat narkat for Britiih 
goods aspaaiaUy aottoa eloth t har ftunetion vas to sarva 
as a plantation for tha rising of suoh axotia crops as inSigo 
and taa as a souroa of roM matarials* Tha ax^iitita hand!* 
erafta V9T9 U rainadi &t first by tha irrasistibla eoipati* 
7 
tion of the naw aga of pcxfor industry*** 
Tha Indian's vara soon fad up and got disgustad Kith 
tha British rula and took up t!^ eoonoeio aspaot of tha 
British occtspatiOR and demonstratad that undor i t tilidre vas 
7. Brailsford, H.M.,alibi9fit Tnaiftt Boobey, Vara 4 a,, 1©46, 
P* 18. 
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eontimed IspovdrishBieiit o£ th« ooontry* SaoaKisc of this 
tt» $<mgyss daffiand«d *^«&raj** 
This spirit roma eacpressicm In the aarly poXiof and 
progrMKti* c&^  ttM iniian National cocgrvsa vlth wlti^ aU. 
IndiiO) Iftadtfrs aixoh as l^ ada Bh&i Bao^oHt ^^•^^ ^ ^ ^*^ 
vl«Digl37 word assQoiatod* Thoy rogardM t&o (Engross as a 
politioaX organisation to rapresont their poIitioaX aapira* 
ti<ms« ilio year oi' 19X6 was a aoDontous year in tha history 
of Indian Kationaliaa* *^Q tha Insso^Taf^anesa wcr had pro* 
dnead a new consciousness In IndiU| tha i*irst World War 
unleashed now idaas ar^ d idaala ev«n thougli in a vary nidi* 
mantary form* 
Tho news of tha itttsslan Ravoltition of 1@17| was 
enthuaiastloally raceivad by o^ar eoontrlaa of tha world* 
India also eoald not raaain aloof froi i t s far raa^iing 
influaaeas. Tha ehanea brought by i t for tha %Milfara of 
raassas of workars and paasants too was tiia baokgramid our* 
tain of tha amarganoa of social ist idaas in th^sonntry* 
now foroos, which sprang i3p in tha country as a rasult 
of i^ A^iaslan liavolutittif slowly bogon to transform tha nations* 
l i s t movsmont with a formalist proerainaa of aotlon against 
Isporial n^o in India* Tim naln f&etors whioh oontributad 
a lo t to the r4iw awakaning ^^ro tha l^ ian National Ctmgrass 
«» 8 <• 
^^hleh spdadlXy transfome^ into a dtynaode organis»tiQii| ttm 
reQ9w«d aotivlty oX* a d«t«nilc»d grvap of !a«n working for 
tu^iovSng froedoa and a signli'lcont ohaiig^ in Uo«r«mB9nt*8 
polloy i'roB reform and oonsoi^ 'OQBiits* to hositatl^i and 
8 
roprossion in ruli'iXling the proBd s^es art«r the war had 
ended* 
She msslan devolution ainoat contagiously forced 
a conalderatlon of aoclo^econoolo content of natlonallsa* 
Since then the sooiallet and the oooaunltt thought have 
Increasingly spret^ d tijbxoug^ut the world* The growth of 
^rade Union noveoent In particulir helped in the develops 
ment of the social is t flioveaentJ)^ Indla.l!he f i r s t attsapt to 
form the Trade Uiion Organization was OMide by B«i>,\ihdia vho 
9 
fomed a Trade Union in Madras on August S l | 1918* 
The alas and objects of the British Labour aoveaent 
Influenced Indian labour to a great extent* The ideala of 
British idkbour attracted a few intellectuals ^ ^ had been 
Interested In social and labour work* The result vas the 
10 
fonation of All India Trade Union Congress In 19£0* C«B*Oas, 
8* laaa, 2;afar« oaualitf PP* 4ii>>47* 
9* Handa, 3*IU« ^!^sS^^ P*^ * 
10. iJilA* Xhe declared ala of the A2TUC was^  **to coordinate 
the act iv i t ies of a n labour organisation In a l l trades 
Contd«•••••• 
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JAitxlAifi&t Rftl and oth«r leaders of the Coagreest lateree. 
ted In soolalieai shoved an active Inter^t In the eaer^ 
Sng trade Union and peaaant iBoir«««ats* Lala Laipat Bal 
presided the First session of AIiiuc In \92o and C«R*Oas 
In t9SS* Mahataa Gandhi also began to take Interest in 
the labour and peasant aovissnts so«i after his return 
to India in 191b* Qiy the tlae the f i r s t session of I^IUC 
took place in I9e0| Qandhl had already f i n control over 
the faffblrs of the Congress and the nation* 
The Xrade Union Movement vaa greatly influenced hjr 
the ideas and act ivi t ies ^f the oooiaunlsts* A group of 
young Indian Intellectuals vas propagstlng MarxlsB* Every* 
>^ere there vas a nev spir i t of inquiry and groving disss, 
tlsfactlon with laperetlve prograHies snd ideologies* 
Among the youth vho vere powerfully effected men. 
tlon may be made of Nazrul Islam who wrote his BvAthdv Myi 
in 1919, young men l ike Mussaffar Ahmad and Fakhrul Itq 
who brought out a nev Bengali evening daily called MWif 
in 19&0 and S.A.Dsnge who publimhed ^ ^ ^ i pnA Laniift in 
i9S9* '^^ 3ombay and Calcutta became the pioneering centres of 
(Continued from the pr*»vlious page) 
and in a n provinces in %idla and generally to further 
tiie Interest of Indian X t^aeurt in matters social, 
pol it ical wad economic.** See, Bi»Dftrt of tha Fir«ii ATTU<! (Bombay 1920), p*70* 
11* iMid* 
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Indian CooauniSBy to b» foUlov«d soon by LahorOf Hi drat 
and Ca%mpor«« 39 th Cteneo and Muiaffar vara th« founding 
mambart of tha Comnunlst J»art«y of Ibdia* 
fhua In So* a taapar of tha paopla vaa undargalttg 
radloal chan^a and tha sooialiat idaaa vara e&pturlng tha 
im&^inAtion of tha Hldian p«oi»la» 
During tho freadoii novaaant in India tha oonaanitta 
called for a prolatarlat^ ravolution In ordar to pat • an 
and to Sapariallao, I ^ Indian Ifstlonal atruggla for 
fr«edoa« fron the ahackus of foreign lnparlallaiB| to thai 
appearad to ba a atagc. In th« longar journa/ tovarda aoeia. 
l laa, 
Comaimlst rational partlaa and froiodt groupa ^vang 
out. Foraaoat aaoni; thaaa vas th« y3rkar*a and Haaaant 
party vhleli had units In ^^n^al, Uoabay, tha Unltad Provincaa 
and Punjab* £h« ooveoiant also csontactad and drav racrults 
from savaral revolutionary and terrorist groupa in Punjab 
and 3en^al« 
M«N*fioy ^ino vas vDi^lag on behalf of the Gaamnlat 
Ihternatlonali vas trying to build up a oofKrunist aoY^ent 
IS* In Bengal the Aunahlian Saaltl and the Jagantar Party} 
in IHinJab the Oadar Par^ sad the Hindustan soelal lst 
Bepubllcan Amy. Saa^  Of era tree t, Oene 4^  ^IndalUert 
Marshall^ c^aauniaa In TnAii^ Sazkelay, University of 
Califor^a, 1964, pp. 44, £36« 
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tiorrovlag his id«fts fxo« abroad. At tha Baoond Coiifraaa 
of tha Goaintam In Buaala la leeo. vhleh reoognlaad lb / 
13 
as the chlaf arohltaet of Aalan Cow^\mAwm^ lb / advoeatad 
that the ooonualsta in oolonlal and aaal^Golonlal aouatrlas 
14 
ahouid puraua a militant onooaproaiaing polio/* Lanin on 
tha othttr hand conaldarad that in tha aarl/ atag«a of tha 
national liberation in tha colonial and aajal»eolonial 
countries the eoauaunists should voA in ooopaxation« and 
not in conflict with tha national taourgaoiaia vho sought 
freedoB* M.N.Ho/ vas not satisfied with the xola of the 
national bourgeoisie entirel/* 
ib/*s «)ntact and correSiiondenee reached bo^ Itenist 
like Cangei Musaffar Ahmad and few others non»Marxist| like 
C«fUDaSf Oange star ted a.%ieekl/ Journal *£ocialist* from 
aomba/ in 1922. It vas ttie f irst regular publioation in 
the countr/ that devoted i t se l f exolusivel/ to the dlssemi. 
nation of Marxist ideas and associated i tse l f openl/ vlth 
13* See* Bu^raJi Vlja/ Sen^ **The Coaaunist International 
And Indian Polities", in wanda^a^R.. Sflaiaii«m in inAtm^ 
ajMJBil*t P*^ *^ ^ ^ Lenin and Bo/ vere included in the 
cbaaisslon set up b/ the Second Congress to ezaalne the 
various aspects of national and colonial questions* 
14. Ghoset Sankar, fi^^iaia— Ani< c.^—u«i«« T» I^AJU a»aba/, 
Allied Publishers, 1971, p«16, 
16, Ibid^ For the Full Xext of B>/*s thesis see^EudiiS, X*/.gi« 
Nort»i, K^C^SQiiiet iaiesla and th« East 'iQ2Q.fiO (. U n d . 
ford, 1967),pp« 181*18d| see also. RB/ M*9*/Disigreeaent 
vlth Lenin over the Colonial c^uestion*', in Ib/,K*^*, 
ISutaia, (daaba/, 1964), 
• le • 
the soolallst cftttss* Boy*t pap«r JUogliiCdf publishtd In 
Europe, vas ftXao tent to eainent natlonailttt . Dange's 
a^clali«t wag aost probably inspired by such publleetlon. 
An Urdu language aonthlyi Innatiab iiag brought out by 
Oulaa Hussaln from Lahore vho had beeoae Marxist* Muzaffar 
Ahnad at the time va^ trying to gather support for the foraa. 
tion of a 6oBinttnl8t Party In India* 
Roy vas trying to carry soelallsa rlg^t Into the 
heart of Congress but could not achieve such success* He 
aade a bid to cultivate support vlthin the Indian National 
Congress and even to wrest loadershlp Into conninlsts 
16 
hands* Boy tried to win C*B* Das, vho talked of Si«raJ 
for the masses at Dehradon* 3ut Das*s speech at Qays 
session of 192£ shattered Boy's hopes* At Gaya, Tu» stated 
flxnly tbac he vas one of those %^ "hold non-violence on 
17 
principle*" The proceedings of the Qaya Conference dls . 
appointed Roy* He thought, in the «»xisting cixeuastances, 
16 
the organisation of a party of the %iorkers and peasants, 
for the aohlevenent of ooaplete national independtfiee froa 
British rule and Indians further advance to soolalisa* 
16* Iverstreet, and Vindniller, op.olt*. pp* 44-46* 
17* Cftngrose PrftSldantial A d d r — t From S l l v r to G^ld^n 
Jufail—y Madras, 0*A*Natesan, 1934, p* 672* 
18* Bee for details, Overs tree t and VlndmiUer, op^cit^ 
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All these ori^anlzationaX efforts r«e«ived a eh«elc as 
thtt tMo conspiracy cAti^j the Csvnpore ^nspfrsojr &se (1924) 
and the Meerut (^nsplraey Case (1l^9«dd)^ dealt a severe l»isv 
to th«lr activities* 
the prlncipd.! plank of the ^oMBunist party at that 
tlae vee to «»nter the National Coa^esa vlthout losting Its 
ovn identity and to transfora C>ngreS8 to bring It ui^er 
"proXatarlan hegeAony*** Coanunlsa at that tlae ves^ s t i l l 
on tru ievftl of Ideaa &nd propaganda* 
Sovards the end of 1886, pol i t ical discontent was 
spreading In th« lyatlonailst ranks* JSit^ cal l for a non» 
cooperation Moveaent had brought out tiiousands of youngB«ei 
Into the fold of nationalist struggle* 3y the end of 1926, 
the f^varajists performance In the legislature has also belied 
hopes of effective pol i t ical action through constltotlona. 
lisa* 
It is evident that the socia l i s t thinking In India 
did not aake ai>y significant progress in India prior to 
1927* The yeai 1927 opened vith an intellectual cliaate 
favourable for the reception of new ideas and thiaking* Wehnii 
19* Shlviah| "Nehru Aad Boy i Soae Aspects of Socialist 
JJiought And Moveaent In India", in i^ gottgitf^ nitt flf ttt 
fiwlnir t>n f?nfililIMI oBafiUi*! p* « « • 
14 • 
during hit v i s i t to Europ* and t^e Soviet Ruttla In 1966. 
27t^  eonsidsrably Influnnoad by th« aehUvewintt of the 
Soviet Union* Daring the freedoa aioveaient he developed 
•oc i i l i a t ld»3s In India. Later on he tried to praetlee 
and ii7.plement these ideas through eeonoale planning in 
India* It vas lar^jely under his Inspiration that a soeial lst 
ori«nUition vas ^Iven to the (x>nstitution, legislature and 
^vernnental prograase in India. £hough i t is onl/ a 
theory not a practice in fact* <fehru*s soeialisB ves greeted 
with an out»pouiing of puiallc opinion ranging froa delight 
acdaia to bitter condennatlen* Many people in India and 
autslde Interpreted his socialism in the l i ^ t of Marxist 
pt^iilosophy. People had «90d reason to u«ll6V«» i t because 
he had a roaantic attachaent with Marxisa* fk>a« event vent 
extent of saying that CTongress under his leadership was no 
longer purauing "le ideology and principles of Mf^ hataa S 
Gandhi and was Switching over to Manclsm, 
Nehru W3S greatly influenced by '^rx. His sdalra. 
tion for Marx and Lenin is evident in his books, ^ 
SO 
iittiAiit An Attteblattaphy and Qitiansof \atlt giitory* To 
hia study of f^rx and Lenin produced a powerful effect on 
his alad and helped hia to "$ee current affairs in a new 
RdnJtOHn 
20« Nehru, Javahar Lai , tiOTflati iftiaatl i fiWi aMMMrtrt 
Id ftBrtaitoaif aaabay^ Chetna, 1989} jSa 
Ibx, aoabayTAllied Publishers Ltd., ! % { 
tefid g^gteryf london, Lindsay l>ruaBond, :<i'.vrtfA; 
1M8« 
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Xi^t*** Xhoui^  h« diinot aec«pt «1X th« fundMsiitaXt 
of Marxlui| h« did b«ll«Y« that th«r« I«M oiMi amtaesBiMi 
and axploitatlon of tha %iorkara and paaaanta 1^ tha pfopartgr 
ovnars In a eapitallat aociat/* "Marx say ba vxoag la 
aoBtt of hia aUtaaanta .Bat ha aaaaa to aa to hava 
poaaaaaad quiat an axtraordloar/ dagraa of inalght lata 
aoeiai phanoaana, and thla Inalg^t vaa apparantl/ dua to 
ss 
tha aolantlf ie oathod ha adoptad." 
Rahru eaaa in contaet vlth aaay aoaaoalata at tha 
Bruaaala Con^ raaa in 19S7« Hia vialt to Biiaaia, «^ara ha 
attantad tha loth annlvaraax/ ealabratlon of tha Ruaalan 
Bivolution, attraetad hia to a ooaiBitnlaa, Thara ha aat 
H*N*Boyt for tha flrat tlaa* At Bruaaalsha oaaa la eoataat 
vlth T*Chattopadh/aya« Ha aald| "So I tumad Inavitatly 
vlth goodvUI tovarda ooaoaalaa, for vhatavar ita faulta^ 
i t vaa at laaat not h/pocrltioaX and not laparlallatie •••••• 
Ihaaa attract«d aat *• *^o tha traaandoua ahaagaa taking 
placa in auaaia. But ooaaanlata of tan ixritatad wf by thair 
dictatorial va/a* thair aggraaalYa and rathar vulgar aathodaf 
81, Nahruy J.L., MiWYtgy ttf IBdU» Boaba/, Aala PuttLlahiag 
Elouaay 1969t p.S8» 
8S, Nahrat ^•i^t An AtttaMattirtirt ofiiJBlt*! 1968, p.69i. 
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th«lr hal»it of d f^iouiieliig tYtvy body i ^ did not agr«t vlth 
th«B« This MBotlon i«at no doubt du*, at they would tayi 
23 
to ay o%m bottrf«oitl<i «dtoeatlon and upbringing.** 
Rshrtt did not aecapt tb« ooaaiuiat way for hit ooontryt 
tha raaaona var« txis baekgrouadf parsonality aaka up^  iKpaat 
of aadhian phiXoaophy of naant and andf and ^ia adharanea to 
non.viol«nea« ISOB iapaot of i^ataxn libaraXiaa \m» writ 
larga on hia peraonality and way of thinking* 
CIt hia return from Europe hia taak baoaoa to giva a 
n«v oriantation to tha polioy of tha Congraaa* It %iea Kabia 
who did aoat to populariaa aocialiaa in th« country and i t 
waa aoatly dua to hia afforta that a dafinita left wing aroaa 
inaida tha C^n r^eas to define ita political, aoeial and 
eeonoaie objactivea* 
Froa hia oonnection with the League Agalnat lapariallaa 
at BruaaalSt ^ehru learned one thing i»a« tha atruggle for 
the national liberation of tha colonial people maat take 
plaee in the eontesit of tha given international aituation 
aa i t waa ^ part of tha unfolding world revolution. So ttie 
national ooveaent in tha aubjaet eountriea aoaahow influeaeed 
mimmmmmmmmmmmmmmi^mtmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmamimmmilmilmmmmmmimmmmmmm 
S4* iMd*f P* 691. 
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IV sooial lst ld«as and id«AXi« 
Nthrtt v&nt«d th« ZadUn IlftUoaal CongrMs to bt 
Asgoclated with tlM Uaga« Agaimt laparlaliaa* Aecaptlnt 
N«hrtt*t sugiaatlon th« ladlan Rational Coagroia daoidad to 
attach itaalf vith th« Laagna Ag^lnot laparialiai as an 
ataoolatod aenbar* Ihla «aa no doubt an Indication that th« 
aoelaliat aoTaiiant vai no longer In th« baeki^tart in India. 
Da Octob«ii.^ovaab«r 1928 Hohrttf along vith Sutahath 
Chandra Bourn and S^^inivaa Ijrangdr^  founded tha fitidapondanoo 
for India L«aguo« indopandonoa for India X«aagua lAa tha 
f lrat organisation vithin tha Congrass with an sxprassad 
i>r«>faranca for sooialisn* 
t9ahrtt*s socialiatio idaas influanead tha youth of tho 
oountr/* In his i^rasidantial iddxass to th6 Uhera Congress 
in 1929» Rahru opanl/ daolarad that ha was a soolal lst and 
a republiean and not a baliavar in kings and prlneas and 
S7 
in th« order whieh produced ^)e modem kings of industry* 
thus at Lahore for tho f irs t tistt soeiallsa was pressed 
26. Bey9M.N.9 Jaiiharlat lfthltl»^»<v nilhi» Badleal DMioera. 
t ic Part/f October 19479 p*S7. 
26* Xhe Priaary objects of the League were (a) | tha aehleve. 
•ent of eoaplete Independence for India and (b) the 
reconstruction of fodisa society on the basis of social 
Indian National Congress*'y in &MuMJL 
QB»fiU>i P* 1^* 
S 7 . Can>r>«fl ! » — t a « n t l « l ^SArmmM^ Att^fiU^., p . 89«« 
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ttom th« Con^tts FrMid«atiai Chair* Iha foUevlng yaar 
N«hcu &lM9 pjra«ld«d ov«r th* trad* Union Congrats and datirad 
to bring tha la^ur to tha nationalist aovaaant at alto to 
28 
fluOca tha Congrata aora toeiaXlttla. In hit fJithmr Lm<a, 
vrittan in 198d, Nahru again ; rnf^iieratad hit baliaf in 
aooialita and ttatad that Indian ttruggia «at link ad vith 
tha world ttruggia againtt oapitalita* Itiut N«hru daeiai^ vd 
in hit tTatidantiai Addjvas at Lacknov .<»ttion of tha 
Oon^rattin 1936| that« '*th« only kay to tha tolution of th« 
29 
vorld problan and of Indiana problaa l i e s in toelalita** 
fTa taid that the uorld vat dlvidad into two iratt gxoapt^ 
tha iaparialitt and fate it t on tha ona tida« and tha toaia. 
l i s t and nationalist, on the othar, and Vidian nationalists 
inavitably sidad vith thoaa foroas of tiia vorld % i^oh wtra 
rangad againtt fatcita and iaparialita. 
Sa vantad to bring socialisa in India through paaaa. 
fttl and daaoeratic aathoda rathar than with a violant rato* 
lution* .lit Gonviotion was that socialisa without daaoexaey 
would maan tyranny in tha Indian oontaxt. In 1fahrtt*s opinion 
tha Journay to socialisa should ba slow* His approa^ to 
sooialita was pra^atic as opposad to tha doctrinaira ona* 
S8* Qhosoy S.^ ankari aiUfill*t P* 182* 
29* Biswanatti Singh» "I(ahru*s Philosophy of nocialitif . 
JSaiaUAiS^ Haw Dslhr^, May 21, 1970, p*26* 
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It is evident that Nehru's Idass about soelallsa 
f o n two stagas* 3«for« Indapandanea ha i«as f i n on tha 
oontants of soolallsu. 13tar on ha started daor/lng %^t 
ha oallad a tdoatrinaire approach to socialism* • Qjr 1956 
social ovnershlp and control was the assanea of soelallsa 
for Nehru* Though he talked auch of Marxian soelallsa and 
^ v i a t aehieveoentSi he neither vholcheailSpidly adairad the 
Soviet experiaenta, nor did he subaeribe to t4arxisa full /* 
Ha vas fond of ^ e general prineiplas of soclalisay but ha 
did not subscribe to any rigid ideology or any particular **iSB 
He repaatadly eaphaslsed that soelallsa Is not Just an 
ideology but a phUoaophy of l i f e whieh involved profcuBd 
change in habit, inatinctSf valuea and aiotivationa* During 
the closing years of l i f e he realised the fut i l i ty of 
Harxisa in the vorld context* lie found Marxisa, as a vholay 
out of date and incapable of solving the soclo«econ«ilc 
probleas of the aodcrn era* 
vlttiout mentioning Hehna*s link with intexnatlonallsa 
his concept of soelallsa oannot be explained fully* Inter* 
nationalisa i s indeed, an essential part of his soelallsa* 
Mis intematlonallaa derived i ts greater depth and force 
from his coatLon feeling with exploited peoples* He believed 
that Indiana auat link their efforts with the struggles of 
other exploited peoples* So hla estahHshaent of a oooptratr-
• so • 
ftoai&lltt or4«r in a country wast alto l«ad to aiach gr«&t«r 
oooptration aaong tht^  nations of th« %orXd» Bt had no 
dottl»t that "MSLI vorld ord^r and poaca v U l OOM onl/ vhan 
30 
soolaXisa is ra&lisad on a %orXd aoala*** Nahru baliavad that 
policy of non-aligomanty paaooi and aaphasls on n««>tlations 
for sattlaaant of Intarnational dlsputas v^ra the assantial 
conditions for socialisa in India• Chinese aggression vas 
a setbaok to his soeiaXistlc ideas at IntemationaX XavaX 
aXthough i t had nothing to do with sooiaxist ideoXogy* Here 
he reaXlsed vlth i shock that coaaunisa vas becoaing inerea. 
slngXy expansionist and aggressive* 
However, !fehru pXa/ed a great and signifioant roXe in 
giving a soclaXist stance to Indian freedoa aoveaent and 
introducing an eXeaent of deaocraoy in totaxitarian soeiaXisa* 
N6xt to NehrUy Indian sociaXisa owes a great deaX to 
Gandhi \idio» in his own way, hcXped to strengthen the deaoera. 
t ic pXank of the aodaXXat aoveaent by iaparting to i t an 
* Indian «»» ness** the end of First itorXd Mir marked Oandhi's 
advent on Indian poXiticaX scene* ulthin the country he 
eaerged on the crest of a new urge for anti . British 
resistance and the waves of antl.westemisa* It was Oandhi 
whOf brought about a shift in the sociaX base of the 
do* fiqi*fln«<»<if| .ft|JUjiJ(«9 P* 28* 
81 • 
nationalist aovea»nt tram th« urban aiddl* cXsi»«t to th« 
viajAg«*dv«Xllng peasantry. 
Uandhi*s particular ooatribution to Indian politiot 
lay in his oonosptlon of non-violsnt rssistanes and his 
insistanos upon aass action and aass oobtaot. Ha vaSf to 
a larga extant, absorbad by tha Idaa of politioal fraadoa 
and ballfcved that India could not p£oca«d ahead t i l l tha 
pol i t ical pro bias vas not solved* tiandhi olaiaad to be a 
great soc ia l i s t hlascilf In so far as he took up the cause 
of th« poor masses and toiling millions. S t i l l his *5^ «ara4* 
vat social ist ic In ^ e sense that It catered for the 
Interest of masses rather than the Interest of the •apitalists 
"Every interest that is hostile to the duap BiUionsy" he 
deolar«dt "must be revived or aust subside i f i t Is not 
capable of revision*** Class var and expropriation of pri. 
vate property ovners vera the Iterxian vay to socialisa^ But 
the Oandhian vay to soelalisa «as the vay of S4tyagraha and 
trusteeship* 
Qandhi ittsiated in basing his socialism on non. 
violencei harnonious cooperation of iJtbour and capital| 
;il, ynwng '^**^f Septanber tTf 1931* 
oo OAA^ Kamala^  ib> i^an u»v fn rnfllllJiMh *•* Delhi, 
HU Fubliahing Hoaee, 19§b, p*27. 
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Undiord and t«nant. In 192<«8 h« l«d th« H(,n.(bap«ration 
Movanant and Xatar on suspandad iU Again In 1030-34 ha 
alona lad tha ClvlUMaobadlanoa Movaaant and rapraatntad 
tha Congraas at the Bound Tablt Confaransa. ITa hlataif took 
tha daelalon to tuspand tha oioviaant In 18d4« In 7940 ha 
launohad Sttyagraha aiovaaant. maaa and othar aueh avanta 
ahov tha atrangth of Gandhi, hla unquaitlonod and unparaUaladt 
patriarchal iaadarahlp of the national Bo^aaont, 
Tha iBportanca of non»oooparatlon imdar Oandhlaa 
laadaithlp l i e s In tha fact that for tha f lrat tlaa In the 
Indian hla tor/ tha naaaaa of paaaanU and tha Induatrial 
%iorklng claaa irare dram uadar a pol l t leai BoYaMant* It fftva 
ftoognltlon to tha dlsoontaat and craatad an aaotlonal 
ellMta for deflanoa and revolt vhlah baaaaa an lndlr%at 
fMtor for tha origin of laf t vlng Mvaaant In India. 
But t^ « fallura of Qandhlan aathoda of atruggla, tha 
oandll-^S^ ^act, tha fallura of eaoond B»«id lahla Con-
not iftd tha vlthdraval of Noa-a9«H««tion tiovaiMiit eraatad 
eXinata «f dafasiatloa *nd dapraaalon* Iha heart of tha 
f t vina***^^** ^"^^ ^'^ ^ ^ atartad aonaldarint 
^ l a n 1—'-^ ^^P •• liiadiai^t- and r W — i ^ a . 
^eiar \a faUura of tha f lrat C I T U Dliobadianca iteir-
.^ aoOllBt iwupa aa.e into batog. Iha Bihar 
• S3 • 
Soalali it party vat fox«ttd In &«i>Uat>»r \Wit ^ ^ that vat 
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foUowd hjf the Pua>^ SoaiaXitt Party* Xha aav daTalopsants 
thovttd that aociaiita vat btglnnlag to attart Itt Indapandanaa 
and vat trying to ba fraa froa tha ttringt of tha Coagratt* 
No foraal ttapt vr% takan to fora an AH India iioelalItt 
group befor« 1932* tha daaiaion to f o » an All India Soeia. 
l i s t Organization vat* for tha f irat t isa | dataninad in 
the natik Jail , ISSSuaaS'iara th« convlots of th* Civil, 
ditobadianca aovamant Ilka Jayaprakath Ifarayana, liOituf 
Maharally, Achyut t'atvardhan, Aahok Mshta, V.a.^ray, (:.K«Jothl 
and othart taikud about tha futura of Indian toolaty and tha 
foundations of tha €on^ass Sooialiti/ , Party vara raaily 
laid dovn thara. It vas agalntt aucU a background and vith 
a viav to or^anlsa tha soeial ist foreat to ttran^than tha 
nationalltt aovaaant* tha Congratt Fooiallat ?arty vat foxsad 
at ?atna in 19b4« uandhi*a attituda to tha tooial i t t t vat 
not ona of hott i l i ty . ^^artonall/ ha fa i t that th^ socio-
economic objactiVbB that he chariahad var« in no vay different 
from thoaa of tha tocial i ttt* Xhis had ba<K>aa avidant from 
tha statement of Mahatma Gandhi vhieh he made on Saptambar 1/ | 
34 
1SI34 i^n % i^ch he %Mloom«>d the formatlon of a social ist group* 
ai« mo» rauiy fineiailem In s^utham Aaia^ London, Oxford 
University t'raaa 1909, p«i4* 
34. Sea. fJ tarisaayya, ^>a.. Hia i?igt^ry nf tha In l^laa 
rr^tannal Congygflt Bombay, ?adma Puhlicatlont, 1940>.47, 
p. 976* 
• 24 • 
Throughout his life Gandhi claiaMd thAt h« vat trying to 
•olvo th« tasa probletts that th« soolal i t ts v«r« trying 
to tolY* in thttir ovn vay* In 194% ha daeXarad that his 
eantral objaetive vss tho soclo»econoaie twttaraant of tha 
sassas and h« had baen using i^olitics only to that and* 
lh« years af tar 1946 had baan tha yaars during vhiah Indian 
soeialisB had in a lon^ >m^ affactad hy Oandhisa. 
Xha main objaot of the ^n^rass ioe ia l l s t party ««• 
daoiarad in i t s ?atoa confaranca in May 1934 as "tha a^iava. 
Bant of indapandanca •• • • • • and tha aatabliahsiant ot a soola. 
l i s t soeiaty**' For aa^y yaars prior to Indapandanea tha 
party trorkad insida the 6ongras8 and voxicad tiralassly to 
^iva 6ongrass a soelal is t orientation* 
Iha fonation of the C«S«P« vag welcomed by Tfahru* 
In his 6ongraas Praaidantiai Address of 1936, Nehru opanXy 
daoiarad his loyalty to sociaiisa and asked the Congress to 
aeeept it* In an article he vrote, "though the stress a i ^ t 
be on achieving freedoa froa British yoke, tiie issue of soeia. 
lisffi can not be obscured* 
36* l!t¥ itort g4ltl» Septeober 22, 1946. 
36* Narayan. Jyaprakash, Tnu-arila rtruygiay «d*, C^usuf 
Maheraily, c'adaa Pufadioatlons, 1946, p. 99* 
37* "Congress and Soclalsia", The r^adar^ May 21, ltf36. 
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Tti9 Ck>ngr«8s socialiats b«liev«d that sooialita and 
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nationalItB varc aot inoonaiatant* 2b th«i soelailaa oouid 
\M aatabiishad In India aimultanaoual/ vlth th« winning of 
fraedMi* TStiu study of ravoiutlonary ooiramanta In othar 
oountrlea, th« rlsa of fatclaa. Manias, and ttiB achievaaanta 
of Povlat Buaala inaplrad thaa too aucdi* 
The Conbreas Socialiat Party ovad nuch of Ita inaplra. 
tion to Marxlaa • Lenlniaa* The Marxlat character of tha 
rarty v&a mada clear at tha fecond Confaranca haid in Maarut 
on £OSlt January ld36« A atateaant on party* a natttra and 
pro^raatsa d«ciar«d that tha ?arty*a own prograaaa att6t ba a 
40 
Marxist one* Many leaders of the i^arty vara at that tlaa 
pr«idonlndntly Marxlat and believed tiiat there %ma only one 
tyye of soclailaa that la .^rxlan aoclallaa* 
FroB 1936 onvard, the Congraaa Soeialiat Party, throu^ 
ita principal theorlticlana had baen profaaalng Ita Marxlat 
d£>. Narendra Oeva, Acharya, rnfllSllta htiA l^t l^^ttoMl 
R«vAiutii>n, td . . iuauf Maherauy, 3oabay, i^ adtaia Publlca. 
tlona, 194&, p.206. 
Z9m Saa^ -The Presidential Addreaa of ^charya Ifarendra Deva 
to the Gujrat Congress ^ c l a i l a t Conference, lild*» 
pp. 74.7&* 
40* vce for details^ "Gtateaent on Party*a ffature, task^ and 
Prograaaa^Adopted At the Second Annual Conference of tiis 
party At Mwrufc 3n June 80,1936", in Ail Ihrfin c^iigraa. 
g n c l « l l « t Partvj Boabay, AICCP, 1937, p.30* 
41. Narayan. Jyaprafcaah, gofilajllli SftfTato P^d IMBHlgngyt 
ed. Blaia Prasad, Boatety,Aaia Publiahlng H6uae,1964,p,3« 
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falt)^^p«ned i ts doors to the CoouMnltts la 1936* Many 
cooDunlsts joined th« Congress Foclallst party and v«r« 
hlghl/ suoeassfttl in Infiltrating positions of leadarship 
vithin ity «iS^<«oiai.l/ in South India* Xha/ were dxpallad 
froiB tha CS? in ld39 for disruptive tactics* 
The saclt^llsts and con^^ressoan vara diaaetricali/ 
opjjiosfed to aach othar on oartain issuas* !Qiey oriticised 
Oandhi particuiari/ for his amphasis on non»violanca as tha 
taohniqua of winning freedom* (bk tha rejeetlon of federal 
part of tha Act of 1936, tha fofoation of Congress ainistrias 
in 1987. the rfcleasa of polit ical detlnus and the introduction 
of ''garian refoxms^ the differences became aore acute* vlth 
tha failure of the young Congress social ists who joined at 
the time of * i^ult India Movement* to develop loyalties to«»rds 
t^ ia (26ngres8 Party, Uie threat of the social ists from the 
activity in tha Trade Unions and finally tha Qovemient*s 
ia&n on the Socialist Party, the differences reached to a 
crucial point* 
At the t^ nd of war the Ck>ngre88 aovemment returned to 
power and lift«id tha ban <3n tha Soclaliat P^rty* /^ t the time 
diffarences batwean thfe Congress and the Toclallst ?arty 
4S* Handa, B*iu, a^aj^li^, p* 11* 
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eiopp«4 up and th« Socialist Party adoptad a hostila 
attitttda tovt^ irda tha Congi*a8a« fhaa ifhan th« Coagraaa 
y»xking Covaittaa, mat In January 194I&, raaffimad Its 
faith in non^violaneay th« Congraas aoclallats diaappiovad 
it* Thay oritioixad tha Congraas laadara tor abandoninc 
tht path of revolution and taking to conatltutionalian. 
Undar th« circuaaf^neaa th« aociajiista thought to 
organiaa on th«ir own. Accordingly vihan tha party aat in 
a conferanoa at Kanpur in Mar«h 1947^ i t took an important 
dttciaion to dalata th« vord *Congraa8* fro« ita t i t la and 
thrown opan ita awaiaarahip to a l l oongraa«aan and non* 
eongraasaan. 7h» eonatitution of t^a party dafinad tha 
obj«ctiv«a of tha party aa being (a; the aatahliahaant of 
a daaocratic aoeialiat sociaty in India, (b) tha aradieation 
of lapaxialiaA, raeialiaat ooloniaiiia and ol^ar foras of 
national oppraasion and aconoaio inequality aak>ng nations 
andt^ e creation of a daaoeratie aocial ist Party, ^ff for 
the f i r s t tioe in the history of the partyt ^« Policy 
Stateaant of the ^arty clearly distinguished deaooratic 
sooiallsa froa totalitarian ooHounisa and asserted that 
4i 
there could be no socialisa vithout daaocracy* Ihe nev 
43, Indian Annual Rayifitar, Vol, I, Jan^^JUne 1946, p.S16, 
44. fsy I h artof Inteftdmaittant Qoaba/, psp. Pub., laee, 
p* 0* 
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•tat«a«nt of polio/ vat not flnaliMd until l^t oottln^ of 
th« gcnexttl council of th« party at flagpur In August 1M7* 
It linked soelallMi with dcnooraey In this fashion^ **It 
l8 an azlon of Harxlaa that thara ean ba no soolallaa with, 
out daMoorae/." In tha Intarnatlonal spharoi tha party 
daolaxad Its prafaranca for world Qovarnaant and p«ac« and 
a blo« of nautrali non^allsnad nations, 
Oandhl had baan anxious to kaap tha social ists In 
the Congress, Tfe proposed J«P*!Varayan or ^arendra Dava for 
46 
Prasldtfit of ths Congrass In 1946, Wtsn tha naxt >S'>clallst 
Confaranea vas held at t7aslk on March 19489 India was lnda» 
pendent and Gandhi was dead, I^e social ists decided to leave 
the Congress and fora a separate x^oclallst t>arty with deao. 
47 
oratlo soclallsB as Its need and ultlaata goal, Ihelr aaln 
charges against the Congress Party Included Its authorlta* 
rlan outlook and the <• gross alsuse of the state power for 
th€ benefit of the party* It also alleged that the Party 
had beeoae a h«aven for eapltallstS| opportunists, coaaunlsts 
and raactlon^arles at the alter of the socialists* Ihe 
resolution OBx the pol i t ical aaa situation adopted by the 
46« fiOBlfciUt ^rto i StiteWnt of ftllUy (Boatay, 1947)tP.7. 
46* waInert Hyron, <*afty PfflltUl fli iBdiit Princeton, If,1*1 
Princeton University Press, 1967, p,68« 
47. For details see, "History of the Socialist Party", 
iJBUUUft (Boabay), March 21, 1946* 
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ISasik Conf«r«nQ« stat*^^ **lc> oontlniM the tradition of th« 
CoagTMt, t^\s»dtraot totalitarianiia, to ehMkaate th« 
r«aetion«r/ forc«i \ ih i^ are gaining strength d&/ by dey» 
there le a great neoeaslty of an opposition party, the neee. 
saity i s urgent." I t deeXared that the Soeialist Party 
could alone provide this opposition. Jayaprakash Harayan 
saidy "In the condition existing in the covucitry today aocia. 
l i s t Party alone can fuX/fil the need for a popular opposition 
party* Xhus taking into consideration a l l the aspects of the 
questioni the conclusion ve reach is that vs aust leave the 
40 
Congress nov and function as an independent Party*** 
Xhus in 1948 the name of the Congress roeial is t Party 
«es changed to Socialist party and finally to the Praja 
Socialist party in 1962| after the f i r s t general eleotionS| 
as a result of the aerger of Kisan Masdoor Praja Party and 
50 
the Socialist Party* then in 1966 a large section of the 
61 
P8P sp l i t away and foroed a £!ociall«t Party* In 1 9 ^ the 
•erger of th« two brought about what we caU the Saayiftta 
48. ntatt aiBOrtt 1048» p. 18* 
49* lh±d., p. 94. 
60. See^ Ofivedy Surendra Hath, why Praia Sactialiaf, Soabay 
Popular Prakashan, 1967* 
61* on the issue of conflict, see JUiiK Lohia, BasiVtiinohar, 
Mi«i ttjfliftl mrt finaliUlli Hyderabad,lfa>^ind, 1963. 
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SooiaiUt Party. Ih«ii, on 9th August 1971» onc« ftgaiii a l l 
th«s« parties jolnad hand* to work tog«th«r and foraad than. 
£«Xvaa into ona *aooiaiiat Party*. 
^ sp i l t alto oocurad in th« Cowmmlat Party of fodla 
in 196^%^ich raaultad in the foxnation of tvo partiat| tha 
CPI anc thfi Marxlit Qonaunlat Party of India, A sp l i t in tKe 
Congrats Party hadi alto come in t969 and thera ara nov tvo 
Congrats Partlbs today. 
Shot va taw that In tha patt ona dacada a graat poll* 
t ical ui^aaval hat takan plaea in ttia rankt of polit ical 
partiat. Evary party becaaa SM>ra and aora tocial itt ie* A 
forsiai stap in th<» dlraetlon of aocoaiBodating toe ia l i t t santi. 
fflant vat takan by thtt Congrats^ in tha trua tanta» in Ti929 
vhan i t daoiarad* *'It i t attantial to oaka ravolutionary 
ohangat in tha px«tant economic and tociai ttruetura of 
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aocitty, and to raaova the grost Intqualitiat/ The ratolu. 
tion on FundatMintai fiightt and econonio prograoma adopted by 
tha Indian National Congrats at Karachi in 1931 %fat pro* 
nouncadly toclal itt ic* At Paispur in 1937 t^e prograna nat 
further ttrangthaned* 
6S* BeoQi't o f the Forty.Fflurfh Annual Setaifln of tfaa Ihdlep 
aaJtlanil Congrtmi >>ald At UJpat Bai Wagar, fcahora on 
26th to Slat Oecefflber 1929« Lahore^ Reception Coasittaet 
n»df p«6« 
6d« aw intfUn htuimi Rtglatift iod<i» voi . i i , p.sdi. 
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The •ittotloa of X«ftlft Nobru as Coagrttse President 
in Mareh 1936 and the appointflMnt of thr«8 advsnt soeUl lsV' 
Ja/aprakath !?ara/an| Narandcft Oava and Ach/ut Patwardhan to 
th« Vfbritlng C^miBittatt shoved that tha Congrasa Idaologlaa 
and programcs vara tH o^oiaing aiora and aora radlo«l and soeia. 
l l a t l c vlth tha passa^a of tiaa. Tha stapa takan by tha 
A ICC in ita raaoXutions of 1947| 1949 and iA I960 In vhioh 
It iuid atraae on aeonomici daaaaoracy, ful l amployaant and 
allainatlon of »icpioltatlon Indlcatad a laa^rning to%#ardt 
aooiaiiam* 
Tha yaara of 1964»l»4 shoved that Congraaa soelal lst lc 
ideology had shifted fron •soolalistlo or soelaiiatlc pattern 
of society* to the id«>log/ of *soclaliat cooperative 
64 
Cooaonwealth and finally to the goal of deooeratic socialisa 
based on dMoeracy, dignity of the individual and social 
justice. But i t is true that the eon tent of deooeratic soeia. 
l i m vas tkot clearly defined by the Congress. Inspite of 
the Jaipur and 3hubanesh%iar Session deaocratlc aoclailsa 
oontlnuB to prove as the golden fleece. The Congress 
54. See for details, "Sociallsa Froa Avadi to Qhubaneshvar**, 
Hartaanip^Horst, PolUlfifl ^ r t l f l in todlilf Keexuty 
Meenakshi prakashan, 1972. 
bbm ciharana, G.K.^jnrttan SasXaltoit iaaufiU«t p*^* 
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Q9V«nui«nt hak f&il«d to eiv« a el«ar aeanln^ to It* It 
i t btcaus* of this l&ok of clear •nunolatlon of policy that 
crit los accu*« th« Qongrtss of matching th6 fr«qu«n«7 vith 
yhith t^9 Idaal has l)««a r«lt«rat«d only by the variety of 
Meanings attached to the t e n 'socialisa* or more reveaiingly 
66 
Uy the meaning sought to be withheld from it* 
The period of 1962*67 vas the period of four major 
social is t parties functioning on an a l l India label as an 
op*»ositlon to the Congress* Ihese parties vere ffM CPI, 
Cl^l(H}i k'Sk* and rSP* In principle they agree on certain 
issues, yet In their Ideology each differs from the other* 
Each one looks upon the various national and international 
problems from its point of viev in consonance vith i ts 
Ideology, 's regards socialism pure and simple^every party 
i s trying to ^ive i t s ovn meaning to it* 
t'rior to Independence, the C?I| did not make much 
head%<ay in tb« efforts to infiltrate the national movement* 
For a very long time i t vas banned by the Oovemment* In 
1943 the ban was removed and i t started to function openly* 
Ih«re have be^ major shifts in the position of the CPI from 
56* "Ihe Socialist Legacy**, Fonnnailc MaAlv, Vol*XVl, ffos* 
29, 30 <i 31, July 1964, p* 7221. 
th« ittftlsb to a r i ^ t l s t smd to a l«^ftlst arid foaa to a 
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Hamiftt and nao llarxlat atratag/. 
Tha CoHBunist Party of India clalat Itaaif to ba 
oonalatantl/ f l u t i n g for a soelallat Pa^ of davalopMant* 
In i t s Aarlttar Congraas of 1968, i t addad a n«v elausa in 
i t s constitution ragarding the databli8hs«nt of full danoci-mcy 
and aoclalisa txy peaceful m«ans» Sinca than i t eontlntiioi^ 
daciaring that i t s aim is to aohisva soolallsa through 
daaocratic a^ans* It balievas that tha dastruction of eapl. 
talisB and in ita placa th« «stabilishaant of sooialism is 
anavltabla and in acoordanca with th« lavs of history* It 
oonsiatantly pointed out that i t is tha revolutionary 
struggle of ttxk masses and of the %#ox4cers and peasants •««» 
that can f i r s t vln real freedom and democracy and then clear 
68 
the vay for aocialism* It is liut striking that, vhile 
adhering consistently the ultimate goal of socialism, in i ts 
1961 programiBe of the party, i t didilot demand the Immidlate 
eatablishment of socialism, ifoiiever^it s t i l l talked of 
revolution directed agsinst feudalism snd Imperialism* 
67* r>e« for details, Betalaff, Ralph 3*^"Reviaionism and 
EOf^ aatism in the Comnttnist Party of India**, in Robert A, 
Ccalaplao, liftg CoMMlltat BJlntlttittH In Aj^i I XMttfitt 
" 1 , Inc., 
iioaU inn AghUmaiOiiai i>rincet3n l?au, Inc., EngleH>dd 
Cliffs. !fev Jersey, 1966. 
68. «?ee^Malhotra, Avtar Singh, iihat Im ihe Or^ mnnmiet i^rttf 
flev Delhi, CPI ?ub«, 1970, p,d4» 
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Xh« C?I Qontlnuouily propagated that oo l / by aehitrlng 
toei&liaB can India, •ntlaved, exploited and under-developed, 
rise to i t s fu l l stature and solve i t s proldiB* Both the 
Right and the Left Conaonlst parties clalaed that the people's 
deiBocxQcy and national denocracy are foms of peaceful 
transition to soeialism* Though the tvo parties proi^gatlng 
thoasttlves to fight for sociallsiB but the study of their 
manifestoes and resolutions reveals that they have failed 
to apply It to Indian conditions* The CPI advocated ending of 
a l l exploitations of India's resources by foreign aonopollsts 
and a oiore positive role In the straggle for peace against 
eolonialisii* It advocated the policy of pe^ oCf non. 
allgnaent and antl-colonlalisa but criticised the vacillations 
and cooproaiises In India's foreign policy*The CPI(M) advocated 
stoppage of further Aaei'lcan aid, nationalisation of foreign 
trade and a l l foreign capital and replacement of the present 
bourgeoisie • landlord state by a People's Deaocratlc '^tate* 
It favoured an Indeptfident farelgn policy based on opposition 
to IsperialieB, coloni^ilisM, neo-coloniallssi and support 
to a l l freedom struggles. 
The Indian social ists thought prior to 1940, vas 
esstfitlally Marxist* The Influence of «^rxon the socialists vas 
technique 
dominant*The success of Karxlst»Lenlnl8t/ln throwing out the 
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Ciarltt r«gla« in ^^ssia vas a oajor •Itficnt* 3ut as th« 
/•ars rolled and <M r.talln dietatorahlp in th« ^ottunist 
Russia bMarac flrttiw «ntr«noh«d« the socialists deoidsd 
to sxaaina tha Marxist ideology. Later on Gandhisa (or 
Qandhldrt sooiallsm) and deaoeratio sociaiisa beeaae the 
doainant forces* 
In pxiocli^le tiiu /raja Socialist i^ art^  did not 
consider souiulisa of the Congress as social ist ic and 
accused Congress of s uri'endering to capitalism. Congress 
prograame, i t argued, offered no solution to/social ist 
problems* Ihe ?SP considered Itself to be "the ^nguard 
60 
3f tht: democratic soeia>list movement** and claimed to 
represf^nt tii# v i l l of "those v^o stands for dtfsocratic 
ol 
socialist.** It considered i tsel f as a true r«;kpr«>sentative 
y£ 
of socialism* It consistently pointed out its main object 
as the achievement by peiiceful revolution s democratic 
soc ia l i s t society fr«:e from social, polit ical and economic 
exploitation* It rei;arded equality and socisil justice as 
S9* HartiM&ny * Socialist^ Parties**, aiUfil^*f P*6« 
bO* fQlfaiy Stete8gnt» <^ fit*t Sanaras, Isra i>rinting v&rks, 196&, p*7* 
t)l* IkM. 
t»2(* See^ChitU l«&nja2i, C*ri*, VS*" which wuy"; Mainatraaa (Nev Delhi), June a, 1967, p*li* 
63* j^ ailgy rtattatnl;, oiufillM P*?* 
• 36 • 
th« Boat dominant values of toelallsm* It elftia«d to hav* 
•voivtd an Indian edition of soelallta. RegardiAg natlona. 
l l sa as one of tHa facets of soclallsB It strongly eaae foxw 
vftrd m the defence of the country* It crit ls lsed Qovern. 
ttent<s policy In Tibet, Hungary, Korea etc. It advocated 
thfc strengthening of the United Ifatlons and deoanded an 
Independent foreign poltcy, free from oillltary alliances 
and entangleaents* It bellevtd in a Wbrld society based 
on the principles of frciedoa, equality and voluntary coop* 
•ration. It v^s a^^alnst laperlallsoi and ooloniailsa* 
The f^ aayukta Socialist Party wanted to achieve, by 
democratic and peaceful revolution, a social ist society. It 
believed that socialIsa i s the only alternative which can 
bring new civi l isation to hwan r^ce* The i^rty instead of 
autoaatlc development of sodal laa demanded radical social 
Changes, It believed in a four pil lar state, lb i t equality 
and prosperity constitutes the essence of socialism. It 
considered socialism as the only doctflne ^Hiich can usher* 
in a new order. It believed in an,> independent and creative 
foreign policy. Like the PSP^ i t !:iso valuod nationalism and 
favoured a policy of national defence based on economic and 
military mi^t . It emphasised the need for a \<brld Government* 
^* a>M gtaroft IiUht (Patna;, Decoeber3i, 1969. 
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Both the too la l i t t partiet i««r« very eriti««l of th« 
€bii&r«»s sociaiisfli* Xhi basic dlfferanea batMa«(i tha 
^ngrasf and th« «oclaXlst« «aa that Q>nfffB» baXlavad la 
tha idaolog/ of valfara ttata, i^araat aoelallata balla^ad 
in tha Idaolog/ of tociai iat atata of soelaXlaa* Tha 
sool&liata varloual/ ohallangad tha aoeiailatie oontantioaa 
of tha ^n^raaa* '&> th«a aoalaJLisoi did not aprlng fioa 
^on^raas Idaolog and prograowa bat waa lapoaad upon It b/ 
Ifahru* Tharo Is no doubt t^at tha praaant ruling part^i 
although propagating Ita goaX of danoeratla aoelallaa on 
pap^ra, 1^ la not actually aattuialAttlc about It . 
Bafore 1927 aoclailm i«aa not glvan aaeh laportanea 
In tha salnatraaa of Indian thinking on foralgn polley. Froa 
1927 onvardy soolallaa baeaoa onm of tha laportant factor 
In Influanolng tha thinking of our laadara and partlaa on 
foralgn policy* !fahru*a participation in tha BrustalSCongraai 
In 1927 vaa an Indloatlon of thla faet* Thla avantvp&rkad 
a tangible change in the aYolutlon of India*! outlook on 
foralgn policy* Since then aoclallta atrangthaned the 
national India*a oppoaltlon to both faaelaa and laperlallm* 
Xha policy of the Oovemaant of India tovarda Euaala beaaae 
one of ooordlnatlon«Soclallaai played aore for ax anha^lng 
tlia preatlge and Influence of India aaong the Afro^Aalan 
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countries vho vero noiwallgned and drifting tovards 
focialita* 
roolallats foreign poXley vas bat«d on p«ace and non. 
aXlg)(Mi«nt with either the ^aerlcan or the Soviet Caap^  
atrengthenlng of th« United Nations^ and the settl«i«Bt 
of International dlaputea* Ihelr poliey alaed at creating 
a Vbrld (jovermeat and the cooperation with other aoeialitt 
moveaenta* ^h«y stood behind a l l the struggles a^lnst 
coloBialls% iii.periail8M« neo^ooloBiallsBy raclalisB and 
under a n possible assistance ts freedoa f i l t e r s . On the 
question of Kashalr they took the attitude that the state 
vas legally a part of the Indian Heputlic against which 
Pakistan had cMUsltted aggressicn, Hoveveri they persistently 
argued for maintaining cordial and friendly relations with 
Pakistan, based on definite and categorical principles of 
democracy and socialisa* They always demanded that India's 
socialisB oay effectively enlighten the country's public 
opinion on the requirements of creative foreign policy* Ihey 
emphasised that to keep i t s international aim India must 
disassociate i t se l f from the British Commomrealth. 
C H & P I S R I I 
TWniA*?; FORF.IGI^ POTICY Vt TTTFnRY fTTtt PRACTlClg 
C H A F I S R IX 
jtniAtfi yoHKiQif PQLicx M rmant AUD PBACTICE 
Xhs aehl«v«a«nt of lnd«p«nd«ne« byr India on August 
16, 1947 opontd a nnw ^laptor In tho history of fortign 
rolatlons* Bsforo Indopondsneo tho oxtsmftX rolationt of 
thtt country voro condaottd lnjr tho 3rltlsh«rs* India did 
not and oould nst hav« a foralgp poJLley of Ita ovn at i t 
did not axiat aa a aaparata sovaraign antlty* In eartain 
alnor and puraly raglonal oattara tha vhltahail allovad 
a llaitad autonoay to tha Foraign and Polltloal Dapartaant 
of tha Qotamaant of India, vhioh «aa Manned axdualiraly 
by tha Brltiahara* Soaa ooneapta aa to vhat ahapa India'a 
foraign ralatlona %iJLl aequira In tha avant of India baooamg 
fr— \ft9 pronounoad in the aanifastoaa of th« Indian 
Rational Congraaa* Af tar Indapandanoa i t adopted aora or 
l9»»^ an Indapendant policy anhaaperad by aqy foreign 
pover* 
Undoubtedly the foreign polley of a oountry la 
aaaantlaXly conditioned by ita Internal clreuaataneaa and 
thla la auch aora true in the eaaa of a oountry like India, 
newly Independent and Juat finding Its feet in a world full 
of perlla and ooapHeatlona* It la thla attitude aouplad 
v l ^ the fact ttot nationalist India under the leadership of 
• 4 0 -
Indian National Congroag had In the past stood for eartaln 
fimdanontal prlnelplas In the fle^d of Intaznatlonal affalrt 
1 
that had glvan ahap« to our praaant foreign policy* 
Sha Indian N&tional congraas ahovad a great intarest 
in aattara of foreign polioy right froa i t s birth in 1886* 
Xhis in tares ty at f i r s t lialtedy grew vith the bcoadaning 
of i t s general pol i t ical outlook, m the aid.loeo'ty the 
Indian National Congreaa turned i t s attention aore regularl/ 
to international politics* The foreign polici/ resolution 
adopted by the Ail India Congress Couittee in Delhi in 
19S1 vas a land^ o^axk in the history of Indiana attitude 
tovards foreign relations* the resolution declared that* 
*'the present Oovermient of India in no %iay represents Indian 
S 
opinion*** thla vas the f i r s t significant declaration on the 
part of nationalist India that i ts interests in the field of 
foreign policy vere diaetricaily opposed to those of Britain* 
It further laid down the guldelinea of an independent IhdiaU 
foreign policy* 
I* Fbr details see* Hehta, Ashoka^ ** Indiana Foreign Policy t 
Ihe SoolaiUt View**, foaiift gmrterty> Vol* VII, »o*£, 
April.June 1961t pp* 90.1O6, 
2* p^Palver, ll6xftanp^**Foreign i>olicy of the Indian national 
Congress Before ,^««P«ndence% SWdltl In toaian rftyi|BI 
£ali£X» «d*>K.P*..iar4^Nev DelHif Vlkaa Publication, 1969, 
p* 88* 
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DM /«ar of 1967 aaxlc«d th« teglanliig of a ii«ir era* 
iVehrtt't raprasantatlon In tfaa Bruaaala Coagraaa pz#vida4 
tha f lrat o»>portunity for a diraat ooataet vlth th« Iaa4aia 
of tha national aov«n«ntt In oth«r Afro^Aslan eountriaa* This 
•vant InfliMnoad tha world outlook of tha Ooagraaa and gava 
It a nav orlantatlon, Iha Congraaa in a raaolutlon, adoptad 
hf i t In 1988 at Caleuttai daolarad that tho Indian fraadon 
atruggla was a part of th« ganoral world atruggle againat 
inpttrlaliaa andf hanoay daairad tho Indiana ahould davalop 
contocta vith oth«r coimtrlaa and paoplaa %^ vara alto 
Qoabating lapariaiiaa* VM Coagraaa alto daoidad to opan 
3 
a Foraign Dapartaont in Ita offioa to davalop auch oontaeta. 
Iha Congraaa rapaatadl/ axpraaaad ita a/apath/ vith fraadoa 
4 
atru^glaa in China, H^P^t Syria, /aifatiaa, Iraq a to. 
Proa 1930 to 1936 Coagraaa did not pa/ auch attantion 
to v^rid affaira dua to th« Civil Diaobadianea aovaaaata* 
Botvaan 193^ to 1939 tha Congraaa axtandad ita ayapath/ and 
aupport to a l l viotiaa of faaoiaa and laparialiaa in Al^alnia. 
6 
Cpain, China, Paieatina, Csaohoalovakia ato* 
3« fijBQft flf ttit r<irfcy«Il>lrd Stiitonof ttt lallan mitianil 
Cangftlt HtM ftt CliffiHttfl Jn latftt Caieutta, J*R«ahoaa, 
n«d«, p«d« 
4* Rajkuaar , If.V., Ed*. Th^ aaAgrauni l a f 1hiii««» F a r c l m 
P a l l e y i a^ing a Coi laa t i f tn of thm Raaftlutlftna gf tha 
Thrflan Tfatli^ii^l C ^ n g p — nn Wf^rm±^ Pf^lfav mnA Iiit«»^ 
JMUtoaal A f f a lMj 1ftfifi«1968> ^av D«lhl , ft>I«C,C«, 1962, 
p«46« 
d« Soo^il^yi., pp« 60-68* 
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Vihgn ^c British Qovnmukt Mat Indian tioopt abxoad 
on th« out braak of th« s«eond ^rld Uir, the Coa^ xvat in 
Ita Xripura saasion of 1939 raoordad ita eoaplata dlaaoeiatJon 
from th« Britlah forvign policy. It daaoribad tha 3rltlah 
foral^n policy aa on« of dalibarata batrayal of daaoeraoy and 
rapaatad toa&eh of pladgaa i^leh haa aisargad anding tha 
aystaa of collective aeourity and cooperation vith «>vanu 
menta* It aiao declared \^^ urgent need for India to diraat 
her own foreign polioy aa an indepandant natloiif kaapiag aloof 
from both • Inpexialiaa^ and faaeiaa hg puiauing har patb of 
7 
peace and freedom* ** In ahort tha raaolutlons of t^e Gongraaa 
froa the vary beginning to the a^iaveaent of i n e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
reveaia an acute avaranaaa of the dangara In the growth of 
faaciaa, a aynpathetie approach to tha aapirations of the 
Soviet Union, a feeling of aolidarity vith tha antl.iaparialial 
forces throughout the world and constant oppoaitlon of al l 
forms of raclali social and aooBoaio discriainatlon. 
Uefore going into deUils i t would be proper to 
assess tha basic objectives of Ihdia*a for<»ign polioy as 
enunciated b/ N«hru« Aa Indians Priaa Miniater and Minister 
t»« Knpftgt ftf tha F i f tv^th lrd Indian ttatJAnal Qingram*^ 
IcljBttCI*Utt8» Jabalp»re9 fieeeption CoaaaUee» lfia9» 
pp. 161.i62* 
?• BajkUBiary N«V.| Ofikfill** P« 68* 
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of BxWmal Affairs I h« ««n b* saidf th« guid« i ^ pr«partd 
th« iMv way* for tho fortDuXatlon of India*• foralgn poXiay* 
As HlohaaX Brachar has pointed out in his panatrating 
poXltleal i>iograph/| he vaS| **tha philosophart the arohi. 
taett the anginaar and the voice of his oountry's policy 
8 
towards the outside world*** He had also tteen responsible 
for shaping Congress outlook on world Affairs ever since 
Nehru was th«» chief apokeaan of ^ e Congress tm 
in the f o r e i ^ policy natters, Gandhi too was vty initio 
ally associated with the evolution of Congress outlook 
to%iard8 world Affairs, Xhe f i r s t focaai declaration of the 
Congress. foJCtsign policy, issued in November toeif had aottu 
ing to do with N<i^ ru*s influence but was a product of 
(iandhi's initiotivci %^ believed that "while we are aatur* 
ing our plans for S^ waraJ^ we are bound to t e l l the world what 
9 
real i t ies we wish to cultivate with thea«** The influence 
of Oandhi in the growth of the policy of non»violent ae^tods 
and ^« preservation of peace in international affairs is 
obvious* 
6* 3re#ehcr, Michael. Ifitini — ft l^oUtlflftl Blagfiabyt 
I^ndon, Oxford University Press, 1969/p*6i4^ 
0* ^^ ""'^  mm^y October S0» 19S1* 
Tht vatlmat* ai« of IndiaU fortlgn polley* lik« 
that -tf the foreign poXlolas of other oountrl«f« i s the 
furtherance of i t s national interoat* A country*! foreign 
poXio^ aliA/a raat upon a prior ooneept of ita national 
Interaata* Therefore^K«S,Hurt/ has rightly stated **the 
major oriterian of the country's foreign policy i s the 
coldly and rationally calculated national Interests of the 
country*** In a speech in the Constituent Asseably (Legis-
lat ive) on Deo«Bber 4y 1947, Nehru reaaricedt 
"Whatever policy we may lay dovn^ the art of 
conducting the foreign affairs of a country l i e s in finding 
out what la Host advantageous to the country* Ve aay talk 
about International goodwill and aean % a^t ve say« y% «ay 
talk aiaout p«ace and freadoa and earnestly aean vhat ve say* 
But in the ultinate analysis^ a governnent functions for 
the good of the country i t governs and no government dare 
<So anything vhlch in the short or long run manifestly to the 
disadvantage of that country* Therafsroy whether a country 
i s imperialistic or social ist or comrounisty i t s foreign 
11 
minister thinks primarily of the Interests of t^ iat country*** 
10* Murty* K*F., IntHan rntl l to Pnllcyt Calcutta^ rclentlflc 
Book -geney^ l9oAp pp* 21.2S* 
11* JanBhirJLil IftfirM'i gHtgflhfii gtataibtr 1 
T^lbi, Publication Mvlsion, "^ 9499 p* 207 
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N«hru having a ol«ar ld«a of growing doioestle probltat 
and k««plng In vl«v national «nllght«ned ««lf.lnt«r«tt| 
daelarad a policy of soclallta for taeurlng econoalc atabl. 
l l t y and indusUl&l progress at homat and of non»aligm«nt 
and neutrailt/y prasenration of p«&c«» opi^altlon to eolo* 
nlallaa or doailnatlon of one eovuitry by anottibrt peaceful 
aettleaent of cllavutesi friendship vlth a l l and enlaity t 
towards none. 
At a press conference held on September SSf 194(&> 
Nehru declaredt 
*'Ita the spht^ re of foreign affairs India v l l l foUov 
an Independent foreign polloyi keeping avey froa the pover 
pol it ics of groups aligned against one anoth i^r* rhe v l l l 
uphold thte t^rlnclple of freedos for dependent peoples and 
v l l l oppose raclaL-dl serial nation %^never It may occur* 
The v l l l vork vlth other peace loving nations for Internationa; 
cooperation and goodwill without exploitation of one nation 
12 
by another**' 
uhat India needed laost after Independence was peace 
ar^ friendship vlth a l l nations so that she could devote 
herself to the task of building up her strength* Mehru also 
1£. IniX^n fnnnai ^l itattf (Calcutta>,Vol.£, July.Deeeaber 
19«t>| pp* 2b£^« 
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•»« th«i 8U^r«a« ne«d for p«aa« in building up a n«v India* 
3n |tia« 12^ 19629 N«hru said in tht Parliaa«nti 
'*If and «h«n dlsastar com«S| i t v i l l affaet th« 
w»rld as a %^ol«««*»««t our f i r s t affort ahouid ba to 
pravant that dlaastar from happaning. If ^ a t proVaa> to 
ba be/ond usi ve musti at any rate* tr / to avoid diaastar 
or to rataln a position in vhlch va shall b& able to a ln i . 
alM. ^* auch as po8&ilde| tha consaquancaa of that disaster 
13 
avan If It comes," 
^11 the principles! vhioh Hehru daelarad var« ^ a 
foundation stones of India«8 foraign policy* Thay hava 
raaainad aor^ or lass tuiehan^ad and oonstltuta th«t main 
planks of India*s foraign polioy* 
Non»alignaant, tha kaystona of India's foraign policy, 
has helpad India to achiava a dagraa of influanea in tha 
viorld vhlch vas quit* proportionate to i t s povar tut fcUr 
beyond i t s military povar* It projaetad tha iaaga of India 
not as a major pov(i>r but as an important quantity in %arld 
fllf f a i r s . 
13. JayiihKial itlaytt^raifg^iig, igiaaf^i *^ «v Delhi, iha 
publication Pivlslon| 1967, p. £16. 
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i^Ut d«allag with th« oonccpt of BoiwaXifmi«nt| i t 
i s vortbvhlit •zaalnlng thr«« rttXst«d conecptt* Ih«M tr« 
n«tttr3litB| nttttrallty and noiwallgnB«nt« W«atralliB is an 
institution vhioh has bsen in szistsnes for a long tim« and 
raoognlsad tay Intornatlonai Lav* It ooneonis a stats \/hitlh 
i s oiore or Isss pemanently n«utralis«d «ither voluntarily 
or tai/ force of circuastancesi sucln as Svlteerlandy vbosa 
nsutrs^lissi vas laposed b/ povars outsid« tb« country as a 
result of Geneva /greonent* On the other band neutrality is a 
14 
i^neept related only to a state of actual war* 
The concept of aon-allgment vhen i t v«s f irs t adopted 
ffleantf non.partlcipation vith great powers in military pacts* 
I t vas a response to the cold var and rising nationalism of 
nevly independent states. It vas also the result of the 
recognition of the fact that a l l the interests of great 
povers are not the same as the interests of small povers* 
Not to Join any one of the big giants in their military 
p'^ctsi served the best national Interests of the developing 
countries* 
1fon«alignnent Is not an Institution dnd not even ^ polic 
14* *'Qy neutrality i s meant non»lnvolvement in vary vhlle by 
neutralism Is meant no»• Involvement In the oold^var*" 
Lyon, Patar '^ fiutraiigM (Hecester University Pr«sS|1946}| 
p*20» ^ 
in the r«al sense of th* texa. It can only te l l us vhat not 
16 
to do* As a guide i t is totmll/ laport%nt* 
one of tdie earliest assertions of the poUey of non. 
alignaenty occurred in a letter vhlch Javaharlal !fehrtt vrote 
to K«?*S.Menon on the eve of hie posting as sKbassador to 
China, "our General Polle/"| he vTote "is to avoid entan-
glement in povtir polit ics and not to Join any jgroup of povcr 
against any othex- ^roup* 
*'Xh«) tvo leading groups to4ay are tht* Bossian hloc 
and the ^nglo 'merican hloe« Vte must be friendly to both 
and y«t not to join either, Both Anefiea and Buseia are 
extraordinarily suspicious of eadi other as vei l as of otiier 
countries. Xhls makes our path diff icult and ve aay «el l be 
suspected by each of l<»aning to^ *>ards the other. This cannot 
lb 
be helped, ** 
The policy of non»aliganent Is u aynaislc foxia of align, 
ment to certain basic and positive forces that enable the vorl 
to l ive In peace and each country to develop in progress. 
lb , aai toa^n Utfftaa (^«v iAilhl)« rfovemotir Ik^ 1970, 
Ito, MenoHi K,?,C,, "Non-ailiniment, i'oilcy in Hetj^speefi 
Frti 4*Mg8 jQUrnal (Boabay;, iSovetnber 18, 1970. 
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Ih« f i r s t of f ic ia l declaration of th« poUc/ of non-
17 
allgnBant vas mad« by Nehru on D«c«ab«r 7| 1946* On 
D«c«iib«r 4, 1947, Prla« Minister Nahru declared before 
Indiata constituent Assemblyt 
•*Xhe main subject in foreign pollc/ to day is 
vaguely talked In terms of *Ib you belong to 
this group or that group ? We have pro* 
claiiied during the past years that ve will 
not attach ourselves to this group or that 
18 
group," 
Ihe whole course of the history of last fev years 
has shovn a growing opinion spread in favour of non.aiigi»ent« 
precisely heoaute i t was in tune with the thinking of vast 
aUBbers of people, leather the country concerned was non* 
aligned or not, because they claooured passionately for peace 
and did not like this massing up of vast armies and nuclear 
banks on elUier side, Therefore, their mind turned to those 
19 
who refused to l ive up. 
Among the non-aligned countries India occupies a 
position of eminence as i t was one of the earliest countries 
17. ibid. 
18. Sae.Jawah^rlal Wehru«« SDaaah^gy September 194&.May 
1949, aJUfiU*f P* SOS. 
19. social i«t in^ia (Weekly), September 19, 1970. 
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that adopUd non«ali^2ai«nt, and latar **noiuaXlgni«nt eatM to IM 
ragardad as th« yairdatldi of a new natlona indapandanea In 
20 
intarnational affaira*** 
Ihe policy of noiwalignnant la In tha baat Intaraat of 
our country* Bacausa of Ita gaographical poaltlon^ population or 
rasourcas, or thcs hlatorlcal and phlloaophleal anglai India 
i s not in the way of aiUiar oloc and thara la no nacaaaity aittiar 
or 21 
for i t / for tha biloca ttmt i t shovud Join one of tham* Indo-
Hisaiaii Xraaty of August 9tl971 hag raisad doubts and sprang up 
a controvaray* But Friae Miniatar Indira Gandhi had rapaatadly 
assartad that India a t i l l raaains a non-aligned country as this 
Xraaty is not £> military aiiianca but only a traaty of friandship, 
Ciis issue v i l l be discussed fully subsaqu«itly« 
It is^hovaver^an established fact nov tiiat India*s non. 
alignment oontriUittsd to the pronotlon of international peace 
and security by preventing a complete bipolarisatlon of the %orld, 
to tha struggle against colonlallsn and the relaxation of ten. 
sions* It has dn several oocaaions put a brake on ^ar• Efforts 
to bring about a ceasefira in ^ e Korean ^ r in 19&b, the cessa. 
tion of host i l i t ies in Indo«Chlna in 1964, Ihdlats participation 
as Chairoan of the International Supervisory Oomisslon, the 
22 
settiaaant of Suez crisiSf i t s rola in bringing about ttie and of 
20* **2i6 «>robi.aa**, s^ainar, January l^uo, p.tl* 
21* Hurt/ , K.S*. a a. a i t . , p, 37 . 
22. Appadorai, / . , Ld..Laaaya In Indian t>>vLitioB Ana Farsigi^ 
kKuliay^ Mew Dalhi, Vikaa PuLlicatlons, 1971, p. 169* 
hot t l l i tUa In Vietnam and froo tht> sidelines th« assistance 
It off«r€d to thci ooncluiion of tht Geneva '(^reement In 1964 
support* Ui« saffie viev» 
!Von»allgnm«nt enal^ied us to strengthen ourselves and 
yrt;vent«d us from beoonliib a se te l l l t e state* It gsve us 
& c:)nslder'bi,6 degree of self.oonfldencei Imwr strength 
end has becooe a sort of ideologyy a faith for us* 
/llgnaent V ^dla vould have meant joining either 
of the bXocs* Nehru onoe remsrked, **Vhat does joining a hloo 
mean? After *Xlf It can only meun one tMng« give up your 
avn vlex'S about a particular position^ adopt the other parties 
viev on the question in ord<.r to please i t and gain i ts 
£4 
favour*** The inherent idea of non.aiignaent %ias that It >ould 
lessen international tensions and avoid a vier and proBK>te 
International peacci and cooperation* "Tehru considered non. 
alignment as the only road to peaceful relations and co. 
existence* 
Having f irs faith in non^uilgment y have tkit looked 
upon the military pacts vith favour* !^ :ntering aligrusent, 
according to KehrUy amounts dJt giving up our vhole soul, and 
handtb'ng over the future to others* therefore, India has 
persistently opposed intra regional or Inter.reglonal aillt^ry 
pacts such as )fATO, rf?D and the larsatr j^cts* They were 
considered disruptive and dangerous to peace and security* 's 
23, Mehta, H.S.f "India'e Foreign Policy^, SfadlflS in rnclii 
Aaa i^QlitXml PsytJLnBBtinfc 18i7»^7t ^^•% '*Appsdorai, 
Bomtey, Asia Publishing :rouse» 19o6| p*21d* 
ii4« Jairfaharlftl ?lt«hru*a .Cuefcch^Sy Cfcatam4>«y tQ4to«Ma^ laeQ^ 
a a . c i t . y p« £21* 
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N«hru ha» oustrrvcd ^^ I^ think that the polle/ cf aUi tar / 
allianc«ft ftnd af the oold vftr has not brought any Buch 
r«sult« to ^ e lorld • • • • • • • It has dlvldad ^•opl* fnm 
l inking on •oonoalo progress and d«v«Ioplng inntr strcngth| 
and triad to bolster up eountrias b/ a l l i t ar / oaaas vhish 
can only b« temporary. It has really eoae in the vay of 
26 
eountry*s progress*** 
In 19t>l| at the Belgrade Conference the nofwalignaent 
principle found i t s practical shape. Zhe Canfereaee defined 
In i U declaration the aain qualities of non^aiigweat • • 
the policy of not joining in Military blocsy stabilising the 
cause of peaoe» believing in oo«existence vhich guarantees 
to every people their independent developaenty effortlng 
to put an end to a l l types of new colonialism and laperialist 
domination in a l l i t s manifestations and voicing for complete 
disaxvaaent. Ihe Second !fon.&ll^ed Hations Conference 
viewed that the principles of non-alignment are ** becoming 
Increasingly dynamic and poverfuj force for the promotion 
27 
of peace and thto welfare of mankind*** Zhe conference also 
harlai Wchru. iBflto't. roftlgH JQJttQlt JSilifiiid 
ahMi St8 | i lbif lM6»ABrU 1861> ^ v Delhi, the 
icatlon Division, Qovernment of India, 1961,p.06. 
e s , Jawaharl ehr 
Publicst 
C6, See for a detailed ammffUk account, **Zext of First tfon* 
Aligned Nations Conference Final Communique.' Issued 
in aelgrade on September 6, 1961^ iatSBlMJioUULat 
M l i t Tilt mf nnfi«iBll» H«V Delhi, Lok Sabha Cee-
retariat, 1966. 
£7* **Z«xt of Eecond HofuAiigaed Rations Conference final 
communique t Issued in Cairo on October 10,1964,** 
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SB 
•«plutis«d th« **righta«ss9 •ffieaey and YisBUv" of ttM 
noiwallgOMnt* 
IbiwallgnBtfit •oabltd India to €X»fB* hitr viowa 
on intamationai quaations and also to kaap frlandljf raia. 
tlona* Mahrtt onca aaid^ "Ihara It no OManlng in aligiHiant 
for a country ilka India, altuatad aa va aia, vhan va 
happan to be frlandXy vlth a l l countries belonging to both 
29 
the bloc4** On aavarai questions related to huaan richtSy 
the probrass of independent peoi>les« the freedoa of ^done. 
s ia , 1949ya;$ grass ion of H^rth and ^outh Korea, tOSOjag^i^-
ssion of British and France on Eg/pt, 1966^ India's irlavs 
vara i^re or less Idantifiad with thota of ^ e U«S*A, on 
the Gonoluaion of regional pacts such as £1£AX0 and CEH20, 
1964| Aaerlcan a i l i t a r / aid to i^aftlatan, 1964, the pasaing 
of "uniting for p«aca" raaolution, I960t the holding of 
nuclear teats, Kaabair and the adaission of the People's 
Bapuiaic of China, India followed the Unltad Stataa of 
Am«rlea« 
India*a policy of non^alignsHmt undarvant so«e ehange, 
lAen China attadied i t s territorial integrity* India refuaed 
S8* i i l l ^ 
S9* ]Sui^ 4gft (VJMkly, ^w Delhi;, March 24, 1969, p. 16. 
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to accept military aid froa an^ country until 196Sy Min. 
taining that such a ncWie vould coapxoaisc i t s noiwalignmciit 
policy. But th« niiitary rcvcra^* i t suffered in October-
November 19(»2| ooapelled India to etrengthen ite defeneesf 
thereafter i t turned to friendly nations, cooBuaiets at 
do 
v«ll as kestern, for Military aid* Countries like China 
and Pakistan thereupon sAid that India has ceased to be non. 
aligned, f-- deoand was also aade by some section of public 
opinion to aoandon this policy. A typical piece of noisy 
feeling couid be ••»n in tiie Indian E » D P — under the head. 
ingy "Mon-aiignment proves halter to defence.** !fehxu» ho«b. 
everi defended non»ali^nment, planniag and soeialisa vith 
great vehemence making i t clear ^ a t h« had devoted a gr^t 
deal of tt^ou^t to the prestfit situation in the country 
and fundamental nec^sitgr of these policies. Xhe acceptance 
of military aid by India did not amount to a fundamental 
change In i t s positidn as a aoiwaligned state because the 
foreign aid taken by India to face Chinese agi^ression vas 
from both the blocs* idaiatever may be tme» one fact is cer« 
tain that ^ e policy remained, throughly unchanged. Nehru 
.so. P i l l a i . K^BSMsn. Inili«t« Far^JMn Pal iay . Bft«i« I M « U ^ 
and PQliticft l Attitutlaey Mearuty Maanakahi Prakaahan^ 
19li9, p. 110. 
31* Indian Exng—« (ifov Delhi), June 6, 1963* 
32. Devdfttta. "Non-alignment in India", lhi IndlM foWMl 
nf flBlitifiiA fffiUncti Vol. XXIII, No.4, October. 
December 1962, p. 361. 
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In 1863 at Chandlgaxfe ip«lt%tat0d htt ft^«r«ic« to nan-
allgl»«nt snd i s Id that h« vouXd not ll»t«n to thoM vho 
wanted India "to t«U h«r lnd«p«ad«n««" to fight Chlntft 
aggr6ttlon« 
FbOlowlng tha guldallnea, laid hy JavatorXal !r«lira 
m regard to India's foreign polic/t h »^ tiicctiaor Lai Saba. 
dur Shaatrlf tlfli« and again affirmed hla faltft in the polio/ 
of non»aJLigiw«nt, In a apee^ on June Jh 5964| Lai BihaAir 
rhactri declared that, "Non»alig8Bent v l l l eontiatie to bt 
th(» fundaaentai basis of our approacih to ^lorld prottLess and 
34 
our relation with other eountries*** 
After the death of Lai Bahadur Shastrl on AuMarjr 
10th 19^f Mrs. Indira Oandhi reiterated In her tpeaoh on 
January £d, 19t»6. that the principles of her father l^^ vtharlx 
d6 
Nehru vould continue to guide her* In a speech on Oetober 
21^ 1966i she stated thaty *'1toiwaligaient has raised a voice 
of reconciliation and hutan oonseleatte above the hsnh dl«« 
amaaents, cold var, pelenics and angry clash of tise Isrgtr 
dd, "Xhe Prlae Minister and the Natioi^. Liiik ivw Delhi^. July 14, 1963, p. 12, ^ ^ •'• 
^« rnytlgn ^ffaUi BuBirAi Vol, i , pp, i67«6a, 
^« ftirnUn htt^Xn Biflnrn, Voi, x i i , pp^ 3.,4. 
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36 
•nd of pt^acuful co.«xlst«Ae««" 
3^ tt fact rtm&lns that India's polloy hat eontiniad 
to adhere to the prlnclpla of noiwaXlfriMnt In spits of 
periods of sevore str«ss«& and strains* Tn th« joint 
ooiUBunique, issued after the tripartite neeting in October 
1966 betveen the hrads of the ^ree non.aligned oountries, 
President Nasser f^ F.gypt, pri^sldent Tito of Itocsslavia 
and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi affimed the validity of 
nosualignaeat* They noted vitii satisfaction, as stated the 
coiBimmique, that, **the principles of non»aligflBent as for«ii«» 
lated at Bel«;rade and Cairo are geiaing oore and aore ground 
aaong independent countries %ihich are exerting efforts tovards 
37 
the achlevaients of peace and progress in the wrld*** 
But the new GoveifHient of India no longer believes 
that non.aii|^nnent in i t se l f ensures seeurit/ or that the 
developfflent of military strength and acceptance of external 
assistance to do so are not oompatili^e vith non*.aligaaeat* 
They nov believe that noa.aiignBent and aiignsent are matters 
of preferred choice and that either means promotion of peace 
36, nen, N.Q,, ed«, VI t And/ltriQl of akHM friinfthli 
New Delhi, »fev Qook Society of India, 1971, p* &03« 
37* Barnhbas, A.,p«, H«rbert Jai Cingh and others* " IffiffIflin 
^oAlUga Aftif SaftraV Bandore, The chrUtian Institute 
for th« study of Religion ,k Society, 1067, p«40. 
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and ••ourit / throughout the world* ViOrld |M»ao« e&AAot Iw 
/(it said out of danger* I'hvr^ ar« var elouda s t i l l in Man/ 
parts of th«> horison^ and var itsalf in ame parts of tha 
•arth. 
India*s var/ axistanoti i s now in paril* It is sar« 
iousl/ thraatenad b/ tvo *8abra-rattling and wasuhUBgr/* 
n«igili23ourt Ilka China and Pakistan* And a suddan ehanga in 
alignnant of tha world pavers has ooapallsd India to saak 
a nav alignment vith U*S«?*jR* vhioh cana in affaet as a 
result of 20 /ears frUndship traat/ slpied b/ Sidia and 
Soviet Union on August 9| 1971* 1!he*treaty of peaea* proved 
that the polia/ of noo-aligneent i s a d/na«ie polie/ whieh 
can be adopted to the changing situations* Acldrsssing a 
fflsmtwoth ra i l / on th*^  spravling lavns of India u&te, curiae 
Minister said that **the |>aet v i l i strent^then India b/ further 
promoting p friendship between the tvo nations* But thera 
i s no change in our pollc/ of non*aii^Mient in vhioh a we 
have ful l faith*** Xhero are many crit ics who contend that 
India has given u^  i t s non»ali4;nient or i t has put an end 
to non-alignment. The independence movement of 1971 in llast 
Pakistan has also eoibroiled India and t'akistan in controversy 
36* a s f^todaatian Xltue (Hew Dslhi), August 10, 1971* 
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ov«2' th« f tyl«s of tioiwaXl8^«iit* But the Qov«nui*nt of 
India thinks that dosplto the recent trends and deYelosnentg 
that have taken plaee in the vorld non^aiigment has not 
los t ita effleae/ for India* Ihere i s no other polloy that 
deveiopiBK eountries ean adopt with greater advantage than 
tdie poXisy of non-aligment* She eoonoaie planning of our 
«>untr/ also dtf&ands a policy of aloofiMSs froa pever poll* 
tics* No doubt the iaperatives of eoonoaie are aore lapor. 
tant than Involveaent in gloh&l power politics* 
ABlUcatoniftlUi and Antaefigfilaljiat 
Anti«eoloniallsa and anti*raeialisa have played a 
doainant role in the evolution of the attitude of the Oongres^ 
Party vls .a.vi8 i t s vlevs on ^orld lS8U68,cv9ibj»ing up before 
U)depend«ice» Later on i t vas considered as sne of the aaln 
planks of India's foreign policy* 
l^roughout i t s long history India stood for the 
freedoa of a l l countries^ ak>re specially for the ellaination 
of colonial doainatlon and racialvdiserlainatlon* Having 
suffered under foreign rule and having va(>ed a struggled for 
;^ 9* Xhe i:'akistan Oovernaent accused India of interfering 
in the internal affairs of t^akistan because of India's 
syapathy for freedoa fighters* friae Minister of India 
replied that Hldia cannot remain aloof s t i l l when al l i tari 
force i s used against an unaraed public* 
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lnd«p«nd«no«t India oontl(i«r«4 eolonlallta and raolal in 
at th« greatest 6n«al«s of mankind* Dialr daaQ^^allaing 
•ffaeta and itogaaaratlng influaneaa ara Imsaaauri^ abLa* Ttity 
atunt tha paraonality of the Individual as vail as tiiat 
of ^M coBBtinlty* 
India's Interast In the question of colonialisn 
is rdvaalad In the support which she gsve to the sehlevaaanta 
of indapendanca of Indonaaia <19Cf)* ^ehru vahaaitfitly 
o r i t i c i s c i the Dutch action in Indon^aia aa the **aost 
40 
naked and unajoashed a^^assion." 'TIS efforts in thii dlreo. 
tlon want a lon^ vay tovards "persuading the Dutch authorl* 
41 
tlaa to accept the denands of ^ e nationalists,** l^an 
pursuatlon s«»effled to fall» India refused to give then per* 
aission for ovarf l i^ts and thus waakt^ ned their al l l tary 
position* 
She First 'si&n Conferancsi t^ hdoh Nehru called on 
January 1, t»49| on Indoneaia at Nev Delhl^ was. one tt the 
important factorisvhich compelled the Dutch to come on agree, 
aent vltii Indonesian people. This was one of the big 
aohieveaents of T7«hru* 
40* T^ a ?rindu (Madras), Jansary 3 , 1949. 
41. Kamiky V*3*y "Javarharlal Nehru t Foreign Poliey". 
in ed., Shah, k.u.^ JnaXi*t ftiftnfia, ^ na Fortta fttUBlUt 
Bombay, Manaktalasi 19&d, p, so* 
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laclia also gavt* support to th4 oas^s for indi«pftiid«ne« 
of the foriB«r Italian coionloa of LXby&^ i:rltr«a and Italian 
Soaalilandi^ 1949-62| Moroocoi 19&t*66 and lunlsls t968«&6 
and so on* Xha dispute with Portuguese over Co& and the 
rest of Portuguese India vas ended vhen India occupied th«5e 
terrltorltis by force of atos In t961« 
For many years preceding Independence Hahataa Gan^l 
established his non»vlolent resistance to r'^ oe snd creed 
discrlalnatlon In South Africa, Following the same llne^noiU, 
before Independence, raised her TO ice a ^  Inst Ixihuaan 
policies of aparthled In f:outh /Africa. The question of 
race coafl lct | resulting from the policy of aparthled of 
the Oovemaent of Pouth ^ f^rlca^ vas also brought to the 
United Nations General Assembly /attention In 1962 t^ 
thirteen Asian and ^^frlcan countries Including India* The 
vlthdrai<al of Couth Africa from the 3rltlsh OosiBonvealth of 
JVatlons was also due to th« strong stand against apsrthied 
taken b/ India, Pakistan, Ghana and other African and Asian 
C^aaionvealth oembers*India aleo ooblllsed vorld opinion 
against a deliberate violation of U.lf* recoamendatlonSby 
* 
Couth Africa and took a l l steps neeesaary tovards laposltlon 
43 
of a polit ical and (>cono«lo byoott of South Afrlea* 
^ * atagCMJD'g yg^ted rfatkMt 6th ed,, STev isrft, p.liSff. 
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India has foXlovtd a slallarX/ strong stand against 
the racist policlas of th« vhiis Qovsnuient of ''outhsm Rhodstli 
It axprttssas solidarity vlth a l l thssa vho arfe struggling 
against thasa avl ls . Mr. Dlnash Singh, formar Mlnlstar of 
Ejiternal Affairs, In ths Lok Sabha on April 8, 1969, said, 
*Hh«thar It Is tha question of Indapandancs of Angola, or 
Ifesaablqua, or South l^st Africa, or any ottiar colonial 
tarrltory, It v l i i bm our andaavour to direct our foreign 
policy to aohlava their liberation, to accelerate the peace 
of decolonisation. It Is equally our belief that aU 
people Buat enjoy equality irrespective of their raoe*** 
2he Indian Govemaent urges free peoples everywhere 
and aore specially the non.align«d atates to land their 
support for the liberation of colonies and the ending Smxiif 
of racial regiaes* 
nlRARMAMCTT. 
The question of disamanent Is the aost crucial 
probias with vhioh the whola world Is faced* It is oonsi. 
der«d to be an laperative need and tha aost urgent task 
facing aankind. lo deal vlth tha prohlea aany disaiaaaent 
44. Singh, Oineah, aflWfda Ww HnffiMMt Boabay, Feffer & 
Siaon, 1970, p. 163. 
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negotiations vers made osf th« big pov«r«« 3ut the long 
and tortuoue record of diearaanent negotiations han shovn 
that t^e rigid stand taken lay the big pov«re on one lesue 
or the other hav« not nade any notleahle progress In the 
direction of s solution, 
Disazisament was realised to be absolutely n«cessary 
to rteaove the threat of var and to lessen ^ e burden of 
arnament, IXiring the later half of the Second ^brld ' sr 
tne appearance of 8<yae poverfui weapons like the pilotless 
projectiles and th^ dropping of the 'tonic Homb on Hlro* 
sheaa and Nagasaki gave rise to a general desire to sc€ 
nrraaments liiail^and oontrolled by international 3greeai«nts. 
Realising i t s «>ffeotive role In the world pe^ee, ^'tUnrn once 
said on ^pril £» 1964^ '*TlJBe appears to challenge us* 
Destruction threatens to cat<^ us up, i f rot to overtake 
us on i t s leard^ to i ts sinister goal, v« aust seek to 
arrest It and avert the dive consequences i t threatens* "e 
fBUst endeavour vlth faith and hope to prosb t^e a l l efforts 
that seek to bring to & halt» this drift to what appears 
4&« Boss, Chitra, '*The Pro|M.eB of msaxnanent"| Thm InAif^n 
Jnurnal nf PoiltiBBl Sfiigncat Vol, viii, i9o,i» 
January»Harch 19b7| p,211« 
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to b« th4i Bi«nac« of total dottxuotlon*** H« folt that^ 
*'dl«arBaflMnt v«ft absoXut«ljr ii«e«ssary in Vnn pr6*«nt da/ 
vorld In vhlch daatractiva veapona thraataning annihilation 
47 
of tha <tntlr« hiiaanity vara baing manufaoturad.** 
fo Nehru i t vaa ragratabla tiiat in tha praaant 
tioaa ao«a big covmtriaa ahould tliink in taroa of var to 
aata^iah thair raapaotiva aupariority in tha world* Any 
talk of war in tha contazt of th« praaant aituation vaa 
nothing iMit **Ghildiah" hfe raoarkad* Haalising tha ooapleac 
siUistlon in vhich tha vhoia vorld ia involvadj Tha HJud^ a^  
tan Tlfftffi raaaxkad that "thara i t a cluar duty for al l 
eouatriaa to raiaa thair voioa in tha cauaa of paaea and 
49 
eontant of diaaxsaaant.** 
Hr* V.K.Manon, the than Union Dafanoa Hiniatar on 
'pril 16» 1961 at tha Confaranca 'fall of Vldhan Habha, 
expiainad India*a policy of non.alignaant as t^a rational 
vay in the praaent vorld aituation, vhan a rae^of amtfuinta 
4li» '*Zaxt of Lok Sataha Reaolution 3n Ifuclaar laata. Paaaad 
on May 22, l^^.r* rortjgll ft>3Llfiy Qf iBd^it tm Qt 
47. ttt litodtt (Madraa), ootobar 28» I960. 
48. ittklU 
49. ft! atedlMfUa I ton <"«v Dalhi), Novanbiir 24, I960. 
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vfis ^Ing on vlth rauoh talk of dltax«aa«>nty tld* b/ sid*. 
rii» str«ssed that afoas^nt* today did not pxovid* national 
aacurlty, Thfa prospact of ki l l ing ona*a anas/ and hlaaalf 
retaining aafa «aa at dlaoount In the prasant atoalc aga« 
and for national aacurlty anui haa baooma Mors or laaa 
60 
uaalaaa* k radical aolution of thla pxt»blaB| vhleh haa 
bacoma an urgent aaad In the prasant state of amaaantSf In 
the unanlaous viev of participants in the !lon»allgnad Nations 
Conferenca« could be achieved by naana of general, oonplate 
61 
and Internationally controllad dlsajnaaant* Kr* V.K.Menon, 
vas of the vi«v that dlaaraasiant did not aean thxovlng avay 
a l l araaaentSy but It vas only a step tov^rda peace by 
6£ 
a btilancad production of arna instead of ar«a race now on*** 
India has consistently tried to channelise peace 
and dlsaxmaaent efforts t^iough the U.K* and had taken 
63 
IntartiSt in the Uenava negotiations ot 17 nations* India 
do. ft! {flatm (Madras;» /^prlll7t 1961. 
61. Ihis IVon^llgned Nations Conference vas held In Belgrade 
in 1961 for the purpose of exchanging vievs on Inter* 
national pro b leu and security* The participants of the 
Conference considered that diaansaBent la an Imperative 
need of aanklnd* 
62. Iht a^nrtMtan Ilaatt r^epteaber 6« 1060. 
63* Xhe CoBBlttee of 18 nations on Dlsamaaent (excluding 
France) met in a«nava in 106£ to discuss the question 
of dlsarmaoient* Both the U*S*S*E. and U*S«A. brought 
forward concrete proposals* Ihe former In a draft 
treaty for (^«neral and complete disarmament and the 
later in a four point plan as the f i r s t step In reaching 
the agreed goal* For ¥ears together^meetings arm being 
held but t i l l now nothing has come out of lt« 
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had b«tta an •^^•v signatory of tha tha Partial ^Tifet 3an 
64 
Iraat/y and haa vaioeaad It aa a turning fiolnt in history 
towards the dlraetlon of ooB|b^ata dlaax«aaantt vhleh 
alona oould aaira suecee4lng gannratlons. froa tha saourgs of 
Kdr* ^ahru^on Au«^ u£t 6« 196a^sald, **£¥ary iovar of pasoa 
auat vaicoaa the signing of NucXaar Mat Ban Traaty* Axthottg^ 
It Is only a partial treaty and doas not fei^ Itsalf oarry 
ua far tovards dlsaraaaant^navarthalass It Is axtraaaly 
s l^l f leant* It rai^rasant tha f irs t braaklng of tha lea 
6b 
prasantad by tha eold var." But tha rncttt azpZoslon of a 
nuelaar davlea by India has caused so«a s t i r even the ugh ^a 
Indian r^ rloM Minister has repeatedly assured that It Is 
far peaceful purposes* roae Countries Including Paklatan 
doubt tha ^•ry bonafldea of Ildla In vlev of Indlaa past 
record* Soote aid giving countries having contended that a 
beggar.country should not indulge in the luxury of lm*estlng 
large SUBS In developing naclear devices at ^ e coat of 
atarvlng nllllone* 
Hovadays India la engaged la tha aolutlon of a vary 
serSoua problea at Besie* In the llght^reeent oonflists vlth 
China, 196£» and Paklstan^l9669 and 1971» India nov eaaaot 
64* This ffudear San Treaty %iea signed by U*S*A*,U*K*aBd 
U*S*S*K* on Au(just 6919681 banning a l l tests of mtelear 
ioaba on the surface of earth* nearly loxtatlons slgnsd 
Treaty* 
66* "Text of Nuclear Ban Treatyf Issued In Mosoov on August 
6, 1963**, rnrijga PnUty of ftirtiaf guufiUtt p. a»i* 
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•aiatatn her territorial integrity without the help of 
a Btroiu ax9/« As Mre* ladire QanOhl reaezked, "It It for 
each country to decide hov twet to eeeure i t t proteetion. 
^o far aa India la conecrnc^d, ve believe that aa a owiber 
of tlittf u«H, v« art^  iintitled to ttie proteetlon of Seourity 
Cbunell action in the event of our being threatened or 
66 
attacked vltii nuclear weapon*.** 
Therefore, l ike other nationti India anitt eontinue 
to prepare herself to defend herself at aany levels ia the 
run until disansament is achieved conpletely* Ihis attl» 
tude givea suustance to the doubts expressed by those 
%iho do not have faitihi In India's peaceful intentions* 
iver since the ran Fransisco Conference ]^ ia has 
becoae a more consistent defender of the great principles 
of the United !7ations Charter* She realises that this 
organisation ia an essential Instruaent of peaceful co* 
operation to bring about desirable changes, as well as to 
proBote peaceful settieaeat of international disputes. 
Dr* Badhakrishnan, the foraer President of India, tsM at 
the special session of ^ e General /sseaibly on loth Jtaae 
^6l San. W.a.^ M t and WiedoM t%f IndTra Qandhiy afi«iUl*» 
p . £06. 
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«*2h« United Nations orififtniiatioii ayatoXlBM th« 
taopttt ftnd aspirations of the psoflss of th« %orXd for a 
csntral autborit/ vhlch can oontiol ths aotlvltl«s of a l l 
nations svontuallir, Viim United Nations hop«5to supply that 
sova or that coavanlsnca to th« vorld ooammlty ^Icii Is 
67 
•attrglng*" 
India lookod upon ths United nations as a grsat ssatrs 
for organising valfare act ivi t ies on an IntemalionalSficik. 
India b«ll«v«d that this organisation could hslp the aaatMir 
statttSf "In r«gard to such basic oattsrs as hmaa rlghtSf 
f ra«doa of dopsndsnt paopleSf and th« d«vslopM«at of aoono* 
68 
mically teckvard araas*** 
Jawaharlal Nahru had an Implicit faith In ths aiUltgr 
of the United Slatlons organisation. In an address to the 
U»!f« General Asseabl/ in Paris on Noveabsr 3^ IMSy he toldf 
"•••••• .ve adhere ooapletely and aosoluteiy to the prineiples 
and purposes of thu U.H.Oiartbr and that M9 shall tr/ to the 
best of our abilltyi to woik for the realisation of those 
60 
purposes and principles*** It \m» his faith in the charter 
67. ynittd IfittoM fitTtiWt J^ uly 1963, P.61, 
68* T"**** ^^ ^ * Onit^a Wfttiana (New lotk^ 1967),p*2l3, 
6 t | Jir^ha^lal ^ * ^ * « gp^aches Eenteaber ltte&,Key 1040. 
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tiut «ad« hlB tak« up a a t U r of lodiant In fouth Africa 
in th« 0«n«irai Asssably* It vas the saaw fa i th that oade 
h i s r«f«r tbt Kathnlr issue to the f^ourity Council. Nehru's 
f&ith in the peac«ful sct t ieaent of internatlonsl disputes 
and strengthtsnin^ the principles of the U«ff« Charter i s 
aanifested in th« provision made in the Indian Constitution. 
Indians record in the U.N. reveals the great lapoxw 
tance she attaches to the U«M« as an international forua 
for the resolution of conf l ic ts and spreading of nutual 
understanding and co-operation^ especial ly through the \oxk 
of specialized agencies* India has evened the U«N. for 
the achleveffleat of aost of her foreign policy objectives 
61 
and principally as a vehicle of comaunication* India's 
appvoaeh to a n controversial p o l i t i c a l questions in tiie 
United Nations has been fflotivated lay this basic objective* 
FroB th<» K.ori.an var» 19b0^ d«vn to the Cub&n cris is^ 19<a»2y 
India has a l l along tried to oalntain contacts between the 
pover blocs preferaoly through Vtie U.H* and seek a nesit iated 
settleaent* Indians special role vas fu l ly recognised by 
both the pover blocs in the international (^maisslons in 
i»0« Th« c^netitutii^n nt Indiay T^ihi^ .Publication mvls lon 
1967, / r t* 61 , p*19. 
61* 3ilgrami, Jafar Raza. "India and the united ifatlons", 
tin tttflin Jatttttii of P>itittflil SfiiwnBit voi* x>ri,No«2, 
AprU^JUne, 1966, p*66» 
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Kor«ft at voll as In Xnds^Chlna, India has b««n abls to 
r«aovt Bueh aisundsrstanding b«tv««n the disputes hslplngi 
thersby th« U,!f. to restore peace* 
At the s^ iae tiA«! in 1966 India participated in 
Ikilted Nations EoergtncjT Force and in 1968 in United Nations 
Observation Group in Lebanon* In 1961 JndlB. sent a iarlgade 
of coa))atant troops of about 6000 and an &ir Unit to U.ff* 
Force in Conip* On pro£>i6as llkey peaceful eaplo/ient of 
atonic energy, universal disanMuoent and test ban, India 
has alva/s supported a l l progressive viev points In th« U*7f* 
for an early settlement* India has a l l along defined the 
threat of nucleir wars as th«^  iK>st crucial problem of aanklfid* 
India has tried i t s oest to stain tain p^ a^ce and disamaaent 
throu^ ti^e U*!f* and has taken interest in Gtfieva negotiations 
of 17 nations. For India the United 'Nations, "is less a 
court of appeal or a farua that can meet out ready made Jus. 
tlce than the symbol of universal utsmaoly of viitl'^ns living 
65 
and voxicing in co»operation vith onn another/^ 
Xestifylni^ to the effective and useful yaxt that 
India has played in the vosfc of U*N*, a memuer of the United 
62* toflta 1B^, Hew Delhi, 1963, pp* 63, 404* 
63* "India and the Uif", Uak (^«v Delhi), October 26, 
1970» p*16. 
. 70 -
KlngdoB delegation to the IVth <:eeslon of the General 
Aeseabl/ st&t«d that India vag, **&n effeotlve and balanolAg 
Influenoe^ In K>rld affairs Sa far as United *fstions Orgs* 
nixatl^n is concerned*** 
Itie aiMve quoted facts go to establish that India's 
approach to the United ITations Organization hag, ^erefore^ 
a l l along been the strengthening of the principles of the 
United Nations Charter* India's role in the UW hai; thus 
greatly strengthened the %brld Organisation in i t s soleon 
efforts to saiatain international peace and pronote hman 
velfare* India has alva/s supported the ooves for disama. 
aent| vorld peace, coliectivts security and preservation of 
human ri^ ^hts* 
She Co''affionirt<2^ 1th of Nations Is an association of 
the independent sovereign states each responsible for i ts 
own policies, but th«;s prioary objective of a l l is vorld 
peace and security* The nature of India's relation with t l 
the Cooaonvealth engaged the attention of the Indian nations, 
l i s t s during the pre.independence period* In 1946, Maulana 
64* Birdvood, Lord, "United Nations <*<nd Asia", ^auwuii nf 
ftt toyfti Cmmi ftnlaa Soclrty (London), vol. xxxx?ii, 
p* 1&&* 
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Atattl Kalaa Asad» the th«a President of th« Indian National 
CoOKrotty told tha Cabinat Niaaion that, "If the question 
vaa x«ft to India, i t vas not unllkaly that India might 
daeida in f:^vour of oontinuing in tha Cowaonvaalth,** 
Iha deelsion arrived at thb Coaoonwaalth Priae Hinlitar) 
Conference in London, 1949, i s of h i s tor ic iaportanoe* It 
enabled India to reaain a member of the Commonwealth inapita 
of her dtiolaratlon to become a sovereign Indapendent iispmbLie* 
It vaa declared ay th« Prime Minister of India on tm 27th 
April, 1949^ that In viev of the his tor ic deciaion reached 
at t!ti% Commomfeallh Prime Minister's Conference, the Repuhlie 
of India shal l be glad to continue her membership of the 
Commonwealth as that was best in the Interest of India and 
the world* r^peaklng In the Constituent Assembly on May t6 , 
1949, Nehru said, **Ve Join the Commonwealth obviously because 
we t^ink i t i s benefeoial to us and to certain causes in 
the w>tld that we wish to advance*** Ihe Commonwealth link 
Nehru f e l t would help India (a speedy progress ecotiomically 
and promote peace* f t a Press Conference in Madras on 
January 16, 19bo, Nehru said that, ** Indians Commonwealth 
66* Asad, Haulana Abul Kalam^ Ittdll VUM FgifflTMit Calcutta 
Drient Lon^an*i» jpvt* Ltd*, 19o9, p. 161* 
1949, p*7* 
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oontacta )a»d vid«A«d th« uii(i«rstaadliigi of Ihdla and thus 
67 
i.«ts«n6d fr ic t ions in t^^ vorldm** o d i o u s l y v i t ^ u t this 
l ink, h« saidt **It vliX te a far aor« d l f f iou l t task and 
v l l l t^k« ffiueh longer t ia«. It is not an •&&> aat t tr to 
do that,** 
Dodiu a({r«ttd to remain in Comaionvealth b«eauae the 
association ful ly confirmed to the underlying principles 
of her foreign policy in particular of removing discord and 
Iw^inging a)B»ut hansony aaong nations* No d^ubt Coaaonvealtt] 
steauership w&s accepted not so auch for sentimental reasons^ 
as for the tangible, advantages telievbd to occur from i t 
70 
both in thto niAtional and international splMres* ' s Karuna. 
karan puts i t , "It \^s otnrious that taking into account 
India's economic defence and s c i e n t i f i c InterestSf i t %ould 
be to th«> advantage of India to continue to remain in the 
Comoonvealth a t l e a s t for sometime to come{ nothing would 
be coined by going oat of the Commonwealth a t this stage.** 
67, JhaJliDMt January lt>, 196o, 
66, Constituent Aaeeablv fiebata^y O I U A U M P*«^* 
<>9« iNfehru be l i t tved t h a t Comaonvealth v^a **a£;ainst iJar" 
una worked an the v h o l e f o r '* peace" • Aairit Baagap 
Hatrika (Calcutta;, *lovember Id, 194&. 
70. P l l l a l , K.haman, fluj^jsliM P» 167. 
73. K&runaktiran, K.P.. India In toiid krr^Um lQ47,&p, 
(Calcutta 1962), p.37. 
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on« appr«h«iisiv« cloud daikttosd ih« sk/, Nthru did 
not h&v« thtt undivided support of a l l India in hit aattorl/ 
aova to stay vlthin th« Coaaonvtalth* Mr. Baral B»s«| Leadar 
of the Socialist Rspublleans. spoka of tiis daolaratlon of 
72 
Nahru, to remain In tho CoaaoniMaith as ^ths great blundar**' 
Xhs opposition parties of India fearad that India «as sndan-. 
garad kv iaparialisa as long as sh« raialned h«r contacts 
vlth toa CoMBonvaalth. Ansverlng th« oonaunlst eritioisB 
In the Psrliaasnt 'lehru said^ '*V)s ara in Coamonvoalth, I 
thiek bacausa i t Is good for us and good for ths causss vhieh 
vs wish to support mnd becausa It does not coaa In oxir m^y 
at a l l In ths policlas that vs pursua. and It is.•••andmight 
73 
ba hslpful*** In th« Kalyanl sassion of the Congress Part^i 
1964, iM re«axlted| *'We arm pressed vith unfailing regularity 
to leave the Coaoonwealth without being told what good this 
74 
v i l l bring us*** 
The opposition parties have oftenly cr i t ic ize i India*s 
aeabershlp of the Coaoonweaith on several occasions* ISie 
aindu Mahasa)3ha, ^ e Coamunlst Party, the PSP and Jana rani^ 
7S« Minti^ttUr fitilrtiaBf M4yl6, 1949, 9.2. 
73. ItM ITtoaii, January 84, igb4. 
74 . Ibid. 
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v«h«B«ntly oppot«4 th* assoel^tlon of Indl^ vlth thm Connofu 
v«alth. 'Ih« CPI polit ieal r«»olutlon adopted at Madura! 
Congrass 1963, aaldi 
"A ful l fraa India outaida tha Coanonvaalth and out-
alda aXl laparlallat Influanca will ba a graat factor for 
76 
vorld puaca and tha fra«doa of alX Aaian eolonlal paoplaa*** 
Tna i>SP waa aXao oppoaad to tha Coomonvaalth link 
i>aeauaa th« Unitad Kingdom and othar Oomoonvaaltfa aaabara 
hava paid ac&nt ragard to India*a v i ta l Intaraats snd aldad 
vlth Indiana opponanta, a«g*» BrltalnU aapport to Paklatan 
76 
on th« Kashmir laau* and to Portugal on Goa qseatlon. Tha 
Hindu Mahaaaisha and Jana Sani^ vara also strongly oppoaad to 
tha Coanonvtaith link mn aoeourt of Srltish laparlallst 
policy In 'nglo«Franchc!^graasion on Egypt* *t tha AH India 
Congraaa Coamittae aaatlng at Calcutta, Mr. Aigdral !?hattrl 
damandad irlthdravai froa tiia Ooaaonvaalth on tha ground th'^ t 
77 
It would be a "vamlng to a l l aggraaaora*** Sr raaalnlng la 
tha Coaaonvaalth, ha aaaartady Ihdla vas "in dangar of balng 
76 
tamlahad*** 
7 6 . CPI P f t l i t i a a l R—ftlntlntt.Mfttttart Afc Tha Oi ird Oanyr—^ 
Hadural| Dioaabar 1963 • January 1964, p*8* 
76. Mr.Surandra Nath Dwlvady, P8F, laadar, vnalntalnad that 
India should laava tha Coaaonvauith, not only on aeoount 
of aantlaantal reasons but baeauaa of ^^ry practical 
raaaons. SaajiaaUia (Boabay), August 26, 1967, p«6« 
77. /ter^t anaff Pitrifcflf Novaabar 10, 1966, 
78. i U 4 . 
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Mbv tb« qoMtlon vss whether India should continue 
in the OoBfflon%feelth or not? Ifehxtt vaty however, ttiXX 
Qonvinced that India should continue ^ e connection* He 
reiterated his old arguaents and said that since the asso* 
ciation %«8 not positively haraful to us It was better to keep 
79 
it* Speaking in the Lsk safaha, he asserted, "despite the 
painful shocks % l^ch India has experienced i t vas desirable 
in the present context to continue this association vlth the 
90 
CoWBonvealth*** Ifehru has insisted that / the Coaaonvealth 
helps to support the causes India supports, that i t i s not 
81 
an ofistaole to Indian foreign policies." 
She British action relating to India vis.a.Tis 
Pakistan a^in provoked bitter denunciation at a l l levels 
of public opinion and also a demand to quit Coaaonvealth 
was Bade* Achar/a KripjLani said at a public meeting in 
?few Delhi, in September 19li6j,that India should quit the 
Commonwealth to teach Britain a lesson for here spearheading 
enti»India and pro«Pakistani moves whenever India and 
82 
Pakistan involved In a conflict* 
79« Paradya, BalraJ S in^, "Mr.lfehru, the Indian National 
Congress and India's membership in the Commonwealth,** 
Inttrnatlnmit Ptttaitlt VO1.IV,NO.3, June igea, Bombay, 
Asia Publishing Bouse, p« 310* 
80. T^ it fiaaia Dahetae^ Yol.I, No. 7, Part II, March Sb,t967, 
Cols. 67CMi7l. 
81. House, M2 .Malcolm, ** India And the Commonwealth of 
irations". Bit JfldUa JflwrnaX of fnlitlgaX SBiaaatt 
Vol.XXUI, flo.3, JUl/.September 1962, p.233, 
82. mt tUkm of IndU (Hew Delhi), CepUmber 23, 1966. 
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Apart from th« alaoif« diaeugslon, 2ii<lai>«n<i«nt India** 
jtola as a mimt»r of Comaonvaalth tiat )»a«n notaiatls and hat 
battn a oradlt and sourca of strengtii to tha Couaonvaalth of 
!f^tiona« It Introducad a profound changa In tha ooncaptlon 
of Go«aoniMaith« It earrlad tha antl*laparlall8t and antl-
ratlonailat polioias Into tha unry haart of this ualqua 
aatociatlon* India•• rola in tha Gowionvaalth pottatsaa 
tha purpoaa of ohaaploning tha causaa Uiat aim at ttringthan-
ing i t s position and l i f t ing tha aoonoaie laval of the taall 
and unprivileged and unfrae paoplas of tha Afro*Aaian %iorld* 
Tha main objaetlvaa of l^dia*8 foreign policy M 
stated above have remained fundamentally tha same, fven 
though the oases of iJiishBir» Korea^ Hungry, fi^ ues^  China 
and latest of Uie East Pakistan have subjeoted our foreign 
policy to criticism from vs^rious quarters^ ifois main tenets 
of our foreign policy have remained unaltered* Efforts 
should^ ho%fever, be made to ne^stiate with China and Pakistan 
and establish friendly relations with them in order to insure 
peace In Agia, But these pursuations should not be at the 
cost of our national honours sovereignty and prestige. Peace 
with tonour should be our motto in dealing with the world ^^ 
«larga particularly our immediate nei^^bours* 
63. Aurton jQttraal nf JnltrBattonal Lav» ' pru t969, p.d96. 
C H A P T E R n i 
XQV'>\ffi INDIA'S raREiflff 5 5 1 5 
C H A P T E R n i 
IH£ AniWIffi Of fflK CQMMBlflST PARIX (PABIIES) QF fflPlA 
TQ^ROS BtOM*g rQfifilOH PQIil« 
The CoBumuilst Party of India Is the party which aetivtly 
adopted a clear programme vith regard to India's foreign policy. 
It proclaims a foreign policyy v^ich, in any fom, should not 
subscribe to iaperialisa. It claims to strive for iorld peace 
and co-existence of a l l n&tions* It is at best only a unit 
of international communism. It is controlled and guided by 
Mbseov or China vlth scant regard for tht^  r e a l i t i e s of Indian 
polit ics and the interests of the Indian cit lsens. It was 
Stalinist so long as Stalin was alive and i t changed i t s 
loyalty to Khzus/i>«chev after he assumed tiie leadership of 
the Soviet Union and Communist China, The right wing of the 
Communist Party of India continues to be loyal to the Soviet 
Union in i t s l&ad of International Communismi but the l e f t 
wing is inclined to favour China and assert i t s adher«r&ce to 
1 
Stalinism* 
The Indian leaders had learnt a lo t from the Russian 
leaders i f ter the Fussian Revolution. I«nin was widely acela. 
laed as the saviour of the masses and their c^afflplon a l l over 
the li^rld«They realised the significance of the revolution and 
teachings of Lenin on the Indian working class and national 
!• See, Bih&rilal, MUkut, **Ihe Communist Party", iaoala (Bombay), February 4, 19t»2, p*&. 
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•ov«m«nt« Ih«y also r«ail8«d that tid« by gld« with th« 
CongrtSB i t va« mocfsary to oripniss th« Indian Vbxklng elaia 
lnd«p«nd«ntl/ and on the baa la of claat atruggla i«hloh oonttl-
tuta tha aaaanca of Harxlan. All thaaa In oouraa of tiaa lad 
to th« aatabliahaant of tha Coaaunlat t'&rty of India. 
Tha CPI iaac&n to funotion with tha totalitarian outlook 
of Marx and ia baaed on tha philosophical principles of Marx, 
Engals, Lanin and Stalin, who ara tha (authoritative souroa 
2 
of Marxism** It haa declared to be the part/, **of miking 
3 
daaa, i t s vanguard, ita higheat form of ciaaa organisation,** 
and a **-foluntary aasooiation of workers and paasanta and toi l -
ing people In general devoted to the cauae of Sooialisa and 
4 
CoiaaunisB." It haa pointed out oonaiatently that i t ia the 
revolutionary atruggla of the maasea and of the %ioxkera and 
peaaanta • that ean f i r s t win rsal fraedoa and deaooracy and 
then dear the way for soeialiam* It olaias i tse l f to be 
fixaly and oonaiatently fighting for a aooialist path of 
davelopBient* It ia tMt striking that, vhiie adhering the 
ultifliate goal of socialisa, in i t s 1961 prograome of the party, 
i t did not demand the immediate eatahlishment of socialism. 
2. Nisami, laufiq Ahmad, the Cftmmmniat Party and Inilla«t 
Pft reign Pal ley, Nev Delhi, Associated Publishing !]6use, 
1971, pp. 3,7. 
3 . Malhotra, AvUr Singh, Uhat la Cnmmuniat Party?, Nev Delhi, 
CPI, 1970, p. 12. 
4« Ibid. 
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Hov«ir«r, i t s t i l l talk«d of r«voltttion dlr«et«d against fauda. 
6 
l l s a and imparlallsa. 
Until 1938, the CoBWinlat Party was outs Ida IhdiaU 
national struggla and ragardad tiia Indian National Congrass 
as a bourgaoisie organisation vorth figjhting and axploiting* 
After tha Second itbrld var tha Indian Coonmnists ranatiad thsir 
support for tha indat»andanca aovafisnt v h i ^ finally andad tha 
British rula in 1947. On August 16, 1947 India bacaaa inda. 
pandant on tha basis of Mountbattan Plan* Tha CoMnmist Party 
valoomad this plan as a graat stap forward. Undar Joshi*s 
laadarship the Cottsunist Party of India supported continuemsly 
7f9hru*s policies. But this policy of oo-oparation vitt- tlia 
QovemBant resulted In agitation and Joshl was subjected to 
great cri t lc isa . The Conmunists in India and abroad refused 
to admit that Indian Independcnoe had In fact been won. At 
that tine r,taiin*s favourite, A«7hdanov, addressing the 
Coalnfoni (Cooaonist Information Bureau) in l^Orsaw, indicated 
that India was s t i l l a colony, though American power was 
advancing there at the expense of British. Ihe Indian Qovera* 
7 
Bent was, i t appeared, a puppet of the British and Aaericans. 
ti. afgflb Iilght (Patna), December 31, 1961. 
6« Llmaye, Madhu, "IMdian Comaunism t Ihe New Phase", 
Padf jg Affatol, Vol. XXVII, NO.3, September 1954, p.l96. 
7. ** Indian Statemmanship and Commanist Opposition", ^OiM. 
Marld today, Vol. II, NO.3, March 1966, p. 107. 
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Then th« Indian Coaaunltta wlthdx«v thslr support froa th« 
Ntthra Qov«m&«nt« In 1948 th« Ctntrai Co««itU« of th6 CPI 
d«clar«d t ^ t the nautrailty of N«hxtt*t Qov«rna«nt vaa only 
•a mask to eovr oolla bo rations vith th« Anglo^JUBsrloan 
8 
lap«rlall8t»*' Ihla cl«ar shift in hsr attitudo towards !9«hxtt 
and th« Con«;r«ss vets tht baglnning of a ssrlss of soasr^aults 
in h«r approaeh«s to Indian politioo*scono«io problaMS* 
Thk 6scond Congrasa of tha CoouDunist i^rt/ of India, 
hald in ld4b at Calcutta, v&s a ^aat stap forward in tha l i fa 
of Inditin Coan^unlst f'arty* Sh« politict^X thesis adopted i^ 
the Congress declared that "the Nehru.Patel Qovexnsent is 
9 
cazT/ing out the dictates of Angio«»A>«rican iaperialists*** 
It attacked Congress policies to ha the direct lieutenants 
of tftM« British and AAerloan laperiaiists and were seeking; to 
make India & oase of v-ar against the U,r.r,H«, the people*s 
democracies and the lioeration struggles of the peoples of 
10 
Asia* It iBust te attacked by iBokdlising wozfeing peopla and 
other deaocratic forces in India against the anti.natlonai 
n 
reactionary bloc l«d by Anglo-American iaperialist^. FollowlBg 
^ e patii of Marxisa-LeninitB and teachings of Lenin and 
8. p««^«i«a Age (Boabay), March fil, 1948* 
9. Initm ^^—"»V» Off'-tY mamanf loao-iafta, fioabay, The 
Deaocratie Hesearoh Serirlce, 1957, p*64* 
10* Ibid., p* 68* 
11. Ibid., p* 60* 
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Stelin to f l j^t &1X all«n trends, th« Cooiiunists also strlYSd 
to unify th« entire part/ ^s a granlts rode ai^ainst laporla. 
l i s a and i t s Indian a l l i s s . It is svidont fro« th« aiaovs 
quotsd vlavs of ths Cofluunist part/ leaders and their organi. 
sation that their vhole trade vas sloganish and negative. To 
allege that Nehru or t'atel vere anti-national or had carved 
out an unholy alliance vith the Anglo-American bloc or to be 
in league vith the eneaies of India is to say the least 
fantastic. Since the end of the Cecond party Congress t i l l 
1954 the CoBBvnist Party of Ihdia consistently declared that 
the Govemnent of India*s policy could not be called a policy 
of peace. It is a policy of otanoeuvring bet^ieen the aain 
eheay of peace, the U.S.A. and Britain on the one hand ^ d 
the peace loving countries on the other. Ihis stand of the 
Coomunist Party of India did ik>t differ so nuch from the 
attitude adopted by Moscov during this period. The Hei« Ti—• 
of Moscow stated that the Prise Minister Nehru %AS directing 
the affairs of his country vith the support of the var Mongers 
and trying to cut itt the Indian people trbm tiieir natural 
a l l i e s and liberty-loving people. It again declared that 
"the struggle for real independence of India, for the interest 
of ttie labouring aasses, is continuing outside the Congress 
12 
and against i t . 
12. Waw Times (Mosoov), January 12, 1949, also see, Kundre, 
J.C., tod^an Tanim PniteYt 1M7v64t (Boabay, 1966;, 
pp. 66-67. 
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Regarding ti)« foreign pollc/ of tnm N«hru Govcrnatnt 
as suojeoted to the lnflu«ne«8 of th« dritlsh and Aa«rlean 
cirGi«8, the CoBUMnlsts In India maintained th&t the driving 
force bekined the decision of the Oovexment of India was the 
need of thb Indian bourgecisie to establish a f lm aUianee 
with th«j Jritlsh iiBt>eriaIists for the eruBhling order In 
Vi 
Iridic I in Aala and in the l«6rld* 
Ihe Draft Prograaae of the CPl» adopted k>/ the All 
IMdia I'arty Conference in Octoa«r 1951, also criticised the 
14 
foreign poXicy of India as suiaservlent to Jrltlsh iaperialisa. 
In the f ield ^f foreign polio/ the Ct'I wanted that 
Indi^ should nat 'play oetween peace and var, or in other 
words, It should give i t s present foreign policy of non. 
alignnent with either power bloc a decent burial and should 
attach herself penaanently with the peace bloc reprMented by 
16 
the U.!;«P«R. and i ts satel l i tes* It also wanted a pact of 
13 . H>iv Tlmaa (MoSCOW), Aut^ USt 4 , 1948* 
14. Xhe sending of help by the Governnent to the American 
troops In Kortu, allowing 3ritish iaperialists to reoruit Qui'khas and Sikhs for the supression of '4alaym*s fight 
for Independence, allowing landing bases in India for 
the ritcnch planes on th^ir M»y to fight against the 
Peoples liepublic of Vietnam —>» a l l these considered by 
the CPI as Instances of India's suiMervience to Eritlsn 
Imperialism. ne«, Pmgramma af tha Cammunimt Party a f 
inAia^ Adopted by the An India Conference, October 
1961 tBombay), p.8, 
16* 'rlvastsva, G.P., "Communism t Its Programuie Aad prospects 
In India*', Iha Indian Journal nt P o l i t i c a l Scifcnca, 
Vol. XVI, Nb.l, January.Kareh ig<>&, p, 60, 
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p«ac« l)«tv««n a l l tii« gr«at powrs of the VtOrld* It also 
vl«w«d with f:^vour a pact of mutual friendship between Indls, 
Pakistan, Ceylon and 'lepal. It demanded prohibition of the 
Atom Bomb and withdraval of a l l foreign troops from a l l 
16 
GO vn tries* 
Mean%Hilie Nt^hru's foreifpi policy aimed at throvlng the 
CPl Into p o l i t i c a l wilderness. !0ie CPI In the face of i t s 
active support for Hehru^s foreign policy, could not develop 
a systematic mass movement against the Government, In March 
19t»d, the o f f i c i a l organ of the Communist i'arty professed to 
Una up beKitldl the Indian «>rime Minister's denunciation of 
the NAXO in these words, "An tiiose who love peace and hate 
imperialism v i l l welcome the denunciation by Prime Minister 
Nehru of the imperialist powers who have oanded together in 
17 
what i s cal led the VNAlo**. Nehxu*s statement in Parliament 
on Korea, H&y ii>, 1963, and the Chinese communists proposals 
of 
for the repatriation/thtc. prisoner* of war had a direct effect 
on Communists Party's original liloe of denunelatlon of India's 
foreign policy. In May 1963, P*Sundarayya, leader of the 
Communist Party in parliament, announced h is party's welcome 
of the Prime Minister's statement in parliament on Korean 
s i tuation and the Chinese Communists proposals for the 
16* Masanl, iM.R., The Cnmrnunlst party of Inrt^y, Bombay, 
Bharatiya Vldya Bhawan, 1967, p*118» 
17. Crft«« Bt%&A&j March 22, 1963. 
18 
rtpatriatlon of the prisoner* of v«r* 
A« a Matter of f&et| throughout fIft itty th« Coaaunltt 
party of India could not d4»eid« as to vhat thould b« i t s 
eorrset attitude tovards 17«hra and his party* It oontlnuad 
In ttagaa alternately to poia i t se l f fts the only defender of 
IVehru* On foreign poliey i t had tuo voices* On the one handy 
Hlren Mukerjetif represtfitlng the Klght group of the C?I in 
Lok !!abha, said that India possessed a noral initiative In 
World affairs and that Kehru had froa tine to tine exereised 
19 
It with '*positive courage*** On the other handf P*rundarsyya, 
representing the Left group In the Upper liouse, deseribed 
Nehru*s foreign policy as & "pale reflection of that of ^nglo* 
SO 
Aaerican iMperialists*** 
Indians role in the Indo»China for negotiated s e t t l e . 
Bent of disputes^ Chao*!!ehra declaration and the enunciation 
18. ^«*:4^nai Rt^nAT^A (Bombay^ Hay 18, 1863* A f«w days 
l&tert A^K.Oopalan said that while h i s party could not 
agree v l th certain things in vhich TTehru vas supporting 
the Angloo^^aerican blocy they certainly welcomed h i s 
stand on the Korean question and mxeh other things* 
Frifi Prggfi jQUnaJL (Bombay), March 22, 1953* 
19. SaxJ^OL (^cv Delhi), }foy 23, 1964* 
80. Thfl Tl8tl flf IndU (Hcv Delhi), May 83, 1964{ the Poll, 
t lcal resolution adopted by the CPl at l&durai in 1984 
had given generally a negative appraisal of Nehru's 
Goverment Foreign Policy* It said, "Th« situation does 
not warrant that democratic forces should giv«n general, 
over a l l support to governmental policies even in the 
international sphere* Ihis i s because the Indian Qovernment does not follow consistently a policy of peace 
and democracy* Ihe foreign policy of the (iovernment Is 
subject especially to the Influence of British Imperialisiri] 
Cfl art CttBgrMiiPfllUioajL fitaaJLtttAiint Delhi, cpi, 1964, 
pp* 8.7{ also see* ulndiilleri Marshall,"Indian Commualsm 
And the New Soviet hlnit*'^ Paeifin Affair ?ol*XXlX,No*4, 
Deeembor 1966, p.348* 
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of the Five Prinolpict of panoh Shlla and 'Mr opposition to 
South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) mada the CoamonlstPdr-
tv of India to approzlBat« vlth the Governnent. 
In Jvme 19bb while Prime Minister was touring the 
Soviet Union, tiie Central ^laalttee of the C?I adopted a 
resolution r^presantlng a coaproalse between the contesting 
fact ions . The party's position on foreign policy thus emerged 
was —» "India has been playing a ^ ^ a t role In the world 
wide battle for the preservatioh of peace «—> a role that 
has hlghtened Indians International prestige and evoked In 
(.very patriot ic Indian a sense of national pride • • • • • the 
Commanlst Party which has ot&i f ighting for a consistent policy 
of peace, welcomes and supports th is orientation and wi l l 
21 
strive to further strengttien i t . " With the Government's 
Increasing friendship with s o c i a l i s t countries from 1966 
onward, tiie CPI seems to extent Its f u l l support to the foreiga 
22 
policy of the Goverment of India. 
The CPI claims to have stood throughout for socialism, 
anti-Imperialism and world peace and supported the antl> 
21. CPI Central Committee^ Commanlst Party In the struggle 
fnr Pgftfitt PiancrftCY ftnd lyttiflnftA AdTfrott Delhi, CPI, 
Pub^^l956, p.4, 
22. In a Press Conference June 29, 196t>9 A Jay Ghosh, the 
then General Stcr^tary of the CPI, said, "We think that 
present foreign policy has ei^anced the prestige of India 
a l l over the l«>rld and has enabled her to strengthen her 
independence. Therefore^we support i t . " Ifew Aee^ JUly 3, 
19U9, p. 13. 
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l aper la l l s t poiicitts of th« Govarmsnt, It believes that 
India can preserve I ts Independence only by adhering to the 
policy of pfcace and ant l«colonial iM, In an address to the 
Press Conference in 1961, Aj»y Ghosh declared, "Our basic 
assassaent i s that the Goverraient of India(s foreign policy 
23 
Is a foreign policy of peace, non-alignment and anti .coloniallsa 
Oie 1962 Election Manifesto of the p^rty attached great 
importance to India's role in the %brld vide struggle for 
24 
peace and against colonialism and demanded that India should 
assume a s t i l l greater role in defence of vorld peace* 
The years of 19t>7*t>2 masked by the processes of rethiidc. 
ing. During this period certain developments that took place 
in the International f i e l d , such as the Avadi Congress's 
declared goal of the s o c i a l i s t pattern of society, the policy 
of non-alignment and peace folloved by the government, the 
nucler r stalement betve^n the t%io giants in the \6rld and the 
t a c t i c s of peaceful co-existence, helped the fodian Gommunists 
to actopi a l e s s mil i tant and more constitutional approach* 
Eventually, at i t s 'mritsar Party Congress^held in April 1968, 
the Communist Party declared ^ a t i t vas possible to achieve 
26 
socialism and democracy through peaceful means* 
23* New 7vy« (New Delhi), Oecemoer £4, 1961, p*9* 
24* "CoauBunist Party Election Manifesto 1962^ * in Poplai,S*L*, 
ad., 1962 Ganaral El«ctinn« In Indla^ Bombay, All ied 
publishers private Ltd., 1962, p*12a. 
2b. Ibid, 
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Dlff«r«nces of opinion soon developed betvaoi th« 
two rival groups of the Communist Party of India. In the 
MBkfi of Chinese aggression In October 1962, the ultra party 
conf l ic ts reached the point of no return. Ihe Issues relating 
to var and peace, people's denocrac/ vs national democracy, 
peaci^ful transition to sdelallsm, peaceful co-existence and 
2<> 
nuclear proliferation also vltitontd the differences. Th^  
s p l i t In the Ihtematlonai ls t Communist Movement which divided 
Moscov and Peking accentuated the differences. These differ-
ences had repurcusslons on members of the CPI, and ultimately 
there took place a s p l i t in the party in 1964, which resulted 
in the formation of two part ies , CPI and the Marxist Communist 
Party of India. CPI was Ideologically closer to Russian 
Communists and the CPI (M; was ideological ly closer to Chinese 
27 
Communists. The basic difference between the two parties 
relate entlrt^ly with the attitude to be taken tovards the 
Congress. The Marxist Communists consider; ^ e congress as 
their main enemy and point; out that congi«iss Is determined 
to suoserve the Interests of ^ e cap i ta l i s t s and landlords and 
28 
In the oargain imperil the freedom of our people. 
Banerjee, Slvadas, "The Communist Split". In Pattabhlram, 
M., ed.; Ganeral Election in India 1067 i An Fjcclu«lira 
Study nf Mito Paiililfiai IrfBd§» Bombay, All led Publishers 
1967, pp. 86.^7. 
27* Ghose, Sankar, Sociallea nriA OtmainieM In InAlA^ OLSbSXia^ 
p. 347{ also see , Dange, S.A., \iilBn COBBttntltt HXtUtit 
Bombay, Indian Institute of Soc ia l i s t rtudles, p 1970* 
28. 5;ee, Peftples Demncraov (Calcutta;, October 9, 1966. 
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The Conmunltt Party of fodla has s«v«raX tines praised 
the great role India has been playing in the preservation of 
vx>rld peace, for general and ooaplete disamaaenty for bann. 
ing of /^tomic Wiapons and for the Afro-Asian sol idarity. It 
beIit:V«.d that th% foreign policy of India''is. in the main, 
a policy of p^acei non-alignaent and ant i -co lonia l i sa . It 
conforms to the interests of the national bourgeoisisi neets 
the need of India's econoaio developasnt and rs f l sots tile 
sentiments of the people of India, It i s sometimes v i t iated 
W lapses and compromise, taut as a vholSi the main character 
29 
of the policy has been generally preserved.** It appealed 
that progressive forces in the country should continue to 
defend this policy and combat the reaetlonaxy pressures against 
i t . On the other hand, the CPI (M) regarded that this 
assessment of India** foreign policy stemmed from a rev i . 
s i o n i s t approach and form the lack of a true understanding 
of the c lass character of the Indian s ta te . 
!0ie i Lef t i s t view of India*s foreign policy can best 
be summed up in the vords of m Sundarayya as fo l lows | "A 
correct characterisjLtion would be our foreign policy i s tuned 
to su i t the interests of the ]hdian ruling c lass , that i s 
cap i ta l i s t landlord govemment-ls one of play between tvo 
^d* Sfle.Proeeadin^s of the Seventh Cangresa of thm CPI 
Bombay, December 19&4, Ifev Delhi, CPI Pub.^  1965. 
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camps. From 1M7.&3, i t leaned t()v:^rd8 iap«r la l i t t camp. 
Slnc« 1963 upto 1968, i t s policy was pro-soc ia l i s t camp. 
From 1968 onv&rds, i t leansd towards impsrlaiist camp again. 
In practice Nehru govsmmsnt kept i t s interests in viev and 
changed i t s foreign policy once in favour of Imperialist camp 
and a t ano^er time tovards s o c i a l i s t camp. It played betve«in 
30 
camps." In viev of the declared policy of Nehru that i s of 
national s e l f . i n t e r e s t there is nothing surprising or wrong 
in this shift ing of posit ions. Nothing i s s ta t i c In the world. 
A dynamic and progressive foreign policy j u s t i f i e s these 
sh i f t s without in any way compromising our basic stand/points 
of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism and 
non-alignment. 
Xh« CPI (M) looks upon the foreign policy of the 
Congress Government as fdrce, a fai lure and a deviation from 
^ e basic principles l a id down in the pre-independence and 
post independence periods and points out that India's prestige 
has fa l l en low ailing the antl-imperial 1st forces and nations 
because the Congress Government, while mouthing phrase about 
non-alignment, has been slowly taking India fxom the ant l -
imperlallst peace-loving camp and towards the US imperialist 
camp. This sh i f t i s a betrayal of the interest of the nation 
30. Rigomt|gB on SBlUtfr t , ^pril 10-16, N«v Delhi, CPI» 
Pub., 1964, pp. 70-71. 
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and la only In Hie narrow s«lfl8h lnt«r«tt« of the bourgeoisie 
31 
landlord ruling c las ses . The Government's stand in regard 
to Vietnaa has been also regarded by the Left Party as shaae. 
fu l . It has condeaned that instead of a d&ar cut stand of 
a n support to Vietnanis freedoa struggle and stopping the US 
imperialist aggression in itsisi "the Qoveinment acquiesce;? ^ 
in the US aggression, helps the South Vlstn'^ m puppet by send. 
ing trucks and s t e e l from the Soviet .bui l t Bhilai Plant, 
praises tiie peaceful intentions of the President Johnson and 
even peddles the bogus peace proposals of the US imperialists 
32 
round the Vbrld.** 
Though the Communist party of India supported the 
foreign policy of the Ciovernment, i t did not refrain from 
cr i t i c i z ing the implementation of the policy. It resented 
vaci l lat ions and compromises under the pressure of Anglo. 
33 
American blackmail. It further pointed out that although 
the Government's foreign policy continues to be within the 
broad frame woxk of non-alignment and opposition to world war, 
" i t s increasing reliance on wsstem monopoly aid to f u l f i l 
Five lear Plans of cap i ta l i s t / ' - i t s continued membership of 
31 . "uhy Communist (Marxists)? Election Manlfesto",tnBhathai, 
Ramdas, G. i.d.. Po l i t i ca l Alternatives in Lndia^ fibmbay^ 
Popular Prakashan, 1967, pp. 427.28. 
32. ilUjI., p. 428. 
33. Klectian Manifasto of the Communist Party of TnAJA^ 
New Delhi, CPI Pub., 1967. 
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British Comnonwaalth « ^ and as & result of a l l th i s , i t s 
provarleation on a muiber of anti«.colonlal issues in tiie 
recent period, objectively f a c i l i t a t e s the US designs of 
neo-colonialism and aggression and lead to India's i so lat ion 
from the powerful currents of peace, democracy, freedom and 
34 
socialism as such i s harmful to our interests.** It has 
declared that the growing efforts on they|;)art of the Congress 
Government particularly' under Indira Gandhi to adjust the 
American pressures In foreign p o l i c / m£itiers has caused deep 
36 
resentment and brought down the prestige of thv Congress* 
Ihe CPI (M) consistently enumerated fai lures of the Congress 
Government in the international affairs and calculated that 
under the leadership of Congress India's foreign policy i s 
rapidly loosing i t s independence. In i t s Election Manifesto 
of 1967 tiie Left CPI declared that an independent foreign 
policy could be followed only in al l iance with the camp of 
36 
peace and freedom»lovlng antl«Imperialists . Both the Parties 
toe the l ine of Moscow and Peking in their att itude towards 
Pakistan and intended in the establishment of close relations 
with her. 
34. prT*frammfi nf tha Coiamttniat Party of India> Adopted by the 
Seventh Congress of the CPI, Calcutta, October 31 to X 
Noveaber 7, 1964, p.23. 
36. Reviftv nf the Fnurth Ganaral Rleetiony /dnnted by the 
^Atinnal Cftunell nf th« Cnmmttnlst Party nf India, Calcutta, 
23«30th April, 1967, N«w Delhi, CPl.Pub., 1967,pp.4.6. 
36* **\«hy Comimmists (Marxists)? Election Manifesto**, aiU£JJUt 
p. 427. 
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Ai r«i»rds tht foreign policy th« L«ftltt Cooanuiltta 
b«Xl«ved that th« country aust follow a dat«niln«d and 
00nalatent foreign policy of aolldarlty with Afro«Aalan, 
Latin Anarlcan and oth^r p«opl«*a fighting agalnat laparlallta} 
that cloaar frlondahlp naat be proaotad with a l l aoelallat 
and progrtaalva raglaaaj and that bold Initiative ahould b« 
taken to bring India*a relatione with our tvo nelghboura, the 
37 
people Republic of China and Pakistan b&ck to noxaalcy* 
The 1971 Election Kanlfeato of the CPI declared that 
the policy of the party alaed at atrengthenlng India*a foreign 
policy of peace and non^allgnatfit baaed fIxaly on antl . 
colonlailaa and antl-laperlallaa and on frlendahlp and co. 
operation with the Soviet Union and othctr countxdet* More 
effective atand agalnat raclallam, ful l diplomatic recognl* 
tlon to tile Deaocratlc Republic of Vletnaa, Oeraan Deaocratle 
RepubllCf Deaocratlc People's Republic of Korea, noraailse 
Indo-Pak relatione In the spirit of Tashkent, strengthening 
India's solidarity vlth Afxo»Aslan countries and a break with 
38 
the Srltlsh Coaaonwealth, Froa then on upto nov both the 
CoWBunlst parties hold, aore or less , the saae stand In 
aattera of foreign policy* 
37. .SunddY^aryatPo^Party Fowa**, Thi BtBflBinP I ^ M (ifev IKbxhl), February 20, 1971 z See also, Eiaatlftw 
ManlfeatA nf the CiMBBimlkt Pai»l:y nf Indie (^Mmmf ^^ 
Wew Delhi, CPI (M) Pub., 1971. 
3 8 . Rlactlan Manifaeto ftf thm Cft—nnlat Party ^t lnA±^ 
New Delhi, CPI, Pub., 1971, p. 13. 
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India signed a so years Ind0-!^ovi«t Treaty on August 
9f 1971 and has played a great and heroic role in the eoier-
genoe of Bengla 0«sh, This has brought about nev directions 
in Indians foreign policy and has added a new chapter to the 
history of Asian people's struggle for freedom. These noves 
have their direct effect on the attitude of the CPT to%«rds 
India's foreign policy. Both the Coaounist Parties have 
vflcomed these developments. The CPI (B) believed that the 
c>taergence of Bangla Dash has been a ^reat blow to US imparl* 
lism. It viewed that the cooperation between India, the 
Soviet Union and Bangla Ossh, has opened up a new and unpre. 
oedented opportunities for advancing the democratic forces 
against Imperialism^ neo-colonialism and internal reaction. 
It has also a<l&lr«d the rola played by the Ihd»-Sovlet *f!reaty 
of friendship In safeguarding India's seourit/ and independence 
and in preventing the move of military Intervention by US 
imperialism and Maoist china. It hailed with great satisfae. 
tion the role which the Ind9-Soviet friendship Treaty played 
In preserving the prestige of India in the Bangla Desh freedom 
oovement. Uhile praising the role of Ihdo-^vlet collaboration 
in the liberation of Bangla l>9ahf the Communist parties ignors 
the fact that If India Involves herself in the liberation of 
dissatisfied people a l l aroundf i t might lead to serious 
3 9 . "Cie Ci»I Manifesto 1972" The SJ.cctian Archlvasj Part I I , 
No.9, New Delhi, 197£, p . T36. 
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r«purGU«slont and tii« same argw«nt may be advancad by China 
In fomenting troubiss in th« dissatisfied peopla within 
India. It a i ^ t encouraiia subverslva tsndanclas and actlvL. 
ti«s and Justify int«rf«r«n.^e iV forslgn powers in Internal 
matters regaidless of chelr sovereign status. !Die Comnonlsts 
In India may, In ti\e name of liberation, help strengthening 
such subversive moments and play in the hands of Qiinese 
leaders whose, act iv i t ies are already inimical to India's 
national interests. 
THK ATTlTUnR OF THE COMMJWIRT PARTY TOtARHR 
fflWA'S FQLlCaC or IfQlfeALlfllPiHfTt 
India's foreign policy of non-alignment i s a product 
of evolution for the past twenty four years. At i t s beginn. 
ing fears and apprehensions were cast about i t s validity in 
the present nuclear age. However, as i t took shape, i t 
proved beneficial not only to India but to the Otorld peace 
and security. BBaiitlng this, many newly independent coun. 
tries in Asia adopted the policy of z»n.aiignment. The 
Communist if«rty of India, in the/years did not support the 
non-alignment policy of the Government. It bitterly oonpl. 
ained that the Government was carrying on a suspicious play 
between peace and war and was carrying out the foreign policy 
of British Imperialism and subserving i ts interests. But 
from 19&& onwards, with the QovemientU Increasing friendship 
with Socialist countries, the Communist Party of India changed 
- 96 . 
l t» att i tude and extended l t« f u n support to the foreign 
policy of the Goverwaent. Sltice then, the CPl has lM«n whole 
htartediy advocating the policy of i^n-allgnaent. I t has 
considered I t as the primary Instrument In preserving Itorld 
peace and co-operatlon. Bhupesh Gupta, leader of the Oommu 
nls t Group In the liajya ijabha, speaking aiaout the policy of 
non-allgnittent said, "India's po l l c / of non-allgnasnt and 
friendship among nations Is correct and •vwy day Its correct. 
40 
ness Is being proved*** 
ISie C?I believes that the policy of itott-allgnment 
necessarily means a foreign policy of support to colonial 
l iberation movements, Afro./.slan sol idari ty , ^^rld peace, 
dissnuuMnt and mutual ^ .operat ion between sovereign nations. 
It also considers that frif^ndshlp with the s o c i a l i s t countries 
im necessary and Indispensable part of non-allgment* 
The Communist Party of India asserts that the policy 
of non^Alignient corx'esponds to the best interests of tiie 
people and In that sense secured recognition as a non»partisan, 
41 
national policy. Such a policy wall help India in safegaard-
Ing i t s national independence, democracy and in building up 
40. ttlrfl ^-^^^ n^batas. Vol. XXVI1, December 8, 1969, 
Col* 17^» 
Ai 8«e>S%rdf»al, S.G., m nftlMnlitt^ aom»y, Popular 
yjtkMhsn, 1966, p.89. 
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i t s national ttconoay and WJa ral8« l iv ing standardt* 
Insplt* of the rud# shocks giv«n by the Indo-Chlna 
conf l ic t , the CPI remained a supporter of ^ e policy of non. 
alignment. In such a s i tuat ion, when the non-allgment policy 
vas variously attacked by imperialism and right reaction, 
the Commmist party of India thou^t that the defence of the 
{>olicy of non-alignment becomes naturally the most v i t a l 
issue for the vhole nation and i t s future* The National 
Council of the Ot'l considered this as the key task in the 
present p o l i t i c a l s i tuation and declared that i t would play 
i t s due part in building the unity of a l l democratic forces 
43 
for further strengthen the policy of non.aiignient« Hiren 
^4ukerjee, while speaking in the Parliament on November 8, 
19t>2, affirmed his party's faith in non-alignment and saidi 
**Non-alignment i s something v^ic^ has not dropped 
from sk ies , non-alignment i s not something \riilch has been 
thought out by Prime Minister* Non-alignment Is an ideal 
Wiich has gripped us, because i t has been implicit in the way 
in v^ich after freedom ve have been trying to build our 
country. Non-alignment i s implicit in the way in which we 
44 
are planning for a s o c i a l i s t society*** The CPI believed that 
42* See, h^isftlutinna nf tha Natlnnal Council of th« CPl^  
New Delhi, February 5-12, 1963, 
4a* ibid* 
44. LQk sabha Debates^ Vol.IX, Novembers, 1962, Cols.149.60. 
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noiuaaignaeat has brought honour to our country. It has 
stren^^thened i t s ind«p«nd<iie« and sustalnsd the healthy 
grovtii of dsaocracy* Kon^aiignisnt l^d l>««n India's aost 
povarful shield in defMio« of her national t independence 
against iaperialist pressures and machinations. And by this 
India could gain the sympathy of a l l peace loving countries 
45 
throughout the Ubrld. At the tiiae of the Seventh Congressi 
Oecentwr 1964, the f i r s t after the historic spl i t in the 
party, the CPI characterised non-alignment as a **positive and 
46 
p^gressive policy.** 
The CPI (M) i s not only against the policy of non-
alignment but advocates an arrangement yith the progressive 
and social ist forces. It claims that the Government of India, 
in a iiK>rld sharply divided betveen tiie %iar camp of imperialism 
on the one hand and the peace camp of socialism on the other, 
embarked upon th« policy of non-alignment only to advance i ts 
oMTi class interest.lheCPI (M), unlike the CPl, believed that 
the Indo-China conflict completely reversed the main contents 
of non-alignment policy and passed India into the hands of 
Wettem powers. It believed that the anti-Chinese stand 
4b. Ibid. 
Afi-c^ Pmcrraam^ r.r ».h« r^ mH.^ y^ |fft Party of Ihdi^, As Adopted 
by the Seventh Congress of the Comiounist Party of India, 
Bbmbay CPI, December 13.23, 1964. 
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which the Covernmtfit of India h^ d adopttd ltd to a state of 
cold v^r exi£tln^ since then. It s^ rgucd governnent's accep. 
t^ <nc« of the uS mlllt^ i^ ry aid In the naaa of national d«pen. 
d«nc€t has made the country more d«pend«it on th« \i»B,^,^ 
47 
rendered dlfflQUlt a solution of the dispute vlth Chlna« 
Tflren Ghosh, CPl (M), said In parllaasnt that India's foreign 
policy had taken a pro.Imperialist reactionary turn In recent 
y^ars. One needed a **iBlcroscop« to find out % a^t nov rmalned 
48(3) 
of the non»allgned policy of the Govemaent*" 
/uaong the concessions which were reducing non»allghMent 
to a farce, to CPl (M), were th« Voice of /merlca deal episode, 
the Government's acceptance of military aid from the US and 
Britain, the Joint air exercise vlth the ur; and British 
forces, acquiescence In the operation of the UC ''ev^ith Fleet 
and th% /ngloo'mtrlcan plan to estai^lish a military base In 
48(b) 
the Indian ocmaa* To CPI a l l these led a position where the 
policy of non-alignment has been seriously jeopardised and 
Is getting emasculated* 
47. "^hy Communist (Marxist)? Election Manifesto", Shathal, 
Eamdas, Qn^elt.^ p» 4S8* 
48(a).Itlftj:iUUUUUUa (Delhi), *ugust 9, 1966* 
48(b),prQgrnfWM nf ttit CrfiMBnlit Party nf, M U t ^<)opted by 
the Seventh Congress of the CPI, Calcutta, ictooer 3 i . 
November 7, 1964, p* 22| also see, Numboodripad, r.M,^., 
Th^  Pr.^f^»mmm vitj.\j,in^A Calcutta, CPI (Marxlst) 
Publication, Oeeember 19i»6, p*SS« 
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The CPI on tii^ athmr hand, oontlnously •upi>ort«d the for«i^ 
policy of iion.ailtiMi«nt and off«r«d only a otUd oriticlsa* 
It resented vacillations which have fflanif<sst«d themselves 
in th4 f:*ilure d to give forfliai diplomatic recognition to 
the Oezaan Democratic Republic, lack of conslatwricy and 
firmness in the Government's stand against nco.colonial 1st 
conspiracies and aggressive actions of Imperialists. The 
growing escalation of US imperialism AV^ viewed as a decisive 
Impetus towards strengthening the policl«i8 of non-alignment. 
The Comounists Party of India asserted that the new 
escalation of aggressive activit ies of Imperialism, parti. 
cularly of US imperialism demanded our non..alignment policy 
to be stren^th«>n«d and based firmly on active and consistent 
antl-imperialism and anti.coloniallsm. 'if we are true to our 
salt , if we love our freedom and honour, if we want to be 
respected in the freedom loving world, if we ^ n t economic 
and social progress In our country, we have to strengthen and 
not weaken the anti-imperialist, antl.colondsl content of 
49 
non-ali^nment,** the CPI held. 
The IndaoSoviet Treaty crit icised blt&erly on the 
ground that i t vas not in conformity wltii the policy of non. 
alignment. But both the Communist Parties, ss against other 
49. Tee, prngraame af the CftaMaunlst PSftv of India^ Calcutta, 
CPI, pub.^  October 31 .November 7, 1967. 
• 100 • 
opposition partl6S| g«m«relly %r«lcoa«d th« treaty* Mr« J/otl 
Batu, of the CPl (M), w«icoB«d thb treaty at i t brou^t India 
60 
cIoa«r to sooial ist oountriat* Hiron HukerjMy of tha CPI, 
while supporting the treaty observed ^ a t i t was entirely 
In oonfoxaity vith India's poliey of non.alignaent« This 
treaty enabled India to shed ^ e "cold feet montallty** and 
took a bold step both In national and International natters. 
The CPI (M) s t i l l believta that foreign policy of the 
Congress Qoveriwont has always been one of playing between 
t^e two camps to suit the class interests of the big bourgeois 
s ie . This policy of non-allgnnent and neutrality has besn 
interpreted differently at different phases depending up'jn 
Its class Interest. VMie the CPI believes l^at despite the 
vaclll'ritions the policy of noiwalignaent hss been preserved 
in the main* 
II m*^*\f*ib*^^i.'^iWMitWMi*<kmiix*fi^v: 
The CooHBunist Party of India elaiM i t se l f to be the 
chief oponent of colonialisa and raeialisa* It has always 
stressed the neates t isiportant role played tay India in the 
^ r l d wide strug^e for peace and against eoloniaiism and 
60* pT ritiyduetan ri«ae (Tlew Delhi), August 10, 1971* 
61. IbldM ^««u»t 11, 1971. 
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hat app«al«d th« aov«n»i«&t to b« flza In i t s stand on 
anti*Golonlali«B« 
Hovuvsr^ It r«p«at«dly pointed out th« failure of the 
Qovcrment to oondenm American imperiaXiata vho organlced 
the Invasion of Cuba. It oonaidered the role played by the 
Govemaent in this natter hesitant and not in keeping vith 
India's traditions. It deplored the fact that due to the 
half-hearted attitude taken by the Oovernaent in relation to 
oolonlallst and neo-colonlalist, Indian prestiget especially 
in the African countries^ has received a set back. 
The Bational Council of the CPI requested the 
GiovernBient of India to recognise the Algerian Provincial 
Goverment of Ferhat Abbas and give aoral and naterial a s t i s . 
tance to the Oovernsent to f i |^t the brutal policies of the 
63 
French Governwint. the Party condesmed the failure of the 
Indian Qovernnent to take a first stand on issues of colonia* 
l l s a . It stated that Indian Ooverment "takes too long a 
tiae to take a correct position and even then the position is 
64 
not alvays sufficiently fixa.** 
In i t s 196S Election Manifesto the Coaaunist Party of 
India criticised the Governsent as shoving sone unbecoalng 
vacillations on the issues of anti-colonlallsm. It said that 
6£. Ghosh. A joy* "Xhlrd Elections and Coaaunist Party*'y in 
Poplaii S.U ed. OBtfilt»» PP« 49.^0* 
63. SmMM (17«v Delhi;, January 6, 1967, p. 14. 
64. fQittlflfti BtiffilMMftftiAdoBttfrt ter tht Sixth Cnpfraii nf 
JtULfiftMminlat Pirty nf BMii» vijay^iada, April 7-16, 
1961, p. 36. 
thy^Mign at Bandung Urdla had played such a great role vhloh 
aroused great expectations about Indians contribution to the 
struggle against oolonlallea, boviiveri today "man/ Afro-Aglan 
nations have the feeling that India Is backsliding and try* 
66 
Ing to soft pedal the fight against Imperialism." It pointed 
out that the hesitation of the Qoverment of India to give 
recognition to the i^rovinclal ck>vemaent of t^ ie Alferlan 
HepuDllc had caused dlsappolntaent and undeznlne^the prestige 
of the country* 
Ihe Communist Party of India in Its 1967 and 196£ 
manifesto demanded th&t the Oovemment of India should take 
a l l necessary measures to secure the liberation of Goa 
thereby wiped out th« last v&stlge of colonial rule on Indian 
so i l . It fulxy Justified aimed action by thm Government to 
"free several lakhs of our long suffering brothers and 
sisters from savagery and violence of the Portuguese imperla-
66 
lists.** toien Goa vas liberated| the party welcomed i t as 
an issue of prestige in Asia« 
It pointed out a number of failures on the part of 
the Goverment of India*s stancUespecially on Issues of anti. 
colonialism. A glaring example vas the haste vlth which 
66. See ^ "Communist Party Election ;4anife8to 1962**. in 
Fbplai B.U lU2*fiifc.«P*)& i^ al«0 se^^Elaetian Ranlfaetft 
fif t^ «i CPI 1062, New Delhi, CPI Publication, 1961,p.28» 
66. JJiM.f p. ^0* 
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th« Qov«riaient of India off«r«d to ••H sugar to th« U.ft.A, 
vh«n the K«nned/ r«£la« stopped ba/lng sugar from Cuba In 
ord«r to iailaokinall th« Cuban paopla for their herolo rsvolu. 
tion* This considered by the CPI as another example of the 
Indian Qovernment's deviation from the poUe/ of antl. 
67 
colonialism* 
It has strongljr urged tha recognition of the DcBocratie 
Republic of Vietnam (fiHV)^  Oexman Democratic Bspublic (OUR), 
Dnocratlc Peoplets Republic of Korea (DPRK) and upgrading 
of the Indian nlsslons In these friendly countries to ambassa. 
dorlal level which would help in achieving firm and active 
a nt 1-00 lo nlal ism. 
The Comisunist party of India had also proclaiaed Itself 
to be the champion of raelsi equality* It strongly condemned 
the policy of racial.discrimlnation pursued by the Qovemment 
of South Africa. It also condemned the barbaric policy of 
aparthied of South Africa as a defiance of UN Charter and the 
Declaration of Human Rights* Ihe Tfatlonai Council of the 
CPI sent i t s greetlngSf to South African peoples who were 
69 
battling against the most "bestial foxms of racialism" and 
67* JJilA* 
68* Ihese greetings were senit on the occasion of the obser* 
vance of * Couth African Freedom Day* on June 2791963* 
69* ?^ w Age (Hew Delhi), July 7, 1963, p. 14. 
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prnlMd the Government of India for taking an active part 
''to Bocure the expulsion of th« racial ist , barbaric and 
oppressive South African GovermBent from a l l th« UN bodies*" 
Xhe Ctr*! (M;. o l t ter l / criticised India's stand on 
colonialism and racialism as faci l i tat ing the US designs of 
neo*colonlallsm. It considered Qoveramentfs policy on tliese 
issues vas week and playing a role of Imperialism* It 
thou^t that India has gone to the U.S.A. and the U.S.A. i s 
dragging India Into their neo-colonial net, and found fault 
vith India's foreign policy to take effective step against 
var provocations and colonialism* Dnoe the Marxist Communist, 
Mohlt ''en said that, '*even worse i s the marked failure to 
take a oonslstent and fIxia stand against the neo*colonial 
consplriicies and aggressive actions of the Imperialists, e*g* 
61 
In the CongOf Vietnam and Malaysia*** The CPI (M) demanded a 
policy based on firm and active opposition to US imperialism 
and neo^colonlaxlsm, fu l l recognition by the Government of 
VitttnamteSe, Koreans, the GDH and Cuban Uovernsents, and recognl. 
tlon to th« t'rovinclal Revolutionary Uovemm«nt of South 
Vletnaa* It extended i ts ful l support to the African people 
struggling against white racial ist regimes in South Africa 
t>o* 7^id> 
tol* Sen, Hbhit, "Ibpt^rialist Pressure on Indian Foreign 
Policy**, Wiw Age, March 21, 19i»b, p«b* 
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and BhodMla and to th«» ilfeiiration f l ^ t « r s against Pdrtuguaa* 
Inparialiaoi in Angola, i4asajBbiqutt, ful l solidarity with Arab 
people fighting against Israeli Cioverment aggression backed 
by .'merloan lisperiallsB. 
severe 
It Is now evident that the CPI (M) is the most/orltle 
of India's veak tinti-colonial policy and oelleve^ that Indian 
Qovemaent's collaboration vlth/US iaperialisn dragged 
India into thuis colonial net. Contrary to this, CPI believes 
that thfe foreign policy pursued by India is a policy of noa. 
alignment and anti* colonialism in tSi« me in* Though VtM 
party criticised Uiu Government for soft pedaling the fight 
against Mlonlallsm and racialism yet lent support to th«» 
(iovemment % «^n«vei- i t followed a firm and consistent policy 
a^^ainst colonialism* 
The Communist party of India firmly believes in the 
general and complete disarmament. It believes that disarms, 
ment has becone a most v l t s l ls!;ue for the future of humanity 
as a whole* It holds that disarmament is the road to a last* 
in^ peace, 'rmament amounts to misuse by the Imperialists 
of thu people's wealth and knowledge for tiie production of 
62,.S:>^J^J.eotlQn ManiftiStQ of tha CiMnminlet ;>agt:v ^f Iniil* 
Oi&iaaiDi Tfew Delhi, CPI (Marxist), Pub.^  1971* 
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wtapomi of aasE destruction and for ^rXd demlnation* 01s-
a£-siam«nt can heXp to make available tiitt rlchas of the •arth 
and g«nlu8 of nan for tJie development of econon/ of the 
countries^ for the ralsint; of l i v ing standards and for the 
v e i l being and prosperity of peoples. 
The CPI strongly favoured for a total dan on veapons 
of oass desti-uctlon. It viewed that "the developacnts of 
monstrous means of mass annihilation and destruction vhlch, 
If used In nev vart can cause unheard of destruction to 
entire countries and reduce)! key centres of Hbrld industry 
and culture to ruins," n© It considered dlsaroaaent as the 
most urgent and icport'-int need of the hour» real is ing fu l ly 
well that i t cannot be done overnight. 
Declaring peuce as i t s primary task, tiie National 
Council of the zel appealed to a l l the units , members and 
supporters to work unitedly with a l l others Interested In 
peace and dlsaxnament to ensure the early achievement of the 
demand of the Indian people for total universal dlsarmsaent 
and for agreements among the great power^on most v i ta l Issues 
facing tiie Tdrld, 
^ « IftlLijIft (^ev Delhi), May 22, i960, p.8. 
i>4« iflzaml, T . ' , , aiuiSil . , p. 48, 
66. fiilLiLXtf May 22, I960, p.9. 
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Th« ConiBunlst Party equally pleadad for a ban on 
nuclear teats. The signing of !«uclaar last Qan Traaty by 
India was ragardad by tha CPI sta a graat atap forvard. It 
axprassad i t s aanaa of satisfa^otlon that tha Ck>vamiant of 
India was aaong tha f i r s t oountriaa to aign tha Taat Ban 
Traaty. Id viewed that &ie Ireaty registered s significant 
advance for th« forces of lubrld j^^ ace and opened up new 
possibilltlea for advancing towards the coapleta stoppage 
of a l l tests of nuclear vaapons and for their banning and 
destruction. It urged the Oovernnent of India to extend 
Its fu l l support to a l l proposals w i^lch could ensure further 
progress tovards dlsaraament snd| in particular^ inmediate 
efforts for the Innnlng of the underground testa, fiyt the 
non»aggresslon pact between 'fATO and var Treaty Powers and 
for the t.st%bli8hment of nuclear free aones in various regions 
of the 'orld. 
The World Comniunist movement and peace loving peoples 
were surprised and shocked to find that the QqMrement and 
the ComsMnlst Party of China d«iounced the Treaty and refused 
to sign i t . The CPI condemned t^ls act of Chinese leadership 
(BfejS...Resolution of the .^ ^^ vanth C^nyri^ y rxf thy CP ,^ Adopted 
at iJOmbay, December 19fe>4« 
<»7. SanJuiAf Septemoer Sd* 19«>3, p.b; See also,mialAUAA 
of Cantral Coiiailttee of tha Communist > arty .^f In^ ;^ ^ 
fin tn% mn UH^U September 14.17, New Delhi, C?I« 
Pub., 1963. 
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It d«olar«d that the naivMr and th« oontant of Chinsta iaadar* 
•hip*a danuncl&tion of tha partial Taat Ban Zraatjr ean hava 
no othar axplanatlon axcapt that of ualng of graat povar mania 
aAd cruda natlonaiiat lo e0>« 
Unlika CPI, the CPI (M) ori t lc l2ad RuasUn afforta 
to affact disarmaoiant and denouncad Huasla for having algnad 
th« x«at Ban Treaty agalnat the oppoaltlon of China, In 
•uoh haasian efforts 'o achieve disaraaaant the Left CPI 
dlacarnad a pacif ist , and revis ioniat approach %ffiloh could 
ureed the I l lus ion that lAperiallat wars could no longer 
take place ana wtiich would there0/ underalne the atrangth 
of the an t l . i aper ia l i a t forceps thj^Ut^h^ut the Vbrld* It 
considered that no sovereign nation, \ ^ 8 a eoonoay waa viaiala, 
would reconcile I t s e l f to the idea of Its indap«idanca being 
the 
guaranteed by a nuclear uaby^alla e i ther of/u«S«A* or the 
u.s.s.a. 
Ilie Chinese explosio/i of a ton oomb in October 1964| 
brought sliarp differences of opinion aiaong the po l i t i ca l 
parties ot Iridic. JTUfc reaction of the Coa.xiunlst Parties^ both 
Left and Right was the indication of their dlabollsai« t^ hensfvar 
Soviet Russia Indulged in nuclear t e s t there waa no dlsturbane* 
anong the Coomunists, '^oweveri after ^ e .'^ino«r>ovlet confl ict . 
6 6 . Par thi. U n i t y at tha ?Art^ AnA Tnt^rnittl^nal f;>^ anmy|^ j^ fr 
xiavamanty ll«w D e l h i , Cc>I, ?Ub*, 1964 , pp. 4 6 . 4 7 * 
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th« Rig i^t CPX r«aet«d sharply to thu nuolvar test b/ China, 
vh«ar«a8 th« Laft a>I, appaarad ta apolo^lata of China* 
It aaaurad tha Indian paopla that tha axpioslon of atoa boab 
by China vaa only a datarrant aftainat US iJBparialiMi* 
Both tha partlaa had rajaetad the plaa for nanufaetar. 
Ing ttia atom tomb in India* TSM CPI (R) valoomad tha dae. 
laratlon of the Govamaant of India that It wuld not ohaaga 
Ita jMlley in this regard and wuld not gp in either the 
making of atomic boms or any nadaar slw ahield* The CPI 
outwardly elted atrtfigthaning of tha foroea of p«a^ and 
presanrlng noruaiignmant aa excoses for not manufacturing 
the atom bomb. At the CPI (M) considered China representing 
the dominant force of socialism and peacci the question of 
manufacturing tha bomb aa a deterrent to i t , did not arise. 
The CPI (M) believes that the feverish armament race» 
the manufacture and huge stoekpiling of nuclear bombai the 
aettin^ up of thouaands of military basea aH over the globe^ 
forging of aggressive military alliances^ are the products 
of monopoly capitalism in i t s "desperate bid to escape i ts 
70 
destined and impending doom*** It, hoiMVer, does not explain 
<»d« S««).R«attmtlnH« of thm Savanth Caneraaa of tha CPl^  
Adopted at Bombay, Hew Delhi, CPI, Pub.,December 1964. 
70. fianltrtl flfiMttittf'• nraft Far thi Idiotoglfiil MMMilnnt 
Adopted by the Central Cbmmitte« of tha CPI (N), Madurai, 
August 18 to S7, 1067, pp. 17.18. 
* no -
tli« v«o« of ainiiUMiit which i t taking plae« In So^lat Hiwtia 
and China* 
Iha banning of mamfaetura of nucXaar vaapooa and 
tasting, th« abolition of military bloca, the elUilnatlon 
of var baaaa on the foreign soi l and a substantial raduotlon 
of axaed forces and armaments* the bringing about nueleazw 
frae aones In Asia* Africa and Guropa and to move rapidly 
towards the destruction of a l l nuclear stockpiles —;» a l l 
theae would, to CPI* pave the way for general and complete 
disarmament* Ihe recent explosion of nuclear device by India 
la Justified by the Communist Parties of India as Its aim 
Is scientif ic developmant of the country and the use of 
atomic power for the peaceful purposes* 
m m ' S MliR m IHK yif IXED ff^TIONSt 
India has always whol«»heart«dly supported and made 
possible efforts to strangthen ^\e United Nations even thou^ 
soma of Its discussions were not to her liking* rince Inde* 
a 
pendence India haa taken/keen intarast in i t s various ae t l . 
v l t les for ensurint. i^brld ptiaca and security* She conaistently 
reiterated her faith in the Ulf becauae she believed that i t 
wil l mnd var by ensuring an effective machinery to achieve 
complete disarmament* she thought that the UK Is Intended to 
help h«>r to llv« in harmony vlth nations Wiose religion, 
polit ics and ways of thinking are quite different from her 
. I l l • 
oun* India always urged tha naad for atrangthaning this 
Ouguat body* The main lasuaa % l^ch }iiut9 ralaad in the UH 
and In vhlch India ^ s eapeelaily interested verei the 
problem of Korea, the problea of dlaarmaaenty the problea of 
race aagregation In nouth Africa and the problea of repreaen. 
tatlon of China, the problea of Kashmir and also the probw 
l£m of Hoi'tti Vietnam. It Is unfortunate that the Ulf has 
failed to evolve a pexmanent solution to a l l these probleas* 
Polit ical strugi;les are s t i l l going on In many countries^ 
Hllllons of people are s t i l l vlctlas of colonlailsa and raol. 
al lsa specially thoae of Africa and araaaents s t i l l v io lat . 
Ing the \«drld peace. However, India s t i l l extending her 
support to this lorld Organisation und believes that Inaplte 
of a l l i t s veakneases and fallures« It i s the Chief Syabol 
of lorld pt»&ce and security. 
Tlie Cozamunlst «^rty of India, in the beginning, whole-
heartedly appreciated and co«oparated the aetlvlt iM of ^ e 
United Nations and looked upon i t aa the only forua l^at 
could maintain %brld peace and security and throu^ which 
disputes between the countries alght be solved by peaceful 
nethoda. Most of Lidla*8 activities in the U1V were apprecla* 
ted Ojf the CPI. India*a voiced support at UN for peace and 
peaceful co-existence, for general and complete disaraaaent, 
for ban on atoaic weapons, her stand on the side of the 
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r«8olutloQ on anti^colonlaliao and indttptndence for a l l 
countri«8| a l l th6S« aets wer« oonsldertd by tih« CPl In 
n 
aeoordanctt vlth the true int«r«sts of th« oountry. 
The Korvan o r l t l s £aire th« Indian Comounltts th« 
f i r s t opi>ortunlt/ to o r l t l c l s * and condemn th« role whleh 
UN pia/t^d In respect of Kortia* Dui-lng the Korean c r i s i s iUM 
adopted a s t r i c t l y anti»Imperialist posture* It uiamed the 
Government of India for not acting in the manner In *!hl^ I t 
should have acted* Indians acceptance }f ^irth Korea as an 
ag«^es8or vas vleved ay tht C?I as of very doubtful legal 
ViSklidlty In the absence of Bussla and China. The .'arty 
thought that India's acceptance of North Korea as an aggre. 
ssor vae suff ic ient proof that she was siding vlth the /"ngio* 
/merlcan bloc, 'ilr^n Mukerjee urged IbAla to t e l l the UK 
that 8h«» vas not going to "s i t quiet In Injured vanity becauac 
I'^st time V7e had that /"cht^  son. doc to red resolution for peace 
72 
and I t came as a bocHDerang.** The f*arty vleved that In t^e 
aosence of U.^.r.F.. and China, this resolution vas the mono-
poly Qf the U.r.A* and therefore l iab le to rejection and 
condemnation, rince then the CPI considered and called the 
71* 0«e, Dange, S*/ . , Joshi, P.O., and Adhikari C , Party 
ConsrsBs ttiniirmnti •— Qraft Progr^ame of the CPI> ^iscth 
Congress of the CPI, Vijaywada, April 7-16, New Delhi, 
CPI, ?ub., 1961, PP.5-.6. 
72* Mukerjee, 'firen, tojt rflfaha,PfihBtflt» Vol. >il, Ho.(>, 
March 16, 1863, cols* 207&.86* 
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UN the bod/ of l a p c r l a i l s U pursuing lap«rial l«t d«signt. 
Th% continuous refusal of th^ UH to reoognlsa People's 
Hepulallc of China a lso lei i thi» coaounists to adopt a host i le 
att i tude tovards this cod/* Ih«y bit ter ly cr i t i c i s ed the 
Mirbarlc policy of aparthled pursued b/ the Oovernent of 
Couth Africa, In defllmoe of the ON Charter and the Dselara. 
tlon of lluaaa iv l^ t s , Ihey ur^ed the Govemnent of Jhdla to 
take an active part expected of i t , In ttib UK and elsewhere 
In the Boves beln^ made to secure the expulsion of the 
r a c i a l i s t , barbaric and oppressive f^uth African Ooveraient 
from/the UN bodies. 1 ^ C?I c r i t i c i s e d the UN role In the 
Congo and Algeria. It asked mdlajfH to condwsn the U1V, as i t 
fa i l ed to provide freedom and prosperity to the supressed 
people under the colonial rule* 
!Ihe Communists of India were total ly opposed to India's 
reference of i.ashmlr issue to thi» United 'Nations. The C?I 
viewwd vlth concern that taking, tl'iis Issue to the UN paved 
tiie way for machinations of' the iaptsrlalists vho had created 
the most danfc,brous s i tuation of tension Ubtween India and 
ir>aklstan« ihe Part/ demanded Imisedlate withdrawal of the 
Kashmir issue from t^a F^ecurlty Council. **Tb keep i t on the 
the agenda of the UN", according to CPI, *'is to give an 
73. MMLLMM., July 7, 19ti3, p. 14. 
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74 
opening to th« imtmrUXUt fiovtB.** Ajdy QUosh, General 
C«cr«tar/ of tarrn e&ttVt said thdt Indians case In ttie Kaahalr 
could not be made th« subject of vote in the feeurlty Council 
or the UN General Assenbl/. Hh« choice of Kashair i s not 
betveen Ihdls and Pakistan^ but betveen independence and 
iaper la i ia t tutelage, ^ny guarantee by the U^neant^for the 
Coofflunists^ iBportine; /«merican mllit&ry forces into Kaahmlri 
and in course of time^ i t s incorporation in t^e Pakistan areas 
which are being made the bases of American plans. The Party 
clearly mentioned that, "tht* fraud, duplicity, bribery, spying, 
tr«»achery, an/thin^ and every^ing for graoing iilashair f roa 
India and making a f i f t of i t to the USA and Britain directly 
7o 
or via i^akistan, that i s thb plain meaning of UNO intervention.' 
The Party oondemned/U^ move for plebisc i te as i t vould 
lead Kashmir to be a military base for the domination of the 
whole of Asia and even India. I t believed that if there 
<K>uid be any settlement^ i t could be betveen thie Indian Qovenu 
ment and t^e Kashmir Government. Xherefore, there Is no need 
to keep the Kashmir issue in tiie hands of the UN, vho ^'Snted 
74. Maw Ay«y A^ril S, 19bb, p. 1. 
76. Ibid. J f eptember £^, 19b7, p. lt>. 
76. Sardesai, n.G., i3ifias§, DMQfflCftBy, Sifittlarlia — 
Kaahair (Delhi , 19bo), p.£4« 
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a diviglon of J&ocuu and K&sbalr* l!h« question au&t b% 
Ittmadiatoly withdrawn from th« UK to that th« p«oj)i« of 
Kashalr aay contlnua to be a part of India. 
vlth ragard to Vlatnaa probl««, both tha CPI and CPI(M) 
oonalderad th« U^f to b« usalesa body which la undar th« eoa-
plet« dominance of th« Unltad rtataa. Ihay fa i t that the 
UN v^s helpless in Vietnaaj^ vhare i t should have evoked 
sternest action. Jhe Gt*l spoke of human tragedy accused Uff 
of Its failure and found i t , unlike in the case of cris is 
over Cypns or the Carlbtwan, in a froien state of forced 
77 
Importance and asked India to 60 a l l i t could to prevent i t . 
The CPI (M) believed that so long as the U.S.A. has a domi. 
nance over i t , i t s every decision wil l strengthen imperialists 
designs for *orxd domination, the party urged the Govern. 
ment to and i t s vt^ ak and vacillating stand with reference to 
Vietnam and take initiative for concerned Afro*Aslan action 
against Ur aggression in Vietnam. India's role in Its view 
deserve bltv^r condemnation along wlt^ thi» U.S.A., which has 
a complete and over a l l dominance over UN decisions. 
The party demanded that the Goverzmient should take 
a l l th(; necessary steps so that Che n«>wly liberated nations 
X like our own and th*: Coclaiist loild find their due place In 
77* Mukerjee, Hiren, \p\ ^f^g Pyjfflftftit Tol.)(I, lVo«3o, 
April 1, 19t»b, Column 7214« 
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tl« executive of tl^ « UN and In a i l Its leading bodlas. 
In th«lr s«st for criticlelng the Indian Cbvernsent 
the communists v i l l fu l ly l«;norttd tha fact thst condemnation 
of the UH vould b^  a fut i le exercise. T^ e Indian Government 
adopted the ^sth of ^ursuitin^i diplomatic activity and 
lobuying instead of outrij^ht condemnation of this vorld 
forum. The approach of the communist p&rties vas immature, 
emotional and unrealistic. They thought that tgr eritioising 
the Indian Government on h«r stand on such popular issues 
as Korea, Kashalr, Congo e tc . , they would be increasing their 
influence In the local pol it ics of India. They v^re sadly 
mistaken as foreign policy of a country Is not bared on 
slogans and so^p^box vituperations. The strategies and 
tactics adopt«id by the Indian representatives In the UWO 
v«tre the product of mature thinking and proper assessment of 
the vorld situation, t. galaxy of our best minds including the 
t^ rime Minister N«hru, vere engaged in taking positions on 
world issues so as to find some solution in keeping vith 
fundamental tenets of India's foreign policy. 
TOE m i m n s OF rrft; cQn^ «IfIfTt p f s n n^fRps 
rinoe the time of her attaiment of independence India 
has rtfuilned a member of 3ritish Commonvealth, and has 
repeatedly justified i t s membership on polit ical and economic 
grounds. 
For India the Commonwealth link vas on^ of the Instru. 
ments of India's pursuit of peace for i t s self-interests and 
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th« largar oaus* of vorld p«ac«« Pria« Mlnift«r N«hjra b«li«vtd 
78 
that It vas In i t se l f a contribution to MuxlA peao«* Ifehru 
on hla r«tam fro« th« Cosaonv«alth Frlaa Minltt«r*t Con. 
f«r«ne« toXd In parliament on Januarjr 311 196O9 "India 
has dacldad to oontlnua her ageoelation vlth the CoauBonvealth 
of Natiana, That la a unique developaent, nev to conatltut* 
lonai lav and history* Thereto/ we do not l l a l t our freedom 
In any vay, tut ve indicate our desire for continued frltfid. 
ship and cooperation vlth the group of nations represented 
79 
In the CoBiBonwealth*** 
The Conaonvealth of Nations is a unique kind of 
assoclation.To put In th« vords of President Radha Krishnan, 
*'Ck>maionveaith means for us complete independence and informal 
association, sharing of ideals^ thougjh not of allegiance^ 
of purpose though not of loyaltleS| common discussion vhleh 
lead to k>etter understanding of our problem and not binding 
decision vhich restrict the independence of the member 
80 
states. ** 
78. ree^Hajan, M.r., ^'Mia flnd ttltt CflMianvialtti> iafei»fi&,"» 
Inflift guar t i n Y> Vol. XVI, HO«1, January.Iterch 1960» 
p*38* 
79. Tha Hiniii^  (Madras) February f, 1960. 
80. Krishnan, Radha, QflgfttlorMil Sptttt^rt and VrltXnga 
(Delhi, 1960), p. 14. 
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Iiidi&*8 OLgBtiMtrahip of th« Coaaonv«aX^, vlth the 
•xce«)tion of Congressi \>^ s nst at a l l &ppr«elated by the 
oth«r polit ical parties. Xhc/ conilder«d Connionv&alth as 
a symbol of shame and trsachery. Xhoui^  there was a l i t t l e 
appreciation of the usefulness of India's menbenhip of the 
Comaonwealth, hovcver, there also remained a widespread oppo. 
sit ion to this link. 
Xhe Communist Party of India was a severe cri t ic of 
India's link with the British Commonwealth from the time of 
i t s beginning* this association with the Commonwealth was 
condemned by the CPI as a "great betrayal**, a **great national 
blunder*", and a '*greatest mistake" subserving Uie interests 
of the imperial powers. It thinks tiiat India's Commonwealth 
link has betjn utilized "to dec^eive our country, sometimes 
take us unawares and generally to undermine and blunt our 
81 
vigilence and oppotitlon." 
The Communist ParV of India through its pamphlets 
and resolutions strongly criticised the association of India 
with the Commonwealth. In i t s Draft Resolution the Central 
Committee of the CPI saidt 
"A fully free India outside the CommoiBtweaith and 
outside 411 imperialists influence, v i l l be a great factor 
81. Gupta, Bhupesh, gylt ftMinaniifJ)t.ht New Delhi, CPI, 
Pub., 19ob, p « l l . 
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for vorld peace and the freedoa of 3ll /slan and colonial 
62 
peoples•" 
It oppossd India's association with th« Cosoonvealth 
for fiiiin/ rttasons. I t condsouMd the continued f a c i l i t i e s 
imitit^ ^iv«n to British to send Gurkha soldiers to Malaya and 
th& faiiurts of the Government of India to condemn strongly the 
lirltish a troc i t i e s in Cyprus, in Kenya and other parts of their 
Empire* Th« ruez c r i s i s of 19b6 furtht^r added to the bitterness 
to i t s opposition tovards the Commonwealth, Ehupesh GuptSi the 
Communist leader, expressed the view that Britain by i t s agg. 
ression on Hgypt and W tiie blodcade of the Sues Canal had 
**crested c r i s i s in Indians economy and our eeonomy i s facing 
considerable strain and is jeopardising our feeond Five Year 
Plan*" T7e added, *'^ <hy should our friends ask us to continue 
in th i s association v^.ich has injured our conscience and of^^ds 
83 
our prestige in the world?** The Party believed that India's 
menibersMp of the Commonwealth, whose leader Britain i s one of 
the leaders of NAlo and Si:^ TO, the chief organizer of the Baghdad 
r*act and the opprt^ssor of t^e vast masses of colonial peoples, 
i s inconsistent with our policy of peace, with our anti*colonla. 
84 
lism and with our opposition to military blocs* I t viewed 
8£* "Draft Kesolution For the Emergency Tossion of the 
cc (1954)", inrtlan rrfiamunajt PayfU atifiywitii onaxUM 
p* 21&* 
83* to>ijn> sahha Habatii^ y Vol.XV, !7o*lb, December 1966, 
Cols* 1616.16* 
84« S^e, ritfiUnn nfinXfaitQ at tht CP1» ^ew nslhl, C?I Pub*, 
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that by quitting th« CoaiBonv«&lth India vottXd Xoaa nothing. 
It further h«ld that in view of the Indignitiet vhleh yerm 
haapad on Indian people in routh Africa and satex^X other 
countries of the CoanonvesXth, to remain in the CoamonvaaXtib 
vouXd vioXate Indian nationaX clagnlt/. 
The CoBMimiat i^art/ of india strongXy beXleved that 
to remain in the CommonweaXth for India vas neither honour-
able nor profitsbXfe* It eompx&lned ^v^t the attitude of 
3ritBin -ini some other countries vith regard to the Kashmir 
issue vas one of partiaXity vith I'aklstan to the det^riment 
of India's honour and dignity* It accused Britain for ereat* 
ing chaos as the Kashmir probXem vas concerned* Ihe t*arty 
leaders pleaded for the severAnce of the Comnoovealth relations 
as ^ retaXiatory measure for 3ritain*8 deXiberate hostiXe 
86 
acts in relation to Kashmir issue in ^ e U!? Security Council* 
India's bitter experience vith the Britishers over this 
question of Kashmir, to CPI, vouXd provide eaou^ Justlflea. 
87 
tion for coming out of the Commonveaxth. Bhupesh Gupta 
asserted that the British cynicism tovards the Common. 
veaXtJi come out in i t s true colours at the time of the 
Euex cris is of 19t>6* He heXdi^vithout the sXightest refsrenoo 
of the issue to India and other Afro->Asian Commonveaxth meicberi 
86. Iht RlndU (Jfadras), February £4, 1967. 
87. Gupta, ahupesh, op.cit*. p. 18* 
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th« British (Jov«irnBi«nt togctiivi:' with th« French and th« 
l8ru«iis l^un i^ed h«adidn^ Into var sind aggrdsslon against 
68 
li^^ptj' On th« ConiOy ^^t^ls and oisuvhare the British Govern. 
a«nt vas Invarlauiy on the 8ld« of th« ooloniallsts. rvan 
the lukavarn British attitude on the '"outh Fhodeslan ques. 
tlon also 6fflbark«:d the C?I to deoand the severince of the 
connection vlth ^.e Coniaonveaith, 
During thtt i9t>o ^doot'akiatan conflict vh«n Britain 
clearly sided vlth i^akistan, the Ct>I strongly deaanded 
IndiaU vithdravai (vom the Coaaonv^alth, / t that crucial 
tine Jrltish Uoveriuient hud nothing to say and preferred to 
s i t vlth tit;ht l ips oecausb i t then suited both ^yub Khan 
and the British ^^ luns and this only indicated that the British 
supported Pakistan on Kashalr f;uestlon« **All this unmasks**! 
to CPly "only a part of the ut;ly fnce of the Coaoionvealthy 
vhltii British Imperialism keeps tiping precisely to prop up 
i t s Imperialist Interests and promote i ts evi l designs and 
plans* 
Like the Cr^ I, the C?I (M) also opposed India's l ir* 
vlth the Coononvealth of N^atlons. It vleved vlth deep concern 
that India's continuation in the 3rltish Commonve l^^  vould 
&&• Ifaid. t i>* ^ 1 * 
fed* JLiiisUf P* SO* 
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help Britain to continue her Interference In Indian foreign 
policy natters . India aust quit the Coaetonwe'^ l^th and should 
develop frlt-ndl/ t i e s vlth Its neighbours and 'fxo^^slan 
countries. Tbe 19b7 elect ion ttsnifesto of the C?I (M) 
strongly cr i t i c i s ed thk Indian Government's connection vlth 
the Coaaonweaith. It statedt 
'*IW3 decades ufter Independence, thu Congress regloe 
continues to keep India In the laper lu l l s t British Coaaon. 
wealth, though repeatedly lntlBl<Jiated and Insulted by the 
former oppressors. Vnat i s even more shameful Is that India 
lends support to 3r i t l sh imperialists plans l i k e the creation 
of i4alaysia >^leh vas meant to checkmate freedoa loving 
Indonesia and Inside the Conaonvealth, India often takes a 
treacheroue or et^ulvocal position on the question of freedom, 
90 
special ly of 'frlcan countries.*' 
It asks as to vhy India should have remained in the 
Commonwealth if I t were not for the close l inks of the 
Government, and tlti uourgeolsle with the British iaperialists? 
It views with concern that India,by the membership of the 
Coamonwealth, has not gained a single thing for herself and for 
others.rhe has,however,lost a good deal both aater ia l ly and 
aorally s^ nd by quitting I t India w i l l sustain no l o s s . I t arguei 
90. "^hy COMimlgte (Mauratlatiy Election Manifesto% in 
Bhathai, haadas, 0. ed . , 0t>.cit . . p. 429. 
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that Coamonvcalth atatership i s in ^ consistent with India's 
polit ical and ttconomie freedom and liidcsd India with the 
i^^stern doc* It believes that for oringing a nev chapter 
in the l i f e of our awakened nation fodia nust severe htr 
connection with this symbol of treachery and shame. Ihis 
will oe/reaffirmation to our resolve to live with honour and 
also a renewal of our faith in the destiny of our great 
country* Ibe eommunlsts attitude towards India's membsrship 
of the Comsoonwealth is more emotional and less realistic* 
23ie history of past twenty five years shows the India's foreifi 
policy has never be«>n influenced by Hie British Imperialist 
siaply because India happened to be in the Commonwealth* Ihe 
evolution of India's approach to world situations has been 
free and firm and is inevitably dictated and conditioned 
by i t s own national self . interest and dl&nit/* India has 
pleaded the cause of antl-oolonialism, antl»r«cialism and 
non-alignment from this platform also* India has gained much 
and los t nothing by i t s continued memoership of the Coouaon-
wealth* Ihe Communist fears have been exaggerated and 111 
founded* Zhe Comfflon%#ealth has functioned as a forum where 
problems facing the t^rld are discussed In a business . like 
manner and possiol l i t ies of India influencini^ the approach 
of Commonwealth countries are greater than JndiB rtoeing 
their policies* i>ast experiences has established this fact 
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and thte CofflJiualst partl«« ass«rtlont hav« not pvov«d tru«« 
Facts and figur«s do not substantiate their crlt lc l ta nor 
db they bear out their fears and suspicions* Ihelr pXea 
that India ml^t play In the hands of British inperials Is 
also far fi^tched and deliberate distortion of the Intentions 
of Indian leaders and ^v^maMnt. Events have proved that 
India's aembership of the Cofluaonveaith have paid dividends 
and have not in any way jeopardised Indian interests* 
C H A P T E R lY 
'SHY. ^WITOSE QT T?ir. mil gi)CytIgI fARK /,^p ifft; 
C B A P T E R IV 
AHP IBB aAMMttlA SQCX&liIgT PARTX^mw/gg 
IBB FflfiKr TfTKJJT^TsnpjiPijnTir, 
It hai alrsadjT b««ii ataUd that toe ia l i s t BoTwiant 
in India began as a rcfvolutlonarjr protaat axprasalng a desire 
to build a new society. In ttie beginning i ts aain aia vas 
to give s social is t orientation to the Indian national sove-
aticit alread/ launched in order to secure political emaneipa. 
tlon froB the clutches of the British iaperiaiisau 'fter 
attaining freedom the nain object of a l l the schools of soeisu 
l l sa eame out to be the establislment of a egalitarian society 
in India. It stepped forvard as an instruaient of socialist 
revolution and became the vanguard of democratic social ist 
movement. It aimed at a society in vhich ful lest economic 
and political democracy should prevail. 
The organisational pattern of the party of demoeratie 
socialism (as i t claimed i t se l f to be> passed throui^ the 
phases of Congress social ist i^ arty^ Socialist Party, Praja 
Socialist Party and Samyukta Socialist Party. In 1971 a l l 
of them Joined hands to vork together and merged themselves 
into one party, the Socialist Party* 
IL& praja Socialist Party claimed i t se l f to be the 
only organised fozce voxkla^ vlth the single aftnded devotion 
1 
for the creation of a democratic society In India. It 
1* ilJUUft (Bombay), October 96^ 1966, p.6* 
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con8id«r«d i tsel f to b« '*th« vanguard of the dttnocratic 
2 
sooial l t t iBovementf and cXalaad to serva a national causa bf 
dttdicating Itself to represent th^ v U l of "those %iho stand 
3 
for deaocr:atic socialise*** 
In the in i t ia l phases the Marxian Influence on the 
i*arti/*s structure., Ideolog/i philosophy and leadership vas 
predoalnant. Lat^r on it; synthesised i t s political philo-
sophy vlth polit ical tiiou^hts of Oandhi and India's socio-
cultural tradition, rince then Gandhism and democratic 
socialism became the t%o main planks of Indian social ist move-
ment, Ihb methodology of p«ac«£ful mass struggl«.s, &>» 
relatlonsiiip outveen ends and means, growing need for devo-
lution of political povt^ r and decentralisation of economy 
to avoid totalitarianism ve:re some of the main features of 
Gandhlan philosophy that vere iilended by the ?S? in i t s 
4 
social ist thinking. 
The i>raja Socialist Party did not consider socialism 
of the Congress as gentUnely Mclal l s t ic . It stressed the 
need of s sp l i t In thk xinks of the Con^ r^ess Party so as to 
2. i'aiicv Ftat^imt, PSPy ^naras, Xaia Prim ting t4>rics, 
19uo,p.7, 
laid. 
4. Goray, M,G, ^ Dwivedy f^ urrfendranath, "uhy PSP7* in 
Ohathal, BuBdaSy G,ed*, Pr^litlcal 'Iternativa In India, 
Jbmbey, Popular prstkashan, t967, pp. 230-31. 
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«{ithtts« a nev liffc in tiie nation ha Uic masses v«r« (In 
their vl«v) Graving for a dynamic party of dtmocratic soc ia . 
i i sa* Xh« ?S? tiioajit that th« Congross brand of sociaXisis 
5 
\i^s not s o c i a l i s t i c in ch&raetar* It oonsidarad Itsalf to 
6 
t» the vanguard of sociallsB* 
Ih«re %ra8 consider a i)le difference b«tve«n the Ideolo-
gical and po l i t i ca l pi-ograffine of the Pf? and the RSP, Ihe 
SSP also favoured a p o l i t i c a l alternative to the ideology 
and the pro^^iaaie of the ruling party. But their appro^di 
to solve certain soc ia l and po l i t i ca l prouieas v-ere different 
from each other* The Oaayilkta Soc ia l i s t Party vas not in 
favour of the waiting postures of the Pf.P, It did not eon. 
sider i t f i t to vralt and play an oppositional game t i l l the 
Congress spl i t* I t oonsidertd Congress as a great ev i l and 
Just i f ied compromises with the Rightists and Communists to 
7 
fi^ht this oody* It s o u ^ t to achieve by dttsocratic and 
peaceful revolution a s o c i a l i s t society, free from social , 
p o l i t i c a l and economic exploitation of man b^ man and nation 
b 
by nation* It held i t s main task vas to Unite a l l forces of 
6* Biharllal , Hukut, Dinegaaa Brand of Saelallaa » A 
CrUlfifti fiSVl^Vt Varanasi, Bie tara Printing i*5i*s, 19tt4, 
pp. 16-17* 
«>• chi t ta , Banjan, C*^*, "PfP Vhioh ^y" , MalnatriAia 
(Mev Delhi;, June H^ 19^7, p*ll* 
7* saayykta Saslamt i^ artjf> s^tttfunt of i^ rtttBiBitit 
iUaUJ^gag 4k Pa l l t i ca l liAntt Adopted at the end National 
Conference held at Kota (mjasthan; on April 3.6,19<)t3,p.34* 
8* iSi^ Indl&M And Pakiatan )LuAr Ifaftky Bombay^  Tiaes of India 
Puulloatlon, 19t»4.«»6, p* 1£66. 
• 128 • 
•oc la l i sa and d«Boeracy und^r i t s banner. Its d«oIared 
objaot %ia8 to brin^^ about the defeat of the Congreta Qoveifu 
ment and the t^atabllahfflent of an alternative s o c i a l i s t 
9 
^veraaent. I t wished to be the party of revolutionazjr 
strugglsi a concrete s o c i a l i s t progr^ ^mme, patriotic fervour 
and decentralized denocracy* It dedicated i t s e l f to the 
seven revolutionst 
( i ; •*'itie revolution of man and voraan eqia l i tyj 
(2) She aool i t ion of equalit ies based on colour^ 
(3) Elioilnation of equali t ies of birth and caste{ 
(4) ind of foreign oppression and Vdrld Qoveztimentj 
(6) Against eoononic inequality; 
(t»j Against encroachnent on » Private r i ^ t s and) 
(7 ; Against armaments and for the principles of c i v i l 
10 
disobedience*** 
Both tiie Soc ia l i s t i^arties had th«>ir ovn ideologies 
and pro&rannes and accordingly had different noti'tns regarding 
the foreign policy* Ihe Praja Soc ia l i s t P^rty believed in 
a dynamic and independent foreign policy that upholds the 
peace and freedom of a l l nations. It vas opposed to a l l types 
9. Limaxe* Madhu, "fehy SSP?*' in ahlthal, Bamdas, aiUfiit.» 
p. ^ 1 * 
10. IfiiiiM P*20df ^«» al»Of fiamvukta fir>cialist i?artv, rtata, 
•ant of >*rtofiiBlfii> fnntfrtafw il PQittlfi^JL LlMt oiUufiUki 
p* 11* 
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of Military alllancss and deplored the policy of the Indian 
aov«fOfli«nt which subtcrliae to systoms of big pov«rs« N«v«r. 
thttlvsty the paity h«id Indian QovcniBcntis foreign policy 
b&f ioaily jpod and sup^ort«d th« policy of non-all^nncnty iMt 
ctomsnd«d a firm attitude towards China and Pakistan. Ths 
party leaders expected a flexible and self.confident foreign 
policy fron the Indian Qovernment* A torld Society based on 
the principle of freedom and equality of a l l nations, and 
voluntary oo*operation between free peoples was the fflaln 
goal of the Party. ^ 
Ih« rsfflyukta foclal ist Party hardly differed with 
PSP in f o r e i ^ policy matters. nbwever>ln place of non. 
alignment It talked muc^  of non.preference btstween powerful 
n 
countries like the USA and U.S.S.IU It condemned the Qovenw 
12 
ment. foreign policy as a iroek.kneed policy. It convinced 
that to put vigour into thtt foreign policy India oust come 
out of the Jritish Commonwealth. The SSP believed that tiie 
f i i s t step for improving foreign policy should be to end 
borrowed thinking and to start thinking independently. But 
in the opinion of the Sf:p this step could be taken only when 
11. "Flection .Manifesto of the r$p«*, 4^anklnd (Calcutta)« 
December 1966, p.43. 
12. "fJfJP Manifesto", Blfi Indian Kapytii (N«W Delhi;, January 20, 1971* 
Indl^ «ouid stop borrowing food and depending upon borrowed 
aoney. 
For a lon^ time the Socialists were not concerned 
wit^ i the foreign policy of the country* ^hen they fomed as 
the Congress <?ociall?:t Party in 1934, foreign policy was not 
considered as onv of the points on ii^ich they in ten ted to exert 
Influence over the Congress* There was a deaand t^ x^&t a free 
13 
India should make foreign trade a state aonopoly* ^s tiae 
went on, th« soc1<^llst8 established contacts with the socialists 
in othfei countries* Only when tht partyleft the Congress in 
1948, foreign policy became an important chapter in i ts 
programme* 
The Socialist i^ arty took an independent stand on 
international issues. It condemned both *Vestem Imperialism* 
aVli *PU88ian laiperlaliaffl** The resolution on international 
s tuition,passed in the Nasik Conference of the f^oclalist Party 
in Match 1948,declared that the immediate task of the ^ c i a l i s t 
Party was *'to take lead in the formation of a DIOO of Asian 
countries and Egypt on the basis of Common defensive alliance, 
14 
strong enough to resist the encroachmtfit of both power blocs*** 
13* Tribune, :4ay 20, 1934* 
14« Abhayavardhan. Hector, "Asian Socialist Parties and 
^n.ali^nment'^, t^kififj (Calcutta), November ig66| 
u* i8 | cee also, c^ «», aflftilMtlnna hiifigd at thfl Sth 
Annual Confcganea of the SQciallat Party hald at ^faalk, 
Inarch 194b, (Bombay, 1948), p*9* 
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She Indian soe la l l s t s always favoured tha I'oxs&tioc of 
a * third i'oree* eomposed of a l l thoQQ countries and soQial 
oljmonts that vant to keop aloof froa the oonfllct of power 
blooo ai d desire poaeey freedcis and justice* Moving the reso* 
Itsticm on international si tuation in Mareh 1048| Cr.Reoaalldhar 
iic^ia, ^dhile tracing tha history of the idea of third easip 
saldt 
"She need of today i s a ca l l for third aaip •-» ^ e 
oaiap of vioTld peace* Quite a mnber of Asiatic eoontries 
have come into t^e i r cmim iliey want to safeguard th^ir freedOQ* 
1%ey BT-s i^alX nations* our <»>untry ohovtld develop last ing 
friendship with tliem* -*& muBt help tiitm to eradicate poverty 
from their lands* so ^ouid ulso t ry to help suoh peoples 
to whOB fre«»dota huB not yat ocme* Xhese should be our taeks-*** 
thQ tasks of our foreign policy* 
••i«et us pitch our tents avery^ere and strengthen 
this Third i '^orce* .Je must a^^^n t r ea t i e s of pexmanent friend-
ship with ImmHf i^paly Oeylon^ and the oUier indepartlent 
countries of Joath J^ast ^sia* Ouch t rea t i e s should lead us 
into a pensanent federation* Once su(^ a federation comes into 
being to strengthen the third ccsipy tlie world can bo made 
15 
safe for deiiocraey a:.d pemaner.t peace*" 
15* iuohia. Remsaanohar. iia£ai£kJLa3Ltoi /-llLhidJed, P*o*wwadash ^ l , har^ SMQISLJJMS^I i-
Jht9rA & Co. (P) ^td* fl9e$;SS^.B&M2m 
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In a roller r>t&teiaent adopted by the Goosral aounoll 
of the Party in fcombay In October 1?4P| the uociallat tarty 
declared that It ctood for the ideals of ( i ) world Govorment 
and ( i i ) peace* Xhe pursuit of ^ e s e objeotitre Ir. Its vleir 
necessitated ad<^tion of a positive forelcn policy. This 
policy, tho party saldf "comprisoo Sonr eleaentsf (1) Treedoa 
of reoplo; (11) democrtjoy and social Justioef ( i l l ) coapara* 
tlvely e«|nal nti^rns to htner. labcwr thronghoiit the 'lorldf and 
16 (Iv) active neutrality." The party further said that i t 
stood for thd freedom of colonial rule« ;fiiat the party con* 
tihuoosly advocating was the poliey of aotive and passive neu« 
tTttllty. It wished thatf ''India nmjt isolate herself, iihe 
should seek to extend the sphere of this neutrality by bring* 
ing in countries which desire puace ar:d went to keep aloof 
froB tlie conflict of power blocs atd thus f<?vn a third eemp^^ 
17 
the OQiap of peace.* It believed thut the policy of building 
tip the third ctaap has to be carried out on two levelS| Govern-
mental find popular, ^lie Goverment of India should onter into 
non*aggressioi. pacts a^ d treaties oT enduring friendship with 
as raany countries as possible and achieve a net work of regional 
alllaruses including ast Asian countrlesy the Arub Leagudi OUT 
IS 
iostern neighbours and evan further." en popular level the 
1<3« wQfilaliatl f^tTtiYt i^Qiiftv :>tat«iQnt Aden tad bv tha Ganitral 
(letipail at hanhnv^ Octobar liMB^ Bombay, f^ fubl leat ipn 
1P4P, p . 3 4 . 
1 7 . IMd^ 
18. "iiooisilist oip; roacL to foreign fblicy" In ucd l^a, 
! cemanohari fiLafill* t P* 373. 
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iijoolalist forty prd&dx.ted itsdU* Tor trying to 8tr«ngth«c 
the third Sona in '^si^i i4'rlc& 8r.a wouth iOBorioa ulso* She 
Party daei&xidea the Govern&ent to 3:&pa:.d tho area oT third 
atmp us Tur ae possible* 
The Social ist Party advooetod a policy of non^involveatent 
iTk tti£» disputes be two n the iiissian ard ^jnorican ooapSy pledgeA 
to strengthen the Unitea iiations aid i t s various ageLOies, 
endeavoured to work for tlie cdliootivo seeirrity of the wneoBisi* 
t ted cottntries, par t icular ly isi the bel t strechlng froa 
Indonesia to l^gypt. I t extended support to rreedom iiovensents 
tm& s o y ^ t to revise a l l t rea t ies vhich crjated en internatienal 
oaste system and aimed to create a World rarlieeencf a World 
DSsvelc^ sownt Cooperation and a World '^ood Pool and exter.dod 
20 
support to a l l soc ia l i s t movements* The far ty aanifesto of 
1&£1«<^ 8 rei terated UIB sase stand* I t i\]rther demanded the 
tflhdrawal of India fros the woxioriwealth of .^atiac:is and strove 
for friendly relat ions v l th a i l poojdes aiid ^ovornaents* 
The soola l is ts supported the QoverriBent's stand on 
foreign policy In general because i t did not difi'er audi frcB 
their policy of non-irivolvasiont in the pol i t ics of oltlior of 
the two power ulocs* The M Praju •socialist * arty« l ike the 
19* lUi^ 
4»ee '•I 2 0 . 5 -nje b u l i d f o r aoalallffla»«j 2h6 i l a t r o i ^ of ih^ ik^^JMifife 
" ' I , p*30* 
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aoola l ls t Party, i'oXlowod tho saae l ine In supporting the 
Government* I t e<»islsted of four oloaents In ^ e f ield of 
foreign p6Lley^naBiely« (1) /roedom of nations; (2) deBocraoy 
imd sooial Justieet (3) eoaparativeXy ecyial returns to bman 
21 
labour throughout the ^orldf and (4) active neutrallt^T* I t 
fully endorsed the objectives and means of India ' s foreign polle;^ 
22 
including tho pulley wl,at i t c 113d ctivo nmiLrallty. Speaking 
in the rarl ieoent ^charya Lripoil&ni said^ "I havo no hesitation 
to say that I support tlio ganasal rrijiclpios o* cwr foreljps 
polleyf our Prlne Ilinictcr hcc oraanclatod t2io principiso that 
should giUde a l l nations In tholr dealings witli each other 
i f world tensions are to be rdd\iQed and if peace IB to prevail* 
l^at are those principles? Xhay are of nejlghb-Tiirly eoodwlll 
and of universal peace* i'hey postulate peaceful eo«K»xi8 tenoe 
of nati«tis holding different Ideologies.... 'Je also stand for 
the banning of cuolear weapons that Uiraaten the very existence 
of hutnan beings on th is globe*•••••They are also prlnciplos 
that followed from the mar.rK)r In which \m achieved o»ir !ndepen» 
der.ce. Ihey are useful pr inciples . They have been enanoiated 
frcra time to time Xny po l i t ica l theorists* They are a t thfi baisls 
23 
of the United l«atlQns Organlxal^on* ^  
1963. bodbay, IS. i^fcllcatiaKi| IP S3, p^l06* 
22* ^eejfQiigY vttayaanti aaQBt^ jfl lav tiit xflflond ttfttlonal jjaagarancQ of th^ l?,h'f^ ,,.hQld <,t ftaya on 36^30 ,&flgQBtiBrt 
l £ ^ i new Delhi, i ap | W66» p*3$ osa aiBfl^ii^ uinAtt (Madras), Dacsaoer 30. 1966* 
23* iiflfc Safcha t}abatfta» v o l . i i i y ho.^x^ Aixvth 38 | i956, coi* 
3602* 
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!Bi« constant crit icl&a of the PSP leaders only related 
to certain specific aspects of the CioirexnBenti foreign policy, 
e*g«| the Bulgarian conflict , Ooa Issue, CoRimonvealth Hetto i^w 
ship, vhere th<b Government of India had not succeeded In 
making clear th« d is t inc t and independent character of India*s 
foreign policy. They oellevedlthat such a policy had creited 
an Ifflpressisn abroad vas that Tndla vas alteznatlvely lean. 
Ing tovardt one oloc or the other. 
Addressing i local study c i rc le on international 
affSiirs on rupt«>iDi>tir "^ B, '^904, Or* Eammanohar Lohla described 
the India's Government foreign policy as one which only 
pretented to te a policy of independence. *^  It vas n>t In 
rea l i ty a policy of independence** he said, '*It does not create 
any r&servoirs of strength . . i* ideological, economic or 
mili tary —•avay from the fovlet Union and thb Atlantic Utoc.** 
He asgeried that thert^ could ba no co-existence Dktveen I4«sis 
and America unl^bss thuru vas a third systua with economic 
and ideological ideals vhieh vould compel them for s co* 
existence, le held that, **unle8s a nev system of civil ization. 
24« See Icharya Kriu^ani*s Speech in Pnrliiment, Ibid. ^  
cols. B&c^Q'f Also 8ee,Krlplani,/''Ch'jria, "For Principal 
l eu t ra l l ty" , Fnralgn Aff t rg j Vol. I l l , •• 95a-60,H46. 
26. Lohla, I^aamanohar, rogtlgP Pollfi/, OJUSJl^f P* 36b. 
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of eeoncMilc pnet lc* and intsrmtional reXationthlp Is 
•voXvad In mind as v«l l as in practioa, the crieit In forcl^fi 
p^lio/ viXl continutt.** H«r«| no doubt ha datir«d to stran. 
4tb«n th« Ihlrd eaap* 
The Fraja focUXlst Party's 1957 eXaotion oanlfesto 
did not differ fixjai tht: GoverOBent foreign poXlcy on funds. 
mfintaXa. riovever, It dapXorad the sad ststt^ of Indians 
raX3tion£ vlth i ts lausedlate neighbours and the negXaot of 
27 
the vltax internets of th«i nation. In i ts l^ ationaX Fjcecutiva 
hsXd at Madras in Jun« Id^ l^, the PBt* Xlkewisti favoured the 
Independent toraiffi poXlcy of the country and extended i t s 
support to the Gov&rnBent whenever i t foXXoved a genuine 
poXicy of non»invoXveBent in the context of pover groups. It 
again favoiucd the poXlcy of keeping out of mixitary aXXiances 
and of se^in^ p€ac«) and ensuring It through disamaaent and 
28 
a 8trt:nbthen«»d United Nations* 
Again in 196£ the PS^  adopted the saiae stand in support. 
In^ , the Uoverment. It reiterated i t s faith in an independent 
£6. iklil* 
27. Se«, "Praja f^claXist Party Tiection Manifesto (1967)", 
in Lax, rhiv» ^attoaal farting of hrito> ^«v nsxhi, 
the EXeetion Archives, June "Id?!, p, 170. 
2&« "PSP Ncationax Vxtcutive BesoXutlon, Mopted at the 
June 17«19j%eBsion held in Madras'^ , Janata^ (asabay;, 
June £6, ldt»l, p, 19. 
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foreign policjr* n6v«v«rt It aiad« I t clear that th« polley 
of noiwailgiaiant did not involve a f ixm stand against •ppr*-
sslon and lnju«tlc«« It advocated th« proaotlon of develop-
ing astoclatad l i f e aoon^ oountrl«a of South-Eatt Asia, 
00th for polit ical and •oonomlo purposes. It was of th« 
opinion that, **vhlle a nation's foreign policy oust hmve 
high objectives i t nust safeguard the vital interests of the 
nation*** It urged special efforts to foster a foreign policy 
of collaboration in polit ical and defence natters* 
ISie Praja Coolallst Party's 196t^  and 1967 manifesto 
demanded a recovery of the territory los t to China and 
Pakistan, a declaration that Kashmir's acceSi>lon to India 
vas Irrevocaule, opposition to military alliances, close 
links vith coth the 'rau countries and Israel, self-sufficiency 
in conventional and nuclear arms, and the establishment of 
co-optjratlve agricultural communities as a second line of 
defence* 
S9* JMAHL ('Bombay), February 4, 196£, p*8{ See alsot 
"PraJa Socialist party Election Manifesto**, in Poplal, 
r.L*, ed*, i»g Qtnirai sitcttoni to IndtSt "^ ev Delhi, 
Indian prlvting vorks, 1962, p*96* 
30* ^ee, p^ y, FAtfitton MftBlffcatet Adopted by National Oeneral 
Council of the PraJa r^jciailst Party on October 6,^966 
at Lucknov) also see, 3he Tlmaa of India^lTati^nul ^rmlA 
November 5. 1906) and for 1967 Election Manifesto see 
&lmn.?rP Eiafltl/>n ?4anifestft, PSF, ffew Delhi, 1967* 
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lli« ^raja SocialUt Part/ conslitanUy wlUraUd 
Its ttariitest stsind on foraign itoHey mattars year ^ftar 
yaar. i^t tht tti.«etlon oanlfasto of the party raiecLatd In 
t»71 fihowd that ?SP had gl»«n up i t s old ainjulari-clta. It 
vaa mort in accord nov with tha policy of the Qoverni«nt, 
«tce/st<»]c«rtain Issuta, Hili« adharlng to th« policy of notw 
all^ntMnt It as8«rt«d that i t vould not rt^ fUM to Judge ^^%ry 
Intarnatlonai Issuo on i t s marlts. It raltaratad i t s daslrs 
to Strangthtfi th« UH, to safeguard the Indian ocean against 
•xploltation by the Big Pov«>rs, and to strwigthsn tha itruggls 
of the p6opl« suffering under laperialist and nesuiaipe rial let 
31 
r«glBes« 
Unlike the PSP, th^ sj^ p, the party of social is t unity, 
as It called i tself , had a fira belief that the Indian foreign 
policy had been a veek.kneed policy. It believed that India 
undsr Congress rule had not raissd a single Issue of world 
slfcjilficance in any international forun since 19€9, "neither 
the question of world freedom nor of world poverty, iiBfr 9f 
HKWiod Sftef-vtjp^ not of growing disparity between the rich 
nations and the poor, nor of the abolition of nuclear flK>no* 
poly, n::>r th<^  United Nations classification of peraanent 
and non.perfflanent Security Council >eabers«** It considered 
a^. "Pfit* Manifitatft". Matinnal HTeld fT^oknow^ January 20 . 
1971, 
32* llaaye, Madhu, lAiy rsp? Bsabay, Popular Prakashan, 
19b7, p.63. 
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tht; polley of noiwallgnunt as practiced by the Oovernaitfit 
a m«aningl«iS8 doctrine as I t fa i led tot&il / to advance 
&idla*s Gttcurlty and th« cause of freedbn and democracy in 
Tibet. N«paly Bhutan^ rikkJUs and In the Horthcrn parts of 
liidia. It advocated a policy of noa*preference between the 
34 
Big Powers* According to Party this alone would evoke equal 
th -0^ 
cooperation froffl the powerful countries like/USA and/UnSR, 
I t affirmed that i t would "try to bring tim two powers together 
to organize a Joint programme to end poverty* 
VIth regard to Pakist^^n the HSP sought to pursue 
36 
i t s clear policy of ''confederation or reunion,** According 
to i t >^re confederation was not possible on the Government 
Ifeveli ^ e people and the parties or organizations would 
3t> 
cs^rry on the voxk« 
Ihe T'&fflyukta ^Socialist P^rty always attacked Oovem-
inent*s foreign policy froa tiotc to t ine . Presided over the 
third Annual fess ion of ttiu rcp National Conft^renoe in Gaya 
on Decefflber £8t 1967, the Party Chairman, Mr.r.M.Joshi 
referring to the p o l i t i c a l situation in the country charged 
33* l a i d -
34* Thi. SKP L l a c t i a n Manlffcsfa., N^w Delhi , SSP, 19(>7,p*13. 
3^* JJaiA^ 
3C»* iJ2i^., p*14« 
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the CotigfB& with vacillations in the &>ffl68tic and foreign 
jx>liciM* H« said that th* Con«ir«S8 had nslthar courage nor 
d«ts»ination. As a result th« country has iK>v«d towards 
disaster* 3^ « ii'arty declared that evasl:>n on the issue of 
the i«Bb>val of foreign status from public places, the conti. 
nuation of the forei)^ tounge as the aediuB of adnlnlstratton 
and instruction and the groving dependence on foreign powars— 
al l these had "robued Indian foreign policy of a l l initiative 
37 
and dynaaisn*** It believed that to Improve her international 
stand India xntst take the Initiative to end iaorrowed thinking, 
borrowed clothing, borroved v«aith| borrowed industry and 
start thinking independently by stopping borrov^ food and 
depending upon borrowed zsoney. 
Both the i>5i> and the SeP eaii^aslsed the^t^ird force* 
approach in international dffalrs* Ihe SSP wished to build 
a *:0iird caap* that kept away from the Atlantic and r^viet 
camps and did not prefer one to the other,"holding the two 
•quails good and equally evil and strove to create a c iv i l l sa . 
tlon of free men in an equal i^rld.** The it prp favoured the 
37. f;pp, rtf tfatnt nf Prlaolaltfii Pwgraaai 4 Pfiimwl 
lillUlt Adopted at the flmd ffatiftnel tonferenca h^ld et 
ISiiA (Rajas than; on April ^J6, 1966, p.31$ See also? 
Limaye Madhu, OiUilU*! P* «>3* 
3&« "Flection Manifesto of the SSP**, Jj^ ldUjad (Calcutta), 
December 19(io, p*43, 
39* Llmaye, Kadhu, **V!hy «'SP?«*y in Bhathal, Ramdasyfto.cit. 
p. 2&9« 
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fozvation of ^ thUd for«« frso from oold vkt politics of 
•ither of th« DIOOS and sought to d«v«lop a third ^oup of 
40 
nations in lHitv««A« 
Both th« r^artltts sto^d for liquidation of colonlallsffl 
and lapsrlallsa and condemned racw segregation and the like* 
Doth opposed military pacts and based their foreign policy 
on Independent and cr€atlve foreign policy of non»allgnBient« 
130th favoured a bun on nuclear weapons and declared that 
general and effective disarmament could be adileved only 
when the tworld becomes equal. Both demanded tile dlsassocla. 
tlon of th«. Government of India from the British Com:3onvealth 
in order to strengthen the forces of socialism* Both assured 
their ful lest support to the peoples and Governments vho 
vers battling against attacks to smoother freedom or obs-
truct thfeir progress to socialism* 
AtXIfflCi; XaWftit^ nS MQ?f»ALlOTMBNgi 
Ihm Praja Socialist Party considered Itself to be 
the f i r s t party to enunciate the principle of non»aiignment. 
with military blocs and contlttUflttly adhering steadfastly to 
It . Xhe Party supported the policy of non-alignment as the 
P U l a i . K.i«uaan9 xndla'a Fnr«l>« Po l i cy t Baelii lamias 
And Pftiitloai /ttitud—,> Meerut, Meenakshi, Prekashan 
1909, p*19« 
40* i' l  
• 14S .. 
v«ry interest ot th« nation d«aand«d that India t^vUd 
pttrtu* such a policy in int«rnatlonaX sphsre* >>v«vei^  i t 
favouwd a third bloc of non^lignad Asian and other nations 
vhich could provid* a positive and concrete alternative 
41 
to th«; nt^gativists concept of non.alignaisnt« 
Ihe i'SP wanted the Qoverment to adhere strict ly to 
the policy of non-ailt,nm«nt. It believtd that if the policy 
of non.aiignaent would iBpiemented vi^rously and efffctivelyi 
the mlniittua advantage that couid to derived frea such policy 
vas ttiat India could be kept out of thfe oroit of the cold 
var betv«en the big powt&rs and could get breathing space to 
build up i t s own independent foreign policy* Xhe Party 
deplortid the Indian Governaent vhich subscribed to the systsa 
of three or four pov^rs ruling the ^>xld« To Wt put in the 
vords of Idhia, the then General r^cretary of the t'artyy 
**Delhi is no slave either thfe Atlantic or ^ v i e t ea«p but i t 
i s certainly a i^rvant vho sometiaes serves one and soflietines 
the other. Delhi i s Independent only in the choice of i ts 
42 
teapovftry Blasters." 
41* Bee^ Gory ?r«a«,d Dwivedy, furrendranath, **%hy prp**^  
42 « lohia, foreign Policyy Qa.cit>y p«3;^ 4x also see his 
articxet "foreign policy" in iaakt^t January 31^1964,p.4« 
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Actually the PSi* vfts not against the policy of non-
alignment which corresponded to th(6 Idsa of keeping India 
away toth from tht ' t lant ic or the foviet oloc. In the 
words of Gon^ a r&ran !?ihha; a ]B«a4Mr ^ OMf ltt»t«M 
**«^ lth regard to the policy of non-alignnent ai^ neiu 
t ra i i ty , we have no difference %dth I'rlae Minister and our 
Oovemnent* Ve art one with ttien so far as the basic policy 
and fundamental principles are concerned. Howevery we tfi 
disagree with hl0 on aeasures adopted to inpleatnt that 
43 
poiioy," 
supporting the policy of non-aiignaent the ?f?P in i t s 
National Executive held thatt "the j;K)llcy of non.3llgnaent 
does not nean condoning International injust ices or oppre* 
ssionj non»aiignment i^en real involves a f i m stand against 
44 
oppression and Injustice from whatever quarters they come*** 
Acoordihg to the Party upholding the common interest In tiie 
46 
international relat ions"is the essence of noiwaligment,** 
It condemned the resumption of nuclear t e s t s by the tvo Great 
Powers and urged their abandonment, 
43. iaoaJ&t ^^y i^» i^Ot p«7. 
44« Ibi^.y June 2b, 1901, p.lQj also see , February 4,1962, 
p«8* 
4b. iJi id. , see a l so , "PraJa r.ocialist party Election 
Manifesto"! in Poplai, £ .L. , ed . , ofiaJBl^t P.96. 
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Though th# t>tp supported the policy of non.allgfM«nt» 
hov«birert pointed oat that It should not be bagsd on the r«ar 
of dlsplfc&sing on« country or h thg other. It crltlolMd 
the Qov«rnB«nt for Uie half.hearted and Insinoere vay of 
Its Impleaentatloa* It Ullevt^d that under the garo of non. 
alignment tht; Governaent of India showed "eaotlon&i allgaient 
46 
vlth one of tht pover uioc*** The raity Considered the Govem-
ffient*s stand In case of fMngary as lukevara* It vleved that 
under the pretext of non-alignment India refused to threw i t s 
moral weight on th^ side of freedom f i l t e r s ind i t s spokemen 
failed to respond to their ui'ge for freedom, from the highest 
the 
forum of/united Nations. This was certainly not Vi% spirit 
of non-alignment* 
The Party tiiought that the policy of non-alignment 
could not be allowed to prevent us from staking and obtaining 
military help that we need for depending t)ura«lve8 against 
47 
powerful aggressor. It believed that non.alignment cou^d 
nevar mean neutrality, in a struggle detwetfi the aggressor 
and the freedom f i l t e r s . Ash^a Mehta, Chairman of the i^fP^ 
asserted that India should alifn herself with certain countries 
in certain aspects, where i t would be advantageous for her. 
46. Goray, N.G.fk Dwlvedy, Surrendranath, "vhy PSP"? ftfl.cit^ 
p. £40. 
47. isnSkl&t March 31, 1963, p. 6. 
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'iht&re i t vas not the adhrantag^ous for h«r, h« saldy "noa. 
4B 
ail^noant vas oest.** Ashoka Mahtra suggested tiiat India 
should k«pt box- non-aligned policy in repaid to the affairs 
of European and African counU'ies. ft the tinfc of Indo-China 
debacle of I9i>£ the ^Tational Executive of the ?srty stated 
thbt, ">^lle non.3lltn»ent ^s a basically sound policy as 
o«tve«n t'ife tvo povor blocs l^d by the UC and the rovlet 
Union, Tndl% is certainly iligned a^jainst China and must 
seick every help from a l l countries to stren<^then her armed 
forces and mmM economic industrial oase*" 
r^ i« i*raja Soc ia l i s t i^arty did not consider non-align-
ment yyieVjeLy as a mor^l attituda in tht» present International 
power conflict* !Ib i t non.aligna«at hsd i t s practical 
lapl icat lons . It echeued military al l iances vith big powers 
and involvement In the clashes of confl ict ing pover blocs. 
It declared that the policy of non-alignment adopted by the 
Ciovernaent of India vas never security oritfited* / s f^ ursnd* 
ranath Dwlvedy had observed in the Parliament, "time without 
number, ve, the 1 ?SP, have made i t c lear that the policy of 
non-alignment Is a sound and basic concept. Ve have no 
48. Ibirt., p. 10. 
49* ikLi . t CepUiAber 1, 1963, p.i». 
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quarr«i vlth that polleyy th« policy mainly vas aeant to 
furtiittr national interest and to '^sa tension in th« inter-
national f ie ld. Ttia main point la that vhila inplamanting 
this poUcyi you had cartain inhibitions in yovur aind and you 
were alvays trying to avoid and fae« raalitias* Tha aain 
d«f«.ct of this policy, and a vary great ona too, that i t v^s 
nikiv^i' saourity oriantad." Anothar leadar of the ^^arty, 
Nath Pal, speaking in tha i^arliamant coatrastad tha polAa/ 
of non-aiignaant of Uia brava. tha couragaous and the honest 
61 
to that of tha opportunists^ tha cowardly and tha tlald* 
Indians attempt to accept aid fxom any quarter in 
defence of her ovn freedtMi and sovereignty from Chinese and 
Pakistan aggression was constructed by the party as a viola-
tion of non.alignment• It vas in this context that ?^.P vfhile 
ad^«rlng to the spirit of non-alignment, did not remain silent 
on thti question of Tluetan freedom, England's aggression on 
^&J9^ In Goliusion vlth France and Israel, .'aerican encroach. 
bS 
ment In Lebaz^n and hussiais aggression on Hungary. 
unlike the Praja Socialist Party, the Samyukta Socialist 
party adopted ^ much more crit ical attitude tovards the 
policy of non-alignment* It talked mainly of non-preference 
colt* 1317-18* 
61. T^ "ff>^ fc (New Dalhi;, VoLXIX, No.;i», July 29, 1967, p. 9. 
6S« Cioray, !V«0« ^ Dwivedy Surrendran&th, aiuSilJk*t P.240. 
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In pXactt of riarwaii^noittnt* % this ttk9 t^arty vantcd to put 
fflortj em^hasiB on sovereignty In foreii^n poiiay* It b«ll«v«d 
tiiat nonuaiienaent %^ 8 only a part of non.preference* "Non. 
aXigmient givt^s the laprefision of soverelgRtyi but i t Is not 
soln faot*««*»3h faet . Independence and sovereignty develop 
^,^iim a country and Its people Independently Judge their alas 
and laeans and accordingly take their ovn action, Ihe f i r s t 
people's aovernnent v l l l strengthen this base of Independent 
thinkIn^, of «n Independent foielgn policy* For tiie building 
of a nev \ » r l d | a I t v l l l pui'sue a policy of non.preference 
oetveen powerful countries l ike <J*S*A* and U*S*S.H*, and 
viu:out prejudice wi l l expect co-operation fron peoples and 
63 
governaents without an^ preference*" 
The nrf hfeid thE.t policy of non-ail^nment had Icsft 
India alone In the y^t^ s of th« vorld* According to It India 
was ploughing a lonely f urrov in thi, entire world* In Bhutan, 
Cikkla, Nepali Tibet and other border areas the Congress 
G^vernaent's r^iglat. had obstructed the process of deaocratL. 
zstion and undefined the prt^stlge of India, It had also 
unable to safeguard t i e Intt^rests of overseas Indians hi 
Fiz l . Guinea, Mauritius, Last Africa, Ceylon , and other 
64 
areas* 
ba* **Electlon Manifesto of the fiTP**, Mankind, Deceaber 
19(»u, p* 4;^ * 
£»4* Llaaye, Madhu, Uiy sgp?^ ap^eit.y p.ti^* 
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Thtt StP b«ll«ved that India's neutrality vas bas«d 
on **|K>lltlcal ai.i|^ nn@nt with the British Comtionv«aXth, the 
ia«Biu%nhiy of s terl ing uloCf tht» yurchase of o i i i t ary stnil 
and storws from particwaai oountrlesi dMpendenc« for economic 
Ob 
aiu on the Aid India Club*^ * According to i t India v&» 
neutral only In th^ sense that* "It hns sivolded formal entan. 
gleraent v i th military biocsi that in tbt United *Tatlons I t 
so^aetlffltts tacke the . 't lantlo countries 'ind soflie tines the 
(jo^ounlst ones, that i t s Icadisrs want to ba recognized b/ 
pjrasperity as pttace-aakers and oedlators in the current 
lorld conf l ic t s ." I t pointed out tliat non^allgteent had 
become a iseanin^ess fonnula as the African and Asian coun-
67 
t r i e s f e l t no hes i tat ion to extend i t to India.Chlna dispute. 
The S"'r» accepted the policy of non-all^naient with 
reservations, lo put in the vords of V'p leader, Koaaanohar 
Lohia, "^ I plead vith this Covernaent to change it^x foreign 
policy in a fundamental way. To o&^in with, \x must pay 
greater attention to the nelgi'ioours, such as / f ^ a n i s t a n , 
Nepal, i-faiaysia, icven Xhaiiand* rlAllarly ye should be friend 
with Africa and U»rR . , Ihere are two genuine spheres in 
v^ich vb cdnltest the friendliness of another countryt lndo»P9k 
b7. ibJUi*! P*t>3i fee a l so , SiaBYUhti SflB4Uli^ i*artjf> gtStt-jBiint nf t^tlncitfitai Pnigraafft ftn<1 PailttMl Unit 
OBaBiit't P* dl* 
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rsl^tions sod poverty* Vfioever h«lp8 us on t}i«S€ t%o issues 
58 
art. our \a»9t friends*** It oontid«r«d ih6 policy of noru 
ali^naent as a periodical support and dsp«nd«nc« on ons 
or the oth^r povt^ r Uloc* It %iant«d to put an end to a l t«r . 
niite slavery to loth the ulocs and to base Its foreign policy 
on Inde^jendent and creative policy of non-.all^nnent. To 
achieve this purpose the B^? dedicated l tst . l f for working 
to stop a l l for<e.lgn aldy vhether eoonoale or o l l i t a r y OT food. 
Ihfe twenty yeax-s treaty iMtween Russia and Indis 
vas not considered lay the s o c i a l i s t s of the country as Injooa. 
froalty with non-.aii(,nment. Mr. £aaar Guha did not agree 
vlth the Ooverna^ot that the treaty vas an ext«>nslon of the 
69 
non.ailgnnent policy* Mr* Ashoka Mehta^ in h i s ar t i c l e "An 
unequal Ireaty**, said that,**In the event of an attack from 
Pakistan the Soviet Union wi l l help us» but in return i t 
restrains our oove against Pakistan*** In a Joint statesienty 
Soc ia l i s t i>aity Chairaan Mr* KarjKiri Xhekur and the Gtfieral 
Secretary Mr* Dandavate said thaty "a defence treaty or 
61 
security pact v^ich lead to our am al ignsent i s n>t desirattle. 
68* Ceej**Forbign Affairs in Lok ^ahha*", I4ankind, February 
1966, pp. agu40t See a l so , Hindustan Times (Hev Delhi), 
repteraber 2b, 19(>6* 
69* The Hindustan TinaSy fugttst 10, 1971* 
toO* Mehta, Ashoka, "An Unequal Ireaty", nundav kHrid-
/ugust 14, 1971* ' 
t>l* i&ld* 
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to th« t'axrty Chairoian th« tvxat| of th« Irttaty also a«embd to 
t)lnd India for £^ 0 /ears to h:iV6 autuai conciliation, "Jeopar* 
dlslnti th^iiiojf our InltiatlvA In matters of foreign policy 
and d«fenc« and building up our cherished policy of non. 
alliens «nt«" 
Uoth ttiki SCP and the ?£<> polntt^d out d&f> l^t:Ctlon of 
tiie policy of non»£iil^nment from Its rigid i^th. 3o^ hady 
In general, no dlfft^rence vlth the policy of non.allgnment, 
but criticised ttm way adopted by the Govemaent of India to 
liopleaent t>i'>t policy. Doth pointed out that the sociallsa 
could vln In India only if she kept away herself from both 
tile / t lant lc and Soviet camp, from capitalism, imperialism 
and communism. 
Opposition to colonialism is the she^t anchor of 
Indla*<s International policy* It has played a dominant role 
in th\» evolution of Ilidia*s foreign policy i^th before and 
after Independence* Defore Independence fodia extended i t s 
unhesltant airport to A&yssinla a^^ainst Italy and Chiang 
Kai-Shek's China against Japan* It condemned the lape of 
CsechoStiAvakia on the one hand and the Invasion of Fialaad 
on the oth&r* 'fter independence i t helped Indonesia against 
6 2 . Ibid, 
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!1611andt the Arabs ag{ilnst the United ntatcs oT Amsrica, 
(ad 
K«n/a 3nd Ghana a^^alnst Srltaln* 
This po i l c / of anti.(KiXonlall8a had the fIra support 
of the Cocialists of Indies, itoth th« SS^ and th« ^Bi? eontln 
uousiy supi^orted the frvedoa of p«opl«» struggling under the 
cojLonlai. rultt| and exprbtafid tiieir dlseat ls fact ion over the 
Vestern pol ic ies of racial discrlailnation. Ihe t I'raja 
Hocialiat j^arty considered colonial isa as the negation of 
a l l the basic and fundamental huaan r i ^ t s and dedicated 
i t s e l f to the jarast iaportant task of deaocratic soc la l i sa 
to ooabat i t and to wipe i t out* 
In i t s i n i t i a l phases, the f o e i i l i s t t'art/ f Iraly 
beliffved that th« struggle for flceedoa had to continiw unt i l 
the l a s t ve8tl4;e8 of iaper ia l i s t doainstion had been destroyed* 
It deolar«id that, '*it w i l l support a l l popular aoveaents 
iiimad a t achieving this end*** 
the Soc ia l i s t Paity in i t s Kanpur Conference held In 
^4-oh 1947 sent i t s greetings to the peoplel of Indo-Chlna 
and Malaya in their strUb4,ie for indeptfidence* It also 
oa, Iiha8in,i>rb£a, RQCialism in India^ N«v Delhi, xoung Asia 
I'ublieation, I9b8, p. 223* 
<>4* Pf^liey Ctat^aant. adapted by tha Genarei Counell of tfa^  
fintsfeliliti f a r t / af IfldU i t annteYf October 1949, Ooabay, 
PP Pub., 1949, p*3S| also see, "Social is t /»pproaoh to 
Foreign Policy," in Lohia, Raaaanohar* Faraiyn Palley^ 
flUUfilb*f P* ^7^. 
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condemiittd th« Gov^rnnent of Nsth^riand for their unprovoked 
aggression a^^Inst th« Indonesian R«publlo« It called upon 
the Indian people to obssnre 'Ibdoneslsn Day* on June 9, 
1949< to extend their support n^d to express their SjUpathy 
to the Indonesian peopls In their freedom struggle* It 
also greeted the people of African countries of ITunlsis, 
MoroccOf Algeria and others vho vers struggling for freedom 
from Imperial domination and assured them of thie party's 
sol idarlt / !*na support* In a Platform '*ve build for socialism" 
the roolaiist i^ arty supported freedom aovements f^ the 
unfree peoples, in particular those of 'ferica and vanted to 
keep them 8va> from the alliances vith either camp, Again 
in i t s Vanchamari Report*; the Socialist Party sent Its 
greetln^^ to tht peoples of Africa vho vere battling for 
their liberation. It also deplored the failure of the m 
to take up this issue and implement Its charter. It called 
upon the Socialists and t^e popular forces of the country to 
extend their support and sympathy to African freedom f i l t e r s 
m 
in creating, the vorld opinion In favour of them* 
CamcU at liicltno¥f December 1948 (Bombay, 1949), p.6. 
^« "*3e, Socialist party. RaDort of the fith Wstlanal Cnn^ 
farence held at Madras, July 19b0, pp. 91-63* 
t>7* "v^ ualid For rociallsm% rh.i ^latfoM «f tha ??^iaii«fe 
t^arw of Indla» iibmtoy^r.p.publishing, lagi , p.ao* 
t»8« See. **Resolution >n African's rtruggle for Freedom", 
in Lohia, Ksomanohar, OQ.CHU 
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Ihou^ tb« psp supported th« Ihdl&n Govenui«nt*8 polley 
of antl-oolonlallsa, hovoverf i t did not fa l l to cheek 
GovernB«nt*s failure &nd faults of Its execution* In the 
case of Hun a^iVi 'lt><*<>^ l^ » Ivenya and otht^ r ht^lplcsss countries, 
Uie iCi* asserted, tii^ Governauint of India had preferred 
«>xpedlency to Uie claims of freedon and justice. The National 
Council of Praja Socialist t^ arty in Deceraber IdbS, while 
reaffirming Its f a i ^ In equality of a l l nations arul peoples, 
deplored the policy of the Indian Government vhlch rested on 
collaboration vlth 3rltaln, vhi^h continued to be the major 
colonial power in the continent of Africa* It reaffirmed 
i ts faith in the equality of all- nations and people and 
demanded the Government to protest against the existence of 
itt^itish forces in Sues, Jordan, Iraq, ringapore, Mala/a and 
Ceylon* • 
.he Praja Toolallst party had a firm belief that the 
evil of colonialism in a l l forms va& a great obstacle in the 
achievto^ i^snt of an equal world for mankind* It declared that 
a l l Africa must particularly be free and united in this 
respect* Xh^  loth latlonai Conference of the Praja ^^ooiallst 
party viewed wiUx deep concern and alarmed the mounting 
69* See, i w j^tari fif tttf i*yaja Saf ik lUt Par tort Bombay, 
PraJa Socialist Party Publication, 19b4, p*28. 
70* See^Lohla, Rammanoh:ar, QM»&lSi*t p«St7* 
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aggr«8Slon of colonial powers «speelaliy In Africa* I t 
pledged Its strength and support to the valiant people of 
Algeria, Kenya, Caoroons and other states of 'fxrica locked 
r? 
In the fight for freedoa. 
The FTP also favoured the part played by the freedom 
fighters of Goa in the liberation gk>Veiient against Portuguese 
colonlallsa* It deplored the Governnent's misunderstanding 
of ^ e Goa problea and Its Inability to find %njr solution 
72 
for It and the flexible opposition to popular efforts* 
In Its 'National ijceeutlve Hesolutlon held In Jtine 
"^yby at Madras, the P^ P stated that, "Antl-colonlaHsra has 
to b« purposefull: liquidation of the rtfmants of colonlall«B 
In our ovn country —» the Portuguese * possession*—— brooks 
73 
no delay*** In the saaa resolution the PSP urged the 
uovemment to take a bold step towards the question of Goa* 
It asserted that It vas not a matter for diplomacy alone and 
that It vas tht Inalienable rlg^t of tv.e people In these 
71* tiBBQrt gf tos lYth Ifatlnnal CanfMiOfla of tbi Praia 
fQclallat Party held at Poona (Maharashtra), ?fay £6.£8, 
7968, p*'}d4| see also, "Resolutions t Praja Toclallst 
l^rty". In Poplal ^.L*, aa«jslt»> p.S'*©* 
7S* It condemned the Govemaent*s policy with reference to 
Goa as weak and uneffectlve, and suffered from swift 
turn as It refused to allow the sd t l zens of Indian Union 
to offer Satyagraha for the polit ical freedom of Goa. 
^rtiiey ctat—ant^ aflfltftafl ttT tht frggnnfl ITntlflnal Canfarp 
t>nc» »r the Praia raciallat Party held at Qava on 
Oecenber 26.30, t965. p.90« 
73* "pep National Executive He so lutlon^ Adopted at the June 
'•7-19, t9b1 Session held In Madras*. iaXULfiaf-^ w** 86f 
"^ Sbt, p*i9) see also, "Praja racialist Election Manlfes. 
tos", in Poplal, r,L*, oa.clt>^ p*9(>* 
8«jttiements lo revo l t aga ins t foi*«jign tyranny. I t vi«ved 
tna t I t w-'» oquaiiy the-ri^ht any duty of the Indian p«oplfe 
as u v.'holu to Sujjport Jiuch revolts* Bit ^:iX'ty y^9 1/ifavour of 
t>ic usb of force for tht litM»r£>tlon of Goa as I t had nade 
a 3)ok«r/ 3f ^ l i Indians px-onouncemsnt ::jigain8t imperialism, 
'^htn Jo^ was l l o c r a t a d , the j^rp welcomed I t s l i b e r a t i o n vl th 
grea t eiithusiasa and vJevtd t h i s as J* par t of a vorld-wlde 
stru^j/lc i n l i n e t Inper 1*311881, 
r-e ."'P also ox^rc:r,ed I t s s t rong sens© of resentment 
a t the policy of bPoss rsciai lsm folloved by VTM '^outh "^'rlcan 
aovemaont;, Tt v^eved tha t the policy of aparthled and r ' ic la l 
d iscr iminat ion , 4>i'ictlced in fouth Africa, pushed "fr ica back 
inta dirkn«!S^ and s lavery . I t extended i t s support and ^re«!t. 
ine,s to tt\% yfcopi*. of fr ioa vho v«*re fi^i^itl'it, for freedom 
ond a^iilnst expiol t ' i t ion frooi Frtnch, a r i t i s ' i , t^ortugucse and 
3al^anin Imptirialisia «!Q<t fiifiotML mamptev. "THe African contU 
n<^nt has ut.en ru th less ly &3ipi.oited by vhl te Impt^rialism out 
i t l£ 5» mattt'lr of g r a t i f i c a t i o n tha t tht people of «'f r ica 
ar*. now consciously' ab l t to organize themselves with a v i t v 
74 
to shackling themselves f ree from vhltfc s tnui^ lc hold,*'^/i£ 
The policy oT r a c i a l segregation and supremacy iaposed 
by r.uropfcan co lonis t s in ^ ^rlca vois character ised by tht .>"•? 
74. Lohia, i\aaaanohair, a ^ . c l t . , p*a2&* 
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7b 
as "unjust and lnJiu«»n." l i extended I t s f u i l support v l thout 
h e s i t a t i o n and ^equivocation to uLL peoples s t ruggl ing for 
n a t i o r a i fr«»»*doin, deoiDcr^tic rlj^'its and r a c i a l equal i ty . 
Tnough, oi'o'idlj sp^-kl-i^, *^ 'V supported tl-ie stand of the 
OK 
uhDvemnent/Uiese issut,s, hovcVLr^lt v-anted only to rescue hwr 
ffos uwsitfa t;iorv£; i^nc. mgntnl rcstJrvytlons. 
Uie r^m/ukta f o c i n i l s t .^srty convinced tha t for the 
achJfcveaifent of an equal world, tiit i r r i t a t i o n s of colonialIsn 
a r t fcTe^t 3wSt:.clw£« I t Kiude i t s ea rnes t e f fo r t to extend a l l 
i^eip to thy people of ytozusm qxxb and Aw^pla for ending colonial 
reolnt^ und tD tht pwojit; of ''oat^iem Rhodesia an-? r^uth *frica 
fov ondS^i, Vi'^ r CIAI i o ie . I t convinced tha t , * 'nir tct oolo-
niaiisTi Is coal "lb to in t.nd out neo-coloniallsm in thfe foro 
3f foreign aid and cont ro l of ea>nomic l i f e of tha weaker 
77 
count r ies i s DH t re Increase ," I t d i s l iked the GoVfernaents 
vi»ci l iat ions an.: v t iknesses on t'i«se i ssues and vanted th* 
GoVttrnraent ta take 'a i«nd on a l l these a . i t e r s . It duolared 
tha t i t viouid raake i l l e f fo r t s to unitfc the people af ttie 
e n t i r e vorld and a i l the democratic Governments to «± f ight 
76. Dikshit . Chandvodaya, ed . , naa^cratiG^Saciaiisa in India^ 
^^i^s r e l h l , CChand i Co«i»vt«, Ltd, , '»971, p ,67. 
7<b, ZHssin, .reni, nnciiallpm in India, f>Q.elt-,Ei.£ia:a. 
77. "raayukta *:oeiallst t»arty Manifesto", in Lai, rh iv , 
National ^aiU^i af InaaLat aaiJiUi«f P* ^^S* 
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against neo«colonialism to sstabllsh a ^brld Qovsmnsnt on 
78 
the tiasis of eoononlc and pol i t ical d«flK>crac/* 
3oth the t%fo parties, the prp and the rr?, stood behind 
al l strugglt^s against colonialism and racialism and under all 
posslisle assistance to the freedom fighters %iho were suffering 
under imperislist and \n0o*Imperialist regimes. Bst^ . the 
parties considered that Oemocr^ t^lc ''oclallsa could not be 
expected to exlsty could not expect to survive as long as 
colonialism w?)8 rampant. They viewed thb continuance of 
colonialism and racialism ns a challenge to democracy, a 
menactt to socialism and s continuous threat to vorld peace 
and security. 
The question of disarmacscnt has become the dbst vital 
issue of modern times. It has nov become an essenti&l nece* 
sAity because of thtt horrible oonsequ^ces of th« 2«>dem vsr 
and an Impending threat to human existence and survival as ^ 
result of the use of weapons of mass destruction. India,since 
independcffice has been trying to achieve a g^eral and complete 
disarmament, Iven though India herself Is f: ced serious 
78. itddM P* 1«>3. 
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tKr«ats at hoffi«9 vl£« froa China and Pakistan, sh« has d«6ld«d 
n:>t to manufacture atonic weapons :)eoau8e to do so Is bad In 
principle and nit In m consonance vlth th^ pollc/ of p«ae«« 
Ihe Pr^Ja Socialist Party is of the vi«v that to ensure 
peacte and to achieve ueneral and complete dlsaxmamtfit i t vas 
nect:ssary to ban the use of atoalc weapons and the excessive 
expenditure on amaments especially of those countries ^^ich 
are already aimed to the teeth. The Party vas convineeel that 
able leadership could successfully direct aan*s thought snd 
nation's efforts to dlsarsament ai^ d diversion of th s^se reeourcefl 
79 
for econoBie development and social uplift* 
Froa tine to tine varying reactions have been regis-
tered vltMn t^e ?srty ranks to the situation created by thb 
Chinese atom bomb test* Addressing the nevs Conference, the 
PCP leaderi r^ * Nath Pal stated that Chinese possession of 
the nuclear weapons was ni^ t only a natter of curiosity, but 
a vital concern of national security* ^^ e urged that f Indii 
should possess the nuclear deterrent, if necessary, to neet 
79* '"eej"?raja Socialist l^ arty flection .lanlfesto iim?)**^ 
in Lai, ^ i v , aaaiSlfc.t P» '»70* 
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tl^e Cblnttto blnckaall Insplrgd by Its possession of ttie 'ton 
Bofflb* The right of defending our country could not be coapro. 
8"! 
mised by shouting thut ve do not produce nuclear vespons,*' 
he added* 
Ihfe rTp viewed viXir deep concern the groving collusion 
between China and i'akistan, China's fast developing nuclesr 
axtsoury, and Pakistan's ae t of training and arming the "^ aga 
and Mi)!9o coosaandos. Taking these snd other ominous develops 
ments Into consideration the Party believed that, "a day may 
soon come vhen the entire arch streaching from Kutd^ to the 
Hiso f i l l s vfould bfc^  tuzned into a VBT front.** /gainst such s 
contingencyi V x. Party believed, India must provide herself by 
striving for se l f - suf f ic iency in every branch of weaponry, 
83 
conventional as v e i l as nuclear* the Pf^ P held that India's 
defence unpreparedness and failure to strengthen the country's 
economic bare had ni>t only encouraged t^ .e aggressors tnit also 
80* Indian i.Trprans (!?ev Delhi), October 19, T964« 
&£• ij^iasin, Prea, (UU£lJ(«» pp« 8 5 ^ ) see a lso , ?<taamtlan nf 
the Praia rnelal iat Party National llaeecutiva at Panllmy 
.ioa on I4ay 2o, 19i»6* 
63* Bhaiin, JUiLI* 
end^angcred Indl's's prestige in tl^e eye>0 of sinalXur nations. 
I t urged t^at India must i t a m a correct lesson and should 
strengthen i t s defence forces by strongtVenlng country's econo. 
talc t ^ s l s , 
Ihe famyukta Pociallst Party, llki; ^.e iTp, also stood 
against armasients. It oclleved that true and effective d l s . 
armament can be achieved only >^en tht s tates -)f the 'o r ld 
becuaife equal In stren^^th, ih«» rrp vfss convinced that India's 
unvllllnc^nfeSf snd incapacity to experiffl^t vlth unl l s te re l 
disaraament on the one hand and use of armed foioes by her 
In the actual practice on the other» made Indl?. look hypocritica. 
In t^te eyws of Internatlongl oplnlori, Ihe "''? vanted that the 
country's attentlo'> should not be diverted from the basic f^sk 
of socio-economic transformation, of 'x firm policy In regard 
to Chirm, by the fut i le tt*lk about manufacturing the bsmb, or 
seeking the nuclear shield either from O'""? or U'^ '*. I t has 
stressed repeatedly for the adoption of measures for ending 
Vorld poverty. Xht problem of disarmament is not to be t^ken 
up in isolat ion. The rrp vas convinced that the fate of 
mankind vas &s much linked with elimination of poverty as vlth 
elialnation of arms fjom the rorld. It demanded that the 
&4« Limaye, :^dhu, \\i^ *;f;f? auaJU^M P* «>4« 
Gov«mB«nt should pursue the three alas of eoonoaic self , 
sufflciencyi disarmament and freedom vith equal emi^vasls. 
3oth the i'S? and the tEP^ In general, 60 not evlnoe 
vmr^f great Interest In the talks of disarmament as tooth laid 
mote efflji^ asls on the Issues of antl»colonl&llsm| velfare or 
thfc flg^t against poverty. Both dtffland India to draw a 
correct lesson from previous i;Xperlenoc>^ and to rely up^ in self, 
sufficiency in conventional and nuclear ams and an Independent 
foreign policy. Doth these parties give a passing reference 
to the issues relatint^ to disarmament. They feel that disarma. 
ment v l l l materialise only If the *Cold t.'sr* disappears comp. 
letely* Economically backvard countries oaimot afford to think 
of manufacturing an atom bomb. Ihe recent atomic explosion 
toiy Indian scientists is hailed toy these parties as a device to 
use atomic energy for peaceful jwirposes. But to use It as an 
Instrument of var Is alien to the ^mry fundamentals of their 
party programme. A poor country like India cannot afford the 
luxury of nuclear amament* The only alternative %iould there-
fore toe continuous efforts to narrow domn the tones of conflict 
and plead for universal disarmament or gradual reduction 
of arras so ^ a t the dangers of war engulfing the vhole world 
are minimised and developing countries may engage themself 
vlth undivided attention to peaceful pursuits and economic 
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• •If safriGi«noy. These parties support India in i ts efforts 
to bring about partial test ban treaty and to sake i t 
•ffeetlvo* 
f-mtups XQV'Big BIDIT^'S mi& iw i m 
Sooiallstsof India always supported the United Nations 
and upheld the principles and objeotives of i ts charter. Thcjr 
re f^idifldel/ stressed that the UN in order to be an effective 
international body aust be uaivtf sal in character and a l l 
countries big or saiaU should be given representation to i t . 
The Socialist Party in Its Mahabaleshvar aeeting stated 
that in pursuance of the policy of peace liidla aust take an 
active part In the UN, Though i t had fallen short of i ts 
declared obJecti\es and had adopted a curious attitude tovards 
India and other Asian countries, however. India's aeabershlp 
86 
of the UNO should be continued. 
The Socialist Party of India condeaned the failure to 
give a lead on issues of vorld slgnifleaiies and to raise ques. 
tlons of social Justicci and vorld frecdoa on the platfora of 
the UN. It pointed out that India tm in the UN had not played 
8k». E«e for details, **Socialist Approach to Foreign Policy**, 
in Lohia, Ramanohar, OiufiJU** P* 374. 
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a positiv* role. "f. oanrellous opportaalty vas there at the 
UKO for th^ (lovemnent of India to declare In ringing texvs 
tVat distinction Detveen tbe victors and the vanquished 
should go and that i.very country In th«^  world no fliatt($r v^ hi ther 
i t lost a var, should h v^« Its ovn i^tlon^l gov*.j-noiMit* It 
should have announced our decision not to accent any repatrla. 
tlons frora Gemsny and Japan* It should have demanded tihe 
vlthdraval rtf foreign authority and armlts of occupation 
vKth&r In Gexmanyy Korea^ Japan, Indonesia, Vletnaa, Malaya 
and territories of the 'frlcan people and the re constitution 
of national authority* Instead of acting on this high pl^ne 
It referred the rout> 'frlca and Kashair questions to the 
87 
UNO*" It also declared that India should make an endsavour 
to reaove th& serious l ialtations from vhioh the U!f suffered 
nnd to transforn It into an Instrument of effective Inter-
national Co-operation* It emphazied the need to admit at 
once the slan nations into the U!V* 
Xhe pr^, like Its predecessor, focial ist Party, also 
upheld the cause of t^t UN* It stood to strengthen the 
United " l^ations and i ts various agencies in such a manner 
that might lead to a 'brld of freedom, equality and peaes* 
E7* Il2ld* 
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I t vant«d that a l l Asiat ic free oountrlt^s should be glY«n 
admission in I t , The National Conference of the Hraja '^ooiaiist 
Party vUvtd with concern the **tendency of the ^sian rtates 
to acquiesce !n the vicious bases of the UK charter vith Its 
permanent seats on tbe r«curity Council for the five Big 
"rations, t^ & veto and the l i k e , and a frequent ec^^es in 
^sian capitals of t>ie demand for a Big Five m&etlng to solve 
88 
t^ <: proulfcos of the 'i-brld*'* the Conference f e l t fear that 
the domination of 3ig povers in th^ international f ie ld and 
tiht r l g i t to decide tht> destiny of mankind must ultimately 
lead to var* 
the PT? «»xprfcSsed i t s firm opposition to the Internationa 
cast system being practiced under th& United Tiatlons ')rganiss. 
t ion, l^ ammanohar Lohia once stated, **The United Nations 
suffered from three glaring v^uknesses • * • l imited membership, 
permanent ser-ts on th6 r.ecurity Council and the veto, but no 
government in the vorld have made a resolute demand for three 
positive principles of universalism, abolit ion of the veto 
and removal of peremnent seats In order to destroy the inter* 
88 
national caste system,** The i'raja ' :ocial ist Party 
demanded th« imr.ediate adtaiisslon of a l l independent 
ea. tw> yfiar« nt tha P£P, nB,c,lt*t P* 28, The Conference 
of the PSP vas ^eld at Allahabad on December 2 9 ^ 1 , 
89. Lohia, oa^c l t . . p. 333. 
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states Into the UN* % this It wanted to revive the &ain 
defects fro« %fhlch It euffertd. vhlle It favoured the fair 
and adequate representation of tht* nevly ll)EH»rfited ststes of 
/ s la and Africa In the un^ It declared that It could not favour 
any move alaed ^t paralyslnc the l^ brld Organisation tor introdtt«i 
90 
Ing the veto in the tfcecutlve fUnotlonlng of the organisation* 
The PSP fe l t conoernfed that the policy of racial* 
dlscrlaination applied in F^uth Africa had set to naught a l l 
the basic principles enunciated by the U7? Charter* It deplored 
U1f*s failure to arrive at any solution of this evil* It also 
condemned the United Nations aetlvit les in ease of Kashair* It 
denanded the vltbdraval of the dispute froa t^t UN i^loh proved 
Itself Incapable of solving it* It viewed that unfortunately 
instead of deciding this siaple Issue the UN further ooaplicat# 
it* Indians abstention in the UN vote on suj^ly of var oateriaj 
to China was considered fcgr the Socialists as an act of world 
unity (uid pe ice» It supported unequivocally the deaand of the 
aoverment of India for China's admission into the UN* 
The PSP wanted that the UN onist becoae equal and 
universal and abolish the veto as vei l as pemanent seat In 
90* Tee, *'?FP Manifesto", ikfiAla. February IO9 19i»3y p*7| 
see alsot Poplal, r.L.y ap.eit.y p« 97* 
Its '"ticurlty Council i^nd 9th«r ioodi«8« Its membership should 
be open to a l l natlors v>o wanted to Join i t . T^ c Party vlt-ved 
tVat W adopting these efforts^ t^e U^  oould bring about 
necessary disarmament, eouid take up the colonial questions 
and Uose relating to minorities under i t s compctenee* djf 
achieving a l l thtjse purposes i t vould become sn intexnstlonel 
organ of collective Hecurity and vorld peace* 
Ttm crpy like the prp, believed that the U*^  must beoone 
equal and a l l nations of tht 'orld willing to join i t must 
be given representation in i ts various organs. It criticized 
the Goveinfflent of In.ilu for i t s support in the U?f sometimes 
the "tiantlc countrlee and sometimes the costmunlst one*s« Indisi 
in their view, has failed to raise the issue of pexmanent and 
91 
n^n^permanent recurIty Council membership* It also condemned 
the Government for i ts contmoous demand of China's rt^coffiltlon 
In the ITT, "the shameless Eamer of our U'^  representative 
extending covert sup^rt, and our prime Minister herself 
extending covert support to the cause of adftlssion of China 
to the U!7 and similar other indioatl:)ns, make one fear that 
If the ruling party servlve, some more territories of IMla 
9l« >^ee Limayet 'iadhu, ftp.elt^j pp, i>8y ^3, t>6« 
mlglit t>« o«(l«d in th« miB« of peace and haxmony*** 
The Socialists supported the UN not as t^e organisation 
of vorld ^cace taut also for fostering balanoed eooosaie deive. 
lopnent in the ^r ld* !Ehey believed that within the im close 
econoaic cooperation needed to be practiced between the Afio* 
/sian Nations, They recognised the need to preserve the IW 
as|an instrunent of collective security* 
mvAh /••TTITUDE TaVRHS IffPlA'.'! MFMBERSTTIP tF 
Fver since the Praja Socialist Party was foraed, i t 
opposed India*s association with the Conmonvealth of Rations* 
It firaly belieired that India could not follow an independent 
foreign policy while renaining In the Conmonw^alth, The 
Party's adherence to r/ociallsn dcnanded that in order to play 
an effective role in international f ie ld India oust ooae out 
of the Coniaonwealtii of f^atlons* 
Before the formation of P^ P the f^ociallst Harty in i ts 
policy statenent in 1949 declaredy '*If India is to play i t s 
92* "HaayukU "beialist Party Flection Manifesto 0971)**, 
in Lai. rhiv, f?atlnnfiil PaftJifia of Jlhdtat aiLkfiX^t 
pp* IdT-S* 
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part in th« 'orld i . f falw «ff«otlv«l/y I t w i l l hav« to avoid 
^ill sudi associations and eooflaitatnts as 8r« l i k e l y to eon pro* 
Biftt this fundBOcntal i86U«« It i s clear th'st Indi:»*s n«mber* 
s^ip of ?Tlti8h Co-naomwaltb i s inconsistent with ^ i s basic 
pollcjr oT neutra l l t / . It v l l l oean that on every v i ta l issue 
Indis sh^ll h&ve tnrovn in h^t weight on the side of nglo-
iiierican. I t v i l l m^un that t^ere v l l l be no independent 
93 
foreign policy**' The i*arty believed that Indians neutrality 
\xmi6 beooae a fdurce J^ s^ e^ r t^^ ld not broke up her Drdc %.'ith 
94 
the Oomreonwealth which i t s e l f \r>» linked witJi ' t l a n t l c p^ct. 
The PfPf year mt s f ter year, reiterated the sa»e view 
98 expressed by t*"e '"ocl'^llst r'^ irty vlth regard India's aeabtr-
shlp in the CoBBuonweelth, Ihe ?? tlonal Conferfcncc of the Prajs 
roc i^ l i s t f'arty held on December £9u3i In 1963, s t ''llahabid, 
deplored the policy of the Indian Govt^rnnent which resulted 
in 3i'ltaln ejierclsing ef fect ive econoaic affairs of 'sl-m 
"^tates. Xh«j only way, to revtrse this trend, according to 
POP, was for India to give up the Inferior meabershlp of ttie 
British Coarnanweslth and free i t s e l f froo the econoaic "^ nd 
96 
strategic ap^on strings of Great Britain* "chstr/a Kri|>^anl| 
"AGlnnat t'arty at af lay an Ictolair llHffl> P.37{ ''ee dtso^  
Lohia, finifilt»t P* 373* 
94» rr^cl-llgt Party, Baaalutlnne oasseil at Hhe 7th *nnuBl 
lanfftCtfJCftt ^eld nt /Ptm 6wlOth M i^rch 1949, Boabsy, **?, 
'•949, pp. 17-18. 
Qfi* IWn i^ tara nf the t^ ra,1a nnclsUnt PartY> aju£ll>% P. S8; 
*^ r«e a lso , Lohla, ojUAlt*! P«316« 
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the P^'i* l6ad«r| speakirttj In the ParlltiMnt, also deoandcd the 
vlthdraval of Ind'*? fpom th« CoBiaonwf^ altb of Nations, "e saJdi 
"If England and other Coomonvoalth countries persist 
in shoving; scant reg'iid for our v i t a l lnt<. rests and sided vit^ 
our oponents, our nembershlp of the Cominonveslth cannot 
continue. 
It biillevcd that India's aembership of the Coaaonveslth 
robbed our country of independent in i t i a t ive in the foreign 
policy an,tters. India's policy of pt?*ce demanded thnt Indies 
should come out of thfc Jrlt ish Commonvenlth vhich s t i l l conti-
nued to be thts major colonial pover and v*tich strategical ly , 
economically and p o l i t i c a l l y vus s part o** the 'nglo*'tterie*in 
bloc nnd sided with India's opponents. For this the Party took 
the example of UK's support to Pal Istan on Kashmir question 
and to Portuguese on Goa question. 
'"urrtndra '^ Tth Dwlvedy, the ?''P leader, in ^96&>speak, 
ing in thi Lak Tabha s.^ld, "^e should Ici^ vfe the Commonwealth, 
t^e Commonvealth should go^because i t serves no pui-pose except 
th« purpose of Britishers, i t i s not good in remaining In the 
Conwaonwe al th,^ 
96. ry>k a^fahfl r)«.bat*«, Vol. I l l , !fo.ai, March £8, 19&6,col.3b07, 
97« IMd'i Vol. XLVII, f3o.8, November ^b, i966, eo l . 1986, 
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CuJttlng th« Coanomfsalth had slvays r««aitMd 3 p^rt of 
^raja r^clsXlst Party's declared policy and th« shect-^^nchor 
of I ts foreign policy sanlf«»^<25. It eoaplalned th9t Brlt'iln 
v«if partial vlth India•• oponents on thk Issue of K s^>wjlr and 
Goa, "b doubtf India • Pakistan relations nnd mlonla l »snd 
m c l s l po l ic ies pr^^ctlced by '"outh ' fr lc^ conditioned the ?P^»s 
attitude tovards the Conuaonvesltb* 
Like the rTP, the Pfp consistently dem'jnded India's 
vltHdraval from the Coamonveslth, It belieir^d that to put 
vigour Into the foreign policy I t i s necessary that India 
should Itj v« the Comoonvealth, One of the arguaent .?lven by 
tiife f-'x" vas the attitude of Britain In reg'^rd to Pakistan 
iplx»a.vls India. It had staboed ^d la In l^e back throu^ 
stoppag«( of supplies of machines and spare p'^rts so necesaary 
for the repair of our planes during emtrgencles* In a joint 
st'itement^the rse accused Britain of "international !iBlsconduct^ 
by refusing to recognise Kashnlr ae an Integral part of Indla« 
Htnmanohar Lohla, the ^r? leader, ^^ille addressing a public 
nesting at Fattehgarh on ')ctober 9, 1966, saldi 
**India should break of vlth the C^nnonvealth immediately 
as ve had so l id ground to believe that the Britishers had given 
an assurance to ^Ir* Jinn^h, founder of the ir'<^kifitan for ever* 
9a* iTiti rtHtellfln (I^elhl;, OctoDer 12, 1966. 
99 
%9 r«e«nt attitude of arltala had strangthand hla ballaf." 
Xha SE? ballavad that It «aa not only In Indiana 
aoonoBie and poXltlcaX Interaata to quit tha Coouionwaalth, 
teit vas alao nacaasary to aaat tha Chlnaaa influanea in tha 
Afto^Aaian and loaekfard oountriaa. Tha poaltlva advantagaa 
^ a t India had In tha pollt ieal and aconoaie flald hava l>aan 
ooBplataly Ignorad by thaaa partlaa. Tha Indian laadara in 
tha Qovamaant juatified thair atand on thla itaati tiaa and 
again, inaida tad outaida tha parXiaaaat* It ia qaita aTidant 
that avan if va had no aaeh to gain tagr raaaining in tha 
CooionwaaXthi our eontinoad aambarahip of tha Coanonwaalth 
brlnga ua aoaa advantagaa* 
It appaara froa tha atova diaeuaaion that thara la 
Dot Bueh of diffaranoa batvaaa tha off ic ial policy of tha 
Qovarnmant of India and tha viava axpraaaad fay tha PSP and 
tha srp. Tha aaln diffaraaea liaa in tha aaphaaia and 
prioritiaa* Tha oppoaitioa haa to pick holaa in tha policy 
of ^ a Qovaraaaat alaply for tha aaka of oppoaition and vith 
tti% airowad ottjactiva of playing to tha galiary* It la aaay 
to preaant an idaaliatio vlav polat bat tha oautioua and 
circuaapact novaa of tSia (^varmant ara Juatiflabia on tha 
gmund that i t la amtaroiltd in tha vortax of foraipi ralationa 
and cannot take, an erratic or raah a tap* It ia alao evident 
fsoB tha viava cited above that the pnp and the f^BP alao do not 
haire radically different vleva l a t u w u . 
99* Thl Hlnitmfain T t m (Wew Delhi), October 10» 1966. 
C H A P T E R 
gtfPIR 
CP 
jj^MJ^mi^i I «l)i tTiP flfft 1?BP I M S 
JSUdSBS 
vm igr. 
C H A P T E R V 
im. (^umm QT CPI» cpim), PSP A^ TD fin? 
Int«matlonaX Hmlatlont ar«i mostly the ^utcomg of pov«r 
po l i t i c s and national svlf—lntertst. *fo oountry can Ignore 
the InvolTrefflent of Fuper Powers In ibrld p o l i t i c s . The devs. 
loping countries In particular have to look tovards one super 
pover or the other for economic ald> military help or tech* 
nloal assistance* tUrlng the m&ny years of struggle for 
India's Independence the U.* .^^ * vas held in ^Igh esteem In 
India more particularly because i t vas the saviour o^ democracy 
and freedom. The sympatby and supj.ort India recelveclfrom 
th^ U.r.A. during Its freedom struggle strengthened further 
the t i e s of friendship betve«i the two countries. Xhelr common 
Ideals, idtfitlty of objectives and the quest for Just and Ifistln, 
peace also cemented thests re lat ions . 
Unfortunately with the passage of time tht glow of 
friendship graduall/ faded avay and misunderstandings and 
suspicion took the place of harmony and ooneord. Indo-^merlcan 
relations entered a period of continued tansloni estrangement 
and uncertainty. India's sheet anchor of foreign policy I . e . 
non^aligraient was subjected to continued valley of c r l t l c l m 
by the American press. I t was condemned and mistaken In 
Washington and was ^ken to mean either hypocritical neutralism 
or double dealings. t the UN both the U.!?.''. and India were 
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usually on opix>8lt« sld«s. It 8««B«d as if India vas going 
ttb Covi«t vay and b«ooaing d««ply ineliiKd tov^rds U.r,r,R, 
and distinotly becoming i t s camp follovcir. The Korean var 
br«d distrust. On th€ econoalc side planning and c:xten8ion of 
public sectors and nationalisation of key in<&istrles pointed 
to thfe i*d signal and >;r(.liainary s l ^ s of a Socialist ordsr 
distasteful to the USA, 
The f irst thing vhich shodcfed India very nuch and aade 
It extremely cautious va* the U«5;«««<» Pak military pact. 
Pakistan's Involvement Into the ST?A1^  and C£3fT0 pacts also 
was not liked by India as i t increased the ^egemony of the 
U.S.'.. and sprtad ^ network of inter regional military alliances 
ha2»rdous to weaker nations. It was deemed as the extension 
of th«) U.S.efforts to undexmine national fr«e<tom and newly won 
Inde^endencti on t>^ e 'sian sub-continent of %^ 2ieh India was a 
ike-
leading state. India's advocacy of China's claim to/UN membership 
was suspected either as eowardicet opportunism of ooaiBltment 
1 
to th6 Tovlet bloc* Ihe U.S.hostility to India over the Kashmir 
issue in thfe lE e^curlty Council in 1967 further strained the 
tl68 of friendship biitween the two countries. Ihe a>ntinuoujs 
Interest th« U.f^ .had shown in Kashmir settlement 8^ ov<ed her 
tendency to see things through Pakistan eyes. 
1. :iat^ Qn^^ f?tr8Xd (tucknow), June 6, ig&3. 
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The pronounced drift In Indo.U,P. rtl^tions continued 
for molt j^ art of th9 ytar of 1962, and vat taapor'^r/ arrcfted 
b/ the In<to.Chinn conflict. Though India aaked for allit^ry 
asaistanoa, i t fixml/ rafuacd to ba trappad in a a i l i t sry pnet. 
U.S. boabardaant of North Viatnam, agsln avokad crlt icisa 
In India, ' t th€ aaaa tiac India repaatadly called for t) halt 
to the boablng of North Viatnaa. /a a ra&ction to thia in 
'^prll 19(>6 the Praaldant of Anarica §yt post^nad tha vial t 
of Hriaa Mlniater ^haatrl to %t\e U,5;«/« lh« pos^^neaant 
sfflountad in India as a great protest against America* 
Ihe use of U.S.ailltary hardware tagr Pakistan against 
India in the Hann of Kut<^ and during the Indo«Psk %rar of 1O06 
aarked a new lov in Indo«U«S« relations* 
I vents during 19^7 Isd to a further setbedk in Indo* 
Aaerlcan relations* India's solidsritx with socialist forces 
rtnd i t s attitudes tov'^rds Vietnam also touched ^ Ashing ton on 
slso 
the raw* Failure on foreign aid front/had i t s lappet on 
Indo.D*r* ties* Relations betveen the two countries further 
deteriorated by the discloser of th« /aerican deal for supply. 
ing aras to Pakistan during Bangla Dash crisis* India strongly 
protested against the American decision and accused U«S« of 
2 
**condoning genocide and atrocities in East Bengal*** 
2. Tha Tiamg (London;, <^ uly 13, 1971* 
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Both ^ e countriiiS isMisd to b« gzoping a l l these 
y«ars In search of & tolerable reletlonthlp betvten tv> of 
the vorld*8 most populous deiKieraeies, 
m fXTiYucii ^r TfiK cpi mu x^s CPKM^ Ta7Ri?ft 
THnlA«g RlUTlQir VITIT TOT U.S.A.. 
")nc "jf the key st<^nes and the major g^als o" bith the 
Coransinlst parties foreign policy had alvays been t>^ e opposition 
of U*5:« imperialism wt^ ich It aimed at vorld domination and 
mennced v^ld peace* ^.'^•ry manifesto^ %V9ty resolution, every 
pamphlet and off ic ia l paper of both the parties bitterly erl* 
tlolsed t>^ e U.S.A. for Its so called Imperialist policies. 
They b&lieved that the cbJef enemy of peace and pemsnent 
advocate of an ag^^resilve var i s nov the United ''tates of 
America % l^ch ^as rallied round herself a l l aggressive eoun. 
tr ies . Therefore^every act of friendship between the U.'^.f. 
and India %«uld prove dangerous. Xhey vers most unreasonable 
in their approach but they vera extr«Bely persistent in their 
confabulations. 
Both the x'arties, the CPI and CPI(M;, considered the 
consistent and continuous flg^t against t>^ e U.S. inpreialisfn 
as t^e fulfilment of their foreign policy objectivms. ^ny 
act of friendship between India and the U.r.f. vas regarded 
by the Comaninlsts as t^e complete reversal of the policy of 
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non«aIlgnBi«nt| and pe3e« and a st«p tovArdt aisery and 
3 
opprasslon* In this also th«r/rlevs v«r« unrealistic and 
•xaggttrat«d* 
a« i t econoaio or a l i i t a r / oo^a by tha U.S.A., tha CPI 
oonsidarad i t as fraught vith dangarous oonsaqufciioas. It 
thraatam^et' Indians tairitorial intagrity &nd sovaralgnty and 
found India getting involved in certain types of nillt^ry 
agreeaente inoonslstent vlth the polioy of non-allgnnent. It 
al%Ays pointed out that increasing penetration of American 
iaperialisa in my/^ry sphere of our national l i f e veuld not 
only weaken taut also uademined the very basle policies of 
non-alifMent and ind^endent eeonoaic develepnent. It raised 
the danger of eventual reversal of Indies peaceful stance In 
i t s policies. It in fact constituted a danger to the very 
nature o** our independence. T»~ia phobia was vlth'jut any 
Justification and perslsis even to tMs day. 
The CPI (M) laeiieved that an independent foreign policy 
c^n b^ pursued only in aliisince vlth the camp of p,.acfe anU 
soclalisn and the freedoouloving anti^inpei ia l iat countries 
of the orld in opposition to tim < aggressive plans of U.*".'. 
and other iaperi^lists. ruoh a policy, th« party thought 
could bb pursued only in f l m opposition to a nuclear war, to 
d* lii»«ftluti^n« an^ th« ni»elglf^n« .^f thfa ??atl«na1 C^unt^ll ^f 
»>^ * f-^ It ^«v 0«lhi, CPI, ?ub., June 7.17, t9d4, p.l£. 
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aXl iap^riallstt vfitrs^  to ooloniailm and neowcolonlaxiui and 
In f l m support to pcae*, national liberation ttrugglss snd 
4 
of peaceful oo-^xlsteruBe* It considered that pexnanent a U l . 
anee vltV conaRmitt bloc v U l not affect -adversely Tndla*s 
policy of non.allgnn^t but even a temporary agreeaent wlt^ 
t^e '^»'^m\ and i t s a l l i es vould mean dependwiec and slavery* 
T^ «e CPI dJd not cal l ifehru's policy as th« policy of 
pe.>ce* Criticising N«hrtt*s foreign policy, /Joy Ghosh ones 
^ i d that while Nehru C3nd«Biied the designs of ^ e U*l?* 
imperialisa» he did not reject the aid vhose aiiioved ala vss 
the furtherance! of the£e vty desit^ns. He denounced the rr'io 
but rt^fused to break vith IKrStish laperiallsa vhlch vas one 
6 
of i t s main sponsors* It was essentially a policy of aanoeuv. 
ring between the main enesy of p^aeey the United rtates of 
Amtrica and i t s Junior partner Britain, on the* one hand and 
t^e ptace loving countries on the other. Tie Party criticised 
the Govemnents Wa><tant support to iaperlaiisfli* in the esse 
of Kijrea* It accused India of taking t^ e^ U.P, side In the 
Korean cris is ^ e n she deelared ^orth Korea as a^^^ressor* It 
believed that the Indian policy on Korea vat in general 
agreeiaent vltv that of the U.f.A,, since she supported the 
4. r«e, LliCtiton i1aalfB»fal of thi Wt*lifsi>i«lit^«?^ev Delhi, 
CPI (M;, Pub*, 19^7* 
b* Ghosh,/joy, iriiamntiti ^mwi Xn ^antflt Wtfini (^ ew Delhi), 
p*74« 
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Bost crucisil pzt>nouno6m«nt vhleh th« UN isads in regard to 
Kor«&» It ffcit hit It served t^e Interest of "oerlcan imperii-
i lea and saounted to becone ita stooge* 
It alva/e advocated a policy of hosti l i ty tov^ards the 
uc;, 'Mie recognising tht laportanoe of foreign aid for 
India's economic dofvelopnent, the Purty vas highly crit ical 
of t^B Covernoent's ex^^esslve reliance on aid from the U,5^ , 
and 3rltaln, Tt polnttr?. out t^ ?»t by receiving econoalc aid 
vlf^ 'strings* India vt.3 loosing economic freedom and indepen. 
Aenee -)<" action in firelgn affairs. The '^9&^ progranse of the 
party stated that the policies of the Government of India vere 
leading to penetration of 'merlcan imperialists into our 
economy n^d t> reatensd us vlth added sls^very ta American 
7 
capital* i^^htimomcrthif the C?I leader, held Usat India would 
8 
not be able to "escape from ^ e tesrt»oles of •^ merloan octopus," 
If i t looked to the U*r« for *ald** thtt uovernment policy of 
9 
"favnlng upon the U*r« Imperialists and seeking their aid,** 
he held, vould lead to the entire country being honey.eoabed 
<»• re»y Mukerjee, Hlren, L^ k ratAa T>»h&t>g, Vol*ITT, rre.34. 
reptemoer 17, 1963, colimi. 408&* 
7. ,X ,^i t'jfnrrfliaffifc a f tht Ci*I> Adopted i^ T?ie '11 India ?srty 
Conference, October '•96^, (Bombay), p«8* 
£• ItSLi.£ftf February 7, 1964, p.9. 
9. Ibid. 
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vit.*" t^•lr spits and ag«nts of th« C,I . ' , 1% called up^n t>^ « 
Indian ]i«p people to demand t^ tat tVe •/'Id ^grsMients* vlth 
the U,r« tie scrapped forthvlth and the country be cleared of 
the "nest of spies In the gsrb of technical "aid" personnel*** 
In 1968 tbt. decision of the U»r* to giire financial aid 
to India vae criticised by the CPI as an -^tttfspt to create a 
favourable ataosphere for Its aaehlnatlons and to put a brake 
11 
on India's forel^^ policy* 
llhe party's strong dislike of aid froa capitalist 
countries Si^eciaii/ fron the U.r.' , ar« IPeflected in a l l i ts 
pronounc«aent8 on economic aid* Ihe party fe l t that ^re^tcr 
t^ e^ quantUB of U*r, aid to I'^dla, the greater vould be its 
Influence on t^ fc polit ical l i f e of Indl?i, ''inc© the U,'".^, 
ves opposed to connunlsm, the CPI believed th^t graving Ameri-
can Influence 'ould jeopardlm the Interests of oooiimuiists* 
.According to It the ma'n al« of U.r, aid to India v-ss to subserve 
the interests of tht \i»t^ nonopolists and to subvert the 
foreign policy of 7H>n»allt^ raaent smi peace and to give i t 'i 
pro*imperialist orientation, *^hiie v&ming about the dangerous 
consequences of the U.r* aid| thd CPI in i ts resolution said 
7C* iMii*» p. '^ O* 
i<>* RMoXuaQna Qf thf.CoMttnJgt f i f ty .af lMl»9AAo\i\^3t the 
ixtra-ordlnary Party Congress* ^Mrltsar 19689PP* ^^« 
- 180 -
that, *• India's national Bdv^ncm cannot be secure and tznooth 
if It is subject .0 th« ups and dovns of ^a«rlcan economy 
which, vlth i t s preponderance of production for >'^ r, uader&>es 
12 
violent flu«tuitions*** 
I very 'American step tov^rds Indian aid l^es coruildered by 
t^ .e coBBiiunlsts contrary to Indian n«itlinsl interests ^itlh 
vould enable lEBperialists to exercise n zutts retarding snd 
otherwise harmful influence on the (Uvelopaent of t^e national 
econooy* It believed ttiat the increasing penetration of the 
US Governaent In the econonio affairs of India vn;" step by 
step tlrireatenin^ India's econcMsy* It f e l t that suriender to 
such i^ressure only «Bboldenc*d the UV imperi'lists to penetrate 
t4iiM deeper and oorxt>d6 the economic l i f e of our country* The 
halucinsktlon of ur iomlnation of India's political and economic 
l i f e \ms so great thr t It sav strings hanging ^llround ready 
to entangle India like the tentacles of Ictopus. 
The collaboration agreement between India and 'merioan 
monopolists, fert i l iser deals, PL4B, dependence of the Fourth 
Plan on U,5?,/*, Indo^merican Tducatlonal Foundation, /'merlei^ n 
C.I*'', penetration and operation, Ft.460 counterpart funds 
"^ S* Tbid . , p« 8* 
12« "U.f* Imperialism . the Main Enemy of the Indian People**, 
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v«r« some of the designs of Increaslnii penetration of 
14 
'merican laperlallsm In India, the CPI held* /gain the 
dev^iluation of Indian rupee was charactarlted lay both the 
parties us going completely of Indian econoojr into the hands 
of the U,C«A, The Kaxxlst leadership found nothing to def^ end 
16 
as Indls had eoae Into the 'aerlcan caap* 
The Qovemoient's aecoptance of military aid from the 
U.S.A. at the time of China's aggression was bitterly condemned 
by the Communists of India, The CPI found in thB proposed 
military aid a plan for ovmr throwing the Government. It con-
denned i t as an infringement on Indians sovereignty. The 
CPI (M) argued that Government's acceptance of U.r.aiiitary aid 
In the name of national def«rtoe made the country more dependent 
on the U.r.A, According to i t the Qovemments acceptance of 
military aid from U.!:.A. and Britain, i t s continuously vooing 
them for m&sslvc military aid, t^ m VO/ deal episode, the joint 
air exercises vlth the U.S. and Britain Air Forces, the Govern. 
ment*s vlrtunl acquiescence in the extension of tht operations 
of the U.?. Seventh Fliet to the Indian Ocean, the i^overraient's 
silence on the li.S.Covemtaent's threat to extent Its %rar in 
i ts 
South Vietnam into the Ti^ mocratlc Eepublic of Viet nam,/lukeMaim 
14. Party T.ifa (CPI), Vol. II, No.7, July 19t>6, p.B. 
16. "India's Grovlng Economic Dependence on Imperialism", 
.^ ftr^ uift'a THaifinrnfiYi February 2O9 1966* 
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r«aotlon tt the U«B, navsl and air b9Bbiirdi«nt In th« Tonkin 
Gulf area, and Its virtual aequleseence In the 'nglo^^aerlean 
effort at the eetabllthnent of ^ nl l l tsry base In Tndlan 
oce'^ tn had al l led to n position vhere the policy of non-
16 
allgnnent had been seriously Jeopardised* They repeatedly 
varncd s^^ainst drifting sway froa non»allgnaent snd said that 
It vss nost hamful for our Indepeiulence, th« independence of 
other Gountrlss and thtt struggle of sociallsa* riey f e l t 
that It was the highest responsibility of a l l ;M3r3tl8t. 
Leninists, of a l l antUiaperlsllsts to rouse th€ people bgr 
exposing in ful l glAre al l the conspiracies of the U,S«iaperia. 
lism and a l l t^e opportunist evil deeds ^f the Qovemsent. 
The U.r« Billtary pact vlth ^Pakistan and the supply 
of arms to r'aklstan always ceased concern to the Coniauiist 
Parties of India* They bittc^rly criticised the U*s* aid to 
Pakistan gnd U.S.,Pak alliance in C!AT% 'coording toCPl the 
Baghdad Pact and T'TO were a threat to India and to a l l free 
nations o^ / s i s* The dumping of artas by ^swrlea in Pakistan 
vas mesnt to Intensify Indo*Pak tension causing diversion of 
resources froa natioa building to defence. The p^rty whole* 
heartedly supported the rejection of BUtO by the Govemnent 
of India* Hlren MiA:erJee, speaking In the i'arlinaent, teraed 
16* "^y Cooaiunists (Marxists)? Election Manifesto", in 
£hathal, Baadas, G* ed« Palitleal / . i f ma tin.« in lnA±&^ 
Bos bay, PoiMlar Prakashan, 19<&7, p*4£8* 
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tvJtO at tt*i mod«m version of a proteotoratt* According to 
hl% Paki£taruAm«rican oli itary p^nct, .^ feAfo and th« Ba^d&d 
D^cts v?ertt **llnk8 in a eh&la of conspiratorial act* agelnst 
t^e pt'ice and fre«doB of Agia.** 
It Is a f^ct that only U.?i.«j»ak: psct gave t>!e best 
Oijportunlty to Communist r»aity to oondsnn U.s,?, bitterly* 
It re'cted IsraedJ^'tely to org'Jnlze meetings to protest sv^filnst 
tl© U.f^ —?ak Fsct. It consid^r-d this pact na the contlnurw 
tlon of tve policy 3f American vsr tnongers to surround the 
fovlet Union, China ami tht ^eople5: diOJocr^cies in l^ urope 
with war fcast £ for launching a third 'Si . iH-ie CJ^ I Central 
Coomlttcfc resolution passed an ieceaber V, 19o3, said, "Mavlag 
been thvarded in their gam* of seising f^ ashmir throuj^ their 
military and diplooatlo aaehinatlonSf the "aerlcan var-aongers 
are nov aiaking tht: state of H^kiftan as their Jtuping ground* 
% X surrounding India ^ilso with var bases, they seek to bring 
18 
pressure on India to uneonditionally joining thels oanp*** 
T^ e Cpl founded this U.T—Pek pact i s direct violstlAn 
r>f Indian territorl-a Integ^lV and «ost dangerous preparation 
Mulcerje« •- r • 
to nuclear vsr,Hire»yconde«ned the U,r«.?ak Pact as an squ«illd 
^7. Tifltr rtm l^fcatilt V o l . n i , Part n Hsreh.April 1966, 
!&• ISflAiJUtt OeccBbor 13,1063, pp* I .8. 
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eontplraey to co&pllcatb India>P3kistan r«l3tl4nthlp ^n6 to 
19 
acx-erbate Indo-f'aki^tan disputes* llhe t'atty streassd th« 
ncittd for h ^v^rfuX uad United c&apalgn sg^inst the U,&* 
biackaail* Stxong indignation^ ugainst th« contcmplatod 
U.S.«.?ak .-'act and firm rosolvo to tigorously figjit badr any 
attempts My U.S. Inptriai lrta to infiringe Indian freadoa and 
sovareignty, vere voiced W tha CPI. / large ninber of aeetlngs 
were held in response to the ca l l of the ^IL-India Peace 
Council to observe Febru:>ry 14, 19&4 ae *Anti .U,<^,.?ak Pact 
The Ci*J slvays considered ii .r. iaiperiallsoi as a source 
of siodem war. It deaounoed t^e U.r^ , aid to Paki«tsn as sn 
Unfriendly s e t of tre u ,r , /« towards India. H tried to rouse 
««rld public opinion Skgainst U.S. a i l i t ary build up in ?aklst«>n. 
In a speech in th« Parliament on 'pr i l 2S, 1965, Tiren ^^erjee 
said, "It should b« reaessbered that United s tates remains 
Pakistan's principal international patron. Even in the natter 
of supplying India rather out of date aircraft»%^leh Pakistan 
already ha5 got in plenty* the United states Is firmly opposed 
because that might offend the suscept ib i l i t i e s of the O.F. 
£0 
friend, Pafclstan." f^ e vsmed against the danger of consistently 
19. .flrilew^ntarv P«fa»t:««j Vol.10, Part I I , l>eceabcr 1963, 
col . £996. 
20. t/^ V FatJ-iii atib&fr^ >, Vol.>:IU,!fo.47,'pril 28,19^6,col. 11606. 
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axning Pakistan vlth Bod^ra wtapons, vhile refusing to supply 
£1 
thera to India* 
During Indo.Pak var of 1 9 ^ the CPI noted that U.r. ' . 
had a dlract xole In inciting Pakistan Into an aggressive var 
against India to divert the vorld attention from the U*r* 
aggression in Vietnam. It deiK n^ded strong neaaures a ^ l m t 
i t . It pointed out that the grovlng tension between the tvo 
countries vas 3 part of planned ^ne of laperlalist pressure 
on IndiSf aimed at the destruction of non-alignment at secur-
ing India's silence for U.$>. aggression in Vietnam arul else-
22 
% h^ere. It ar^Ued ^ a t the U.S.-Padc military pact of 1964 
lies the funnel t^ rougjh ^ i c h the Pakistani armed forces vers 
equipped vlth modern weapons out of a l l proportions to any 
reasons ble "difence** equipment. The rrA70 and the Qa i^dad Pact 
£3 
were also major parts of imperialist oonsplx^cy in this i^glon. 
Th«> t'art/ repeatedly warned the Ooverfnent that the U.S.lmperia. 
llstSy far fiom wonting peace and friendship between India 
and Pakistani were only interested In roping India and Pakis-
tan in a front against China to suit Its strategy of containing 
24 
"CoQSittnlsm in Asia." It f e l t that if the Government of India 
gt - Ibid-
2£. "rditorial*', iittcJlttf V r U 18, 1066, p.8. 
23. Tee, JklL^iEft Ftibruaxy 27, 19^ «>. 
24. "lUlitorial**, Ptftnliff DMnBrftfi/t ^•t>ru3xy 27, 1966. 
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vas not oorrodtd vlth pro«liap«rl8iittt holding k«y positions 
at different levelSf i t vould t e l l the U.S. authorities once 
for a l l that India vould i^ longer tolerati the U.S.OovemieaVi 
pressure and blacduiall. 
3oth the CouBunist parties of India bitterly criticised 
India for her shasefuli veak and TaoUlating stand In regard 
to Vletnan Issue. They stated that instead of condesming 
this aggression and deaandlng the vithdraitttl of the U.!;«axaed 
forces froB South Vletnaa, the QovernBent of India appeared to 
be virtually condoning this aggression by adopting a hesitant 
and apologetic attitude* 
In a •enorandUB to Priae Minister Shastrif the CPI urged 
upon hin to take the init iat ive boldly to assert that the 
26 
U.S. forces must quit South Vietnam. It also organised 
a deoionstration In front of the U.S.eabassy on February 
9, to protest against the ''aaerlcan attacks on North Vletnan 
In New Delhi. %upesh Gupta warned Anerlcans that their gun 
boat diplomacy was heading towards disastrous oonseouenoes 
in South East Agla. He said that Vletnaaese people were not 
alone in their fight against foreign troops on their so i l and 
S6. SMMj^f AprU 18, 10i^ 6. 
Sd* Ibld.y Febzuary 14, 1966, p.d. 
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U« struggi* agaimt tb«» pupp«t rfigloes propeJL up ti^ th« 
U«S« -irottd Bi^t« le expressed solidarity vlth t^ e^ ^ig^tlng 
people of Vietnam and assured thetn of the support of Indian 
27 
people* 
The National Council of the Conounlst Fart/ of India 
condemned th€ dishonourable retreat of the Indian Ooverment 
fron Its former position of disapproval of U.S* bombing In 
28 
Tf^ rth Vietn'-iffl to one of "total sllenoe*' nov* The resolution 
said If the Government of India "tempted by the eoonoalo aid 
£9 
of the y,S«** agreed to the /mertcan demand th&t India should 
contribute "Its pressure In some rvforms alongside U,S* In 
fouth yietnam *^* It would spell disaster for India*s Independence 
and dfloocracy* 
The Ci'l Mtk» convinced that the Government v^s making 
concessions to the Imperialists, %ihlch surely undermined aon. 
alignment. It urged the Oovemment to take a bol<? Initiative 
together vlth other non«allgn»d povers to bring the force of 
t^ -^ e vorld opinion to stop the conblng of Vletngun, er»ure 
complete wlthdra^'al of a l l U.P* troops fron ^outh Vietnam ^n6 
27* mid*! February 21, 1965, p*13« 
28* hiifilttttoni AtfoBl^ tf fay tiht ffaUanaJL CounfiU of tht Cf I 
a t HYdarahad ^n Jttin Q»1&, 1Q&6-
29. ikld. 
30. lAidi ^e« aiso^thf. fUrmuitan Yinaii ^w i£,i9t>o. 
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r«eo^nltloa of the South Vl6tnMi»«« p«o^l«« 
The Ci'I (M) also eaJLled i t s m«aib«rt to unleash a pover. 
ful aovament against US laperlalltm and gava prlaa laportance 
to the oulldln^ of a powerful sol idarity odmpalgn In support 
of t>>e hsrolc Vietnamese l lb#ration forces and In defence of 
Toclal lst larth Vletnaa. It oondwuied the stand taken knsr the 
Indian Uovemsent on this Issue. E.M.s.Naaboodrlpad severely 
cr i t i c i s ed India's declaration that the U.r,*. vanted peace 
In Vlt^tnast, :ie &uiil that ^ e n the Soviet unlor, the Soc ia l i s t 
countries, and the nevly l iberated countries of ^fro.Asla 
did not support the American role In Vietnam, the GovermMt 
of India label led the U.r .A, 's peace efforts as sincere and 
32 
branded China "s the disturber of peace* The CPI (M) f e l t 
t^at India's st'ind on Vietnam ^ms s manifestation of reaotlonar 
changes in India's foreign policy under pressure from the 
b«r.A. on vhon, the Congress had l^ ecome dependent for the 
so^alled '^ ald**. £he Party condemned this InUlsn stand and 
denanded the Govemnent « to change Its po l i c i e s on Vietnam 
and to declare Its vhoXe hearted support to the freedom f l i t t e r 
of Vietnam and stand unequivocally on the side of freedoa 
33 
against imperlellst aggression* 
31* ibiH. 
32* Namboodrlpad, E*H*S« "Settle ^Ith China", 
if February t>, i9&t»* 
33* lbld,y June 6, I9b«»« 
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Th« CoBummlst Parties atahorance of th« U«r«A, is 
pathologioal and is baaed on a vorld vld« poliey alned at 
cr0!iitlng and strengthening Tovlet sphere of Influence to 
prepare It for a struggle against the U,??,.', They onslder 
It t^elr utoost duty to prove that the U,S.A« was preparing 
for %/ar vlth feverish )liaste In order to dravn In blood the 
8trUt> l^« of national lioeratlon of the Asian people* To thMi 
the chief force of ag^r^ssion Is nothing but U»€» laperlQlisa* 
No douot this typt» of st&nd with regard to U.i^ */* Is prejudlcid, 
eootional snd Intoieratit, Their demand that India should 
iK>t hsve friendly relations with the U,r«\ is contrary to 
and Inconsistent vltSi our nat l^a l Interest, In the existing 
international situation and in th«: Interest of the country's 
vei l beingi It v ! l l be benlfltlal for us to have friendly 
relation with a |3oMtrfaI country like the U«r,f., There has, 
hawever, been a ;^.iift In Indias attitude to-apds the U.r.A, 
since t^e liberation noveaent in Bangla Oesh, distrust o^ 
each other's intentions has led to some bad alood betwe^ m these 
tvo tr^dition^iilly friendly countries. *flxon a(iilnlstration 
took a hsrd-llnti and %8. Indira Gandhi took a bold and 
honour'ible position, ^^ er firmness in dealing witt^  the whole 
situation ^^s commendable and silenced the opposition both 
from the right and the l e f t . But the tirade of the CPI (M) 
e9ntlnu€is unabated. '*u<^  an opposition is characterised as 
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for thfa s^kt of opposition* I^« vituperations of the Coaioa. 
nista of both the bnnds is unr«alistiC| uniBSglnatiirci and 
unfruitful* 
iifttA*^ REi.AXM§mn m u.fyir.fi.t 
lo have friendly relations with U.S.r.R* has alimys 
iMi^ of bTest value to India. The vazn regar<3 t^at tl^ « p«>ple 
of India and the U*r,f?,R, hsve for each other i s one of the 
eompenents of vorld p«race* Tt has al>>^ y8 been a useful support 
to le'^n on Vhe vestem povers particularly vihen pressure ease 
ChiWX 
fro«/or Pakistan* This friendship Is based on the prlnciplt; 
of equality bcrtween Independent st'ites and co«>operatlve co-
existence* In fr«ct the U.?:,'',R. irss the f irst great pover 
t^at &cceptQ;l|the sincerity of non«.alignBent &nd agreed to give 
us such econoalc aid and defence ^elp as i t could without 
trying to Interfere In any vay in India's Internal affairs. 
This help has strengthened our capability to withstand the 
continuous pressure exerted by Western Povers to change our 
economic and foieign policy objectives* 
The continuous friendship between Russia and India is 
a salient feature of the Khxushehev period* During Stalin's 
days t^t foviets did not regard India as a genuinely inde» 
pendent country* India's continued association vith the Brltlsli 
Cofluaonvealth of ^Tationsy the pressure of British and "fflerican 
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flrott In India, th€ lsrg«» 8eal« arr«st of eowraaltts by tb« 
Kr«hni Qov«mm«nt after the outbreak of th«ir r«volt in 
tel6gan8.ftll this Xmd StBlln and hia foUU>%«ra to traat India 
as a colony of i^nglo^Aaoriean Moliopoljr capital, rulad by tha 
national bourgaoiala* In the whola Stalin parlodf India's 
non.alignii«nt poatures want unnotiead in Bassla* 
Tha nore fiaxibie sipproaeh icQr rtalln*t aaceaaaora and 
tht^  setting up of aNfo, rvkto and PakiaUnia ineluilon in 
thei£, lad to changes in Sovlat p o l i ^ tovtrda India* Dsalring 
to ve'ken waatarn influanea in India, tha U«S«S,R« in tha 
• • t Mid 60*a hailed India*a non^alignaent aa ^ poaltive force 
in M»rld affaire, nade India the leading rece^iant of ita 
foreign aid progranaei and gave unreaerved aupport to India's 
poaltlon on the issues of Kashalr and *3oa« 
vithln two years «fter Stalin's death» the U,*?.if,R. 
Bade a series of friendly gesturcf deaigned both to gain 
India'a confidence and to deainlsh western influence in India, 
India's recognition of China and her efforts to get her seated 
In the UN, her heroic role in preventing the spread of hoati. 
l l t i e s in th*i Korean war and aohlevlng a txuce, led to a 
sl ight iaprovenent in the heretofore alnoat non.ellstent 
relationship between India and the U.S.S.R* 
3 4 . ^ la lkfJ . ! , , lni<ia,Chlnii A Baagln T^eh, 19sv Delhi , CChand 
<k Co«Hvt« Ltd . , 1972, p . 13 . 
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From 1964 onvard Indo-Poviet relations grew in a l l 
t^• major ar«ag of f ore l ^ policy op«rfttions^ S^h at •oononio^ 
polltieal and cultural flelde* In r«pta«b«r i964 U«^ »''*Ii* sx 
off icial ly offered to built a steel mill at Ihl ls l in tbc 
Indian state of Madhya Pradesh* A formal agreement on Vhe 
Bhilai plant was signed betvecn India and fkiviet Union in 
35 
February 1966. 
The main key of improving Indo-Soviet relations was the 
exchange of a host of delegations.eultural, industrial, trade, 
agricultural and parliamentary, foUoved by the v i s i t s of ?fehru 
to the Poviet Union and Oulganln-Khrushohev to India, Nehru 
paid a memorable v i s i t to Kussia In I95ti* Thoi joint eoimttniqtte 
at the Hind of trie v i s i t reaffirmed the faith of both the 
coUAtJi-itoS in th« fiv«> principles of peaceful co«>«xistenoe* 
Khurushehev and Bulganin paid a return v i s i t to Indin 
in ??ovember 19b5« They gave their unqualified support to 
India on Kashmir and Ooa* In his address to ti^c ParliamcHit^  
Khrushchev paid high tributes to .Tg^sharlsl ?^ ehru snd the '^Ive 
principles. From then on several v i s i t s vere paid by H^ 
35 • rteln,'rthur, In<lla and thg SOYUt tfnlont Chicago, University of Chicago ?v%i^6f 19^9, p*4£« 
36. ^r'-Un ^rlln" nf WU • Titil nf nTimnmri 7Q*?-^ t 
New Delhi, CW)vemment of India Pres8,pi4^ 
37. Tee for details, MiX&*t PP* 490-94. 
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th« leaders of toth th« oountrl«s»th«gr s^ Xl conf limed ^ c i r 
vlsh and desire to continue tShu poXiey of frltfi^hip and 
operation i)«tween the tvo-oountriea« In international affairs 
both the eountrites found vide areas of agrecaent. Soth strive 
for peaeey helping nev emerging nations to establish their 
freed^B. On th^ issues relating to Kashmiry Ghinsy Koreai Ooa, 
Vest Asia, Xndo«>Chin8 and dlsazneaent^ India and .^ y>viet Onion 
have had Identical views* 
The Soviet Union alva/s upheld the Kashair accession to 
Indian Union and declared that the state was an integral psrt 
OB 
of India* Khrushchev and Bulganin declared their support for 
India on Kashmir v^en they vere on their historic tour of 
India in 19&6* He Urn declared* "the question of Kashmir as 
one of the states of India has been decided by the people's 
39 
of Kashmir*'* Cince then Soviet support to India on Kashmir 
cane so long as Khxiishchev vas in pover* The Soviet Union 
stood solidly by India when Pakistan again raised the Issue in 
1969t 19bS and 1964* All the time the r«vl«t Qovernment having 
ful l sympathy towards India's iK>sltlon exercised Its vetoes In 
the UK Tecurity Council on the ground that the question of 
Kashmir had been solved once forall* 
38* Neeikanty K*, jr^artfttfi ip Pijififl I ^ Study In Intfa ^nvii^ 
iiMlafcl/>na, Bonbay, Vikas Publications, 1972* p*13* 
39* riBW fif IndiSf I^ ecember 12, 196t* 
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Mim th« Indo^Chlna relat ions had baooaa ttfisa In ^969 
Longju Inoidant, i t vat vldaly aeoapted that Moscow v l l l 
support Faking, Hoverary i t vas to the surprise of the 
40 
obsarvara, the Poviat Union adopted a l ine of neutrality* 
I t vas the f i r s t tlsie that any aworunist nation had ever taktfi 
a neutral stance in a dispute between another conmunlat nation 
and a non-coanunist state* Hovevari when China attacked India 
in October 20» 19&&9 Moscow made a volte face and sided with 
the Chinese keeping a l l the time a show of neutrality* In an 
edi tor ia l on October 26, 1962, Pyaii<te, denounced the NeMahon 
Line as a l ine imposed by the Imperialists and approved ^ e 
41 
Chinese cease-fire proposals* Many in India were deeply 
disappointed, but the Indian Govemoent, however, di(1 not 
give up the hope that Moscow night change i t s a t t i tude once 
the Cuban c r i s i s , with which Russia was seriously Involved, 
had subsided* 
With the passing of the Cuban c r i s i s , Khrushchev, In an 
important address to the ^uprene Soviet on Deceaber 12, 1962, 
resilnded the Chinese tliat the Himalayan conflict benefited only 
the i ape r l a l l s t s and s t rength^ed the "reactionary** elements 
and weakened the **progressive** forces within India, and could 
40* £jaaMt (Moscow), September 19, 1969* 
41* Ibid. , October 26, 1962* 
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hav« an sdv«rs« «ff«et on India's policy of noOmHligmmtm 
Uth thfe furth«r aggravation of Slno«.tovlat dlsputa, 
Moseov «v«n r«nouno«d i t s posturs of nsutrallty^ and began 
opsnly to crlt ie lxs CMna for h«r attitude tovards India* In 
a ssrlss of articles in August Ifl&S PganAa. denouncsd Chinese 
3ggressi<?n against India, and lashed out at Peking's failure 
4S 
to seek a settlwaent of the f i^np^Indian border dispute* ^t 
the saae ti«e the Soviet Union stepped up aid to India and 
concluded a nuaber of agreeaents. Sty May 19&4 the total 
fflUltary aid eaantlng fron >bscoi«»iao a i l l l oa dollars «-• vas 
greater than th& aid that v&s ^Iven by t^e US during the saoie 
44 
period* llhe y*S*&*ii* also accorded in January \9>b to const. 
truct tl^ e 3okharo Steel ?lant* It also sent a l l types of aias 
equipaent vhioh oould be used on any part of tht Indian frontier. 
In fact froffl ^959 Dnv?ard China posed nn Incr^slng eon-
eern to both India and U.r.r.R, By then the Indo-*'ovlet rela-
tionship hr«d passed throu^ a stage of cautious eo-ex5sten«e 
to a phase \^ich n i ^ t be temed 3s peaceful co*optration* The 
later period m&rked some tensions) ^ i c h had developed since 
4S* fTtein* Arthur. **India's Relation with the U*f?*!;.R* 1963. 
^"» Vbi^ (Quarterly), Vol.Vin,!fo*2, runmer 'V964,p*366* 
4d* Pra»Art-j *u^8t 10^ 13^19&3* 
44. !fg¥ ^nrt Tlaifii (Nev ifortt), May 13, 1»>7. 
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19^6, ttcmed from l\m Hutsian t«nd«ney of n«utr>llty on 
certain Indo^Fftklstanl dispute*, particularly of Ksshalr 
and Kavui of Kuteh disputes* 
Althoue!h despite the fact thatjU.S.C.IU in 1966 became 
the leading supporter of Bilitary veaponry to India, the f^ovlet 
decision In iaid.i9&e to give Pakistan a l inited Rinount of 
military aid bad became f great concern to India, 3Ut t^e 
differences on some is.ues did not undermine seriously vith 
t^e broad accord t^at developed during Ifehru-Khrushehev era* 
Itie tlteS $f friendship further enlarged by the signing 
of Iido-''oviet Treaty in 1971# The treaty was the culmination 
of developfflunt over ':• numoer of years which sav tie Government 
of India, Q p'rt from increasing trsde ynd economic relations. 
It was si{;ned in the b^ckgrouj d of developing U,r, pressure 
ag'iinst India in relation to tht; freedom struggle of Bangle 
Desh, Thfc treaty formalised and governed Indo-Soviet relations 
on 8 place which was essentially pol it ical and i t concerned 
its«>lf directly vith tim qu«»stion of Indians security. It 
vs the fix St time vhmn India had undertaktfi to consult a 
great po^ 'er on >er security matters &nd ^&ve up her option 
to take sides In We event of "oviet Interests being t^reatened• 
It gave a new direction to the graving relation of •'rlendship 
and co-operation betve«n t^ «d two countries in various fields 
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and bat«d on matuaiity of int£r«tts In the taf« guarding of 
peae« in Asia and In the vorld* 
THE ATTI'^CE r>F THR CPl ASH TRT. CPllVl'i 
mMvs mi^i^r< RF.y TMJ: WITH isr, urs.riS. i 
The Conaunist Party of India, ovlng Its loyalty to 
Russia, had always advocated to strengthen a l l forms of co-
operation with the Soviet Union* Ihe policy of friendship 
between the two countries in the eyes of Conamnlets advanced 
the cause of world freedom snd socisl iss* They considered i t 
as the only foreign policy which corresponds to our national 
interests, the interest of democracy, econoaic development 
and socislisffl in India* 
Because of historical nnC other reasons the Government ^  
was, during the early years of Independence, closer to the 
v^estern bloc th^n to the Soviet bloc* Ihls made the Indian 
Communists sceptical about the Indian foreign policy* The 
main plank of the Communist Party's criticism of the Governmental 
forei0i policy from T948 to 1964 was that the Oovemment ndopted 
a foreign policy which l3or9 the imprint of British pressures and 
inclined tovards the ^'estom imperialism* As the Tndo«'V)viet 
relations strengthened during 1964«6S, the comments made by 
45* Cardesai, <:*G*, todla'a Path to f.ftCtalliB» e^w I^lhi, 
C?I, Pub*, "1966, p.64. 
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the CPI on India's foreign policy w«r« dlff©r«nt tton Iti 
previous stand* Tie itussian regards of India's polley of non. 
allgnnent as a potent factor iiorking aj^^lnst ths forces of 
vaT and colonialism, hsr glorie^s attribatss to India and to 
'^ ehru on the occasion of 6th anniversary of the Repuialic of 
India, greatly influenced the CPl»s attitude tovards India's 
foreign policy. This wss, in fact, the CPl's f i m loyalty 
to the declared policies of t^e U.f:.'".K« vhlc*^ led It to ado t 
this ch'jLnge attitude. 
^hen '^ ehru was touring Bassia, the Central oomlttee 
of the CPI dealt at length vlth the prevailing political 
situation and adopt&d a 32 page polit ical resolution, vhlch 
vas a coaproffllse between different contesting factlorei. It 
supported '^ «hzu*s foreign policy and declared In clear tf^ms 
that Indian had been playing a ^reat role in thfc world-wide 
battle for thb prtsezvation of p«^ aoe. This xol<: enhanced 
India's international prestige and evoked in every patriotic 
Indian a sense of national pride. 
The CPI maintained tiiat the only way to inprove the 
Jhdlan economy was to have closer economic relations with the 
Soviet Union and social ist countries. It f e l t that the rovlt^t 
aid was more advantageous to the Indian economy than the aid 
4&. Mndmiller.Marshall, **Indlan coaaunism and the '^ ew j!^v5et 
Line", Pacjflfl Affftlfy Vol.7^I>, ^o.4, Oecember "^ Sd^ , 
p. 336. 
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frrm ^'•st«m countries, ^'ccording to It t^€ econonic xa sl<9 
off«r«d bar tb« U.r,r,R, «as totally dlff«r«nt fron that doled 
out by th« l«p«riali8t pov&rs* No political strings vere 
littachcd to this aid, and th« technicians vsre nslthsr **-ilt« 
elephants nor *sple8** The jt^srt/*s strong dislike of sld 
froa 'capitalist countries* and Its ^gtmess to bring Vt^t, 
r^vlet Union and other social ist <^untrie8 closer to Indls 
5n the field of economic ooll&boratlon are reflected in a l l 
Its pronourcetBents on i^onoaile aid* 
The UPl (K) vas of the irlev that In a slUtatlon vherc 
the nevly liberated developing countries vere effected by 
dlfflculticiS ^nd recession, the iaperiaiist countries Instead 
of helping theffl tried to convert then Into their neo*colonl9l 
appendages, and aggravate the aisriss of the people* On the 
contrary, the countries of social ist eanp led by the Hovlet 
Union, In CPl*s vlev, rendered disinterested aid to the 
developing countries* These countries v«re genuinely infterestei 
in India's econonic progress and had no mind to Interfere in 
India's internal affairs* ^upesh Gupta explaining this said, 
''the continuous ^rovth of India's ecoacwle oo«op«x«tlon with 
the Soviet Union and othcx social ist ctKintries vould enable 
us to keep th«; aedleaoas U*?* Senators in their propmt places. 
47. ITfiV /.tfi> February S8, 1964, p*8. 
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pr«v«nt Aid India Club tr^nsfomlng Itsalf into a bl&dtmaix 
club and frustrate any sitt^npt to v«'^ k«n and und«mine our 
48 
country's indep«nd«at««" the '^arty alvays declarsd that the 
only vfay to inprovc th€ Indisin economy vas to hnvs oL>s>«r 
eoononlc relations vitb th« U.r.r.u, and oth«r countries* 
The national council o<* the CPI, ^-hlle strongly con-
deamlng t^e infiltration by Pakistan personnel across the 
cease-fire line in f.ashnlrt admired the reitei^tion) by the 
foviet Union and other Socialist countrleS| of ^ e i r stand 
t^at Kashffllr Is an integral part of India. It asked India 
to pay due regards to the friendship of the U»B,.':,B* vhich 
again and again in the fecurlty Council prevented th% U«^«'« 
and Britain from adopting antl»Indian resolutions and decisions 
49 
on Kashmir or foiled Imperialist ^ e s » 
It may be noted that the CPI vas ttm greatest crit ic 
of UC military aid to Pakistan* i!oveveT| in case of Soviet 
arms aid to Pakistan ^ e partys choice was limited. It could 
hardly adopted any antl*rovlet posture* )n the contrary^ t t 
tried to justify t'^ e stand of tht^  U***,?:.!?, The party denied 
that t^ere vas any shift In f^oviet policy to India, Speaking 
48* r-««ji<raw Agfty June 10 | 1962* 
49* rardesal . r.O*. Hiifanee. Danftcracyy Emaularlam > Ka«h«lr 
(New Delhit 19&6)» p.3d« 
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In th« Jjak rataha^ Dange strongly condesned Urm attetapt of 
reactionary c irc les In th« ooontry to raise an antl.Sovi«t 
hysteria on tht Irsue of r^jvlet ajrtas supply to Pakistan, '^e 
pointed out that uiilie there voe concern snong &11 sections 
atout tMs Tovi^t decisioni i t was not in the national Interest 
60 
to weaken Indo^roviet friendship because of ^ i s developaent. 
The CPI &l8o adnired the role played by the Indo-!=?ovlet 
Treaty In safeguarding Indians independence and Security in 
f^e move of so l i tary Intervention by U,n« iaiperlalisa and 
Maoist China during Bangla D s^h c r i s i s . I t hailed the T?reity 
9f friendship, co-operation, of non»aggre88l'>n was a treaty 
which V58 In entire conformity with non-alignaent. The P j^rty 
believed that thle Treaty enabled India to shed the ''cold 
61 
ft^ et** mentality and took a bold step both In national and 
international matters. 
The flational Council of th^ CPI hailed ^^e treaty s s 
a h is tor ic landaai^, not only in the develoinent of mutual 
friendship and co-operation between the two countries, but as 
62 
a bulwark of ptace and pi'ogress in >*sia« The CPI (M) also 
50* Ihia.f July 28| 19fi»&, p.9. 
61 . Thi ilnrtUBten UMM <??ew OelM), August -•••, 1971. 
62 . ree,Ohate, h\ylnAnmr,n\Ht Inntft *Jsw Delhi, F>eQndayal 
heser^rch institute» 1972, p.d6. 
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wtXooned th« Inlo.Sovi«t Tr«&ty« It believed t^at this Treaty 
cam« In t^ .e teckground of the Threat of aggretsion by Pakistan 
v^lc^ bad been armed to the teeth by Asserlcan Imperiallsa 
vlth the lateet aodem weapons* The Central Council of Ve 
CPI(M) noted that the Treaty had cone es a culsination of 
increase of mutual trade, economic and technical aid oirer 
bd 
the past fev ye airs betve*>n the tvo countries* In i ts 1972 
election manifesto the party praised the role vhich the Indo-
r.oviet friendship Treaty played in preserving the prestige o^ 
India in ^ e Bsngla Desh* 
Xhti IndovToviet friendship and co*>operstlon alvays osnsi. 
dered by the Comnninists of India as a contribution towards 
larger co-operation between the socis^list and non-aligned 
countries, vhich vas of such decisive importance for the 
defeat of imperialists and ^ e markers of v^ ir* ^^ovever, the 
C?I*8 assumption ^ a t the only country that took the side of 
India in hours of cris is is nothing but a blind faith, t^ e^n 
China attacked India i t \^» hoped t>>at the <^oviet Union would 
support i t s Just cause, but inst^d of supporting ev«n the 
previously promised delivery of Mlgs was tactically delay^ol. 
Also on the issue of Indo-?ak v.>ir of 19U6, the Soviet Union 
remained neutral* The Communists belief that the U*r*A. would 
63* Ibid., p. 33* 
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alvayt prove to b« the •runy of the Indian ind«p«nd«ne« and 
soveTttlgntyy and th« U*S.C,fi. wuXd in a l l olrcuBStane«s 
b« tt'.e b«8t frl«nd| vas not real l t t ie and reasonable • 
TOR ATTItUfF. OF mi. PfiP Ann VIV. gRP 
Tn»-ARry rai: u.n.A. Awn T?»r u.s.r-R., 
The !^oclail«t Parties did not believe that the vietory 
of either of the power blocs vould lead to the eaanclpstion 
of Q»id£ind« Ihey pointed out t^at ^ e extension of Anglo-
American influence to a l l parts of tVe eurth vould make the 
'mtsrican system almighty on this plsinet and would not allow 
tht social ist partKs to develop and bventuuliy challenge 
t>ti su i^remacy of capitalism* fin the ot^tr hand Incorporation 
of the world in the Toviet sphere vould put tht Krtmlin con-
trolled communist parties in po%'er ev%ry^»r& and destroy 
the democratic and socia l i s t forces* rherefoz«« no c>^ice 
or i^raference tm i s indicated* India should not, therefore, 
do any ^ ing that is likely to Increase t^^ Influence of 
fcither of these uloos, but strive to create a 'Third Camp* 
of active neutr5»llty and to expand the area of tMs tblrd carap 
as far as possiole* Ihey had a firm belief t^at the third 
force could grow on the basis of v i ta l home policy, i t cannot 
be build up by becoming an honest broker of peace between 
the two blocs* 
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Th«/ eont«nt«d that a dose association vlth tither 
of th« pov?«r blocs vould drst^  the n«vljr liberated countries 
of ^sla Into oiilltary pacts and the intern:^tional ara rsce 
%)OUld ruin their economleS| entails loss of initiative in 
international affairs, and even spell the end of their national 
independence* Xhe Praja Socialist Party alvays stood for an 
fyvsm 
lndei>endent foreign policy fm free/ail ltsry slllanees and 
entanglement with the policies of big povers, particularly, 
the l>*.%/.« and the U«n,^ «lt* The Inclination tovariN a po%rer 
bloc, as Iruiia w s tov«rds the CMi<nttnlst bloc in t^e 60*8, or 
the double aligment vlth the U«f./^ . and the U*r«''*F, a i t 38 
pursued today are policies based on veaknesn and are unrealis. 
t ie n^d dr^ngerous* It alvays supported the Oovernnent ^en» 
ever i t followed a genuine policy of non.Anvolvefflent in pov'er 
bloc politics* The Faayukta Socialist Party alvays affirmed 
that i t would try to bring the two super powers the U*f!*A. and 
the U*S*S*it* together to organize a Joint prograaae to end 
poverty* It considered both the U.S.A, and the U*C*f:*B. as 
friends but judged their friwidshlp on ^ e ground of their 
support India received from theffl on the issues of IndooPak 
relations and the iSt^clon of the probiea of poverty* It 
64* Blti HindV^ten I lat l (New Oelhl;, SepteBbc^ r £5, 1966* 
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wished to build a * Third Caap* that k«eps svay fxoa the 
HIantic and Tovlet ryttems and d9«8 not prefar the otir^ tr* 
!*:€ PSP»8 sppro'SiCb to th« problem of fori Ign aid ^ns 
oore real ist ic than that of ths Conrminlst t'artlss of India, 
It bell«v«d th^ t^ in h«r fight for surviv&ly India nost secspt 
l«ip fiom a l l sourc«s» wlthout^h4»v«v«r| cocproaislng h«r 
national Intsgi'ltjr &nd ld#sls« It did not favour ^^ « Idsa 
of axcluslTs fnibrican or Tovist aid for India's eeononfc 
d«vslopaittnt, like ^« CPI, In other tords i ts attltuds vas 
coincldsd vlth that of the Oovsmasnt* It oppossd foreign 
aid vlth *strini;;s** It esiphaslsed the n«ed for regional 
economic co-operation for acceleratii^ the s process of Indls*s 
e<»noaic devclopBent. Ashoka '^hts. polnttsd out that greater 
attention aoist be ^Iven to econoaio cooperation and nutual <ild 
66 
sjiiong ^ e ft Colombo and all ied countries* 
The PCP, like the CPI, dl4 not raise any controversy on 
vestem military aid, following the BAlltary threat posed by 
China. It called upon the Qovemtent to take military aid 
from any soxiroe to me t^ the Chinese chall&nge. This was not 
thought ss 3 violation of noA^allgment* It believed that 
iriille non-alignment is basically a sound policy as between the 
two power blocs led by the (J«r,/. and the U.S.r.K., India must 
6b• Jftw»»Jt (39mbay), October 3, 1964, p.t6* 
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certainly aligiMd against China and mat sought avary halp 
froB a l l eountrlea to atrangthan bar amad foreaa and aeonoale 
Induatrial hBf* A^ i^oka M^ta onea daclaradi "va auat not 
l^aaltata to »99k asa la^neaf avan tha atzongaat and proudaat 
(»>untrlea had to raaort to *land and laaaa* asalatanca* Hlatory 
ahovs that aueh land laaaa co^operatl'^n did not eonproaiaa 
the indapandanea of the country." 
The PfP, t>ou^. conald«i«d the Importance of foral|pi 
aid for Indlay hovaver» wanted the Oovernnent to depend aa 
amch aa possible an i ts ovn reaourees* It vanted India nuat 
not take her friends for granted»nelther the U.r.A, nor the 
f^ovlet Union* Instead she nust drev the correct lesson from 
previous experiences and decided upon self»reliunc« an inde» 
pendent policy. 
The views of the rnp on foreign aid are totally diff-
erent than thut of the pr;?. It believed that foreign aid in 
an/ V y vas not humiliating and dangerous to l^e receiving 
countries iaut oouid never hd (lde<|uate to aet^t their needs and 
re<}ulr«iBents* It comnltted i tse l f to woAlng for stopping 
al l foreign aids, \^etver econofflic or military or food and 
**%fOUld strain every nerve to mobilize and ut i l ize the produc 
57 
tive resources o^ the country to the maximum capacity," The 
66. Ibid., October S&» 1962, p.S, 
67. "Samyukta Socialist Party Election Manifesto ("'971)*' In 
Laly fhlv. rfatinnal ParMU a,f Ihdl8t *7«v DelMt the 
Election Archives, 1971, p«163« 
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SS? f€it that the total stoppaga of a l l foraign aid vh«tber 
fzoa the U«&«A« or tHrrn U«S,S«R« vould do aora good to India 
than ita eontftnuanea* It daelarad that aid to uadavalopad 
countrlaa aust cona tbr^i^ a %rld Davalopaant Authority to 
68 
vhlch eyx]f nation would raeaiva according to i t s naad* 
Tha viavs of th%! i*BP with ragard to tha U.S* aiilitary 
p'ct vith i'akistan and Paki8tan*a allianca in 5?EAI0 vte not 
yry nuoh different from thosa of tha OovarnBant vho dascrlbad 
thaaa various pacts nn intarlodcad arranganants fil lad vith 
danger to sankind. Ilhe ?SP VHB crit ical of the attampta of t>i( 
tvo povar blocs to expand and build positions of strengti^ in 
's la . Accordingly i t opposed tha creation of the PF./TO, It 
condsnned the efforts of the Atlantic Canp to forv the <7Fi^ t9 
and thus draw i^ outh ^slan Ooveraients in i t s orbit and the 
Wwc arua and also t>^s« of tha Covi«t Caap to expand if^ Sou^ 
Asia* In a resolution, adopted at Xim 0«neral Council aeeting 
at Indort* in June 19i>4y i t urged upon such states of routfe 
A8is >diich %,<&nt to pui'Bue the policy of Independence fii-oa 
either casp ''to coae closer together and device measures of 
69 
mutual assistance*** 'Xhe l^rtyi In its Bolicy ntateaent^adopted 
68* Liaaye^ <^dhu, **The SB? Perspective"| in Patta^iraa, 
-'• Qd*, agnttfll r.laBtlnrai in Inflla ^8^7 i liTHacmalTi 
rtUlly nf fiiin P Q I U U B I Tfgnrtl» Bbabay, Allied Publishers, 
ie»7, p.ti6* 
69. IW ygaw n*- tea Pgy, aoabay, PS^. Pub.^1964, p.30. 
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at t^e Second National C«»nf«r«ne« h«ld at Ga^a, raltaratad this 
view* It hoped that ^slsn j;»overs vould abstain from such 
arrang«a«nt8 of 6olltotiv« def«n«« as sight ^'smrytm t^e 
Interests of big powers and drsv then into the orbit of the 
60 
Aaerioan or tht: Soviet bXoe*** The Party wanted Asian states 
to resist £LAi<> and urged the Uoverment of India to initiate 
oulti lateral t r ^ t l e s with countries of '^ outh Fast /^sla* 
The pj^ rty vas i^x^atXy concerned over the UB.Pak all ltary 
psict and Its enevltnble repurcusslons on Asl^ and Tndo* 
i^akistan relations* It supported the Government In protest 
agsiklnst defence arr&ngeraents b^tvetfi Pakistan and 'merleaw 
The '^'tional Conference of the party expressed i t s fesr that 
t^ls development vould je»pardice the &tteitpts at developing 
9 t* i^rd ^orce ar^ would Involve the Asian ststes in great 
61 
power conflict and eventually in war* It pointed out the 
danger of a pact between India and Russia^ suggested hy sane 
peoplei »s 3 sort of counter aeasure to the proposed p»ct« 
fnich a step, the Party V^eld.would play into the hands of foreign 
62 
powers agaln&t whoa al l Asia laboured these nany years. 
60* Ranort nt tile Eaanfm CftHfaramaa h«1<i a t Qava, D«ceaber 
19bo» New Delhi, PSP Pub,, p, 2^» 
61. Inn j^ iBM nf fgf, oa,,cit«» P« 3 I , 
t>2, Ibid>y p, 31, 
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Madhu LlBi^«f #oint S«or«tax-/ of tiit painty, oontldcrad 
th« U«S«.Pak pact as part of the U.S. gaaa to ottabliah a 
n«t wxk of th« U.S.alllary basoa aiound ^ « SoYlat Union* 
'?• said, **a part froa the new ohaint of baaas th«y vUl 
aequira on Pakistan tarritory* t^oy hop* throu^ this psot, 
to eheclcBata avan tha tlaid and hoi ting afforts of India to 
consolldato s paaca area and blaokaall her into • slallnr 
63 
arranganents vlth tha Onitad ^tatas*** ^ doubt the Idaa of 
tl^ a U«S«.P8k Pact ran counter to P5P*s*third foreo* approach 
In intamatlonal affairs. Tha party luled out the idea of 
a 'no«>var and loutual aid pact* anong the free states of Asla« 
The supply of sros by th6 U«S» to Pakistan vas also 
condsmned by th6 Socialist parties as huBlliating the Indian 
sovereignty and independ^^nee. The P^ P vieved that the Uj5. 
ves trying to cripple our defence init iative by threatening 
to cut th€ arms supply to Pakistan* "The latent prejudices 
against India*s independent foreign policy were nov being 
pursued in the open* /vaerican opinion had tried to Inalllating 
64 
the country by these threats*** It enphasised the need to 
strengthen India's ovn defence vlth a sense of urgency* 
63* lanalfti ^pni 18, 10549 p*2o* 
t»4* itOdM October 3^ 1966, p*16* 
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Th« Socialists (l«plor«d the U«S»aggression In Tletnaa 
and duuuEUled the Indian Qoverment to take a f l m stand 
against the U«&, aggression in VietnaB* It believed that the 
danger to this attack escalating into a major conflict not 
be over looked* They asked the Govemsent of India to define 
i t s position in no uncertain texas« IHe solution of Vietnaa 
protaen, they vievedt vould have to be sou^t at the negotla. 
66 
ting table of cieneva Conference* 
The attitude of the U*C«e*B« Airing the Indo^Pak var 
vas bitterly criticised ty the Socialists of India, They 
pointed out that the Soviet Union had departed froa unquall. 
fled support to India's pol it ical stand in regard to Kashair 
issue* TTltberto she had always applied* the veto ^tnt/fr 
Kashailr Issue vas in the UH, tut this tlae Russia had agreedy 
to a unanlaoua resolution asking ^ a t the pol i t ical dispute 
underlying the existed conflict be settled* The announcenent 
of the U*s*S*E* about the supply of arms to Pakistan vas 
treated as a threat to India by the Boclallsta of India* The 
prp vieved the Soviet deeitlon as a failure of Indian dlploBncy< 
It vae fe l t that the Soviet Onion had been pursuing a course 
of systenaticaUy voolng Pakistan. It expressed i t s great 
concern and g y w s t suggested that Farlianent sould voiced i ts 
regret over the supply of arms to P^istan by ^ e fovlet 
Govezment* 
^6* ianalAt February 14, 1966* p*ld. 
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The Inao.8ovl«t Tr«aty of frlmdthlp and oo-op«ratlon 
betv««n India and U*.<^ *c»R« «at oonaid«r«d tagr the f^Qciailsts 
of India as Ineonaiatant with aorualigmant* Mr. f^ aaar Ooha, 
vhlle realising that the situation deaanded that India should 
h3ve dose relations with U.S.S.R,, thoui^t i t vhoUy un. 
necessary to codify ^ i s relationship of friendship with 
Hussla in fora a treaty binding India to the Soviet bloc 
polities fbr &0 plus b years* f^e vas disagree with the 
Govemsent's view that the treaty vas an extension of the 
policy of non.ali0went* Karpoori Thakury Chaixaan and 
Hadiu Daadavatoy General Secretary of the {Socialist P^rty 
had In a joint statement declared that a defence tlnaty or 
Tecurity t'aot vhich leads to our allgnaent is no desirable* 
Mr* Baj Narainy the S*P* leader said the treaty VBB 
against thfe interest of the country and the p^ple of Bangla 
Desh* to hla i t v/as a treaty between unoquals vlth the aore 
powerful country In an advantageous position* He held that 
the gains of the treaty, whatever they are will go to the 
69 
Soviet Union and whatever the losses wil l coae to India*** 
66* Ghaie, N*M*, Inflf^finYlit Iriatyt oyacUM P*^^* 
o7* Xhi Hlnduatan Itoaii August lo , i97i* 
t»8* GhaU, N*M*y Ibid., p, 55* 
69* 122ldik| P* 78* 
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Thtt abov« diteutslont shov; that %fhere«s the CoHHnl8t»i 
favoured India'• oloae ataoelation vlth the Tovlat Union and 
othar oountrlaat ^ « aoolallstt aiiphaalmd th« naad for 
oeonoaie eo«»oi>eration betvaan India and othar oountrlas in 
routh Eaat Aala* The Coammlsts alvays osnaidarad tha U,C,/l. 
to ba an anany and tha U.S,c«li« aa t^a baat friand. In tha 
other hand the aoolalista di» ii»% ballava that a eloaa aeaoeia. 
tlon with either of the pover hlAO "uould drag the nevl/ liber* 
<ited countries of f^ain into rallltary p^eta* They vlahcd to 
build a *fhird Caap* that keeps avay fro« the 'tlantle and 
f^oviet Caap and doaa not prefer ^ e other* Xhey considered 
thin mamii^ r in vhlch the Governnent of India dealt vlth 
'V%8tem laperlallam* and *Lu8slan iAperlallm' as indicative 
of double standard* 
C H A P T F. B VI 
fF. ^TTITOTE fJT TBT. SOCIALIST P>BTl!;i 
C H A P I E R VI 
INDIA'R RETJ.TL-lMg WITH C??m A'ffn PAfClRT.^ W 
*hil« dealing vltb the foreign policy of n country 
3n€ s'touid try to find out the main trends of i t s relations 
wlt^ Its neighbours. Jsv'aharlal Nehru once aptly rcBarked 
t^3t ^he t e s t of i sound forel^i pr>licy i s the abi l i ty of a 
country ^a8 of getting along v e i l vlth Its neighbours,Living 
In peace with ntiigK.bours was eiaphasised by the present Prlne 
Minister Mrs, Indira viandhi when she 'isserted that^^^iet us 
there be no doubt aosut t h i s . It i s our sincere desire to 
1 
l i v e in peace wit^ our neighbours,** In the context of re lat ion. 
ship with the nei&hijourlng s tates India's foreign policy wi l l 
hsive to be judged at^alnst the background of i t s relstloruihlp 
with China and Pakistan which ^ave px*oved to be i t s arch. 
enemies, challenging i t s t err i tor ia l integri ty . 
It i s common understanding that for siany years the 
two nelt'hbouping countries India and China l ived in peace 
and mutual co-operation, ' f ter India achi6V«>d Independence 
In 1947 and the Chinese rtjvolutlon trlumpVed in '»949, good 
neighbourly relations again prevailed between the two countries, 
India vos amongst t^ © f i r s t country which recognised the new 
rfeglmfc in China on December 3c, 1949 and since then continuously 
1. Indian Lx^raaa (Mcw Delhi;, ''eptember o, 19bc. 
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arga«d for China's adBlttion in th* Unltad Wattont. 
Tha vritings and apaachts of Javaharl&l ffahru shov 
that China aivaya faaeinatad hia ifazgr Baeh, Ha vaa graatly 
attraetad biy Its hlatoxy* ^ts "graatnaas", i ts baing a '^ world 
povar or vould b« a vorld povar**! and a **iBl^ty povar" sitting 
on our bordara* -le ehaoploaad tha causa of China m t in tha 
lit? but also in aanjr othar intazisational oonfaranoaa* At 
I^ndung ha triad to introduea China to the 'fro—'sian ^brld 
and sacurad for hai "& place of honour* 
It vas not only India ^ l e h van tad to gain China U 
friandshlpi China too saw ^a advantagas of India baing 
frlandly. Doth baing navly indapandant vara kaan to prasarva 
thair fraadoB and vantad to find their place in a vorld 
doainated by soona big powers* Both realised that cooperation 
between India and China aif^t lead in enhancing their prestige 
in international coaaunlty* During the ejuibassad^rshlp of 
K«M«Pannikar tht fealings of friendship and aalty becsae Bore 
and aore pronounced* In fact we aay say that ^ehxu and 
pannikar vrare tha joint architect of India»C i^n& relations* 
However, Chinese Coamunlsts ware secretly plaming to st^ila 
India In the back* They paid seand respect to Indians waxath 
£* Nehru, .T.:.., Tn<ii«»ft v^i^mifn Pnilcy, Delhi, publication 
Divlalon, 1961» pp* ad8, 376* 
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and goodwill, Th«y had no genuine fslth In Iiidla*8 policy 
d 
of non.allfinBont ovtn though thoy paid l ip atrvloe to lt« 
Xh« Invasion of Tlbot In Oetobor 11960| was on« of th« 
lstu«s \itiitii in i t ia l ly gave aoae eausa of Ixrltatlona to 
1)0th India and China, aut India, having a f i m balltf In 
p«ae« and friendship^ iSlgned an agreenent with China, on 
April S«9 1964« ooncerning Trade and Intereourae between the 
(liiMt Ue^lon of d ;^ina* and India, Under the agreeoMnt India 
gave up a l l the rights previously enjoyed )ij the British in 
Xibet and tacitly recognised Tibet as a 'region of Chins,* 
This agreeaent oontatned inter alia, five prinelples of 
peaceful co^existence t^B Panc^ rheel^^^ieh beeaae the guiding 
principles in Indo^Chlna relations, /1 a Joint eowmmiquef 
issued on the conclusion of Chou»i:n.L%l v i s i t to IndiSi la 
June 1964, the tvo r'rlae Ministers of India and China reaffir. 
4 
•ed their adherence to these five principles. 
They later received favouraole reception in aany eoua. 
tries of '"sia and Europe and was expected to serve as the 
3 , Kaiiififtkftran K - P - InAin Ami torld A f f a l i A tQ4,7^^ l^nA^^n 
Oxford, 1962, p,100« 
4, The rive i^rlnelples tstentloned in IJidla^China joint state-
aent arei (1) Mutual respect for each other^s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty^ (11) T^on-agKreSfiiont ( i l l ) 
17oiwInterference in each other's internal affairsi ( iv) 
equality and omtual benefit dk. iv) Peaceful oo-exlstence, 
^•9,Tnt§iim milesf nf India • Tut af tocu 
New Delhi, LOID r^ atha {Secretariat, 1966, p,294. 
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guiding prlnolplet In th« Indl^uChlaa relations* It Is, 
hov6y«r« Ixonlesl that these principles fs l led to restrain 
China froa attacking India and did not provide an/ respite to 
the developing nations in th% nelghbiMir>^ 1iood of India* 
Meanvhllsi various good Missions vere exchanged betveen 
India and China* The Bandung Conferenee sav the ellaax of 
India's efforts to introduce China to the Afro«>^slaa Vbrld* 
Here both Mehxu and Choa.£n»Lai worked in co-operation vlth 
each other* But unfortunately China's desire to beooae a pover 
•quel to the United "tates and the r^vlet Onion led to a shift 
In China's policy in 1968i^9« The drean of Asian leadership 
and the urge of expansionissi at the cost of territorial 
integrity of India nade China Invade the Northern and Tiastem 
frontiers* 
The border dispute vhlch e&ae to l ight in 1969t l ike 
the bolt froB the blue shodced ^ e nation and the yery basis 
on which Indo*China relationship vere besed had been shaken* 
India's non.alignBent and neutralisai vas put to hard test 
and the vhole coaplextion of Indian polit ical l i f e underwent 
a drastic change* ^ehxu ^nfessed in Deoeaber I9609^«it he 
5 
*'dl4 not expect** thero vould be **aggression** by China* India 
changed i t s policy to sake a delayed atteapt at ste^vning the 
6* Nflhniy Jaw&hariaiy India*a flnffiign PnlJBYt afia£lUfP«359« 
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tid« of ChliMSt Mipanslonisa at Its second l ine of defence, 
Rehru having already declar«d| "Ihe HcMdhon Line Is our 
boundar/y m&y or no aap« '^e v l l l not allov any body to cone 
6 
!:tcros8 the Ijoundary." India took It *'for granted" t^at by 
nov In International pollt lesi the rule of Jungle had been 
replaced by that of loW| snd that "naked" snd "oEsslire In-
7 
vaalons" vere "a thing of the paat*** 
Hlft betveen the two countries developed at <> gloplng 
speed* China realised that to weaken Indla^ the friendship 
of (Pakistan would be very necessary. Pakistan too believed 
that to achieve her object to get Kashalr froa India such an 
alliance would be served veil* To achieve their objeetlvee 
both of them came in close co-oporQtion, Pakistan aade a 
reappraisal of i t s foreign policy vlth a viev to establishing 
8 
relations vlth China and other CoBRHinist countries* j^r 
befriending Pakistcn, the Chinese believed that they had 
opened a se«>nd fsotor a^^ainst India. Indian GovemBent 
expressed concern at the growing collusion betveen China and 
Pakistan* 
&• fn^linmentnTv nobataSj Official Heport* Wovettber SO, 
I960* 
cientifle 7* Hurty, K.n.y IndUa Tntttign PnUflYt Calcutta, ": 3o6k ?tcncy, ''964, p.67* 
8. rinth, M j^or .^ odh A Khera, p.If., JndUVt Intlla, r>elhi, 
ISHD (Indian Cchool Supply Depot*) Publication, 1978, 
p* 26* 
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th« PrlBi« Ministers of both th« oeuntrits m%% in April 
lO&O In vi«v of Vm d^ivrlor^ Unf r«i.atlon» b«tv«ta the tvo 
oountritts and aer««d that offieiaX* of th« two countries 
should a«wt &nd «xaaiiitt a l l thtt hlstorlG&l doeuatints* The 
off ielals a«t thrlc« in Peking^ Dclhiy and Kanfoon rotp«etlv«ly 
during thfc later b:af of l»»o« But thia did not result In 
resolving the differences that hiad arisen* 
Ihe reail orlsls in Indla*s relation vith Chine started 
with the dlreet fflllltarjr conflict of 6epteaber«.^oveaber 196S 
^ i c h iJBbittered relations betveen the tvo countries «liK>st 
to a toeakins point. On Fcptenber 8« the Chinese aimed forces 
topped across the "/Meftbhan Line In the east into 'fl^A, There-
after on October O^f thi^  Chinese- launched a nassive and » 
large scale attack in iooth NEFA and Xiadhakh* The Chinese 
amies advanced, and then suddtfily, the Chinese announced s 
unilateral cease-fire and a decision to vithdrav on Noveaber 
The border conflict of Hiaalayas had alread/ caused 
great deaage to the unity and cohesion of fro-Zsian countries 
in their Just struggle a^Jnst iBperialism and ooloniallsa* 
They vere very aaxlous about this position. In order to break 
the conflict and to provide n basis of agreed cease-fire 
arrangcaents, the leaders of th<» six A elan-African eotmtries, 
vls«, Ceylon , Buna| the UAR, Ghana, Indonesia and Coabodiaf 
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diMfV up certain proposals at tb« Colombo Conference, lOt'-^  
s^ nd li-ti^ aaoemuer 19ic»2t aiaed at achlevinti i pe^c«^ful se t t l e* 
ment of tht> confllet* II 6 Conference expressed the l3ope that 
i t s i»roi*osals vould «>ntrloute to tht o^nsolid'^tlon of the 
'rmlstlce and would pave the vay to tht n«»goti:'tlons i>etveen 
thfc tvto countries* X^ey ver<3 used to lure India Into her i;>ellef 
tlrkt i t vas possible to vard of the Chinese raon&ce throu^ 
9 
negotiations vitb r'eklng. Indian Oovernnent accepted then 
in totot vhllte the Chinese Uovernaent under tht^  cover of 
10 
ncceptmce "In principle**) rejected the very besls of Colombo 
proposals* 
India suggested various steps to resolve the problem 
5ncluding international arbitration in a note dated 'pr l l S, 
igb3* In a nat« on October 9, 19o3y after s ix aonths, Chinese 
r e j e c t s t^e suggestions and accused India of having proposed 
trese steps "to makb negotiations Impossible hjf setting up 
12 
an array of obstacles*** The Government of India sent another 
nott on Kstober I**, 19«t>ii| with thfe hope that f ina l ly 
"wiser consels would prevail and the Chinese GovernDent vould 
la 
revert to the paths of peace*'*Butf unfortunately, t!"e voice of 
9* "Inha, Tatyansrayan, china rtrlkaa,. London, 31sndford 
/'ress, 1904, p*9;»* 
10* ^ee for de ta i l s . Government of India, Ministry of xtemal 
/ f f a i r s , IndHa^Ch^na CnnfAUt Hew Delhi, 19^3), p.9* 
:temoranda, and l.ettex*s exchanged between the Governn^ts 
of India and China, 'hitcCanary Nb* IX, January-JUly i9bS, 
pp* 34-36* 
1£* Ibid. , ^o*x, July igk>3.January 1964, pp. B-H* 
13* Ibid.y p. 18* 
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r^ton •xprtsfling th« v i l l of Afro^Asian p«opl« %AS not 
he0d«d to in Poking, Th« r«j<stlon of various proposals lad 
to a dasdloclc In tha India«Chlna ralatlons %fhloh s t i l l axists« 
Tha Chinasa conflict oaaa as a trauotatio sbodic to 
Indian leadarship, Tt quastlonad Indians strangle, disturbad 
i t s stability and thraatanad i t s indapandanca* Indians daslra 
to have frlandly and peacaful ralatlons vith China vag dashad 
to piacas. !Bh9i India's polioy of non-alignmant IAS blttarly 
14 
attackad* Casting of tha oloak of non-aligmiant tha Oovamsant 
of India had opanly beggad for nllitary aid frosi tha Unitad 
Statas of Amarioa and was racaiving a continuous supply of 
15 
Unitad states arms* 
Tha fundaaantals of India's foraign policy vara nov 
opan to quastion* Daaands vw aada throu^out tha oountr/ 
for the raassessnant of India's foraign policy* India's poliey 
of noxwali0uiant had und^r gona oodifications* Thou|^ India 
had Joined opsnly any povar bloat sha had to gat aras and aid 
14. Yhfl lahran Jnurnfll daolarad. ** ironically enough tha 
ehaaplon of neutrality. India has been attadcwl by tha 
armed forces of Cowsimist China, The Coomunist aggra» 
ssion on India once again proved that neutrality has 
been ruled out by intexnational circuBstancas*** 
Iht Ittefta Jgymil (Tehran;, October £4, I96e, 
16, Eekeien, v.ven. indU'i Fartlm Pollfiy ind th« an 
PlwnMU WIttI Cnjnii 2nd •<!»» ^ a Haguct Martinus, 
Nijhoff, 1967, p. 116. 
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and ^t^ier equipfflsnts froiB a l l t^b friendly nations. This 
*i?3d 'a disastrous Impact on the prt^stlge and stature '>^  '*ehru 
and w .8 an acid/for t^e policy of non-allgnmsnt. The rTlas 
Minister hlase l f said that India had bmen "l iving In an 
Id 
a r t i f i c i a l atmosphere of our ovn creation.** The eonoept of 
non-aligraoent ^ad lit;:.le meaning, Indians f e l t , as India vas 
•ittacked by a Conaunlst Pover, Speaking In the Lok rabha 
ri.U.itanga asserted that| "Mon-all^^naent has not served US( 
doteS not serve us any longer* IVfe sooner ve get rid of i t , 
t>>e oetter; the sooner ve turn our ba^c to i t , tVe better*** 
But according to some others the Chinese invasion brought to 
the forefront the wisdom of Indians non-alignment poUoy* 
Ja^^Q r^akash ^lai-aln, at a neivs confer«ice in Dalhi on "November 
J, 19i»<;, said that the policy of non-alignment '*needed no 
change" -ind was "not questioned by any of India's friends," 
According to him, "the real culprit vas the mental and 
18 
t ional alignment that vent about In garb o^ non-alignment," 
The Coamnmist ?arty was also in favour of non-alignment* The 
stated that 
Central laeoutive Committee resolution of the Psrty / l t " f l ia ly 
It), rha Indis>n ^m-t^ss (T7ev Delhi), tfovember ^, 19b£. 
17. LQfe Sa&ha Debfttafit V o l . U , NO*;^, November &, 19t»2, eo l . 
T59. 
18. fuoted ty K.r.Murty, aa*fiii.f P* 99* 
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b«li«v«s ^ a t the pollcjr of aoiwailgmwit far froa obstructing 
or veak«nin£ natldnai def«iec Is on the contrary vital for 
India's defenes* C.Rajsgopalaoharly an statesaian of Indl<3| 
stated that **non-allgnmtnt of India's part was an axeellsnt 
policy vhleh helped KbrXd psaos as long as neither party aads 
CO 
aggrasslon on Ihdla,** He further said that non-allgnnent 
"Is a Moral policy connected vlth the peace of the world" and 
that "it is very ridiculous^ therefore*. people defend i t by 
saying that i t had paid good dividends*" It vas thou^t and 
f«aied ^ a t in attespt to strengtbM i t s defence vis.a«vis 
China, India nouid MOV^  tovsrds the v^stem oaap and noiw 
alignsent alone vould help to keep India avay froa the ^'^stem 
camp* So the non.aiignaent vas to reaain India's off icial 
policy* 
Pakistan and China are in collusion ami the Joint 
threat froa thesci hostile neighbours «>ntinues* *& China 
later becae th<^  nuclear pover the danger further Increased* 
in Dctober l&t )9^^i China carried out her f irs t nuclear 
explosion and slso exploded hydrogen boab, which d&naged the 
world opinion and increased the danger of proliferation of 
19* ^»^ f"» (Hew^elM)» Deceaber 9» 1902, p. 7* 
20* Banglore f^ peeeh on February 1» 19&4* 
21* iklA* 
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nuGle&r wapons* Chin6s« attitude tovarda atomic devasta. 
tion shattered thtt vt>ry teals of '.€hru*s policy of 'slan. 
solidarity. This hop« of pcsc«ful rslatlons b«t>««n t^e two 
countries received greater shodc* The five ^jrlnclples o^ 
Pancb "heel proved of no use, Chlnt^ se Oovernnent, which had 
so eagerly accepted the% vlolfttid tVese principles for its 
own interest, 
DespltCi China*s intraflgence^ however^ It is desirable 
to break the deadlo<dc by recognizing eac^ other's Interest on 
the k^sls of pbaceful co-existence. India and China are close 
neighbours and It Is In the Intercast of both the countries 
t iat co-operation and friendship should develop between the 
two. ^ detente between then would necessarily lead to the 
rapid developments in eoonoale and cultural fields and would 
s've India froa China's nuclear exparalonisa. India^ veil 
conscious of the rising nudear power of China, is ready to 
restore good relations with China at any lev^l at any tiae. 
Ihe former r'resldent Eadhs Krishnan in his Independence hay 
speech (1966) spoke strongly for an understanding vlth China. 
1« declared! 
"China and India v l l l sooner or later» sooner than 
I'itert ieam to l ive In pe ce and oo«operstlon. ^ just se t t l e , 
ment of the question dividing us Is not ifflpossible. !fothlng 
should be avoided b^caust. i t is thought impossible. The only 
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r«l«VAnt quettian i s : fibts It require to b« tenclY Thon v« 
22 
must try and to do it*" 
India n^ver has any ensalty against China. ni« aivays 
vlshsd h«r veil* India realises the ''"^ ot that being nelf^boutS 
iaoth India ancl China in friendshl|) can face some eoanon 
problems vith ooXleetive security. If China vould accept this 
position, th<bre v i l i be no diff iculV n^ iMringin«, about a 
lasting solutida of India •«— China differences* 
Let us nov analyse th« stand taken by t^e leadership 
of the Socialist parties vls.a»vis tl^ e nev developaentr in 
Indo-Cbin^e relations. 
rmyypK r^ m cpi >ID HE CPI m)t 
Froa i t s vty inception XiM Coanunist Pa^ rty of India 
supported the Cofflmunlst aovemaent of China. It hailed the 
CooBittnist revolution in China as a landnaidi: in the history of 
soeialisau 'xhe Comrade 3.X«Hanadiire of CPI sent a congra* 
2S 
tul&tory massage to comrade Hao Tse.Tung on October ^2, 1949* 
The CHI hailed the Oovfermeat of India's decision to oo-
operate vith the People's Eepublie of Chlmi. It also %>«;lGom«^ (! 
2 2 * In^if tn E3tDri>««y U^i^St 1 6 , 19t»0. 
23* For the ful l Text of th« massage of gr^etinf^s sent by 
Comrade B.T.lbnadlve to Mao Is««XUn£. <;«.« inAinn r i^wiiniafe 
Pft^ fev tv%ni-^t« toan^totife, OdabQy, The Democratic Heseax-eh 
rer-vice, 1967, pp« 4i&.47« 
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the signing of th« *'4'aneh ChMl** agr4Htai«nt b«twtt«n India 
and China* A joy Qhosby i^eeretsry of th« CPI, eonsldertid the 
signing of th€ five principles of peaceful eo^existenoey 
enunciated by Choiu>?ehra Declaration %» a "significant kuul 
landaark In the annals of India*** 
Thfc Jittitade of the CPI^  in the early stages, %ias in 
favour of China. As in /u^ust 19699 ^^ Chinese occupied 
longjtt in the E^FA, i t coapletely ruled out the possibility 
of andu^«b(clash vith China* fM>on &fter| the secretariat of 
the ^fation&l Council of the CFl issued a stateaent regretting 
t^ :e incident* The Central l^xeeutlve Comlttee of the CPI, 
at i ts Calcutta sessioni adopted resolution on the border 
conflict In vhich i t advised the aovernoHint of China not to 
Insist upon th(> acceptance of i t s naps and advised the Cbvenu 
sent of India not to press for th« McMdhan Line* It apresse^ 
i ts deep faith that Tocialist China could neii^r eoaunlt sgr re. 
ssion against India, just as India had no intention of CMnsl. 
tting agcfesslon agc;lnst China* The resolution also stressed 
that the C»'I stood with the rest of th« people of India for 
24* e^w Ay (!fev Delhi), Deceaber 5, 1964, p*l* 
26* UaljS*, Sep tern i3er 20, 1969, p«l« 
a>« ^ e , itimltttton /iilnateil fay ths tienlirft] rinainUitifl of tfai 
rriBinnlit Party nf InrtU» Calcutta^ rapteaber as, 1969| 
see also, ??ftv / .^ (New Delhi), October 4,196g,p*6* 
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tbe terrltoris^l integrity of the nation. The National 
Covmcil of the CPI^  held at Heerut in mid ITovemberytilaaed the 
reactionary elements inside the Congreca for launching a 
27 
campaign of hatred agalnat China. It formally stated that the 
"area of McMahan Line i s now a part of India and should remain 
In India.** Ihe Party viewed that Chinese were not right in 
not accepting the !4oMahan Line as India's boundary. As regard 
the North.U'estern border i t pleadi>d for friendly discussions 
so that the territorial l ine could be redravn. 
Ihe CPI supported the policy of the late Prime Minister 
Nehru of making a l l efforts to bring about a peaceful negotia. 
ted settlement of the border dispute with China. She National 
Council in i t s resolution on May iS^igeOy expressed i t s fee l . 
ing of satisfaction! that following the recent talks between 
the Prime Minister of India and the :^ remier of the Chinese 
People's UepubliC) there had been some lessening of tension 
in the relation betweim the two countries. The Party hailed 
the Joint comraunique as an important document and a step in 
the direction of peaceful settlement of Indo-China border 
dispute. It asserted that c»»operatlon and friendship between 
India and China had »^t only given to the '-brld the Panch ^ee3 
£7. New Aygf November 22, 1969, p.7* 
28* Ual^i '^«ti alao, Tha rtatiteaen (!fev Delhi), November 
lb, 1969. 
• ££7 . 
and th« 9Gtnduag 8pirit« kMt indeed profoundly influenced the 
eourte of history in tiie entire 'fro^'tian region and ttreng. 
S9 
thened the larger cause of i^ r^ld peace. The party v^s oonf 1. 
dent t ^ t p«3Ciful n«iotiatlons with China vould naturally 
be given paranount importsncet iiould bear fruit and arou#it 
about the present chapter to a close. This stand of t^ ie CPI 
vas, no doubtf pro«>i\us»lan which also stood for a ne0>tlat€d 
do 
solution of thfc probleo. 
AJoy uhosh in a stateaent, issued on November 22, 19&1, 
condemned Chinese pn>b« in L^ dakh and d«iaanded that the 
Ooverment of th« People's Republic of China aust iasedlately 
put an end to such acts, '^ e also urged that effective aeasures 
uttist be taken lay thea to ensure that such tilings dondoccur 
again. 
'i'Jie CPI vas in favour of building up the defences of 
the country against the possible aggression of the China, 
Hukut Biharilal, vhile spt^ akln;^  In the mjya Sabha, in 1961, 
statedI 
29. Kwar, Qlrjfi ^ 'rora, V.K., ed*. JhgMlintl an todlan 
rrttkiim iflgn^ Bombay, / s ia Publishing louse, n.d*» pp. 
b£8.29 . 
30. ^JoUatLt Hov%aber 11 , I9u2, p. 11. 
31. EMMJjtkt January 13, 1963, p. 12. 
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"No nsition can d«ny to Si»if defonott m«^tur«s under 
threat of further aggression* Ve had no option tut to build 
up assidously ^n anti^China front on idiologie&ly dlploaatic 
and ph/sical pl&nes, «^ aust ke«p th« vorld fully Inforaed 
of t^6 a|;^r(»S8lve designs of Qiioa and dulld up a strong a l l 
/"sia front against th%; Chinese oenace* 
*'^ bove s U ve aosty at a l l cost res is t Chinese penetra. 
tion in ttm NiF^ area* ^e wist st^nd by the A^ c^ '-teshan Line 
and strive for the vacation of Chinese sggresslon In a l l 
possible vays and our entire foreign and defwice poliey should 
be tuned to tlit objeetlve of meeting the Chinese menace with 
3S 
which we and many other part of Asia are faced to day*** 
fhe September*October clashes and the subsequent massive 
invasion of the Chinese forces on Ladhakh and H<^ Kdhan Line 
e«ctor thrm' the >.hole country out of i t s various moois of 
expactations of the cessatl-tn of tension* Thti Indian oommunists 
?*t the time were confronted with ^ ^tnty basic Question "mm. 
whether a soela l i s t dountry could eooAlt aggression? ^hlle 
the majority of the Party had condemned Chins for her aggre. 
sslon, a third of Its mem^ e^rs continued to have their reserva. 
tlons on tie issue* 
3S« f^nata^ OeCtfRber 17^ '*961| p*^S* 
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Xh« CFI stated t^at Cbina had ooamltted aggr^tslon 
against Indis* The resolution adoptad by the ^atloml Council 
of tha CPl on rbvembar £« IStil, apaeiflealljf tamed the 
erosainc of the H<^ !Hl!an Lina by Cbina as an -ct of aggra-
awl 
salon and violation of Indian territozy* fha t'arty gave its 
ful l adherence to the i»rioa Minister ^ah«i«s ©all of national 
34 
unit/ for national defence* The reaolution had eipoked total 
denunciation from the Chineee leadership* It pledgsd itself 
to participate fully in a l l activit ies for the prosMtlon of 
national unity* defence and str«tgthening of the morale of 
the people* It (^lled upon a l l the sections of Indian paople 
to u' Ite ih defence of the ootherland* This narked a turning 
point in the history of the CPI* The adoption of this reso* 
lutlon had an Iromedlate lmp<)ot on the inner party conflict* 
The leaders of ^ e tvo grtMips in the party had oade each other 
'i target and took a l l possible steps to sp l i t and divide* This 
led finally to a division and r i f t of the CFT into t«o distinct 
groups «-<» Left and Hlght, i*e*, C^ I (M) and C**! respectively, 
each claiming Its party as the genuine Maraclst.I««ilnlst party* 
vas 
The left/inclined to support China in i t s stand, vhile the 
right wished to follov the (Soviet Union in the natter* 
a*i* fee, ?^ tf*> g*, '^ovembcr 4, 1962, p*!. 
d4* Ibid, 
db* iMd* 
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lh« CPI bteame th« bitterest critle of China follovlng 
th« RuMian lln«« It aecusad China of d«llb«rat«ly poisoning 
Intopnational Security and paaea* It disapprovad a l l proposals 
that sought to lasva India's d«f«no« at the msrey of othsr 
countries. It generally agreed vith the approach of the 
Priae Minister Nehru and his vaznlngs against dependence on 
foreign countries for the supply of anis and equipments. The 
imperialists hoped that once India get involved with thea 
through military alds» they %«9uld be able to undermine her 
foreign policy of non-alignment and her independence* 
vhlie some opposition parties questioned ^ e validity 
of non-alignment, the CPl strongly urged that the defence of 
non-alignment, at such a crucial time had become more necessary* 
The party vas confident that once ^ e supporters of non»allgiw 
ment '^ are united there i s no power on earth vhlch can sverve 
37 
India from this policy*** This stand of the CPI shovs the 
genuine fear of the party that India would move towards the 
vestern camp in sn attempt to strengthen i t s defence to meet 
the Chinese threat* 
The Central Executive of CPI in a statement released 
on /aamary 17, 1963 velooaed the Initiative of the Colombo 
Conference In seeking to prove a basis for the consolidation 
of the cessation of host i l i t i es as a f i r s t step for the opening 
36* 2bXA»t February 4, 1963, p*6* 
37. See, Rrr^ i»ifei«*n,/ldi%«t>rt bv the Watlnnil r^mcll (if ttt 
-nirr?*-^ ^"^^ "^ ^"***' yeb^iary 6»18. I9&a> 
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of nsgotlatlont vltih China. Th« ttattfitnt extandtd tht 
^'arty's ful l support to Nehru in his **construotiv« approaoh** 
to th« Coloniao proposals* It viovsd that dcspita ttisse fa^ur. 
atila d«v«Xop«entS| ths path to a negotiated settlement vas 
not dear* Th« Chinese aggression had ereated a ''crisis of 
conf idenoe" \^ich could not be easily tadeled* It could only 
end %^ en a nutually ai^eed plan of disengagement vas brought 
into operation and further negotiations held in a proper 
38 
atmosphere* The Party stated that the stand of the Govern. 
fflent of India in this respect vas vholly consistent vith the 
dignity of the nation and vith Its fundamental interests* 
5:peaking in the Parliament, /•K.Gopalan, a leader of the CPI, 
saidf ''ve find that t.(.a Colombo Conference proposals vith 
the clarlflcatlonsi constitute a reasonable basis of starting 
negotiations* consistent vith our honour and our vital inter. 
39 
ests." Ilhe Pixrty urged the Goverament of China to alternate 
India's acceptance of the Colombo proposala iqar A similar act 
40 
on i t s part vithout any further delay. 
3&* jhg gtatiiaaB (N«V Delhi), January 18, 1963. 
39* Lnk Sitfarti ag'MtMf Varies 3, Vol. XII, January £3. 1963 
Cols* 6007«1S* Hovever, i t i s strange enough that vhile 
the CPI velcomed these proposals in to to by the Govern, 
fflent of India, i t did not thiitc the acceptance of these 
proposals t&' China necessary and asked the Oovemment 
of India not to insist on having these proposals as the 
only basis for negotiations^ see, Cbakravarti, Rem* 
Lafc f^tbha DabaUai Thlr<! ^•ries, Vol* XII, January U , 
1963, cols* 6248.62&4* 
40* If aw Aga, Feburary 24, 1963, p*6* 
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Lat«r on th« Central £x«eutlv« of th« CPI, In a 
resolution adopted on ^prll 14, 1Qk»d, expressed Its f irs 
oeiief that *'the responslbillt/ for the oontlnusmce of the jor 
present ondesirsble si^istion and for Uie failure to start 
negotiations l i e s vhoUy vith the Chinese Cbvermenti vhlch 
has turned down the just and hor^umiole initiative and proposal 
41 
of friendly impartial norwallgned oountries." It accused 
the Chinese of strengtl^eain^ "the very forces vhieh do not 
4S 
desire a peaceful settlenent,** !7o doubt this was the f irs t 
tiae vhtitn the CPI adopted a fire stand tovards China, 
43 
'1th th€ Ideological spl i t in the Party in April 19&4, 
the C?l turned out to be t^c severe cr i t ic of the Chinese 
Goverfwent* It openly accused 6bammist China of "unleashing 
aggression** on India and betraying the cause of coMBunlssi 
and socialisB, The main plank of the CPl*s cr i t i e im of the 
Chinese government vas ^ a t China is policy tovards India 
strengthened tiie hands of *'reactionary forces" In India and 
foi'ced the uovernatftit to accept military aid froa the Vest* 
The Party^hovever^ stood for a negotiated settlement of the 
41. "^ eci Ibid., April 21, 19&S, p. 11* 
42. Th*. Tl«i>. nt inriia (Nov Delhi), 'pril 1t>, 19&3. 
43* The Split vas the natural consequc-nce of the ideological 
r i f t uetween Moscov and Peking «hieh resehed its C I^MSZ 
in J^reh 19l>d i^en the China claimed for themselves that 
they not, Russia vera the true hiers of Lttiin and Hajix* 
probI«B* Th« Party twli«v«d that the border dltput* between 
the tvo oountrlei could not be settled ^ foreci It could 
only be settled through peaceful neflotiatlons to find s 
pollt loal situation. Forceful settleiient of the dispute 
would be deteml ned to the Asiaa-solldarlty • the solidarity 
of nevly liberated countries against the neo-eoloniallst 
plotting of the l«perialist|;^ and to our ovn national interests. 
Ihe CPI Chalr»&ny r.A«Dange fe l t that since the Colombo pro-
posals ver« dead end ^ne , they could not be said to oecupy 
any raore historical stage for a peace treaty betveen the IMO 
countries. He appeiled the three countries •—» India, China 
and Pakistan "to meet at the highest level directly through 
a t tx friendly mediation and arrived a treaty of permanent 
p«ace and friendship in the Interest of the /"sla and ^r ld 
46 
peace*** T^ ie CPI believed that for the promotion of Asian 
solidarity and for th« maintenance of vorld peace, the 
friendship and cooperatlf>n between the two great countries 
of the world . India and China • had become, an imperative a 
need of mankind. 
The CPI (M) in this respect adopted the Pro-Peking line 
It always demanded friendly relations betwe«n India and China, 
44. [;itttt Wltih Chlnftt Calcutta, CPI Pub., 19bo, p.£. 
46. mn ??tet§MHin (Nav Delhi), Hay 18, 196<>. 
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It r«fus«d to accept th&t China <K>flnltt0d an act of aggcMsion 
in defiance of international lav. It did not attad^ any 
laport&ncit to th« integrity end eecurlty of India* It had 
abeolutely an antUnatlonal way at thiiitinf in this regard* 
It went on propogating that China, governed bur the great 
Peoples revolutionary Govemient can never be the aggressor. 
It foug^'t against the vorld **aggresslon" In relation to China. 
It suggested that %>hile Insisting on t^ €. Mc^^^n Line as 
our frontier in e&stem sector^ the Ooverment of India should 
sho '^ re&dlnesa for mutual adjustaient in the vestem sector. 
47 
particularly in tiw Aksai Chin area. 
^ e^ CFI (M) urged India to enter into negotiations with 
China without sny condition. B.f.KBnadlve^of.CPI (M)^ealled 
upon the aovemsent of IiKiia to take initiative for a dialogue 
with China without insisting on adherence to the Colonbo 
proposalSi when the sponsors of these proposals themselves 
did not look upon ^ea as soaething sacrosanct, was politically 
48 
iaoorreot and %frong. the Marxist leader r.M.l>»NaBbooiripad 
said thaty **eontiimianoe of the state of ^^ ar, would force India 
46. SeeJiMnlUtllftn fin rpJLitligfif New Delhi, CPI (N)» Pub., 
'I9b4, p.76. 
47. *'A Voice of ^anitary**» Editorial, p«>ftni«it« oa^oa^y 
February 13, 19tiio» 
48. X^ i^ fttettaflian (^elhl), May 5, 1966. 
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to pa/ a prle* vhote «xt«nt and lap&ot ooald not aiva/s b« 
49 
••on*** He launched a bitter attaek on tiie Indian Oovemnent 
and the ''revisionists*' (the Kig^t Coammlstt) on their appro^eh 
to the problems of IndiaU dispute vith Its nelg^bottrs. parti. 
eularljr vlth China and Pakistan* 
Ihe cn (M) Vm^ declared that the antl.ChlnB pftlley 
vas cansistently util ized to Sttcure more aid froa ^ e U.e.^. 
61 
and the same veapon was used to • appeal to the U«S,S«IU It 
blamed India that instead of US inperlailsa and aeo»ooloniallSB, 
opposition to socialst C3ilna had became the naln feati&re of 
India's foreign policy* It vle%*ed that in place of breaking 
the deadlock over the CoJioB^ proposals^ settl ing Indo»Chlr» 
conflict peacefuilyi the Congress, leaders had been dragring 
India towards the camp of U*B* Imuerlallsm. In the naae of 
62 
national defence* The Party oontlnCLOMiStLy insisted the Indian 
Qovemment to re-establish friendly relations vith China, In 
the vords of L.M.S.HaBboodrlpad^ "our basic position is that 
India should have good relations vlth a l l the ;&}olallst coun-
tries* Bn& has nov established such relationship vlth the 
4»» iJslA.y May 30| 19t»6. 
60. Th« FTlfmu««nm Ti«i>« (;?ev Delhi), JUly 1«»» 19i>6* 
61* PallUfial i)rgan;iatitonil Bmmrt of thi fiintitl fim 
tn thi liUht Congrtiig of ttm fiftfiinUti farty nt India 
QbJOlMXh Calcutta, CPI (M) Pub*,Aprll 19&9, p*111* 
62* "Vhy CoBOKUiist (^xxist>7 Llectldn Manifesto*** In Bhathal| 
ftamdas, G* ed*yfnAUlfial AlUmaMYM lU IndUt (iBtClttt 
pp* A 4£8.29« 
Bovltt Unioiu Sh« should not nov a«lay such an •stato.lshaant 
of rsapport with China as vsXl*** 
Both th% CoRORmlst partlas s t i l l doaand a reai^ro^eh. 
Bent bstvaen India and China on th« basis of p««ac«ful se t t la . 
mant of a l l th«. lntaj»toord«r disputes* Such & stsp^ the tvo 
parties believst is iaevitahle for establishing p«aee in Asia* 
So far as China is concezBttd India alva/s tried to maintain 
friendly relations with this neighbouring country and continued 
to pl«3d foA i t s aembe ship in the U«N, dn the other hand 
China has repurted t ^ Paneh Sheel spir i t and has not accepted 
the Coloabo proposals* She has sided vit2i Pakistan over the 
Kashmir issue and has adopted & policy of opposing and aatagon. 
ising India at a l l levels* Ignoring a l l these brutalities 
of China, the Communists ask India to se t t le a l l the diff. 
erenees vith China in order to establish peace in Asia* As 
long as China continues to keep up i t s aggressive designs 
tovards India, the talk of friendly relations Is unrealistic aw\ 
uncertain* 
Aiinypr ftr nis PSP ^m 'mr, pfnPt 
T^ e "PSP, i t might be said, consistently advocated a 
t^ o^ttgV policy tovards China* It was bitterly crit ical of the 
53* 1^^ mndxxmt^n Ti—» (Hew Delhi), August 31, 1971* 
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•xpantlonlgt poXiey of Communist China and apprahantivtly 
varn«d th« country of the danger from China slne« t960* It 
danounoad Chln«a« int«rvantion In Tlbat and urgad tha Indian 
paopla to ass ist the Tl&atan paopla In safaguardlng their 
Indapendanoe and avoiding a polloy of socialism. Tha party 
laadar3 considered China*s oocupatlon in Tibet as a 
64 
*'daXiberate act of aggression,'* It did not volcome the Panoh 
Sheal Agreement and denounced i t as a surrender of India's 
r l ^ t in Tibet. Acharya Krlpaiani| vfaile speaking in the 
Parliamant on the issue sacoastically remaiked; 
"This great doctrine (Panch Pheel) vas bom in sin 
• . • • • s in because i t vas ermnciated to put the seal of our 
approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation vhloh was 
associated vlth us ypirltuaily and culturally*" 
The aggressive and mspansionlst acts of China threaten. 
Ing the territorial integrity of India in 1969 caae as a rude 
sho€dc to the PSP^  Following the prevailing situation the 
party in a resolution demanded that, "the Government should 
Insist upon the Immediate vacation of a l l areas wrongfully 
and forcibly occupied by China and demand unequivocal aocep. 
tanoe af the HoMah«n Line and the traditional nimalayan 
64, Acharya Kripaiani, Irfifc Sfttftt I?Bl»taa, Vol.V, Part II 
May 6.12, 1964, col. 7646^ 
66. Ibirt., Vol. >VIII, August 19, 1968, col. 1678. 
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f3rontl«r, f Im W troatiy. g«ogr&phy &nd usag«. •lt«i^«rc 
66 
fjEoa Ladakh to Cikkia« af th«i pr«r«qul8lt« of any iMcotlatlon." 
It d«aand«d the Oovanutfit should kw prtsparad to taka auch 
ma'suraSi fflilitary and diploaatlct as to eonpal China ta quit 
Indl:^ n tarrltory. It OAaurcd the Qovanaant of India Its 
full support in a l l h«r ataps to dafand the Intagrlty and 
67 
honour of tha l&nd* 
.'t the time of Chlna'a Prlaa Mlnlstar's v i s i t to India 
in 19&0t ^® '^^'^ £innouncad Ita ooiaplata diasatlsfaatlon 
regarding the Invitation extended to the PTIJM Minis tar of 
China* It held party maetlnga and demonatzmtlons on /pr l l 
17| 1990, to deoand the vacation of Chinese aggression and 
68 
the rcco^jiition of Mctijhan I4ne by China, 
The ^rational Exeoutiva of the t'fP vleved vlth grave 
eoneem that the mch advertised talks between the Prime 
Htel8ter*s of the two countries failed not only to produce a 
aatiafaetory sattleaeat but even to ornate a friendly ataosphei 
in vhieh fruitful dlseusslon would beooae poseible* It con. 
deaned the Coramunist x^ arty of India's prolonged propaganda 
66* "iiesolutions adopted 't the JUbilee Session held at 
Ibmlwy 6 • 9 Novenber 1969/ In Poplal, P.L^ toag 
QentraX EXficltiflina in Indita> nM«filt*» P* 286« 
67. liiXii* 
56* Janatay Hai'ch £? , 19t»0|P«l£« 
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that no CoBonnlst country can ooonlt an aggr«talon. tht 
part/ declared that i t would i^t glv« up It* stand Ifcat "no 
sattlaaent Detvaon India and China vould ba poaslbla until 
69 
China vacatas aggraaaion of our aoll«" It urgad tha Govanu 
mant of India to deal f lr«ly v i ^ China* It daaandad ^ e Gov. 
amaant to aata^lah closer relatione vlth a l l the nations 
6 
in 'fro-'sl?* wlt^ 't view ^ rtsistlng the CoBHonlsts offanalir*. 
It persistently demanded tha Ooverment to take neoeesary and 
effeetlve 8t«ps to eject the Chinese aggression froa the 
Indian soil* 
i'fter 196S border conflict, the ??P*s attitude in 
re^id to China b«caae very rigid* It oond«BMd China as 
^ l l t y of deliberate and unproiK^ed aggression on India* Dur. 
Ing the \'iki- the party extended i t s ful l support to the war 
efforts of the Governsent* Addressing a PS? rally In Sbubay 
la October t9t»S| Ashok& MehU, the Chaiman of the party, 
stated th:>t theie could be no ne(ptiation vlth China "until 
the aaered so i l of the aotherland i s get rid of the invadera*" 
60* DffQMitniii an laflian AffaXra 7a&Q» Afi«£il«» p* 63i* 
60* itUji* 
111* Ktiilng Cnn1i«Hflrafr ArflhitMIt Vol*13, London, Ke«slng*s 
publication, 196U6£, p. 19139* 
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He gave tbii c a l l to mak« a coQ'Bon cause with the '^joverment 
In fighting the Chinbse aeaace. '!,V.Kamath, Deputy leader 
of ti'c r'art^'i v^dle s^ivaking in the r'arlian^t saidy "ve 
want every incJ of our territoJcy should be eibared of the 
l a s t Chln«£S«i tidier*** Je added| "Tht illaalayae are n?t 
today Q physical barrit-r •• They are the ideological 
frontier bttveen democracy and coiuayuiism • • • • • and tiiis 
comnunlst conspiracy, the international eoamunlst conspir cy, 
must be scotched on the helg»^ts, not at tht foo t -h i l l s of t^ -e 
Iflnalayas." 
rhe i'raja Tvoclallst Party wanted that the Chinese agg. 
ression sVould ae repulsed. The party over»ruled the idea 
of a compromise with China, as was voiced in some vocal 
Si:^ctions of the public opinion* I t equally opposed the 
proposal f-yr nelotlatlons with China on the basis 'if V^b v l th . 
drav^i of chintSfe forces to the position occupied by them 
oefoie r«ptember &, i9o£. I t viev^^d that no usual purpose 
vould be &«.rved by V^ e continuance of diplomatic relations 
«>4 
vith China, 
*>2« Janatay October 28, 1962, p,3« 
63« T^ y:ahh.n netetca, ' ei'ies 3 , Vol* IX, M9.2, November 9, 
19^2, c o l s . 390-9. 
t>4. " e^e, i l Q ^ ^ , November 11, 19b2« 
• Ml . 
Th« national £x«eutlve of the i^ fp h«ld t^at unllataral 
e4ias«.flrfc by China and her to called peae* proposal! ar« only 
a part of China*! stratajy to v«ak«n, and even paralys* India•& 
v i l l to resist asgr«s8lon. It fully dlifavour^d the ««aa«. 
f l m proposals, 
Thou^ th« i*SP upheld the valJUUt/ of noa^UcBBsnt 
during the 1962 eonflict, howevery It viewed clearly that 
non.allgnBent policy would not be allowed to prevent India 
from seeking and obtaining a l l a l l l tary help for defending 
66 
herself against a powerful aggressor* 
The i'SP was also p opposed to the Colombo proposals* 
It criticised the Coloabo fomula on the ground that, **It 
has dealt with problem as if i t were a laere boundary dispute* 
and has not ev«i referred to China as an aggressor^ i t has 
5&)ig^ .t to equate the a^^ressor with the t i c t las of* aggression, 
and the aggressor is pezmStted to enjoy the fruits o^ his 
aggression.*' The /ndhra Pradesh ?^? ixecutlve v^.lch met on 
February £5, 1963, described the Colombo Proposals on the 
^ino*Indiin border dispute as totally unaocsptable and 
&&• 13iX^$ February lOf 1963, p«11, 
66. Jbid., Maxch 3i , 1963, p*^; 
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dang«rou»» ^coordlng to Ity "The six natlQius rett at Colon bo, 
instead of oondcomlng China for l l l t ga l oecupatlon of Indian 
tmrtitot^f had lndlr«etl/ lent their seal of approval to 
the aggressldn by asking India to aUov It to retain large 
parts of Indian territory under i t s exeoutlve eontroX and 
also to agree to have ^ Joint c iv i l adtalnistr^tlon over some 
of th« other Illegal occupied Indian areas*" 
J^e PFH cateeorically stated that sicceptsnce of the 
Colombo proposals %ould mean national hiMlll>ji.tion and losn 
of Indian terrltor/ | so the Priae Minister had no r i ^ t to 
accept the proposals* H«i 3araa, the PfP leader^%^ile 
Speaking in the Psrliasient said^ "By our aeeeptance of Colombo 
proposals ve hsva made a defeeto cease-fire line Into a dejure 
69 
line* This i s defaeto appoasescnt*" 
The other leader of the ?art/^ H«tk Pal asserted In 
t^e Parllaaent that^ "If we are aiAced to suocttftb to such 
proposals th»t wil l aaik the disintegration of this country 
wC and if India disintegrated| there may not really be such 
70 
a tt^ iln^ in /sia* It wil l only be larger China*" 
«>6* i t l i^ t Hareh iQ* 19l»S« p*8* 
69* IkUUf March S>\^ 19o^, p.6* 
70* Ibid*! p*^* i^ uri«ndrft ??ath Dvlvedy also oondenned the 
proposals as dangerous* rpoaklns In the ^axllaaant, he 
said* *' I feel that ColoBbo . roposals were dangerous la 
U^eir iiXsplicatlons and iisactrous in their consequences 
fbr the countryy polit ical ly and n l l i ta iy . they ifcre 
advantageous and favourable to our eneogri P^O-T^V Kaifca 
nihft»^y Vol*XIIy!«o* 29, January 23, 19bd» cols*60i6^0» 
The Party d«iiiaiid«d that OoiramiiMit thould Inilat upon 
lKB«dlat« vaostlon of a l l araas oeeupicd hjf tha Chlnasa* It 
obaervadt in this oonnaotlonf t^at t^fou^-out tha oountrj, 
tha 10th Fabruary, 1963 ba obsarvad aa Antl^ooapfoaiaa Day 
to carry on a caasalass atniggla fbr th« llboratlon of Indian 
tarritory from tha Chlneseoccupatlon. It also daoidad to 
oppostt any mov^ on thu psrt of the OovamBai^ to eoaa to a 
ooapcoaiaa with th« Chlnsae im^«rl&llaa« It op^oaad to any 
negotiations with China as lon^ as Chinese aggratsion i s not 
ootiplatel/ vacated* It argued that :tll the Chinese, s i t t ing 
on the chest of the countr/i fflust be pushed and dislodged* 
Any negotiation vith the en«ay voulc! then be possible* It 
\'as coBpleteiy opposed to the ptKceful surroider In the n&ae 
of peaceful ne^tlstions* It also voiced i ts opposition to 
^ e Governfflent for i ts Inability to prepare the country and 
Its amed forces to oeet the Chinese attadt* 
the Pr?9 in i t s election aianifttSto of 19&7^  sou^t an 
independent force with regard to China* rhere vss s pico 
for forging cloae link with 'si«n cwintrles against Chinaae 
expansionisB* Ttit party aanlfesto was crit ical of the Congress 
72 
policies for being lukewarm* The 1971 raeetlon Manifesto 
71* Jan^ta^. Iforch 3 1 , 19^3, p*6« 
72* This marited the departure froa the stand Hk taken ty the 
i^ arty In 19&1 and 196£ in supporting the Oovemaent 
vhenever i t followed a genilne policy of non-lnvolveaent 
in powar bloc politics* 
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highlighted th« ne«d for olosor eooptration vlth oth«r 
oountrlee In th« fi4e« of an afgr«»slf4 p»Xl«jr pttm«4 tgr 
79 
China* 
The rrP| tloe and a^ain, laaiinted the OovenB«iit*s 
over-optlalsm &nd short-sightedness in regard to China* T!^ « 
Party stated that the advocacy on t^.e part of the Indian 
delegates for seating; H«d Ciiim In the U*!}, refleeted the 
wishful thinking of tli«> Jovema«mt« De&plte Uie aggressive 
postures across the borders ev«i befoxe the notual oonfllct 
broke out« th« Indian Oovemtent failed to realise the dang» 
«rous endemic in such a policy* 
The T*^? stood for a strong China Policy* The Party 
vas 3^3Inst gatting aassiv^ military aid from friendly ooun. 
tries to maintain the tezritorl&l integrity of India* It 
characterised the Goveroment's policy in regard to Chinese 
aggression as far from firm and dear* She r^ arty declared 
that the ioveraaent "has taken a slippery road of oompromise 
and surrender of our national territoryt talking a l l the tlm« 
ahout dignity and honour| i t has refused to break off dlp» 
lomatlo relations vith th<: aggressor vho retains in occupation 
of our sacred soi l) and finally It has proved i tse l f to be 
73. **PrP Election Manifesto**, {fatilinaX Hgraltf (Lucknov), 
January £0, 1971* 
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d«void of stlf.respsct 1]or «3cohanging gr««tlngt with the 
Chinese Ooverment on Its !?atlonal days and tqr tMI lupporting 
74 
the aggressor's nembershlp in the UN,** 
The srp urg^ d the Ooiremseiit to fonulate a f im and 
oXear polley in regard to China, the 19l>7 EXeotlon Huilfesto 
of the B?,t* stressed the need to strengthen the aned forees 
of the country. It declared that the "needs of defeneejire 
firstly a strong villf secondly econoaie power and thirdly 
79 
ailltary strength," Jn the contingency of var^  the aanifesto 
said that the 6BP would not hesitate to sake radieal and aU 
round flanges In the araed forees and stood for ooapulsory 
conscription* According to the Party the primary a la of 
fbrel^ policy should be that| "either Tibet becoaes indet>endent 
or Kailash Mansaroveri and the east-floving Brahaaputra 
77 
becoBMS the boundary line between India and China," It deaanded 
a foreign policy of regaining for India of the frontier that 
history« nature and emrironacst have given her* It consistently 
affiraed its stand for strengthening the will of the 
74 . SaMyilfcti S O g U m t Pir tyt Statiaantm nf Prinaipl^a 
PrnfMai inri PaUtilaal Untt AHidsi^t p» di» 
76. ffiP FilMtton mnXTMtQt e^w Delhi, S5P. Pub*, February 
19» 19t»7, pa2. 
7l». ittLA« 
77, See, "Election Manifesto of the srp", Th« Indian R^ nr^ f^f (New Delhi}, January SO, 1971. 
p«opl« to d«f«nd their fronti«rs, and 8«Y« top priority to 
th« territorial integrity of the eountrir* 
Gb^ the ?ep and the SSJ» never eev vith favour the 
China's efforts to eaerge as a sole doalnant pover in / s i s* 
Bath expeeted a fira and f <«lf*eonfident foreign poliey froa 
t^e Indian Govem&ent, Xhr. ar^uaents put forvsrd to thea 
vere nationalistie rather than ideologieal* Ihere wes noth. 
ing unique In their approach to Chinese Stigression. Fvery 
patriotic Indian, ^atever his pol i t ieel creed, was eri t ios l 
of Chinese aggression and t^e i l legal occupation of Tibet and 
Indian territory south of McMohsn Line tgr Chinese expan. 
sionists* Even the Coaounists condssned it* She unequivocal 
stand taken by the social ist parties indicated that th«qr 
vere nov in possession of one acre stick vlth vhlch to best 
the goveroaent. Xhey ut i l i sed the opportunity to highlight 
the weak.kneed policy of the eoveifiaeat| the dniaaginative 
approach with regard to relations vith China and gave %pam^ ng 
for the future in unaaMguous tefas* These parties, ho%wver, 
refrained from suggesting to the govcrtaient to align i t se l f 
vlth the v«ji8tem bloc and accept huge azas aid froa t^ea, v l ^ 
strings or without strings* 
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i^akistani judging froa the situation prevailing at 
the momMity seaos to b« the most unoooproBlslng sad unfriendly 
nelg^ibaur of India. The problsa of t^aklstan Is ths product 
of past history and ths pres«nt Internal situation In that 
country • Xhere Is no qulek and slaiple solution to this 
problaa. t>ifr€<renc«s between the tvo countries originated 
since the very birt^ ^f i^aklstan following the ^buntbatten 
Pl&n, As Michael Brecher observed^ **India and Pakistan h«ive 
been in a state of undeclared var, vlth varying degrees of 
intensity, trroughout wheir brief history as independent 
78 
states*** For nearly &» years India has sought to nornaiise 
her relations vlth Pakistan on the basis of territorial 
statusji^ue and no var pact* t^akist^n, despite the lapse of 
fit) yearS| has not responded to India's genuine desire for long 
lasting peace* It )T&» rather becoae an article of faith with 
Pakistan to pour hatred against India, and to balk a l l attenpts 
on the part of India to arrive a peaceful settlement of ^11 
outstanding problem through bilateral negotiations* 
The Indian Government claims that i t s policy towards 
Pakistan has n'>t been different from its general policy of 
78* 3recher. Mic>iael, !!rt>m i fi ft>litjfiil Blagraahyt tondon, 
Oxford university Press, 1969, p* 67&* 
« &4B « 
•utual fritnathlp and aeeoBaodatloii lrr«tp«etiT« of pollti«ai 
79 
Idtologleal and oth«r dlff«rencM« In n ««atag« to a prost 
on «agu«t I69 1947, Prlno MlnisUr lf«hrtt saidf **! n«Bt to 
say to a l l natlona of th« ^rldf InaXudlng our nolghbour 
60 
oountry, that vo stand for paaeo and frlondflhlp vlth th«i«** 
In a spooeh at Indian Council of Vbrld Affairs la Mareh 194k9, 
ho statod that, **th€r« i s no doubt at aXl in a j aiad that i t 
i s insTlt^bila for India and i^:iki8tan to havo olotc rslations, 
v«r/ eloa« rslations somotiaes or othsr in ttie fttt«r«* I 
oanittt state vhsn this viXI taks plaes bat situatod as v« 
arof with a l l our past w« cannot Uit Just ladiffsrsnt tisig t^aoux 
Vo ean be oithor rather hostila to oach othftr or i^rjr friondljr 
with oach othar.Ultlaataly y oan only bo raally vtzy friandly, 
iri^ atevor poriod of host i l i ty nay intervona In batvoon boeaust 
81 
our intorosts aro so closoly int«r»link«d«" 
Indead the sssmes of Indlisi*s forolgn policy tovards 
Pakistan vas Its attwpt to l ivo in poaeo vlth thAs dlssatis . 
88 
fisd nslghbour* In s broadeast, tho Qovemor-Oonsral of 
79* HaJan. M.S., *India and Pakistan As a ?a«tor In B s^h 
othsr's Forslgn Policiss and Hslations**, JntTnatiAnai 
fitami—y Vol*Illy IV»«4« April 19t^ Si p, d49. 
80* Nohxtt, S^Uy in^^pandana* Aivi Aft«>^ A Collection of aors 
iaportant spsschos of ^avaharlal !Vcnm fro« iBsptcBbcr 
19*» to Kay 1949, Oslhl, the Publication Division, Qovomscnt of India, 1949, p. 14* 
81. /tUHfihru*! *^ BttBhm» gfipti 
p. £68. 
Contd«««*» 
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Pakistani M.A.Jlnni^ said that h« v^ntsd to 11 vs peaeafuily 
aod Balntaln eordial IVlendL/ rtlatlons vlth Pakistan's 
isnsdlats nslghbours and vlth wrXd at larga* Tha Frasldant 
of Pakistan Genaral Ajrub Khan o^n Saptaabar 1| I969>at Nav Dalh 
said &!ist "Balng naxt • door nalghbours • / suteltslon Is that 
vhatevar mlg i^t hava happanad in tha past^ tha tlaa has ooaa 
whan va should think of having Bora national and nai^bourly 
ralatlons vlth aaeh otiiar. I hava a faallng that i t v l l l ba 
84 
in aach othar*s intarast*** 
Tiovavary Insp^ta of thase friandly daelarations t^a 
story of thasa tv.o eountrlds ralatlons baeaaa ona of discor^l-' 
sonatioas latant. aoaatlaaa aanlfaatf but dlacord al l the 
86 
saaa* 
fASHMiRi 
^ part frofli tha othar problans that cloudad haaltSijr 
ralatlons batvaan India and Palclatani tha pro bias of Kasha Ir 
is tha Most Important for bo^ t)ia oountrlas* I t Is that 
dlsputa in %<hieh India has baan Involvad sinea ladapandanea* 
It is laportant baeausa I t InvolYas an issua fundaoantal to 
83* nafiwiMfai and ^awriiM of SrUlali CaMftnwialtfa Affairi, 
oonpUad by Man s«rgh| London^ 19i3, ?ol«II« p«70E« 
84. Fnnign PftllCY at IndiBt oaacUM p* 3^9. 
8 6 . Oupta, Jyot i %UShan ms» InAwPakiatan R^latl^ina 1047^ 
fi^ (Ajistardam, 1968), p.34« 
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the secular basis of the Republic* "Here l i e s the last field 
of battle over the Ideological cleairage vhloh rent che sub. 
continent asunder In 1947* Here Is the final test of validity 
of the tvo nations theory, the basis of Pakistan and Its con* 
86 
tlnulng ralson d'eti'e*** 
The accession of Kashalr Is entirely In conformity 
vlth the Indian Independence '^ct. passed by the Parllaaent In 
87 
1947, Kashmir accorded to India on October S6| 1947 «hen 
Maharaja Harl ringh signed the Instruaent of Recession to 
India vhlch vas accepted by the Oovernor.General on behalf 
of the Crown* The accession vas accepted by the Indian Govern. 
ment and in March 1948 Thelkh Abdullah beoane the Prlae Hlnister 
of Rastalr* Thus the accession of Kastmlr to India is valid 
88 
as the accession of any ^t^er state* Pakistan, hovevcTi did not 
recognise Kashnlr's accession to India* The believed that the 
so called accession to India w:^ s a result of manoeuvring on the 
part of the f^haraja and Indian Governaent*Prime MinisteryLiaqua 
All Khan, in a speech broadcast on November 4,19471 said that, 
"the accession of Kashalr to India Is a fraud perpetrated on the 
people of Kashalr by Its cowardly fuler vlth the aggressive help 
89 
of the Government of India*** 
To Pakistan,possession of Kashalr Is vital for the fu l f i l . 
ment of the ideal upon vhlch she rests,a national hime and a 
natlon.state for the Muslims of the sub.contlnent* Ihdla alvsys 
rejected this theory of nationhood* Pbr Pakistan, 
86 . nraehag^ Mlehaalj_ ftp-git.y n,&77. 
Aelatione"y India and Timr 
,Patlala,Phulklan Press, 1967,p.! 
* B ec er* mc el, aiuiilA** p*6 
87* Das,Harl,Earan,*'Indo.Paklstan i 
^alglitPUIlyed*narmandar Singh,; 
88* ibiT! 
89* Thfl nawn (Karachi), lfovemb«r 6, ''947* 
. 261 • 
possession of Kashmir h&c; become a l l f« and death nuestlon. 
In a stattfBent at nicca on October 18| 19&1| the then President 
of Pakistan, Ayub Khan declared that, **Kashmlr Is a l i f e and 
death question for Pakistan, and without the solution of this 
problem ve cannot be assured of the safety of our territory, 
90 
especially the *\>stem vlng of our territory.*' On the other 
hand Nehru believed that Katluilr Is juridically and politically 
an Integral part of India and ut XK> time the Unl^d Nation's 
91 
Commission and Security Council challenged this fact. No 
doubt, "the position vhloh India acquired in Kashmir ••••• vlth 
enough legal and moral sanction ••••• i s a part of reality 
92 
and has a natural bearing on the problem*** The Kashmir issue 
vas brought before the Security Council on December 3tt ^947, 
in the vake of Infiltration of Pakistani troops into tiie 
territory of Jaaou and Kashmir, respite the best efforts of 
the United fTatlons, the problem could not be solved 9n account 
of the uncompromising attitude of Pakistani delegates, Kven 
the U,^. Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and three 
93 
distinguished mediation failed to provide a solution to the 
Kashmir issue. 
90*>akrsiw!r»>«t6rf?^''0t ^9 '^'» 
91. N*ehru,Ja%raharlal, ftp-olt.y p« 467. 
gikm purl, BalraJ, Kashmir Perspective** gaminar^ No«48, 
/ugust 19t>3, pp. 30-31. 
93, For details see,GupU, Sisir, Kaeh«ii> i A study In 
Tn<ilft,P«ki«tan RiJ^atianey Nev Dilhl, Asia Publishing 
House, 19&6. 
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Iha Kashmir lssu« ov«r and ov«r a^aln d«tet«d In th« 
b.N. and various ffle«tlng8 ver« held b«tv««n India and i'akistan 
to solve thu problem. Nev hopes were aroused in ''eptenuer 
94 
19bO %^ en India and t^akistan signed the Indus Water ^eaty . 
rhere vas a faradk and friendly exchange of vie\s in the Joint 
ooGosAuiique between tl^ tvo Prlae Ministers in re^rd t) Kaslwlr* 
unfortunately i t did not provide any basis for the solution 
of thfe Kashmir problta and in&ensififed feelings of hatred 
betveen these two uountries* 
In 19C l^| the leaders of the tvo countries affirmed 
their vle'^8 on i^ ashmir question, 'hl le 'T^ hru vras rer»dy to 
h&vc t^lks with t^aklstan, he made i t clear that on Kasl»irt 
they had to accept things as they were n^d talks could only 
be about adjustment of ceasefire line* On the other sldsy 
President Ayub Khan **talked of other means'* i f a peaceful 
97 
settltfaent of the Kashmir question proved impossible, fe saldy 
"ve are continuing to adopt peaceful methods for an wiieable 
settlemwit of the Kashmir dispute, mt in case we !ir£ forced 
96 
to adopt other means, the story this time would be different*" 
94* For Indus vattjr Treaty see, aupta, r i s ir , "Indus VBter 
Treaty", Tas^isR 'tffalra Rwtnrt» T^oenoer igbo* 
9b* Tfce, "Text of thfe Hecond India t^akistan Joint Gomnunlque", 
FnrftlgB fttllcy (if Infllat oa«fiU«f p* d<»&* 
96* Thfi rtr f^e^Man^ December 29, 1961* 
97* Aalan fitonrrtar (^«v Delhi), is&i, pp* 4S7cu79* 
98* Ibi^-
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Thus conesaXed threats vers offered froa the other side of 
th« border* In pursuanee to th^se sentlaents expressed by 
Its leaders Pakistan brought the Kashair question before the 
fecurity Council* It frequently raised the question of p i e . 
b l sc l t e . The motion in tht» r.eeurlty Council requesting India 
and Pakistan to resuae negotiations vas vetoed) In June ig6£| 
by the Tovlet Union. Xhe Tovlet veto came as a great shodt 
to Pakistan* 
In la t e 19&£, tit'.% ni-goti^tlons between India and Pakls. 
tan on Kashnlr question a^bln h^id. Xh«; discussion betveen 
the two «untrler. delegation headed by Foreign Minister ''varan 
ringh and ^•/•ttiutt-) vere held between Deoembex S7y 19^2 and 
99 
^^y ^6, 1963 at Six different meetings* Unfortunately^ both 
of them fa i l ed once again to reach &ny f ru i t fu l settlement* 
once again the Kashmir question was referred to the re«urlty 
Council in a bid to mobilize international opinion against 
India* Ihti Siecurity Council took up ^ e discussion of the 
Kashmir question on Fearuary 3 , t9t»4* / 1 the time i t vas 
reported that the British delegation iias lobbying among the 
Security Council nenbers for a resolution to support Pakistan's 
100 
demand for a plebiscite* India had a fee l ing of concern that 
99* For detai ls of Indo-Paklstan s ix rounds talk > !?ee| 
pp. tg63..64* 
100. m i nindttfitan Tlatit February 13» 1S64* 
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Britain supported Pakistan ov«r the question of Kashair* 
As the debate M^B ^oin^ on in th& Deourlty Counoili 
tht» r«Q.«aseof Chiekh /.odullah iavou^t & change in the Kashalr 
situation and in Indo^Pakistan relations. The fHielkb cane 
to Hew Dtlhl on April 29, he also paid a v i s i t to Rawalpindi 
on May 24. rie dlseussed the Kashoiir issue vlth both the 
Prioe Minister and Presidant of India and Pakistan respectively* 
He announced on May 2o In liavalpindiy that a aeetlng of Pakis. 
tan President and Indian Prime Minister was going held in 
Ifev Delhi in June 1964 to discuss Indo»Pakistan problens and 
101 
Kashmir question* 3ut due to the sadden death of "tehrtt al l 
hopes of solution and th& reoexrded matters remainfed as complex 
and insoluble as before* 
The growing collusion of Pakistan and China, tht arm 
supply bty th« UK to India during the 19S& India.China confllcti 
tKiC a^ou.Chelkh Abdullah meeting at Algiiirs on March S0» 1966, 
and the supply of mod«m arms to Pakistan by her partners of 
military alliances, led the fodo»Pak relations to a deterioting 
point. It was against tMs background that fighting broke out 
102 
in the Paun of Kutoh on April 9t 19&6* f l^nce the tension in 
1 0 1 . P^lrl«ton Tl«ae^ May 27, 1964. 
102* The Bann o^ Kutch is a *march* in the Xutch district 
of Oujrat rtate covering an area of almost 32.40O9 sq« 
km* and streching, along the f^ orth last of Gujrat of 
India's bordar a^oinlng V^st Pakistan* 
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th« Kutoh arsa vas sountlngi Pakistan ordered on April 24^ 
19&6| the general iBoblllxatlon of i ts ax«ed forces• India 
also jMt her ained foi ees on th« alert. Both Fhastrl and /yub 
TOS 
*'Indulged In sabre ratting and talked In terns of var*" 
Af a result of the good offices ofthe Goveinaent of 
Brit' In, India snd Pakistan readily a^'ced to a cease.flre on 
104 
Jul/ 1, ig&b* 
The cease-fire In Kutch vas short lived. India and 
Pakistan again clashed on June 16, 10&6. Niain a Kutc^ eease. 
fire agreement vas sl^ nt^ d uy the Governmanc's of India and 
106 
Pakistan on June 3o, 19i>6. 
Inspltc of the Kutoh cfease»flre agreement of June 30, 
the relation oetveen India and Pakistan remained tense. Kaeh 
side continued to occupy th« areas of others territory. 
103. Nayvd|v Kuidiy, Inrits thtt t^riUiial Afaarit i^i^it vikas 
Publle&tions, t97t, p.1«>8» 
104* The /greem«it provided for the vithdraval of Pakistan's 
forces from Kanjar Kot, Blar Jet, and Point 48» On tiie 
other hand India vas pemitted to continue her post in 
Chhad 2et, hov&ver, she asked to vlthdrev her forces 
from rardar Post and Vlgokot. riome of the territory 
India claimed rwnnlned und«r Fivalplndl. The 'greement 
also prolrlded foi the referring of the disiMte to a 
Judicial Tribunal, if no agreement could be reached in 
regard to territorial claims of Pakistan. Thfe Hiimu, 
July 1, 1966. 
106« l^ i^s agreement vas signed on the condition that "the tvo 
sides 'T)Uld restore the position as prevailing on June 
1, and refer t!ie dispute to a Tribunal vith three me^ )bers, 
on9 each 'appointed by India and Pakistan and ^ e ti^lrd 
acceptable to thems in ease they failed to agree upon the 
third person v i ^ in three months, then the IT^  Secretary* 
General vould nominate him,** Tee Nayyar Kuldlp, ruufili** 
p. "'69. 
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Incidents on the Kathnir border Increased. On <^eptiaib«r l , 
19&6, tbe ?3kl^rtan nray launched s beavy offensive Into Jaffliau, 
aecrossinc the ce^se.f lre l ine and a saiall portion of Inter-
national border* In vlev of a great a l l l t a r y threat to Its 
t err i tor ia l Integrity, India crossed the International frontier 
on Septenber o, 19od, in seif^defenoe. i'his var continued upto 
Septeaber £d, yihen a cease- f ire came Into force at the i n i t i a -
t ive of U*M, Cbcurity Council* The 19^6 vsr^ In vhlch Pakistani 
used f i ee ly thm aias supplied to thtoa by the U*C* and the 
SE/'!iX) ar«d CLM£0 powers, vus the mala Issue In Indo-Faklstan 
relations* ^o doubt the real cause of the confl ict vas In a 
large t^easurto due to the frustration of /'aklst&n over the fact 
that International mediation had fai led to give her control 
106 
over Kashmir* Xhls ^^r, hovever, underline a fresh set of 
rea l i t i es* Indian strategy r^nalned iinehanged in relation to 
Kashmir* The Kashmir riuestlon remained unaffected by a new 
threat to i t s border* 
TUV. T^SHKr.NT rf CI^.RATlQWi 
Ihfe tvo countries had agreed to accept a ce'^se-fire 
on September 22, 196b in pursvuinoe of the Security Council 
directive* 'n agreement vus also needed for u military 
10C»« 'ppadoral, A* '*India's Foreign Policy after Nehru**, 
•aaaya in hiriian ^oitttca n^fl Fnftlgn Pallgyt Qa«cU*> 
p* 1^3* 
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ditengag«n«nt and th(^  mutual vithdr^waX of tror>ps by India 
and Pakistan to their r<kSpeotlve sid«s of the Inteznatlonai 
border as v«lX as t^  cease-fire line In Kashmir, The Tsshkont 
Conference offered a dirmce of dlseni^geraent of Indian and 
Pakistani troops. This conference %ms s bold step to bring 
about !i reapproachflient between India and Pakistan, The Tash* 
kent meeting oomsenced from January 4 | 19&6* It was hoped 
t^at tVe Tashkent meeting vould better the relations betveen 
India and Pakistan, Insuguz«tlng Tashkent meeting r*rim« 
Minister Kosygln hope/Tully remarked that tMs meeting would 
"aaik ft turning point in the relation betveen Pakistan and 
India •••••••Khat Is important is to chart the path leading 
towards tl^elr settlem«it, to create climate of trust and 
mutual understanding and simultaneously to solve t^ •ose questions 
101 
which tbday constitute an obstacle to normalising &ie relations. 
In his openinii speecV on the occasion Prime Minister 
rhastri expressed t^ '«. hope that i t shoulc? be *'our endeavour 
to try to op6n a new chsipter in Indo«^k relationship.....Our 
objective at this meeting should not be recriminetlon but a 
lOB 
nev look toi^rds the future." President 'yub FThan very 
107. Taihkinii DftClaratlnnt ^w Delhi, Oovemment of India, 
ftr&i: 
106. ikltf* 
Y nKint If l i <vev oein uov i ls 
External {Publicity mvislon| 19&6) also saa. ynrmien 
rt ir» RaTv>i-ti«y January 'vg&o, pp. 1«<»* 
. 268 • 
hopefully s'ld that thli forthooalng meeting with rbastrl 
at Taahkent *'oould prove a turning point in the history of 
109 
th« subucontlnent*** There vae no decision on Kaeholr* Accord-
ing to th« c'akistani spokesoan Jajamu and Kashnlr wag **the 
110 
root cause of tho trouble.** If i t were not settled Indo« 
Pakietani relations would remain as estranged as th«y were 
iMfore* I'hanke to the Soviet t^ rime Minister'a good officcsi 
the Tashkent declaration was agreed upon and signed on January 
t» , t96i>| hy the het^ de of both tbe countrleS| India and 
Paki&tan. Both th<^  heads of the two Governments declared 
th«»lr firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations. 
The declaration provide for the immediate resumption of nonal 
friendly relations between India and Pakistan* 
It was not only an agreem«nt to restore Indo-Paklstani 
relatione to the pre 1966 war level) i t was also a declaration 
to make their relations more firm, more co*operatlve and more 
normal. Taking this into considerations the Prime Minister 
rhastri held that the Declaration had paved the way for norma. 
112 
l i s ing Indo-Pakistan relations. It promised the start of a new 
113 
era in the relation between the two countries. 
109.'2S2Auai (Kaiechi), Janu&ry 2, 19t^. 
110. ?^ee,|ht rtattaain (nelhl), th* ITlndmttan TliB>y (^ev Delhi) January 6^  1966. 
111. For the Full Text of Tashkent T>iclaration seewQM 
IfinrtVttten Xiata Hew Delhi), January i^, t966. 
112. Tha rtMtmmmtmj January If, 1966. 
113. Th^  Hiimu (Madras;, January 11, 19&6. 
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»i« r«al natur** of the Ta»hk«nt Declaration had •Ither 
tetn ov*!- «*tiaat«d or under-est lasted. Bath In India as 
wtll asirtPakistan, interpretations had bwn given vhlch are 
dlaaetrlcally opioscd to each others pdlnt of view. The 
Indian deXsgatlon t?iought that the significance of ftshkent 
tieolaratlon vas n,t that i t resolved a l l outstanding differences 
between India and Pakistan, but despite the existence of 
differences the tvo countrlts had pledged to l ive together 
114 
in ptacs as neight)c>urs. The President of India, Br. Radha 
lirlshnan said, "If we closely analyse the Tashkent Declaration 
116 
It apptaj^ s to be a compromise foxnula." The Indian 'abassador 
In HDSCOV, Mr. Kaul, said, "The 'Xashkent /greaaont aaxlted a 
reirersal of Lovd Curson*s policy of keeping Bussla out of th« 
BUb.ooiitinsnt. in the other hand the Pakistan's reaction 
vat dlffarant. Thty thought that the declaration did not gs 
cauae 
far inoughi nor aade It dear that the basic aaaa of the 
conflict wuld be satUad. Xhay did not look upon this as ^^ ^ 
a vfctopy of Pakistan or India, tnt a victory of ooaaon sense. 
Jim TIM "^ ^"^^^ ^^•^ Dami^t ^'anu.ry . i , » — . 
' T ^e. The Praaidant Radha Krlahnan;. broadaaat on Republia 
r s . Sajt g * Tilt* '^ ^ ^»^^- January 28, 1966. 
116. m V ^ " ^ ' ^ <^ *^ ^^ ' "^"^^ '^ ^^* 
n?%^sWa (Karachi). •'»«»•'/ '^'^  ^*^* 
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According to th« foreign offle*^ "Tht DBolaratlon opened three 
avenues for a pe^iceful solution of the Kaehalr dispute* First ly 
the Implementation of clause 4 of the U«If.n«ourity Council 
resolution of i^eptember SOf 19t>b} Hi^ condly direct negot iat ion 
provided under paragra)ih 9 of ^w Tashkent Declaration and 
thirdly TOntinuin^ with the good off ice provided by the ''oviet 
Union which emerged as the key faction in the success of 
118 
Tashkent Conference*** 
The more immediate gains of Tashkent Declaration can 
eas i ly be recoxmted* As the Prime Minister of India and 
President of Pakistv^n agreed in declaratloni over f l ights of 
119 
each others terr i tor ies vere resumed on February ^0^ 1996* 
'^ll aimed troops of the t^^ countries vere withdrawn before 
120 
26 February 1966 to their August b^ 19&6 posi t ions . The 
121 
exchange of prisoners of war was compelled on the same day. 
The Flgh Commissioners of the two countries returned to their 
122 
respective posts and on July 4 , 1969, the dispute over the 
Bann of Kutch was formally s e t t l e d . The Tashkent meeting and 
the declaration, no doubt, constituted "a unique «cperiment 
118. Ibid. 
119. Tha ntntmammnj February 12, ig6o. 
120. See "Zashktfit Declaration**, A Appadorai, ap-clt.^ p.219« 
121. The rtataeaan (Delhi; February ao, igi>6. 
122. Ibiri.y January 18, 1 9 ^ i also see^ A.Appadorai, asu£il*t 
p. 219. 
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In lnt«znational dlploaacy*" This Is Itself t«as a remax1cabl« 
a<^i«vefflent vhich reversed the trends of t^e past ^7 years 
and maxfced a new era In tht relations of the t«o countries, 
T^ls V38 a monument to the late Frlme lllnlster f^astrl*s 
wisdom and love of peace* But apart from thls^ t^ ts relation 
betveen the tvo countries art as unfortunate as ever* The 
Tashkent Declaration has not made any change In the stand of 
i'aklst^n vlth regard to Kashmir* India s t i l l reiterated Its 
old stand on Kashmir Issut:;* Thus ttM old i akistanl position 
that f irst Kashmir then any thing else and the Indian position 
that f irst other thing and then Kashmir s t i l l continues as 
a limiting factor in Indo.Pakistani relations* The relation 
betveen the tvo countries are s t i l l far from nomal. The emer-
gence of S^ngla Desh, under the best efforts o^ Indian Oovenv 
ment further oullt up the v-aH of severe differences betveen 
them* ^^ovever, there Is a great need that ^€ two countries 
must bear to l ive in co*operatlon in the spirit of Tashkent 
Declaration* To solve the outstanding problems both of then 
should create an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding* 
Tin: /TTTTUtif: nF m^ cpi AHD THE cPlfM i^ 
Tie Conoiunlst Party of India alvays stood for In<k>. 
iak friendship and fo^ the hon^ui^ble settlement of a l l dis-
putes betveen the tvo countries throu^ bilateral talks and 
negotiations* It believed that pt^ ace betveen the tvo countries 
1S3* This vas remarked by the Prime Minister 5:hastri after 
signing the Declaration* T^• TtMff Of Inilla (^ev Delhi) 
Januagy, 11^ 10&6« 
from a l l points of vl«v Is nee«ssar/ and a l l efforts should 
b« tak«n towai'ds Uils «>nd« Xhe C^ I^ thought that the strife 
iMtveen Pakistan and India •nablsd the rsactlonary ruling 
o lrdes to divide the peoi^le and provided the 'mciriean and 
liritish ifflperialists with opportunists for intervention, as 
in Kashmlry ^nd for increasing their aoaination over both 
India and f>akistan. It would be overcome, in vitw jf the c: !^, 
bs/ a firm alliance of friendship and mutual assistance betveen 
124 
India and ^kistan. The C?I believed that so lont^  as Indlss 
and t'akletan -^ re at logger heads, i t i s difficult to keep the 
imperialist ava/ from 's ia . It has also advocated for friendly 
relations between ^.ese two countries for e<»nomic reasons* 
The CPl in i t s pol it ical resolution^adopted at the 
Fourth Congress of the Qi*l in 196o, said that i t would wozk 
for thto improvement of relation with Pakistan, for settlement 
of a l l outstanding issues through peaceful methods and friendly 
negotiations,for^no war pact^for establishing cordial economic 
relations between India and Pakistan dislocated by partition, 
for removing a l l barriers that stand in the way of mutually 
beneficial r«i>lsitions between the two countries and for promot-
ing cultural and other act ivit ies to strengthen the bonds of 
124. Prftgra«m« ^f the CftMnunlwt Party nf India*Mootad by 
ti.% full 1B^X% Pilfty Cnnftranfilt Ibmbay, CPI Pub., 
October 1961, p*22« 
126 
brothsrly relations lMtv««n then* It considered ^ e peoplei"' 
of India and Pakistan onich aore than mara nal^bourt —» 
brother people, torn of tha Bima stock, speaking the saaw lan. 
guat..eS| with a long tradition of cooBion struggle against 
laperlallsmi and opposad %mr hysteria workf^ d upon against 
f'aklbtan by cooucunal reactionaries* Peace, tk to Cfl^ between 
India and Pakistan vas a l l the nore vi tal and every effott 
should be made towards this end. A^aln In 1967 election 
manifesto, the C.""! spdke of th«d establlshaent of friendly 
relatlans bet%reen the tvo countries, for Increase In trade, 
cultural and other contacts betveen then as well as for 
12d 
greater fac i l i t i e s for coanunleatlon between their peoples. 
The CPI strongly oondenned the laperlallsts for widening 
the gulf between the two countries* The partition of the sub. 
continent, the Party held, was Imposed by laperlallsts and 
caused an un^lanclng of the laperlallst economy. It held 
that It would not allow the Imperialists to decide India*8 
fate either t^ r^ough the Intervention of ^^rld Bank or through 
the U.K.o. Hlren Mokerjee, Speaking in the Parliament saldt 
'" «i are reat^ to go the utmost length for a real under-
standing with Pakistan, but >>« have to t e l l ourselves and our 
"^SS, Nfiv / ge (Mew Delh i ) , May 6, 1966, p . 4 . 
126. See, "CPI Manifesto ( 1 9 6 7 / , In U l EMv, Watlnnal 
i*afMta nf hidtat QB«fiIU> p« i&9« 
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poot>X« that the v&t«rs of f i i«ndihip are b«ing auddied, that 
the whoX« position Is being bed^^vllXed Iqr th« Intervention 
187 
of certain forcee." 
The CPI stressed the need for the development of a 
1S8 
poverful cdapalgn against tht^  U.S. blackmail and for Tndo-
?ak friendship^ Asian so l idari ty and vorld peace* 
The CPI (M) l ike the CPI, also favoured friendly 
relations between the two «>untries. I t believed that the 
two countries cannot afford to l i v e as enemies. Good re la . 
tlons between th«& a l^one could lead to the progress of the 
two countries and thft welfare of their people. It demanded a 
peaceful settlement of a l l disputes with Pakistan so that 
the forces of reaction and imperialism oould no longer "exploit 
the disputes to the det/^rlment of the freedom of both the 
countries.** 
f s far as Kashmir issue is concemed« the CPI was of 
the vle\' that the status of Jawnu and Kashmir as a constituent 
130 
state of Indian Union i s not negotisiile. It believed that 
127. r^ ir ?;abha nebatfta, Vol«27« March 12, 19&99 6ol.6021* 
128. '*fter the U.P. detente with both "ovlet Bussla and 
Communist China, the position i s l i k e l y to change. 
129. *'^V Comnamsts (Marxists)? Election Manifesto", In 
^^3thal, Randas, aiLk£l£«t P« 4S0. 
ISO. USiLlASLt February 24, i9fc>S, p. 10* 
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vhoX« Jauaau and Kathair Inoladlng the part occu^jied by 
Pakistan la a part of the India Union, It b&ld that Kaihalr 
prottlen vas a creation of external forces* According to 
the Party It was the British and Aacrlean Isperlallsts ^ o 
formented and armed t^ « ag&resslon In Kashalr* 
It opposed the Idea of a plebiscite* It wae very 
crit ical of thci U.N« role and called It mainly responsible 
for Inspiring dissensions between India and Pakistan on 
KashBlr issue* '*K*Copalan, the Crl leader, said In a par-
ll'^nentary speech in IdbS that, *'the main object of U*?7*today 
is not to see that there must be a plebiscite* They want 
to ut i l i se a l l their resources ••••••* they want to divide 
the people into Hindus and Musllas, their Interest tod^y is 
that Kashalr and Jamisu must be divided •*•*•• their interest 
• • • • • • • i s not for th& solidarity of the Janmu and hashair 
as a part of India* They want a dlvl«31on of Jaamu and Kas)uBlr, 
they %rant to see that the division takes place by some way 
131 
so they Bs^y th^ ere amst be plebiscite*" The den&nd for 
plebiscitei th«s party consldeied^wfts harmful not oi^iy for the 
peoplt of Kashmir but also of Pakistan and India* 
The Party, while supporting the Gov«rmeat*s stand on 
Kashmir, demanded the lmmedlat« wlthdra%«l of Kashmir issue 
131* j^arUaHftterY rHitiauii voi*iv, ^o*e, August 7, 1952, 
cols* Sm 6605 • d80&* 
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froa the n«curlty Council* Hlr«n }&ikerj«e» sptaking In th« 
Parliament statedi "The country certainly support^ t^e Prlae 
Minister** policy on this point especially In regard to 
Kashalr Ve suggest that perhaps It Is better that ve 
Ids 
vlthdrtv? the Kashnlr Issue from the f^ecurlty Council*** The 
CPl vigorously opposed the Kashmir issue being nade the sub. 
Ject of veto In th« Cacurity Council of the U.N. General 
As^eably. It said that though Kashalr acceeded to India In 
accordance vith an Act oT British Parliaaenti the Anglo* 
Anericans have consistently questioned the validity of ^ e 
accession* Kvery tine the question of Pakistan aggression 
against Kashalr bad cone up before the fsecurity Council of 
the U.N.o* Anglo-^aierlcan spokesman had made the vithdraval 
of Pakistani forces frtyi Kaslmir conditional on India agreeing 
to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir under <i*N*o« auspices, mean. 
133 
ing their oim supervision*^' 
The Party contlniuosly reiterated i t s stand that the 
whole JaiBEu and Kashmir Including the part occupied by Pakistan 
is a part of Indian Union* It ruled out any negotiation 
132* Ink ^abha ftltottt Vol*IIIt No*?, July Sd, -?967, cols* 
133* nee, !?erdesai S*G*, *^y ^^ ^^ W^'n^ ffMi afi*£ll«, p. 66* 
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vlth t^akiut&n tagr any country \thi«jn laplied rticognltlon of the 
occupied part of Jaouau and Hashalr as part of Pakistan terrl . 
134 
tory* It d«olarsd Itself to be stood for peaceful settl«aent 
of a l l outs finding probleat between the two countries through 
bllaterstl talks and extended Its support to th^ Goverment of 
India In Its every effort It may take to this end. 
The C;'T (M) supported the retention of a special sf^tus 
for hachalr vlt>?^!n the Indian Union, It believed that reooval 
of such 3 status v-ould only put harr^iess In tht '"iy of a « 
settleaent vlth aek Pakistan. It apoke, with.out any hesitation, 
that Kastolr question is not over, i t s t i l l remains to be 
settled. On l-^shmlr Issue, the CPT Marxist leader, r.M.P, 
^amboodrlpad advocated a ''realistic'* stand i . e . Kashslr should 
be considered a. 3 part of India vlth special status, fe 
considered i t totally unrealistic to argue, as the spokesmen 
of ti^ e Oovernfflent of India were doing, that the state of Jsoaa 
and Kashmir In no vay different from any other sti^te of India. 
These arguments to him run against the reality that, on a 
number of occasions tblks had been held between India and 
Pakistan on this problem. *?o useful purpose, according to 
him, would be served by repoating that tht;rt; la no Ksshnlr 
"134. "^aw .'fa (Nev Dalhl), February 3D, igOl, p,4. 
136. ^ee for details, H^srilutinnfl af tha Central C%iam±ttm^ 
fLftft) ftfthfe Cnamttnlet Party af IndJa^ Tenall, June 12. 
19, 1966, Calcutta, CFI (Uft).pufa.; 19Si>« 
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piobl«a| *'the f::ct i s thst th« OovvrnrDont of India i t s e l f 
took this iuroaiem to the UN in 1947. nven t o ^ y th« St^curity 
Council resolution of fepteiibcr eOt t9o&» vhieh India has 
aec«pt«d envisages p o l l t i e a l negotiations after the eease» 
f i r e and vdthdra^^ls arc ef*'ected#" 
Xhfe CPI (M) condeaned th« Govemneiit's increasing 
reliance on Imperialist a id . It believed that the increasing 
reliance on i a pr i a i i s t aid has enabled the Anglo-^aerlcan 
iaper ia i i s t to increasingly interfere in India's dis{^tes 
137 
with ?^-kistsn on the Isfue of Kariimlr. i:.M,*:,Nainboodripad 
vlewtd that/United "tstes by vithholdlng food and eoonoaic 
138 
aid "is tlghtlng t^e screw on India," preclsfcly in order to 
force India to go to the negotiating tt^ble and * set t le* the 
problem in such a way ^s to f a c i l i t a t e further Imperialist 
139 
intrigues In ti^e suo.continent« The Party vtewed that India 
would not be aole to r e s i s t this lauaen^e pressure from the 
United rtates so long as i t continues to pursue pol icies of 
reliance on the U.S. for food as v e i l as economic and military 
aid* 
13t>. liM^t P* b3, 
137. Naoboodripaa, LH.*^., '^ChauviBisn,towards s>skl8tan*', 
i*iOB3LM DtiBncrafly (Calcutta), July 3" ,^ '*m^. 
138* riflfifilyil.lan8 if Pa^i Ctntrai CnaalUM (l.gft) CPI, oja^ hfiilM 
p» 63. 
139. Ulli . 
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Th« CPl took a d«flnlt« approach to the pnblen of 
Kuteh dispute* Th« Central Exeeutive of the CPI viewed t^at 
tb€ cease-fire agreeaent between the Govemnent's of India 
and Pakistan, relating to Rann of Kutch foraally restored the 
atatua QUrt anta as i t existed on January 1, 19t>6. The with, 
dreval of tht Pakistani amy froa Kanjarkotf Blarbetf Chadbet, 
Cadar and other points was viewed by the party as a positive 
gain for India. But i t did not favourly look on the agreeaent 
in»so*far as i t laplied the withdrawal of l^e Indian forces 
fxoB two posts. It asked the peor'le to be vigilant so th:>t 
the dangerous lapllcatlons of the cease.flre agreestfit were 
negated and Pakistan's fantastic te ir l torlal claSas were not 
inposed on India under the guise of an arbitration *award.* 
The Central iJceoutlve Comalttee of the CPI deaanded a peaceful 
settlement through direct, bilateral talks between India and 
Fakiptani at suamlt level If necessary, and without the medt. 
atlon of ^ny third party or tribunal* In this connection, 
the Central rxecutlve Cwialttee appealed to the popular, 
deoocratlc settlement U r^ough direct negotiations, which 
would be, to thfe party, in the interest of th« both countries* 
It strongly eondeaned the Infiltration of Pakistani 
forces across th«e cease-fire line into the Kashair* It 
viewed that behind th« infiltrators stood the ^yub dlctatorshl 
140* Tec for details, fififlniutiiiM fidnattd by tti Cantaral 
rvy^jtiiil^a o«.«ifcfc^> f^> thm. CPI^  July 11, 1966, !7ew Delhi. 
CPI9 Pub*, 1966* 
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vhieb always had th« support of the U«S« and British iapsrla. 
141 
l i s t s in rsgard to i t s aggraseiva aotlvitias In Kashair* Tha 
CPT \^ i l s standing by national dafones whan the f i t t i n g was on^ 
IdM stress on the need for paaaaful aattleaant through dlraet 
tcxks between India and Pakistan* **India*', H«M« f^idcerjee 
said, "should be ready to meet Pakistan and to dlseuss natters 
14S 
direotly and to oome to settleBent*** He again said that, 
"t^akistan has kno%m that n i l i tar l ly i t esnnot take Kashair* 
Pakistan o u ^ t to have a settlement in a civil ised manner* I t 
cannot come throu^ the instrumentality of U*N. as i t i s at 
present oontinued.^at is why we can have a settlement of our 
143 
own," 
In a s rally, organised by the CPI^  the Communists cr i . 
tieized t^e Western povers for giving arms to Pakiatani tiie 
sole f&etor which instigated Pakistan to attack India* The 
party also advised the Government to set t le the problem on the 
basis of existing i^osltion of Kashmir borders and bury the oonf. 
146 
l i c t for ever* ^^imilarlyy during the resuMd debate in tilie 
141* See 
Pa r ^ .^f Indlay P«lh ly CPIy Pttb.^ 1tt-84 Antnmt I M S . 
142* Ihii fllndttfltan Ytoll (New Oelhi>, September 26, 1966* 
143* 2idCL» 
144. The fitiit.tMl.in (Dalhl) September 20, 1966. 
146* Ibid.I May 18, 1966* 
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iiajys Sabha, Bhupash Quptat vhlla accusing th« Qovammant 
of oomplataly rttvartlng the country's dsclarad policy undsr 
th« U,S« pressure^ suggastad that the present caasa^flra Una 
In KashBir vlth some adjustaant should ba raco^lx«d as an 
146 
Intarnatlonal toordar to settla tha KastaMlr problam* 
Tha attitude of tha CPI (M) tovards Indo*Pakletan var 
147 
vas datafBlaad by the F^nd of China on the issue* It nantad 
to deal vll^ the problem on tha baals of real it ies of ti^a 
aituatlon. r.«M*S,^ 3mboodripad^vihila repeatedly affirnad 
his party's ful l support to a l l Govammant measures to increase 
i t s defences to meet the external aggressioni made It clear 
th .t the party %ould not support any form of military in i t i -
ative to ohan^a vhat we called the 'status quo' in relation 
to 'zad Kashmir and ^ksai«Chln area* ll« viewed tiiut i t vas 
not possible to retaka >^ sad Kashmir or Aksal^Chin unless ve 
ver« prepared for a lo or 20 years period of fighting and 
India could llL-afford such a var* His party, therefore^ favoure< 
a nagotiated settlement both vit^ Pakistan and China* !!e 
said, India should give up her claim to A sad Kashmir and 
Aksai Chin and China should agree to keep the other side of 
148 
the McHdihan Line* The Party did not regard Pakistan as an 
14i* Ibld*t August 10, 1966* 
147* China did not considered Pakistan as ag|;ressor but by 
supporting her demanded her Just claims* 
146* Th« rtMt»mman (Delhi)^November 10, I9b6, 
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aggr«SMr* 
Tht CPI National Ez«outlv« hali«d th« Tashkant Daelara. 
tion as an ovant of graat historic signifieance not onl/ for 
t^« paoplas of the two countriasy but for a l l paaea loving 
nations* According to i t the Declaration opaned out tooad 
vlstaa for constructive efforts for the ending of a l l out-
standing probleBS and for building up friendship bet%feen India 
149 
hnd ii^istan on solid foundations* It walooned t9ia decision 
on nonalisation of diplomatic relations, exchange of priaoners 
of ><ar and iaplenentation of existing agreaaants betveen the 
160 
tvo countriaa* ^ e party considered the TasMcent Declaration 
as a gre&t olov to imperialisa* Ihe Part/ viewed tfiat i t 
opaned possibil i t ies n^t only fox laproving and noxaalixing 
Indo.Pak relations^ but also for strengthening India's foreign 
policy of non-alignaenty anti«eoloniallsa and consolidating 
the forces of * seculariaa and deoocraoy Inside the country* 
It declared th^t» the Tashkent Declaration is Indeed dun abiding 
legacy, a aonunent to peace^ a blue print for the settlaient 
of disputes b«t%reen nations* It is a blow to iaperialisn mnd 
reaction, a rebuff to their efforts to increase their influence 
162 
and interference In the internal affairs of India and Pakistan*** 
149* hM«nmtlftn Ailftot^rf fay tf>e f fat lnnal C^unoiX n f « i a CPI^ 
New Delhi, CPI Pub*, January 7 • 16, 1936, p*3* 
160* Ibid. 
161* UiiJUi* 
162* fliliJLgftf February 27, 19^ «», p*11» 
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The Party v«nt among the fflassee to explain the histo. 
rleal significance of the Agreement and also fought against 
the antl«Tashkent propagandist* 
the CPI (M)^llke the C?Z, also supported the Tashkent 
Agreement* The part/ favoured the -^ greementi as It believed 
that nov India and Pakistan could discuss their problem without 
imperialist presence, without the danger of imperialist exploit-
ing and exacerbating th« differences to dictate their ovn 
163 
tains. The paftpi^u n—rici'aftv in Its editorial stated **Ve 
pay our respectful tributes to Toviet Prime Minister Kosygl% 
Pakifitan President Marshal Ayab Khan, as ve i l as our own late 
Prime Minister « * vhose untimely dmsise has plunged i us al l 
in grief •-» for the statesmanship shown by t^ea xm in working 
out the historic Tashkent Declaration*** 
The CPI (M) held that Tashkent fgreenent was s step 
in the Interests of both the people's. & military conflict only 
plays into the hands of U*r» imperialism* 
The CPI (M) demanded early release of rheikh ''bdullah, 
because i t f e l t th%t Sheikh represented the popular MM. 
163* £ee,**All sets for Xashkent**, p"rrt^ r*r l^ ^^ ^^ *^*^  (Calcutta) 
January £« 19ot* 
164* See/X shkent A|tur«ing Point", Iha Ptipli*! THinfimflTt JanuBiy 29|1»»6* 
166* **!hy Communists (Marxist)? Flection Manifesto**, na^eit^y 
p* 430« 
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8«ntlii«nt8| so h« should be given fullest oppoxta&itgr to 
express hlaself. It believed that the only «• / for the solu. 
tlon of Ksshalr problem vas to release Sheikh end hit Ineliu 
slon, and then s i t vlth the r^i^tisentatlves of tiw people 
to find out vaye and means of fully satisfying the vlshes 
of the state* 
The CPT election manifesto of t9t»7 shoved soae departure 
froB the previous pro-Govemaent stand of the CPI on Kashalr 
lssue« 'Ml6 previously i t said that even Pakistani • held 
territory of Kashalr constituted » part of India, hovever^nov 
i t demanded that over the issue of Kashilr efforts st^Mld be 
made for a lasting aecord vlth Pakl&tan on thfr tosls of asking 
the existing cease-fire l ine as the International boundary 
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vitt autually agreed adjustaents* 
Like the CPI (H), the CPI also favoured the lanedlate 
rtileas€ of Olelkh ^bdullah* I t stated that there should be 
serious attempts to find to the Internal probleas of Kashalr 
and for thls« talk vlth Sheikh Abdullah aust be reneved In a l l 
seriousness. Fiovevery the solution aust be found vlthln the 
fraae voik of unalterable fact that Kashalr Is an Integral 
part of Indian Union* 
1t)6. TllH PtatMaan (Delhi) J\me 16, 1966* 
167* ''ee. Rl««tl«n !ftmif«etA «f thm CPT, :?ev Delhi, CPI Pub*, 
19b7. 
168* pfiiUical fliBQrWAdQBttd by ttm SUht Cnngrtii nf thi 
finnmunUt Party nt IniHat Karyanaundnagar, Patna, Feb. 
xuary 7.16, Nev Delhi, CPI Pub., 1968, p*48* 
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6 o ^ the Coauminist c^artles expressed their desire to 
maintain friendly relations with i^aklstan by peaceful and 
deoocratic eieans vltliout thb Interference froM laper la l l s t 
power* The Ct>I (H) suggested that India should take the path 
of direct negotiations vlth t^akietan* Ihe CiPl demanded that 
India should take the i n i t i a t i v e in set t l ing a l l outstanding 
disputes with i^aklstan and In this oontezt, should renew her 
offer of a 'no war pact* with that country. It strongly 
condemned V:m imperial ist 's for keeping up the tension in tho 
sub-continent and stressed the need for closer relationship 
between India and Soviet Union and other s o c i a l i s t s countries* 
The emergence of ^ng la Desh as a Tov^reign Independent 
Hfcpubllc vas considered by the Indian Coavittnists as a great 
blow to American imperialism* The C?I dtfsanded for the reoog* 
nition of 3anela Desh by a l l the countries of t^e ^brld and 
for substantial Velp for Its econocie regeneration* It also 
mobilised the international communist moveBent and democratic 
and peacti loving ^brld public opinion for the cause of Bangla 
of 3angla Desh 
Desh* The C?I(M) considered that the emerg«ice/and the changes 
following It In t^sklstan raised new problems in the foreign 
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policy of the sub-continent* Howev«r« i t believed that the 
/Adopted by the Ninth Congress, .^adurai, Ji 
1072, Calcutta, C?I (K) i'ub*, 1972, p*20. 
S7«J'uly 2. 
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«»«rg«ic« of a n«w independ«nt Bangia Dtth ha* aad* i t pottlbl* 
f^r the peopla of th& sub»e3ntln«nt to rapla«« th« S6 ytari 
long ralations of host i l i ty tsy n«v relations of friaadthlp and 
eoooperatlon among the three lnd«pend«nt states of India, Bangla 
Dash and Pakistan, The liberation of Bangla Oesh to C?I (M) 
has constituted a defeat Df 'sierlcan ImperialisB and haa veak* 
ened i t s capacity to use Pakistan against India, a>th the 
parties have demanded that It is In the Interest of the people 
of Pakistan and Jndla that the period of conflict Should be 
repl^ ncedjby a period of mutual understanding and sympathy. They 
varned the Govexoment that any chaviaistic stand foUoving 
the Indo«Pak t^r would only strengthen the reactionary forces 
and their patron, the American imperialists* 
Tht stand taken ty both t^ -e parties in regard to Tndo-
i'sk problem shovs th-it both of them v«pe confused, lnx«onsistent 
and self-contradictory* Their pronouncement changed from time 
to time &nd In actu:il practice they differed griHitly* Both 
failed to give a dlfinite approach to th^rol^em* Their 
approach was sloganlsh and platitud^ious* They habitually 
found fault vlth **Afflerlcan Imperlaliwi*', and reactionarlsm of 
the capitalists and vested interests* 3hey f e l l in l ine with 
teo*. Tee, "The CPI (M) mnifesto 1972**, Th« iti^atl^n .'>^i»>« 
i^.vt IT, -^ ew Delhi, 1972, p* ^45. 
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other pertl€i8 and leaders in Justifying the stand tak«i tgr 
India, hovev«r transient i t \s&9. Opposition to the stand 3f 
the govemnent on Kashmir and China vas considered by then 
as in keeping vith nationalisa and patriotlMi* They vera 
fond of denigrating the government, Supporting Indlas stand 
on some popular issues \fs.& considered by th«B in their party 
interest, and hence on the Kashmir particularly they urged 
upon the government to pursue 9 firm policy. Territorial 
Integrity o** India was dearest to f^eir heirt and tthey nould 
not toleiate any compromise on that issue* 
m , AiiKmi ?r 111?; fsp f^nu m s^ pt 
Ihe pr? alvays emybealxed the need foi cordial and 
friendly relations vith Pakistan. It Ubmanded ttiat the Govern. 
ment of India should adopt a firm and positive policy towards 
Pakistan vith v^ om our tlt^s of history, culture and language 
are y^ry strong, P.'u party had a firm belief that India's 
troUDies vitii Pakistan vere due to ^ e Inti^rventlon of third 
parties* It hailed Pakistan alliance vith the / t lantic camp 
a b^lov to Asian solidarity and urged free &nd fraidt exchange 
witl i t , vith a view to achieving eo^-operation on the basis 
of nonp.involvement in the Atlantic • ''oviet disputi s i^ nd 
161 
peaceful settlement of a l l differ«ice8« f^ peaking in the 
i<»i« Xim 3faag» of ffl^t OAAjsliM ?• s* 
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Lok rabha, the ?r? Itadar wath Pal aaldi 
"I hold that there is nothing more desirable than 
friendship vlth Pakistan and ve believe that no price Is 
too high to vin that fri&ndshlp. *e should be resdf to &> 
to any extent to cultlvat^and vln that friendship." 
Outstanding dl&putt^ s betve^n the t>io neighbouring 
countrl«iS| the party b«ilitV(L'(!, could be solved by outual 
understanding and nst by mutual reerlalnsttion and loud 
accession* 
The raayukta HoclailLt party, like thv prp, also 
emphasised the need fox* fosteringji^ policy of flraness and 
frl<:ndllne££ to ^void the counting tension betveen the sub. 
continent* It always sou^t to pursue i ts olfc?r policy of 
confederation or reiznion* 
The views of the praja f^oelallst Party on Kashalr issue 
were nevertheless agitational and uncoaproaislng wi^ the 
Govemsent* It considered Kashitlr as an Integj^l part of the 
Indian Union* It opposed the intervention of third parties 
in Kashalr affairs* In Its National Fxecutive resolution^ 
held on January 15, *»«>, 17, 1964, at Patna, the prp sala$ 
162. t/^ if rahha n^bat^ a^ Vol. X, Ho.28, D^ceober 17,1967, 
col* 6947* 
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"Mishandling of foreign Interference of more than one 
variety conspire to make the naturally difficult situation 
in Kas^ n1r welL-nlgh Insoluble, Yet a fair and vise solution 
Is lapiXYAxlve n:>t onljr in the Interest of the tvo eountrlesi 
but of «>feace and goodwill among nations.*' 
The National £xeeutlve strongly f e l t that It %i9Uld be 
irery nuch better for both the Qoverrment's to s i t together and 
Tlnyd out a satisfactory solution without the Interpretation 
m 
of uny out/slde ag«ficles* The party believed that the acc«islen 
of hashnlr to India Is lavful and defacto* It considered 
Kashmir as a closed chapter* rpeaklng In the Farllaaent| 
furrendranath I)wlyedy, a leader of the P!5P, ssldj 
•'Let us not fa l l Into the trap of a make believe peace 
or n solution -><* the Kashmir nucstlon. There Is no question 
snd there can be no negotiations on the Kashmir with any body 
Kashmir is entirely our ovn concern.****..Pakistan oust 
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accept India's sovereignty over Kashmir.** 
Xh*j PSP opposed the Oovemment of India's decision of 
taking the Kash a^lr question to the United Nations. The Party 
tt>3« *^He8olutien passed at the Meeting of the National 
Sx«Qativ« of PHP held at Patna on January 16.17| 1964, 
In Hammaoohar Lohia^ ftp«eit>, p* 329* 
164, iJBJLd. 
166* lot Patiha mtBtiMi Vol* XhVIU^ Vo*fi, Ifovember 76, 
1966, cols* 19e7.88* 
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vievttd that instead of proirldlnii the toltttloQy It further 
vor8«n«d thci situation due to 'extraneous roftfoBfl*. Iho partyt 
t3:ierefortty demanded the vlthdravaJL of the dispute ti^m the 
United !^atlons« Surrendronath Owlvedyt speaking at the Fouxth 
National Confer«nce of the ?Gii* held at Poona^ said that ve 
onist withdraw thtr cils^te from the u*H« which had proved Itself 
incapatile of soiVng i t . India and Pakistan may then uoth forced 
to start direct talks and search for a muti;^lly acceptaule 
basis for solving the tangle* Although the Party criticised 
the Government for taking the issue of Kaslwir to the U«N,, i t 
m^ ire or less a-greed with the policy which the OovemBsnt of 
India adopted with regazd to Kashmir* 
The Fourth Conference of tht party also rejected the 
idea of holding a plebiscite in Kmshslr* I- v^ is af the opinion 
that plebiscite vould not ue considered as a means for solving 
the dispute* It affirmed that the state of Jaaau and Kashmir 
Is an Integral and analienaole part of the Indian Union and 
the question of plebiscitCi tiierefoxe. should not arise as no 
such thing happened in other parts of thie InJian Union* rt| 
1^* iijBflrt Of 1ih§ lYth ^atlonil Cnnfftrfinci nf thg Praia 
•cr>eiflii»t Party h«id at Pnn.nsi^ Maharashtra, »ay 26.£6y 
1858, pp* 99-100* The S'ime demand was made by Mohd.Umar 
Jiat, when he said, " rhe question can be |(amicably 
settled betvefrn the Indl<»n Union and PsOclst n without 
the Intei-vention of any t^ird party*" JLkld*i P«1fi1* 
lb7* IbJLd*, p« 4^;^ « 
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hov«Y«r, str«s»«d that an attempt should b« aadt to s«ttl« tha 
diffar€)nc«s In a friendly spirit* 
Again In I96it the part/ rlataratad Its flra opinion 
that Kashalr Is an anallansbla part of India and tha il lagal 
occupation of a part of Kashalr bj Pakistani foroas should 
168 
tharafora ba vacated* "Prasid«fit Ayab Khan and th^sa vho 
support his . v l l ly • nily^ unvllllngly,** said Nath Pai| 
*'ronatimes for their own aelfish, narrov ends • • • should taka 
notfc of this . Kashmir say be a feather in nil itary eap| a 
piece of territory to hia, but i t i s soaething for oore vital 
and fundaaental for us. It is the pivot round which turns ^ e 
vry conception of ths deaocratie l i f e whl^ ve plan>«d for 
169 
the people* Ibere eannot oe any kind of bar (^^ nlng on that" 
2he F t^rty re^enphasised the need for fostering a policy of 
*fiianess vlth friendliness* to avoid mounting tension in the 
sub»oontiaent* It suggested tiiat a l l restrictions in the vsy 
of free movement and Integration of Kashalr should forthwith 
be reaoved* 
The Pft* did not want to rep^ isat the question of Kashalr* 
It believed that no part of Kashmir was negotiable* The Seventh 
168* "Fraja noolalist Election ^nlfesto**» in Poplal, S.L* 
XUU&i£*9 p*96* 
169* See^Pal, Nath, "foae 'specU of Indians Foreign Policy**, 
J[gyagJU (Bombay;, August t7, 1961, p*1l« 
170* ibi'i-t February £4, 1963, p. 11* 
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ffational Conference of tii« PSr* pag8ed|( a reeolutlon rleter^tlac 
Its flxia stand that Kashalr aooeesion to India oust be consi-
dered as final and irrevocable. It also regretted that ever 
since the t iae vhen Pakistan eoaaltted aggression against 
Kaslmir» the policy of the GovemB«it of India had one of 
171 
"indication and hesitation*" 
Xhfe lt9o& conflict between Iiidisi %nd Pakistan gave a 
nev Jolt to the Indian foreign policy. Hovever, the PSP*s 
strstegy remained unchanged in rest Ion to Kashoir* It ^.id not 
•xtend i t s ful l support to the Tashkent 7)eelaretion bectsoise 
i t believed that i t vould Complieste the Ka^oir problem ind 
embolden certain SMtions to deoiand to surrender of the terri* 
tory of Chinese aggression. Criticising the Tashkent Hsclsra. 
tion^ t^e !fational Executive of the iTP, held in New Delhi on 
February f8f IStb, expressed oitiemm at the decision of the 
Indian Crovernment on reduction of streng^ of the armed forces 
in Jamssi and Kashmir to the 1949 level and said ^ a t this would 
178 
expose the country to greire danger from the aggressors. I t 
viewed that the withdrawal of Indian troops from HBJI ?ir« 
Kargil and Tithwal would mean a total repudl«'Jition of the 
173 
assurance given to the people. 
171. Ihfl nntlnnil liXUU Vol.I» NOS. lO-lS, May ld.li», 10&4, 
Calcutta^ Nabe mndran Ltd.y p. 172. 
ITS. / • i a n RAcnrdar^ 1»>w, P . 6 9 8 S . 
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• 288 • 
lh« party asked the nation to be avare of growing pre-
tsures b^  Big Povere on the Kashair Issue. Although the late 
Prlae Minister Mr* Lai Bahadur Shastri had assured the people 
on the Parliament floor that even after the f^eeurity Couneil 
resolution, India had aeoepted notMng oore than a slaple e^se . 
f ire, the nation vas nov sxtat called upon to sake further 
ooaaitaents of vlthdravals fron Hajl pir and other areas* ''7h« 
PCP can never l>e a party to such a eoafldtnent that runs counter 
174 
to the fact that Kashair is an integx«>l part of India,** the 
party held* 
The PSP characterised the Tashkent Declaration ag **an 
Inspid docuBtfit that VN>uld never vard off the t^-reat of agg. 
176 
resslon iv Pakistan*** Tl^ e Party cited the example of Presl. 
dent Ayub iChan vho Interpreted the Tashkent Declaration as a 
mere orientation of the United Nations Charter and «Bphatiealiy 
stated that so long as amicable solution vas not found to the 
Kashmir issue, preparations for var could not be avoided* 
The Praja !!k>cialist Party expressed concern over the 
growing collusion between Pakistan and China* In view of this 
Increased manifold threat to Indians security, i t emphasised 
the need to strengthen India*& defence with a sense f^ urgency* 
174* Ibid. 
176* Go ray, N*a* A Dwivedy. Turrendranath, '•vhy PSP?** in 
Hhatkal, Eamdas, luuidl*, p* 247* 
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The 19t>7 Bleetlon }tenlf«tto of tb« Party demandad th« roeovery 
of territory lost to China and Pakistan and a daclaratlon 
176 
that "Kashair accssslon to India was Irravoeabla,** 
Ih« Saayukta Socialist Party strongly favourad cordial 
and haraonlous relations bctvaen India and Pakistan. It 
ballavad that th« art i f ic ia l partitioning of the Indian subu 
eontlnant is the root caura fox the present r i f t betveen India 
and Pakistan and therefore^ the sooner i t i s tindonst or 
annulled the better for both the countries. Kaj ffarain, a 
leading party nesibert observed very rigbtly on f^epteaber 16, 
1966 that, "The Objective of the current Indo.Pak conflict 
would be achieved successfully only with the annalnent of 
Pakistan and established of a united India again. To achieve 
this purpose India should not hesitate to take ams aid froa 
171 
any country. It should be prepared to fight alone if necessaxy, 
Due to th« Indo-Pak conflict the party deaanded for the 
reunification of India and Pakistan, i^j Narain said ttiat 
reunion did not aean subjucation of one country by another 
but reunion of th^ two countries on prlnclpl^es of equality 
178 
and omtuai haraony. On Deceaber 10« 1966^Raaaanohar Lohia 
l?l». >>SP Flitf lt lnn lfanlf««tny Nev D e l h i , PS P. P u b . , 1967, p . 1 4 . 
177. Th« Hinrtuntan Tl««« (*Tev Delhi), Septeaber 17,1966. 
178. 2iiU* 
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said thaty **v'hen th.re i s no post lb l l l t / of an ngr««B6Bt 
over the Ksthair Issue alone and t^ &t vay Is neither t^e 
''eeurlty Council's v^y^ i«e« of eease»fire| nor of « return 
to the positions of 6 ^U£ust, tut of sosie type of union of 
179 
a flexible eonfederation of the two countries*" 
Tbe espi l ike U^ P^ i", also f e l t disap^ointnent over 
the Tashkent 'greenent«The T€? National Executive held in 
etjtn» on January 16^ ISou^ discussed the details of the 
Declaration, It hald that vithdraval of troops vould be of 
no use unless pakieton reciprocated* lit* Jo&hl, theOiainian 
of the party,observed that,'*vithdraval8 are not in our party's 
hani but exposing the coimtry to any risk should be carefully 
180 
t^ought over*" 
Ihe crp in a resolution adopted at Patna on January 
20| IdBOydeclared that Tashkent Declaration Instead of giving 
a dear and difinlte leady added to confusion in Public nind 
in respect of Indo-Pak relations. "Inspite of the sacrifice 
of t*'^  precious l i fe of India's Priae Minister^ the Tashkent 
^greeaent is not going to yield more than a tenjpoiary respite* 
179* i^nklim (Calcutta)y February i|K»6, p«4i>* The Idea of 
confederation of India and Pakistan constituted the main 
part of Iiohia's foreiupa policy* k He suggested that 
t>ere should be a confederation of IndiaiH and Pakistan 
having coBMBon citisenship of the peoples* Ihls confodei^t 
ion of India and Pakistan would have five units consist, 
ing of Unit«.d Bengal (Both East and Vest 3engai;| The 
rest of India (Jaouau and Kashair); rest of Pakistan* 
frlnagar and Pakhtoonistan* He also emphasised that« 
Contd****** 
This agr««tia«nt Is bound to B«et tho saae fate as t^€ previous 
181 
Indo-Pakistan sgrseasnts," It further said that only s con. 
federation of India and Pakistan could sustain the Tashkent 
spir i t and r«iaov« the tmslo eause of conflict betveen the tv3 
countrlt^s* In the same vlen« iiaa fevak iadaV| Geiiiral Tecret^r] 
of the Partjr^ y expressed the vlev ttAt a confederation "by 
18£ 
<»nsent or conflict or ty a itlxture of both** vas the only 
reaiedy for tYn Indo-?ak conflict* The Party also suggested 
tbat t'^ e people of both the countrl«s should launch "^  aoveoient 
to undo the »al8chlef8 o** the partition* by aovlng In the 
dlrt^ctlon f^ establishing -i confederation, vltb out wMch all 
talks of ^rlendly relations between the tvo countries would 
be fut i le . 
)n the contrary, the Praja roelal lst Party never cherl* 
shed lllusl:>ns of confederation or unity wltli P'^klstan* Though 
always comltted to supporting the people's struggle for 
(Continued fros the previous page) 
"the policy towards Pakistan sust be uullt out of the 
fresh premises of an honest federative approach*" '^ee, 
**Xhlxd Camp Versus Non.alignB«nt"| lAld*, March-/prll 
t9t»&, p . 4 3 . 
!•()• The Meiiinnai TMerv, Vol.HI, !7o«2t January tb.£3, 
p. 824* 
181. **?^r? (Pstna) National Coanlttee Hesolution", i^ aHUMt 
March 1 9 ^ , p,65. 
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desocracy. I t f e l t that only a policy of caution and 
t>ougbn«s& could succettd. On the other hand, r*'? had a f l m 
belief that real and last ing solution of Indo^t'ak problen 
l i e s In soae kind of unif ication of the two states* The 
r'arty advocated that the nineteen years old nistske be r a c t i . 
fi<&d only by putting an end to the a r t i f i c i a l division of 
the country and by establishing a United Hindustan* It hoped 
tVat In the nfaar future peoples of India and Pakistan would 
cone closer and the a r t i f i c i a l partitioning would be wiped 
out by the sheer w i l l of the p^^ople of India and t^akistan* 
Ihe att i tude of the Cocial ist parties Including the 
Coauaunist i-arties, towards Indians stand 5n relation to China 
and Pakistan has been wavering and uncsrtain* Whenever an 
euphoria has been created on account open ^rmed conflict these 
parties have been v^ry vocal, but when the storra ble^ *^ over 
and the dust se t t led ^^ ovn they held the Congress {^ovenusent 
responsible for a l l tht^  i l l s Uiat inhibited the India's r e i a t . 
ions with the neighbours* Moreover they always saw soae foreign 
hand in th& r i f t or conflict* The conspiracy to aake India weak 
was always considered to oe the whole time occupation of the 
foreign powers excspt the CoaMtmist blodc*Xhe Chinese aggression 
was also the outcone of long drawn policy pursued by India 
in which she >as played in the hands of c a p i t a l i s t countries* 
The Invasion of tiie iflaalayas had so taadh infuriated the nation 
that the Soc ia l i s t parties had na option but to condaom China* 
But they were ai£o c r i t i c a l of India not playing i t s cards too 
well* Th'e picture of their attltudCf therefore, i s hasy and 
uncertain, to the extent of se l f •contradictory* 
C O H C L U 0 I O H 
coifcmsifl i f 
V« hftv» air«ad/ dit«ttM«d In tht pr«e«ding pag«» that 
JavaharXaX ff«hrU| the main arehlt«et and axeeutar of India'a 
foraign policy had alva/a aetad on the eonviction that a non. 
violant and peace-loving country lika India, baliavlng In 
mutnal co-oparation and co-axist«nca» «ould n^vr need strong 
dafenaa us she viXl hava no ansmiaa. As a result of this 
baliaf %ihich later proved to ba ^rong, vary l i t t l a attention 
vaa in i t ia l ly paid tov»f^ »rd8 building up a strong araiy even for 
defansive purposes* ?h« myth of his nost cherished Idealisn 
%ias badly shattered by the aggressive postures of China in 
the early 19^0 and the incursions of Pakistan* The Ihdo»China 
conflict of October ie62| the Chineae explosion of the atoa 
toab and the amed conflict with Pakistan in Sapteaibar 19669 
the energence of Bangle Dash in 1972| forced India to reviev 
her foreign polioy in the l ight of new developaants* Despite 
the Chinese aggression and her conspirat4rial role to break up 
Afro-^slan solidarity, India persisted in her devotion to non. 
alignaent and peaceful co*existenee» 
The Socialist parties of India, in principle, supported 
the pursuance of a foreign policy vhleh ajjud at aecuring 
national intereata and promoting vsorld peace* They subscribed 
non-alignnent, opposition to colonialisai and racialiCB in al l 
fozss. They unaaloously opposed Indians link with the Coanon. 
wealth of Nations. An considered thenselves to be ^ e true 
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r^pTMcntatlYM of soalalliB and *dh«r«d to Itt var/lng foraa 
without bting abx« to giT« It a eonertta Baaning. D«apita 
tha clo8« alBllarltlaa a«ong thaoi, each ono has lookad upon 
th« various national and Intaniatlonal iatuts froa ita ovn 
point of vi«v in oonaoaanoa vith ita Idaologjr* Th« differ«no«a 
ara minor vhieh incvitaia},/ lead to vagnenasa and nceaasarUy 
make th«m shift their ground repaatadI/« 
The Socialist parties triad to influanoe the Qovemment 
lay creating an articulate public opinion. To begin vith their 
pradominant mood vas one of indifference and passivit/* How. 
9i99Tt they continuously called for a reorientation of India's 
foreign policy In order to give It a social ist outlook. As 
for themselveSythey claimed to be firmly and consistently f l ^ t . 
ing for a social ist path of development*They continuously advo-
cated that only by achieving socialism can India, solve i ts 
political^ economic and International problems, nevertheless 
a l l thesis parties vhich vociferously claimed to have been 
engaged in a relentless war against the forces of imperialism, 
colonialism, racialism and terrorism, vere playing to the 
gallery and indulged in slogan mongering, Hovever, a deep 
atudy of resolutions. Manifestoes of t^e partlea and speeches 
of their party leadera reveals that they did not have any thing 
constructive or positive to offer and vere controverting the 
controverted* Their opposition to the off ic ial policies of 
the Ooverment vas for the sake of oppoaition* 
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Th« CoMianltt Par^ of India, foUovlng th« path of 
MarxiMi and Lanlalaa, ttrlvad to unify the •ntira partjr as a 
(Yanlta xook against iMparialisai and i t s Indian a l l i e s . It 
is tha only party in India %(hich aetlvaly and ssriously adopted 
i t s pxograama and strategy with regard to Indians foreign 
policy* It acted on the asstaptlon that iaperialisBi In any 
foiBy vas an evil for huaanitj and the foreign p411ey of India 
vhich refleets close t ies vith imperialisa Is dangerous to our 
national interests and territorial integrity. It believed 
that the only vay through vhioh India can preaerve i ts freedoa 
is by adhering to the policy of peace and anti*colonlalisa or 
friendship and co-operation vith the f^oviet Union and other 
social is t countries* It also en»;hasl8ed the necessity of 
strengthening democratic aovca^t vithin the country Vhieh 
would fom a stable base for sound foreign policy and lAich 
would essentially be antUiaperiailstf anti.colonialist and 
antUracialist* It night be said that the CPI adopted i t s 
attitude tovards India's foreign policy in the l ight of Indians 
relations vith soc ia l i s t countries nore particular vith the 
U«8*S.B* Before 1066, the CPl vas yty cr i t ica l of ^ehzu 
GovemBent's policy* It declared that the foreign policy of 
the Indian Oovemieot could not be called a policy of peace* 
It criticised the foreign policy of India as It subscribed to 
British and Aaerlcan ifflperialism* This attitude of the party 
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did not dlff«r Btt^ floa th« «ttlt»d« ad»pt«d Iqr Koteov 
tovardi India during this p«rlod« Boygftf iih«n tht Ooir«mBtiit 
•ought gr«ftttr friendship vlth toelalltt oountriM pArtlouarly 
with th« U*8»S,B«| th« CFZ ehangtd it* attitude to%iard*a 
official forolgn polloy. Inilla'a rolo In Indo-Chlna for 
nagotlatttd i«ttla«wnt of th« dlaputo, • Chao«!fdhrtt doelaratlon 
and tho ffiunolatlon of th» Plvo Prlnelplat of Panoh eMla and 
htr oppotltion at to SlATO alto aade tho CPI approzlaato vltti 
tha Oovaniaant* Fro« thon onward ^ t CPI agraad vlth th« 
gonaral prlnelplas of India** forolgn poll«y« It aupporttd 
and dafandad tha foralgn pollay of paaoo^  notwallgoaant and 
colonlaXlaa* It tupportad tha QoYamiaDt** stand on tha Arabs 
and African raaurganoaf hsr opposition to South Afrloan apar* 
thlady ilbaratlon of Goa| har parslatant support to China*a 
raprtsantatlon In tho U.lf* and hor opposition to join any of 
tha Imparlailat var pacts* Qftaa tlaaa It praltod tha great 
rola India haa baan pla/lng In tha prasartatlon of Vbrld paaca« 
for general and eoapleta dlsanisaent« for bamlng of Atoalc 
voaponsy for strangtheniag tha United Nations and for the 
Afro«»Asian solidarity. Hovevary the Party did not hesitate 
to asseasthe aohlevesents and shortooaings of the Oovenuient's 
foreign policy* It believed thst the amin policy of the Oovem 
•ettt IAS soae tlaes vitiated vlth lapses and eoBproalseS| taat 
aa a whole the aaln character of the policy has bctfi preserved* 
• £9S «. 
Contrar/ to CPX, th« CPI (M) h«id th«t India*• for«ign 
polioy und«Y th« 6ong7«f« na«t it rapidly losing its Indo. 
pandtMo and Is b«ooaiac •abaarvlant to laporlalitt povart 
Ilka tha U»S*A« It lookad upon tha foralgn polio/ of tha 
Oovaraiaat as a fdroat a failura and davlatlon froa tha baale 
prinelplas laid dovn in tha pra*indapandanoa and post*indap«n» 
danea parlods* Asaailing India's foralgn polley aa tlad up 
with British laparlallsB, tha CPI (N) advooatad for an inda-
pandant foralgn polie/ basad on opposition to lapariallsMi 
nuclaar and laparlalist varS| promoting paaea and paaeafal 
oo-azistanoat or a polley of f lm frlandihlp vith all paaoa 
loving oountrlasy f lm solidarity vlth tha Afro»Aalan paopla 
and a luraak vith tha British Coviomraalth, It appaarad that 
paraanant alllanoas vith tha Sooiallat oonntrias yT% oonsi. 
darad hy tha CoBnimist partiaa aa raal non.allgniant lAlla 
any underatanding vith tha Vastazn povara aaadtad of ailgnaant 
and aada India a sacond fiddla in idsrld politics* 
Tha Praja Soelallat Part/ and tha Saayukta Soelallst 
Party had adoptad a global outlook in foralgn pollay aattara, 
Thoy adoptad a aoolallat Xin* in supporting tha Qovaraiant* 
Hot bolng tlad up with tha Atlantic or tha Sovlat hloe^ th«y 
adoptad an Indapandant atand on intamatlonal Issuas* Thay 
oondaanad both •vnataxn lapariallsB' and * Russian liqparlallsa.' 
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Thislr critlclsffl vos dir«ot«d against the aathods adoptad 
bjT the Govaraaant to iaplanant i ts foralgn polley* Jh^jf vara 
a<)ualiy bittar against *'tba dollar lapsrlallsa of ths U•S•^• 
the Idaologleal lap«rlallsB of ths O.f.'^.R, just as they vr9 
Inveterate eneales of the territorial laparlallsa of the 
British, 
The t^ P^ considered Itself to be the Wanguard of 
desocr^tlc soclallsa* and clalaed to represent the v l l l of 
those who stands for grass root deaoerao/ In the doaestle 
policy of the Indian Qovernaent* It sought an Independent 
foreign polloyt free of a l l the cob-webs of forel0» doalnation. 
It extended Its support to the aoiremaeat's foreign policy 
In general because i t did not differ auoh fioa Its policy of 
non.lnvolv«B«nt In the polit ics of Atlantic and the Bovlet 
blocs. It b€)lleved In a dyaaalc and Indepwident foreign 
policy th^t upheld the peace and freedoa of a l l nations. It 
alaed at strengthening the United Nations^ safeguarding the 
Indian ocean against exploitation by the big povers and streng. 
thenlng the struggle of the people suffering under laperlallst 
and neo«laperiallat reglaes. It %ras oi^osed to a l l types of 
military alliances and deplored the policy of the Indian 
Govemaent which subscribed to systeas of big povers. The 
party criticised the lukewara attitude of the Congress policies 
and expressed ^le vlev that the aanner. In which. It dealt 
vlth *v«8t«m laperlallsa* and *Rusrlan laperlailsa* vas an 
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indloation of doubl* 9tftnd»rd* 19«irtrthcXttti th« iiartjr h«ld 
Indian OoVMna«nt*a for«lgn polie/ tetioally sound and oon. 
• Ittantly supper tod tho polio/ of aoiwaiigaioati but doaandod 
a titm attitudo towards China and Pakistan* A ibrld soolot/ 
basod on th« prinoipla of froodoa and oqualitar of all nations 
and Toluntarjr oo*oporatlon botvo«n tho froo pooplos vas tha 
•ain 09al of tho party* The roeont treat/ vith SoTiot Russia 
%ias not likod tijr than as It brought us undor tha stranglahold 
of a supar povar* 
Thoro vaa a oonsldaratola dlffaranea batvoan tha idao* 
logical and politleal progranoo of tha PSP and tha SSP* Hov. 
avoTy thalr approach to solvo aartain social and political 
problam vmf diffarant froa each other* Tha S8P also favourad 
a political aitarwtiva to tha ideology and the progranna of 
tha ruling party* But tho 8SP did not consid««r i t f i t to 
%iait and play an oppoaitionai gaaio t i l l tha Congress split* 
It considered congress as a great evil and Justified oonproBlsei 
vith the Rightists aud the <:oa«iaisU to f i |^t this body* It 
held its Main task vas to unite a l l forces of soeialisa and 
denoeracy under ita banner* Its declared object vas to bring 
about the defeat of the Congress OovenMiant and the eatablish. 
neat of an alternative socialist Ooveniaaat* Contrary to the 
stand taken by the PSPf the SSP had a flra belief that Indian 
foreiffi policy had been a veafeJmeed policyi which in its 
opiiiion« has brought ditftst«jr to th« oountry* It aix«g«d 
that Gov«nuii«ata ovtr d«p«nd«ne« on foreign povora haa robbad 
Indiaii foraign polloy of a l l initiatlvaa and djraaaiaB* Tha 
Party vahaaantly oritlciiad tha Govanvaat for ita half* 
haartad approach to auch erueiai problcaa aa dlaanaaaant* 
Tha SSP hald that i t h&a faiXad to ohaek tha growing iaparia. 
Xiaa in tha Vbrld* It ehargad tha ^agraaa v i ^ taeillationa 
in tha doii«atic and foraign polleiaa and aaid that tha Congraaa 
had nalthar oouraga nor datasatiiation* Ag a raaolt tha oountrar 
had Bovad towards diaaatar* Tha SB? atood for bringing tha 
tuo povars togathar to anabla thaa to ehaUc out plana for 
radueing Mounting tanaiona batvaan thtfi dlaantangling tharalqr 
bha aaallar nations froa tha eold war politiea of th« Eaat 
and Vaat» Sudi a poliey tha 6&P viawad^ would anaura paaea 
and proaparity of Mankind* Lika tha PSP» i t alao valuad nation 
aliaa and favourad a polioy of national dafanea basad on 
aeotaoBio and military Bight* It aaphaaiaad tha naad for a 
vtbrld Qovamiaat* Both PSP and 66? anphasiiad tha third Porea 
approaoh in intamational affairs* Broadly apaakingi thaaa 
partiaa wara not opposad to tha ganaral prineiplaa of India'a 
foraifEi polieyy yat on various national and intamationai 
quaations thay of tan eritiaisad t^a Qovaroaant* 
In ita early yeara tha CPI %ma oppoaad to non-alignaant 
and allagad that tha Oovamiant wt&a playing In tha hands of 
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thm East and ^••U But frcNi 1956 onward tha party ravarsad 
Ita fonwr attituda and It not only aupportad non^allgnaant 
tut laid Bora aaphasla upon Ita naad and utility* It haa 
oonaldared non.allgnaaat aa tha prlaary Inatxuaant In pra* 
aaanrlng \1S9rld paaea and eo^oparatlon* It ballavad that non» 
allgaaant had ba«i India*a aoat povarfol ahl«ld In dafanoa 
of har national Indapandanea agalnat Isparlallat praaaura 
and machination. It offarad a mild orltlelam In this raapaet* 
It raaantad vaolUatlona vhl^ manlfastad Hiaaaalvaa In tha 
fallura to glva formal diploma tlo raooffiltlon to tha (}*D.R«» 
laeJt of oonalataney and flrmaaaa In tha Qovanmanfa stand 
against nao^eoXonlallst eonsplraelaa and aggraaslva aetlona 
of lmparl6llata« Iha grovlng ssoalatlon of tha U.S.lmparlallsm 
was vlavad as a daoaslva impatus tovmrds strangthamlng ths 
pollelaa of noruallgmant* It strassad tiiat ths policy of 
non»allgnmant ahouid ha furthar strangthanad and ahould ba 
basad firmly on aatlva and oonalstant anti«.lBparlalltfi and 
antl«>colonlallam« Tha CPI (M), hovavar^ did not approva tha 
mannar of Implamanting tha polley of non.aHgnmant* It elalmad 
that tha Oovarnmant of India, la a %torld aharply dlvldad 
batvaan tha War camp of Imparlallam on tha ona hand and ths 
paaes camp of aoelallam on tha othsr, ambarkad upon tha policy 
of noiwailgnmsnt only to advanca Ita elaas Intaraat. In Its 
vlav thsre could be no guarantas of an honest Implamsntatlon 
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of th« policy of iioiuaXlgiBH«at so lonf at tho tUto is ooa. 
tvollad hy th« bourgooiiio and i t foXIoviiK aiiU.f«opla polict/* 
Xha Party advocatad arrangaaiaiita with tha psograaaiira and 
aoaialist foroaa. On tha oontvaryi tha CPI baliavad that 
daapita tha iraaillatSona tha poXiey of non^aiigaaant hat baan 
pratarvad in tha aain* 
Uka tha CPI^  tha PSP alao favoured ttrong adharanea 
to tha policy of nen»aXigfBant, It ballairad that ^a policy 
of non»aligiHiant la s tound and batia eoncapt* It aaialy %fat 
•aant to furthar national intarastt and to aata tantian in 
tba intamationai fiaXd* It erltieiaad th« Covaraaant for Ita 
half.haar tad and lAxsinc^ra way of ita iaplanantati^i. It 
urged that undar tha garb of noiwaligmant tha QoYarmant of 
India thovad aaotlonal alignaant vith ona of tha povar bloc* 
Tha aain dafaet of thia policy, in Tiav of tha P6P| vat that 
i t had nfi99t baan taeurity oriaatad* Tharaforay tha party 
caUad tha policy of non^ligmtBt at timid and opportunittic. 
It fa-vourad a third bloc of noiwalignad Atian and othar nationt 
which could provide a positive and oonorate alternative to the 
negativittt concept of non^aligoaent* The SSP, on t^e other 
hatodf adopted a au^ aora critical attitude towarda tha policy 
of non^aiignaaat* It conaidered tha policy of noiwaligmant 
aa a periodical aupport and dependence on one or the othar 
power bloc* It held that non.attaiment of ooaplete tecurlty. 
fTMOoB tnd th« QBVLBm of dtBocraey hat r«nd«r«d the poXior 
&nd Bodts of iioBwalicynitiit abtolut*!/ •«anlnga,«ss and Ulailv** 
Xh«r« va« not aueh dlff«rtao« b«tw««n th« official poller 
of tha QovatiMiant of India and thm viava axpfaaaad tgr tlia 
Sooiaiiat partiaa vith ragard to eoloaiallta and laaiaXlfB* 
An thaaa partiaa randarad thair support to aoat of tha aata 
of tha OovarmaBt alalng at tha allaination of ooloniallaa 
and raoiallaa. iiovav«r« tha CPI (N) vat tha Boat aavara 
eritiA of Indiana %r^dc antUooloaial poller and beliairad that 
Indian OovarnfliaBt*a eollai»ratloa vlth tha U*S« laperleliiB 
dragged India Into thalr colonlsl net* All th—% paftiea 
lent thalr aupport to th9 Qovenwant vhanever i t foUoved a 
f lm and Ineonalatent poller agalnat oolonlallaB and raelaliaa. 
Hovavar« a n held that India*a stand on ooXoniallsa and raeia* 
llsB has not been fixa, clear and eonsistent* 
&11 theae parties stood for general and eoaplete die. 
armsBent. However^  the FSP and the rSi». did not erlaee ymry 
great Intert^at in the talka of disar&u«ent* Iher felt that 
dlsamattant v l l l materialise onlr if tha *eold var* disappeara 
ooBplatel/* It la strange enough that th« CoMninlst partiaa, 
nhila opposed to the araaaent raee did not explain tha raee of 
araaaenta which is talcing place in Russia and China* Thar 
did not find dlaaxmaBent neoessarr for tha Coanuaiat eountries* 
• 890 • 
All ttm»9 partitt v«r« Rlto opposed to India*t link vlth 
th« CoMu>iiw««lth of nations* Ihoy fbond no advantaga in 
Indiu*» eoatinuoua aaaoolation vith tha Connomraaltfa and la. 
tiatad that India ahould quit It aa aooa ^» poaeltaa at i t 
haapam India*a aconoaia profraaa and stands in tfaa va/ of 
touiXding up a salf.raliant stiong daf«iaa potential* Thay 
oppoaad to Vtx9 CoivaoRtfaalth asvbarship ae thay consldarad that 
tha U.S.A. and othar atrabars of tba Conaonvsalth sldad with 
India's oponants 8fi«»eiaily In ragard to Kashnir lasua in the 
Baourity Cktuneil* Tha positlva advantaga that India had in 
politieal and eoonoaie f laid reaalnlng in tha Comonvaaith 
hava baan coaplataly ignorad Ijgr thesa partios. Ibth fjoa 
dafanoa and eoocoaia points of vl^v, i t is in the Intarast of 
Indis to r«aaia in tha Coaaomraalth. 2ven if va had not 
•nab to gain by rtfflaiaing in i t | our contiauad aambarahip of 
tha CoHDiomraalth brings us soae sdvantagos aconoale '^B vall 
as politiaaX* 
In thair attituda towards Supar Fovars al l thasa partias 
adoptad diffarsnt posturas. Iha attituda of both tha CooBunist 
partiaa in this ragsrd was irary santla«Eit«l. Thay oonsidarad tha 
U.S.A. aa snaay of India and tha U«S«G«iu as the bast friaad* 
Tha aasiMption that tha U.S.A. would aiuaya baan an anaay and 
a Btaoaaa to India and tha Soviat Union vould in all critiaal 
yaars ba the bast friand of India has bam only aloganish and 
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do«i«ti«* 7h» fmet r«iialiit It ^a% «h«ii Chtat attaek«d India, 
I t \m» th« U«S«A« vho hoipad India, %^«r«ai tha U»S«S»R» rtaaia* 
f Uaat and adopted a nautral attltuda* vtianavar India had 
fallan In aarloua orlaia, tha U«0*A, had oooa to halp hart 
to hava ooi>oparatlon only vlth tha U«8«S*fU and othar aoalaXlat 
aountriaa and allanata to tha U,e«^, la not in the national 
intaraat of India* India aho«ld pay oqual raiprda to both tha 
povarful eonntrlaa In ordar to guarantaa vbrld paaea and 
aacurltgr* 
Xha SCP and tha PSP both van tad to kaep avay fzoa th« 
Atlantic and S^oviat caop and did not prafar ona to aaeh othar* 
thay favourad a pollay of non^isvolvaaant in tha politlaa of 
tha Atlantic and Soviet iotloe* Thay danouncad both vaatam 
iMparialiaa and Euaaian inparialiaa* Tha Pf:? vai highly a an. 
aatina to the problans oonearned with Indians aeourity* In 
Ita view for the aticuxrlty of the national frontiera, India 
railed too mut^  on Uia ruper Pov«ra which vmu •tranalant** Botti 
tha parties pointed out that snciaiistt could via in Ii^ia 
only if aha kept avay heraelf froa both the Atlantic and the 
i^viet casp* Thay failed to raaliae that India could i^t force 
the aupar Po^ t'iira to d isan th«aaelvea or to reduce t^eir nuclear 
pover' • 
The views of a l l theae partiea on the queatlon of foreign 
aiA| iBfluanead tha QovanaianVa foyalgn policy. The CPI 
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ttxongly oppe0«d th« aec«ptanc« of aid fvoa th« Or.lttd rtatM 
aainly because of i te strong &ntl-^st«m posturs* fhs 
party's cr l t le lsa of aid froa the %mBt vas a factor in favour 
of the GovarnHiaat's aoctptanee of aid froa the U»r,%R, i t 
build up a strong case for India *s dose eoonoaie oollaboratior 
with the Soviet Onion and other socialist eountries* It 
stated ^"it fovlat aid v^s aore advantageous to the Indian 
econoay th&n the aid froa the U,v^ «A« It believed that i t 
%fa8 only because of the aid t^'it India failed to oondean 
openly the U.r. aggression in Vletnaa. The CPI believed 
that i f India bends aore and aore towards the socialist eoun. 
triesf and reclines aore and aore on their aid, the principle 
of noo^alignaont Is not violated. On the other hand if i t 
takes aid fxoa the capitalist countrieSf i t i s accus/ed of 
having knocked out the basic planks on vhi<^ the policy of 
non»alignaent i s based. This type of approach i s totally ^gtifi 
tionObh and sloganish. The approach of the FTP to the problea 
o: foreign aid waa aore real ist ic than that o** the CI»I, It d!d 
not favour the Idea of exclusive "merlcan or '^ "ovlet aid for 
India's eoonoaie developaent. It did not adopted any agita. 
tional attitude on ^estem ol l l tary aid follovlng the Chinese 
aggression in 19(»£. It called upon the Government to get 
ai l i tary aid froa a l l sources to aewt the threat froa China. 
Ihe pr? gave f irs t priority to the defence of the Country's 
freedoB and integrity. Contrary to the P^P, t^e r??P adopted 
a crit ical stand tovards foreign aid and considered It as a 
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gr««t •vl l to ooimtrjr*f ptogrts and s«curlty and th« vary 
idaa of aoeiaJLlsa. 
Tha CPI alvaya favourad a oonoillatoigr apptoaoh tovarda 
China. Aifhoa^ tha Part/ opanl/ aeeaaad Counmiat China of 
an unlaaahinc agcraaaion on Indiay i t daelarad that daapita 
tha oontinuad hoatila attitada of China i t ia in ttaa intaraat 
of India to b&v« a poaoafUI aattXaoMnt with China* dueh a 
a tap tha party baXiavad vould anavitahla for aatataliahinc paaoa 
in Aaia* It ^lao apoka of a *no var paot* vith China. Tha 
CPI (M) in thia raapaet adoptad tha pro^paking lina* It 
refoaad to aeoapt that China oowiittad an aat of aggraaaion 
in dafianoa of intaraational law. It haa abaoXutai/ an antl. 
national way of thinking in thia raapaet. It want on pro. 
pagatini that China, goirarnad \ay tha Qraat Paopla'a ravolutionai 
aovarmant oould navar ba tha 3ggraaaor. It eondwnad tha 
OoTamnant for uaing tha k>r«i, "aggraaaion** againat China. Tha 
Part/ hald that tha anti^Chlha polioy of tha Govarnmant vaa 
oonaiatantly utillaatito aaeura aora aid froa tha U.s.A,. and the 
aaaa vaapoa %^a uaad to tppaal to tht U.S.S.lt. It hlanad 
India that inataad of U.S. ifflparialiaa, 3ppoaition to Socialist 
China had haooaa th^ sain faatura of IndiaU foreign policy. 
It inaiatad on ra»aatahliahing friandly ralatlona with. Chlnet 
and baliftvad In pa^cefal aottlamant of ^11 outstanding disputes 
batvaan th4 two countilaa. 
Zha attituda of PSP and S6P vith ragard to China «aa 
vary Much diffarant than tha CPI and tha CPI (M)J)>te PSP adoptad 
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• t ^ u ^ pollQjr la thU r«f«rd« It wfts » bitt«r orltlo of 
th« •xpamlonlat pollojr of China «iid wamcdl th« ooimtcx of th« 
dangor txom China, tiiwo 1960« With ineroatiac terdar tlath«a 
i t tevught praaaura on tha OoTar«aat to follow a rigid atand 
on tha quaation* Vhan tha amad eonfliet took plaeti i t gava 
tha 
ita ttoQualif iad aupport to/Qoveimant* It oond«niad China 
aa gttiltr of daliharata and naprovokad aggraaaion on India, 
It eomplatal/ rulad out an/ nafdtiation vith China aa long 
aa aggraaaion ia vaeatad* It gava ita full aupport to tha 
Oovaxaiaat in al l ita afforta to dafand tha intagritgr of tha 
eountryt Int warnad tha Oovamant of tha dangam of a vaak« 
Icnaad poliey towarda tha aggraaaor* It propoaad aom tant 
liaaon vith othar ^ian oeuntriaa agaimt Chinaaa axpanaioniaa« 
Z.lka tha PSP| tha 6SF alao eonaidarad China aa an aggrattor* 
It ationgly aaaailad Qovajmiant for not talcing appropriatai 
draatio and rataliator/ aotiona againat tha aggraaaor* It 
ahargad tha Oovaimant for adopting an anbig(^ua,iBfiniy 
alipparr and unooaproaiaing polie/ towarda aiina. Both tha 
aoaialist partiaa danandad tha aavaranea of diploMtia ralationa 
vith China, Iha ¥iava axpraaaad by a l l tha 6oaiaiitt partiaa, 
barring tha CPI (M}, in thia rM»p99t vara nationaliatla ratiiar 
than idaologioal. Thay utiliaad tha opportunity to highlight 
tba lulE«iiazB polia/ of tha OoiranaiaBti tha uninaginatiira 
approaeh vith ragard to iadia*a ralationa vith China and gata 
vanning for futura in unaabigoLotta tama, Ihaaa partiaa, hovavari 
. 30* » 
r«fyalM4 froM tttcgMtiiiK to tb* GoYina«Bt to aliffi ltt«lf 
vith th« w«tttm ialoo and aectpt huge amt aid froa thgi vilh 
•tringt or wltisout itrlngt* 
All th« Sooialitt pArtltt p«rtist«ntly trgutd for 
•alatalBlag eordUl and frltodl/ ralatlont with Paklttan. Both 
tho CPI and tho CPZ (N) dwaadad that Jhdla ihottld taka an 
laltiatlva in tattling a l l outataading dlaputaa vith Pakiatan 
without tha Intarfaranoa of laparlftllat povart* Tha/ atrongl/ 
oondamad tha laparlaliat* for kaaplng up tha tana Ion in tha 
•uli»oontlaant« Thajr ballavad that paaaa batva«n tha Un 
ooimtrlaa froa al l afforta ahould ba takan tvwarda thla and* 
In thla raspaet tha/ toa tha llaa of Paklag who Inalinad no* 
wada/a towards Pakistan for fTiandl/ ralationa. Hn^y found 
tha aaia oausa of troubla in tha Kaahair pipblan and aakad tha 
QovariMaat to approach to Shaikh Abdullah In aattling tha 
laaua. Tha stand takan bjf botli tha partiaa showa that both of 
thaa wara eonfusad and failad to giva a dafinlta approach to 
tha problaa* 
Tha P8P and tha S8P also advooatad eordial and friandl/ 
ralationa with Pakiatan and strassad tha naed for autual dls. 
oussions and undarstandings batwaen tha two eountrlaa. Thay 
also objaetad tha iatanantlon of tha third party in this 
•attar* Tha SSP alwa/a sought to puarsua its policy of oonf a. 
daration or raunion with regard to Pakistan* It aiwaya ooatanta 
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that th« accession of Kashalr to India i s eoaplstSf d«Jur« 
as vsIX as dsfaoto* It critiois«d tbs poXlo/ of the Govern, 
•ent as guided taiy iiaoiliationt and proorastlnations* It 
believed in a permanent solution of ^ « proULsM of the tvo 
countries and strongly advocated for a ^nfederatlon of India 
and Pakistan* the eop never cherished illusions of confedera. 
tlon or unity vlth Pakistan. It f e l t that only ^ policy 
of caution and 'Xoix^neBB could succeeded* 
Ihe attitude of the social ist parties including the 
Coamunist parties, towards Indians stand in relation to Chlrut 
and Pakistan has b«en sloe&nlsh and platitudenous* They alvays 
held the Congress Ooveiment responsible for s l l the i l l s th^t 
inhibited the Vidian t ies of friendship vlth her nel^bours. 
Ihe conspiracy to make India veak was always considered to be 
the vhole-tiae occupation of the foreign powers* The Chinese 
aggression was also considered by them as the outcome of vestec 
policy pursued by tl:e India in the hands of imperialists and 
capitalist countries* Opposition to the stand of the Qovem. 
ment on some foreign policy Issues was ^nsidered by them as 
in keeping with nationalism and patriotism* The picture of 
their attitude is wavering and uncertain rather U^ an logical 
and constructive* 
It can not be denied that the hyper-sensitlvlty of thes« 
parties often led them to take init iative in foreign policy 
dftiaattts* ^jf thtir propaganda th«y 9ft»iVtla«t toou^t prtssurc 
371 t^« (jov«rai«at to follow a particular court** Ih«y a l l 
gav« paraoounto/ to d«f«no« and prot«ctloa of tht territorial 
intagrltjf and 9ov«raSgnt/ of India against a l l probabla ptrila 
and t^-raatt. H9v«v«r| lack at identity in th«ir rasota a l u 
and objaotivaSy both on intaxnatlonal and dtfBoatlc iasuat, 
pravanted t^alr approach or ideas fion beooalng imanioMittS* 
Xhty shifted the5r position tiac and again to suit their own 
purposes* In an «nd«£ivour to ilv% India's foreign policy a 
nev look and a social ist orientation keteiDgenity has been 
persistently salntained* Ih« recent develepaents haTe« how. 
evert estalsilished the supreaacy of the OoYexmeiit's spproaeh 
and ^ave belled a l l the -Apprehensions expressed froa time 
to tiae by th« racial ist parties with regard to Indians pro* 
vest 3r pro»'aerlcan and» t> erefore^ pro«laperlalist stance* 
Indians Treaty of friendshipi p«&Ge and oo«>operetlon v l ^ ^ e 
"^oviet Union has taken t^ ie sting out of the Socialist opposi. 
tlon^ in natters of foreign policy* Recent developBeRts have 
also ttstablikbed the tuQt t>^ at the ^overnnent is capable of 
taking Initiative and pursuing an Independent forelipn policy^ 
giving at th% same tine nev dimensions to i t s policy of non. 
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